linux/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
David Howells 0b1568a453 RSA: Fix signature verification for shorter signatures
gpg can produce a signature file where length of signature is less than the
modulus size because the amount of space an MPI takes up is kept as low as
possible by discarding leading zeros.  This regularly happens for several
modules during the build.

Fix it by relaxing check in RSA verification code.

Thanks to Tomas Mraz and Miloslav Trmac for help.

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08 13:50:17 +10:30

278 lines
6.6 KiB
C

/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447]
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "public_key.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RSA Public Key Algorithm");
#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
/*
* Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
*/
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08,
0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const struct {
const u8 *data;
size_t size;
} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
[PKEY_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = _(SHA1),
[PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
[PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
#undef _
};
/*
* RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
*/
static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
{
MPI m;
int ret;
/* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
return -EBADMSG;
}
if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
return -EBADMSG;
}
m = mpi_alloc(0);
if (!m)
return -ENOMEM;
/* (2) m = s^e mod n */
ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n);
if (ret < 0) {
mpi_free(m);
return ret;
}
*_m = m;
return 0;
}
/*
* Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
*/
static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
{
unsigned X_size, x_size;
int X_sign;
u8 *X;
/* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
* with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
* bits not being reported by MPI.
*/
x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8);
if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
return -ERANGE;
X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
if (!X)
return -ENOMEM;
if (X_sign < 0) {
kfree(X);
return -EBADMSG;
}
if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
kfree(X);
return -EBADMSG;
}
*_X = X;
return 0;
}
/*
* Perform the RSA signature verification.
* @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
* @EM: The computed signature value
* @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
* @hash_size: The size of H
* @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
* @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
*/
static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
{
unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size);
if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
return -EBADMSG;
/* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
return -EBADMSG;
}
T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size);
PS_end = T_offset - 1;
if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]);
return -EBADMSG;
}
for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
return -EBADMSG;
}
}
if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
return -EBADMSG;
}
if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
* Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
*/
static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
size_t tsize;
int ret;
/* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
const u8 *H = sig->digest;
u8 *EM = NULL;
MPI m = NULL;
size_t k;
kenter("");
if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data)
return -ENOTSUPP;
/* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
k = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n);
tsize = mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s);
/* According to RFC 4880 sec 3.2, length of MPI is computed starting
* from most significant bit. So the RFC 3447 sec 8.2.2 size check
* must be relaxed to conform with shorter signatures - so we fail here
* only if signature length is longer than modulus size.
*/
pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize);
if (k < tsize) {
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
/* Round up and convert to octets */
k = (k + 7) / 8;
/* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
/* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
* (EM) of length k octets.
*
* NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
* pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
*/
ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
error:
kfree(EM);
mpi_free(m);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = {
.name = "RSA",
.n_pub_mpi = 2,
.n_sec_mpi = 3,
.n_sig_mpi = 1,
.verify_signature = RSA_verify_signature,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm);