60e6627f12
In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption (via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace. In this case, the affected files are in debugfs (and should therefore only be accessible to root), and the read handlers check that *pos is zero (meaning that at least sys_splice() can't trigger kernel memory corruption). Because of the root requirement, this is not a security fix, but rather a cleanup. For the read handlers, fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic. Add min() calls to the write handlers. Fixes: |
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| .. | ||
| core | ||
| hw | ||
| sw | ||
| ulp | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||