forked from Minki/linux
6bd364d829
We run into this bug:
[ 2736.063245] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000
[ 2736.063293] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000037efb0
[ 2736.063300] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 2736.063303] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[ 2736.063310] Modules linked in: sg nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6t_REJECT iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter iptable_filter ip_tables ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 nf_nat nf_conntrack ip6_tables ibmveth pseries_rng nx_crypto nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd sunrpc binfmt_misc xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc scsi_tgt dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod
[ 2736.063383] CPU: 1 PID: 7128 Comm: ssh Not tainted 3.10.0-48.el7.ppc64 #1
[ 2736.063389] task: c000000131930120 ti: c0000001319a0000 task.ti: c0000001319a0000
[ 2736.063394] NIP: c00000000037efb0 LR: c0000000006c40f8 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 2736.063399] REGS: c0000001319a3870 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.10.0-48.el7.ppc64)
[ 2736.063403] MSR: 8000000000009032 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28824242 XER: 20000000
[ 2736.063415] SOFTE: 0
[ 2736.063418] CFAR: c00000000000908c
[ 2736.063421] DAR: 0000000000000000, DSISR: 40000000
[ 2736.063425]
GPR00: c0000000006c40f8 c0000001319a3af0 c000000001074788 c0000001319a3bf0
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 000000000000000a
GPR08: fffffffe00000002 00000000ffff0000 0000000080000001 c000000000924888
GPR12: 0000000028824248 c000000007e00400 00001fffffa0f998 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000022 00001fffffa0f998 0000010022e92470 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000000f4a828 00003ffffe527108 0000000000000000
GPR28: c000000000f4a730 c000000000f4a828 0000000000000000 c0000001319a3bf0
[ 2736.063498] NIP [c00000000037efb0] .__list_add+0x30/0x110
[ 2736.063504] LR [c0000000006c40f8] .rwsem_down_write_failed+0x78/0x264
[ 2736.063508] PACATMSCRATCH [800000000280f032]
[ 2736.063511] Call Trace:
[ 2736.063516] [c0000001319a3af0] [c0000001319a3b80] 0xc0000001319a3b80 (unreliable)
[ 2736.063523] [c0000001319a3b80] [c0000000006c40f8] .rwsem_down_write_failed+0x78/0x264
[ 2736.063530] [c0000001319a3c50] [c0000000006c1bb0] .down_write+0x70/0x78
[ 2736.063536] [c0000001319a3cd0] [c0000000002e5ffc] .keyctl_get_persistent+0x20c/0x320
[ 2736.063542] [c0000001319a3dc0] [c0000000002e2388] .SyS_keyctl+0x238/0x260
[ 2736.063548] [c0000001319a3e30] [c000000000009e7c] syscall_exit+0x0/0x7c
[ 2736.063553] Instruction dump:
[ 2736.063556] 7c0802a6 fba1ffe8 fbc1fff0 fbe1fff8 7cbd2b78 7c9e2378 7c7f1b78 f8010010
[ 2736.063566] f821ff71 e8a50008 7fa52040 40de00c0 <e8be0000> 7fbd2840 40de0094 7fbff040
[ 2736.063579] ---[ end trace 2708241785538296 ]---
It's caused by uninitialized persistent_keyring_register_sem.
The bug was introduced by commit f36f8c75
, two typos are in that commit:
CONFIG_KEYS_KERBEROS_CACHE should be CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS and
krb_cache_register_sem should be persistent_keyring_register_sem.
Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
227 lines
5.3 KiB
C
227 lines
5.3 KiB
C
/*
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* The "user cache".
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*
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* (C) Copyright 1991-2000 Linus Torvalds
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*
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* We have a per-user structure to keep track of how many
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* processes, files etc the user has claimed, in order to be
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* able to have per-user limits for system resources.
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
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/*
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* userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
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* and 1 for... ?
