forked from Minki/linux
4f0c40d944
Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in
dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb.
A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len.
skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so
(correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in
ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close.
Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter
program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header
length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and
queued for reception as 0B payloads.
Fixes:
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| ccids | ||
| ackvec.c | ||
| ackvec.h | ||
| ccid.c | ||
| ccid.h | ||
| dccp.h | ||
| diag.c | ||
| feat.c | ||
| feat.h | ||
| input.c | ||
| ipv4.c | ||
| ipv6.c | ||
| ipv6.h | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| minisocks.c | ||
| options.c | ||
| output.c | ||
| probe.c | ||
| proto.c | ||
| qpolicy.c | ||
| sysctl.c | ||
| timer.c | ||