Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If afs_cell_alloc() fails, afs_cells_sem doesn't get unlocked, which
leads to a deadlock. Unlock it before returning.
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
[PATCH] mnt_expire is protected by namespace_sem, no need for vfsmount_lock
[PATCH] do shrink_submounts() for all fs types
[PATCH] sanitize locking in mark_mounts_for_expiry() and shrink_submounts()
[PATCH] count ghost references to vfsmounts
[PATCH] reduce stack footprint in namespace.c
kafs doesn't check if the cell already exists - so if you do an echo "add
newcell.org 1.2.3.4" >/proc/fs/afs/cells it will try to create this cell
again. kobject will also complain about a double registration. To prevent
such problems, return -EEXIST in that case.
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
... and take it out of ->umount_begin() instances. Call with all locks
already taken (by do_umount()) and leave calling release_mounts() to
caller (it will do release_mounts() anyway, so we can just put into
the same list).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
make propagate_mount_busy() exclude references from the vfsmounts
that had been isolated by umount_tree() and are just waiting for
release_mounts() to dispose of their ->mnt_parent/->mnt_mountpoint.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
[PATCH] get stack footprint of pathname resolution back to relative sanity
[PATCH] double iput() on failure exit in hugetlb
[PATCH] double dput() on failure exit in tiny-shmem
[PATCH] fix up new filp allocators
[PATCH] check for null vfsmount in dentry_open()
[PATCH] reiserfs: eliminate private use of struct file in xattr
[PATCH] sanitize hppfs
hppfs pass vfsmount to dentry_open()
[PATCH] restore export of do_kern_mount()
Try to find the culprit who caused
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10150
Cc: <balajirrao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
[CIFS] Fix mem leak on dfs referral
[CIFS] file create with acl support enabled is slow
[CIFS] Fix mtime on cp -p when file data cached but written out too late
[CIFS] Fix build problem
[CIFS] cifs: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences
[CIFS] DFS patch that connects inode with dfs handling ops
Change pagemap output format to allow for future reporting of huge pages.
(Format comment and minor cleanups: mpm@selenic.com)
Signed-off-by: Hans Rosenfeld <hans.rosenfeld@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit e9720ac ([NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3))
broke ganglia and probably other applications that read /proc/net/dev.
This is due to the change of permissions of /proc/net that was
introduced in that commit.
Before: dr-xr-xr-x 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:30 /proc/net
After: dr-xr--r-- 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:29 /proc/self/net
This patch restores the permissions to the old value which makes
ganglia happy again.
Pavel Emelyanov says:
This also broke the postfix, as it was reported in bug #10286
and described in detail by Benjamin.
Signed-off-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fs/ufs/balloc.c: In function `ufs_change_blocknr':
fs/ufs/balloc.c:317: warning: long long unsigned int format, long unsigned int arg (arg 2)
fs/ufs/balloc.c:317: warning: long long unsigned int format, long unsigned int arg (arg 3)
sector_t is u64 and we don't know what type the architecture uses to implement
u64.
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A read request outside i_size will be handled in do_generic_file_read(). So
we just return 0 to avoid getting -EIO as normal reading, let
do_generic_file_read do the rest.
At the same time we need unlock the page to avoid system stuck.
Fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10227
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Report-by: Christian Perle <chris@linuxinfotag.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix kernel-doc notation warnings in fs/.
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/super.c:560): missing initial short description on line:
* mark_files_ro
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/locks.c:1277): missing initial short description on line:
* lease_get_mtime
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/locks.c:1277): missing initial short description on line:
* lease_get_mtime
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/namei.c:1368): missing initial short description on line:
* lookup_one_len: filesystem helper to lookup single pathname component
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/buffer.c:3221): missing initial short description on line:
* bh_uptodate_or_lock: Test whether the buffer is uptodate
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/buffer.c:3240): missing initial short description on line:
* bh_submit_read: Submit a locked buffer for reading
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/fs-writeback.c:30): missing initial short description on line:
* writeback_acquire: attempt to get exclusive writeback access to a device
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/fs-writeback.c:47): missing initial short description on line:
* writeback_in_progress: determine whether there is writeback in progress
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/fs-writeback.c:58): missing initial short description on line:
* writeback_release: relinquish exclusive writeback access against a device.
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//include/linux/jbd.h:351): contents before sections
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//include/linux/jbd.h:561): contents before sections
Warning(mmotm-2008-0314-1449//fs/jbd/transaction.c:1935): missing initial short description on line:
* void journal_invalidatepage()
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ecryptfs_d_release() is doing a mntput before doing the dput. This patch
moves the dput before the mntput.