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*/
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struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
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.uid_map = {
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.nr_extents = 1,
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.extent[0] = {
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.first = 0,
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.lower_first = 0,
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.count = 4294967295U,
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},
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},
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.gid_map = {
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.nr_extents = 1,
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.extent[0] = {
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.first = 0,
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.lower_first = 0,
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.count = 4294967295U,
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},
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},
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.projid_map = {
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.nr_extents = 1,
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.extent[0] = {
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.first = 0,
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.lower_first = 0,
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.count = 4294967295U,
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},
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},
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.count = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
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.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
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.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
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#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
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.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
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__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
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#endif
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
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/*
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* UID task count cache, to get fast user lookup in "alloc_uid"
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* when changing user ID's (ie setuid() and friends).
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*/
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#define UIDHASH_BITS (CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? 3 : 7)
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#define UIDHASH_SZ (1 << UIDHASH_BITS)
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#define UIDHASH_MASK (UIDHASH_SZ - 1)
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#define __uidhashfn(uid) (((uid >> UIDHASH_BITS) + uid) & UIDHASH_MASK)
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#define uidhashentry(uid) (uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((__kuid_val(uid))))
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static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep;
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struct hlist_head uidhash_table[UIDHASH_SZ];
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/*
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* The uidhash_lock is mostly taken from process context, but it is
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* occasionally also taken from softirq/tasklet context, when
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* task-structs get RCU-freed. Hence all locking must be softirq-safe.
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* But free_uid() is also called with local interrupts disabled, and running
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* local_bh_enable() with local interrupts disabled is an error - we'll run
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* softirq callbacks, and they can unconditionally enable interrupts, and
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* the caller of free_uid() didn't expect that..
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*/
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);
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/* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */
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struct user_struct root_user = {
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.__count = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
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.processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
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.files = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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.sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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.locked_shm = 0,
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.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
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};
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/*
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* These routines must be called with the uidhash spinlock held!
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*/
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static void uid_hash_insert(struct user_struct *up, struct hlist_head *hashent)
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{
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hlist_add_head(&up->uidhash_node, hashent);
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}
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static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
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{
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hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
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}
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static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
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{
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struct user_struct *user;
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hlist_for_each_entry(user, hashent, uidhash_node) {
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if (uid_eq(user->uid, uid)) {
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atomic_inc(&user->__count);
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return user;
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/* IRQs are disabled and uidhash_lock is held upon function entry.
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* IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released
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* upon function exit.
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*/
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static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
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__releases(&uidhash_lock)
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{
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uid_hash_remove(up);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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key_put(up->uid_keyring);
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key_put(up->session_keyring);
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kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
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}
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/*
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* Locate the user_struct for the passed UID. If found, take a ref on it. The
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* caller must undo that ref with free_uid().
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*
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* If the user_struct could not be found, return NULL.
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*/
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struct user_struct *find_user(kuid_t uid)
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{
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struct user_struct *ret;
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unsigned long flags;
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spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(uid));
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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return ret;
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}
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void free_uid(struct user_struct *up)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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if (!up)
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return;
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local_irq_save(flags);
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if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&up->__count, &uidhash_lock))
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free_user(up, flags);
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else
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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}
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struct user_struct *alloc_uid(kuid_t uid)
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{
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struct hlist_head *hashent = uidhashentry(uid);
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struct user_struct *up, *new;
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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if (!up) {
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new = kmem_cache_zalloc(uid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new)
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goto out_unlock;
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new->uid = uid;
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atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
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/*
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* Before adding this, check whether we raced
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* on adding the same user already..
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*/
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
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if (up) {
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key_put(new->uid_keyring);
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key_put(new->session_keyring);
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kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, new);
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} else {
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uid_hash_insert(new, hashent);
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up = new;
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}
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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}
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return up;
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out_unlock:
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return NULL;
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}
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static int __init uid_cache_init(void)
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{
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int n;
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uid_cachep = kmem_cache_create("uid_cache", sizeof(struct user_struct),
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0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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for(n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
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INIT_HLIST_HEAD(uidhash_table + n);
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/* Insert the root user immediately (init already runs as root) */
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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uid_hash_insert(&root_user, uidhashentry(GLOBAL_ROOT_UID));
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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return 0;
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}
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module_init(uid_cache_init);
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