0350785b0a
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
digest based signatures, both based on policy.
In addition, are two bug fixes:
- avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
Macs with T2 chips.
- remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
command line ordering issue.
The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
evm: Clean up some variables
evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
fsverity: update the documentation
ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
86 lines
2.3 KiB
C
86 lines
2.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
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#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
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#include "../integrity.h"
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#include "keyring_handler.h"
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static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
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static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
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EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
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static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
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/*
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* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
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*/
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static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
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const void *data, size_t len)
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{
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mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
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}
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/*
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* Blacklist the hash of an executable.
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*/
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static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
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const void *data, size_t len)
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{
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mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
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}
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/*
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* Add an X509 cert to the revocation list.
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*/
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static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
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const void *data, size_t len)
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{
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add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len);
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}
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/*
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* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
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* the UEFI db tables.
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*/
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__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
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{
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if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
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return add_to_platform_keyring;
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
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* the MokListRT tables.
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*/
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__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
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{
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if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
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return add_to_machine_keyring;
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else
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return add_to_platform_keyring;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
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* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
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*/
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__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
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{
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if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
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return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
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if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
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return uefi_blacklist_binary;
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if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
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return uefi_revocation_list_x509;
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return NULL;
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}
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