Thanks to Rajouri Jammu for reporting this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Rajouri Jammu <rajouri.jammu@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix a long-standing typo (predating git) that will cause data corruption if a
journal data block needs unescaping. At the moment the wrong buffer head's
data is being unescaped.
To test this case mount a filesystem with data=journal, start creating and
deleting a bunch of files containing only JBD2_MAGIC_NUMBER (0xc03b3998), then
pull the plug on the device. Without this patch the files will contain zeros
instead of the correct data after recovery.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix a long-standing typo (predating git) that will cause data corruption if a
journal data block needs unescaping. At the moment the wrong buffer head's
data is being unescaped.
To test this case mount a filesystem with data=journal, start creating and
deleting a bunch of files containing only JFS_MAGIC_NUMBER (0xc03b3998), then
pull the plug on the device. Without this patch the files will contain zeros
instead of the correct data after recovery.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up an error in iget removal in which romfs_lookup() making a successful
call to romfs_iget() continues through the negative/error handling (previously
the successful case jumped around the negative/error handling case):
(1) inode is initialised to NULL at the top of the function, eliminating the
need for specific negative-inode handling. This means the positive
success handling now flows straight through.
(2) Rename the labels to be clearer about what they mean.
Also make romfs_lookup()'s result variable of type long so as to avoid
32-bit/64-bit conversions with PTR_ERR() and friends.
Based upon a report and patch from Adam Richter.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Adam J. Richter" <adam@yggdrasil.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are several places where we make allocations with GFP_KERNEL while under
a transaction, which could lead to an assertion panic or lockup if under
memory pressure. This patch switches these problem areas to use GFP_NOFS to
keep these problems from happening.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We should always put inode we have reference to, even if quota was reenabled
in the mean time.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
My group ran into a AIO process hang on a 2.6.24 kernel with the process
sleeping indefinitely in io_getevents(2) waiting for the last wakeup to come
and it never would.
We ran the tests on x86_64 SMP. The hang only occurred on a Xeon box
("Clovertown") but not a Core2Duo ("Conroe"). On the Xeon, the L2 cache isn't
shared between all eight processors, but is L2 is shared between between all
two processors on the Core2Duo we use.
My analysis of the hang is if you go down to the second while-loop
in read_events(), what happens on processor #1:
1) add_wait_queue_exclusive() adds thread to ctx->wait
2) aio_read_evt() to check tail
3) if aio_read_evt() returned 0, call [io_]schedule() and sleep
In aio_complete() with processor #2:
A) info->tail = tail;
B) waitqueue_active(&ctx->wait)
C) if waitqueue_active() returned non-0, call wake_up()
The way the code is written, step 1 must be seen by all other processors
before processor 1 checks for pending events in step 2 (that were recorded by
step A) and step A by processor 2 must be seen by all other processors
(checked in step 2) before step B is done.
The race I believed I was seeing is that steps 1 and 2 were
effectively swapped due to the __list_add() being delayed by the L2
cache not shared by some of the other processors. Imagine:
proc 2: just before step A
proc 1, step 1: adds to ctx->wait, but is not visible by other processors yet
proc 1, step 2: checks tail and sees no pending events
proc 2, step A: updates tail
proc 1, step 3: calls [io_]schedule() and sleeps
proc 2, step B: checks ctx->wait, but sees no one waiting, skips wakeup
so proc 1 sleeps indefinitely
My patch adds a memory barrier between steps A and B. It ensures that the
update in step 1 gets seen on processor 2 before continuing. If processor 1
was just before step 1, the memory barrier makes sure that step A (update
tail) gets seen by the time processor 1 makes it to step 2 (check tail).
Before the patch our AIO process would hang virtually 100% of the time. After
the patch, we have yet to see the process ever hang.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Barnes <qbarnes+linux@yahoo-inc.com>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ We should probably disallow that "if (waitqueue_active()) wake_up()"
coding pattern, because it's so often buggy wrt memory ordering ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Ignoring the return value from nfs_pageio_add_request can cause deadlocks.
In read path:
call nfs_pageio_add_request from readpage_async_filler
assume at this point that there are requests already in desc, that
can't be merged with the current request.
so nfs_pageio_doio is fired up to clear out desc.
assume something goes wrong in setting up the io, so desc->pg_error is set.
This causes nfs_pageio_add_request to return 0, *WITHOUT* adding the original
request.
BUT, since return code is ignored, readpage_async_filler assumes it has
been added, and does nothing further, leaving page locked.
do_generic_mapping_read will eventually call lock_page, resulting in deadlock
In write path:
page is marked dirty by generic_perform_write
nfs_writepages is called
call nfs_pageio_add_request from nfs_page_async_flush
assume at this point that there are requests already in desc, that
can't be merged with the current request.
so nfs_pageio_doio is fired up to clear out desc.
assume something goes wrong in setting up the io, so desc->pg_error is set.
This causes nfs_page_async_flush to return 0, *WITHOUT* adding the original
request, yet marking the request as locked (PG_BUSY) and in writeback,
clearing dirty marks.
The next time a write is done to the page, deadlock will result as
nfs_write_end calls nfs_update_request
Signed-off-by: Fred Isaman <iisaman@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Somebody had put struct nameidata in stack frame of link_path_walk().
Unfortunately, there are certain realities to deal with:
* It's in the middle of recursion. Depth is equal to the nesting
depth of symlinks, i.e. up to 8.
* struct namiedata is, even if one discards the intent junk,
at least 12 pointers + 5 ints.
* moreover, adding a stack frame is not free in that situation.
* there are fs methods called on top of that, and they also have
stack footprint.
* kernel stack is not infinite.
The thing is, even if one chooses to deal with -ESTALE that way (and it's
one hell of an overkill), the only thing that needs to be preserved is
vfsmount + dentry, not the entire struct nameidata.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some new uses of get_empty_filp() have crept in; switched
to alloc_file() to make sure that pieces of initialization
won't be missing.
We really need to kill get_empty_filp().
[AV] fixed dentry leak on failure exit in anon_inode_getfd()
Cc: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise. A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.
[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
After several posts and bug reports regarding interaction with the NULL
nameidata, here's a patch to clean up the mess with struct file in the
reiserfs xattr code.
As observed in several of the posts, there's really no need for struct file
to exist in the xattr code. It was really only passed around due to the
f_op->readdir() and a_ops->{prepare,commit}_write prototypes requiring it.
reiserfs_prepare_write() and reiserfs_commit_write() don't actually use the
struct file passed to it, and the xattr code uses a private version of
reiserfs_readdir() to enumerate the xattr directories.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* hppfs_iget() and its users are racy; there's no need to pollute icache
anyway, new_inode() works fine and is safe, unlike the current kludges
(these relied on overwriting ->i_ino before another iget_locked() gets
to that one - and did it after unlocking).
* merge hppfs_iget()/init_inode()/hppfs_read_inode(), while we are
at it.
* to pass proper vfsmount to dentry_open() store the reference
in hppfs superblock.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
--
Here's patch for hppfs that uses vfs_kern_mount to make sure it always has a
procfs instance and passed the vfsmount on through the inode private data.
Also fixes a procfs file_system_type leak for every attempted hppfs mount.
[ jdike - gave this file a style workover, plus deleted hppfs_dentry_ops ]
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Dike <jdike@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-2.6-block:
Revert "unexport bio_{,un}map_user"
relay: fix subbuf_splice_actor() adding too many pages
The ps2esdi driver was marked as BROKEN more than two years ago due to being
vfs_kern_mount() requires having a reference to fs type, which
makes it impossible for module to create procfs, etc. private
mount. Open-coding is not an option, since e.g. put_filesystem()
is _not_ exported, and for a good reason.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Outside users like asmlib uses the mapping functions. API wise, the
export is definitely sane. It's a better idea to keep this export
than to require external users to open-code this piece of code instead.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
oops and fs corruption; the latter can happen even on valid fs in case of oom.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This bug was always here, but before my commit 6fa02839bf
("recheck for secure ports in fh_verify"), it could only be triggered by
failure of a kmalloc(). After that commit it could be triggered by a
client making a request from a non-reserved port for access to an export
marked "secure". (Exports are "secure" by default.)
The result is a struct svc_export with a reference count one too low,
resulting in likely oopses next time the export is accessed.
The reference counting here is not straightforward; a later patch will
clean up fh_verify().
Thanks to Lukas Hejtmanek for the bug report and followup.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Lukas Hejtmanek <xhejtman@ics.muni.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Shirish Pargaonkar noted:
With cifsacl mount option, when a file is created on the Windows server,
exclusive oplock is broken right away because the get cifs acl code
again opens the file to obtain security descriptor.
The client does not have the newly created file handle or inode in any
of its lists yet so it does not respond to oplock break and server waits for
its duration and then responds to the second open. This slows down file
creation signficantly. The fix is to pass the file descriptor to the get
cifsacl code wherever available so that get cifs acl code does not send
second open (NT Create ANDX) and oplock is not broken.
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
