Don't implement per-filesystem 'extX_permission()' functions that have
to be called for every path component operation, and instead just expose
the actual ACL checking so that the VFS layer can now do it for us.
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
helpers: get_cached_acl(inode, type), set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl),
forget_cached_acl(inode, type).
ubifs/xattr.c needed includes reordered, the rest is a plain switchover.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If a filesystem supports POSIX ACL's, the VFS layer expects the filesystem
to do POSIX ACL checks on any files not owned by the caller, and it does
this for every single pathname component that it looks up.
That obviously can be pretty expensive if the filesystem isn't careful
about it, especially with locking. That's doubly sad, since the common
case tends to be that there are no ACL's associated with the files in
question.
ext4 already caches the ACL data so that it doesn't have to look it up
over and over again, but it does so by taking the inode->i_lock spinlock
on every lookup. Which is a noticeable overhead even if it's a private
lock, especially on CPU's where the serialization is expensive (eg Intel
Netburst aka 'P4').
For the special case of not actually having any ACL's, all that locking is
unnecessary. Even if somebody else were to be changing the ACL's on
another CPU, we simply don't care - if we've seen a NULL ACL, we might as
well use it.
So just load the ACL speculatively without any locking, and if it was
NULL, just use it. If it's non-NULL (either because we had a cached
entry, or because the cache hasn't been filled in at all), it means that
we'll need to get the lock and re-load it properly.
(This commit was ported from a patch originally authored by Linus for
ext3.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Move ext4 headers out of include/linux. This is just the trivial move,
there's some more thing that could be done later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
This fixes the allocations with GFP_KERNEL while under a transaction problems
in ext4. This patch is the same as its ext3 counterpart, just switches these
to GFP_NOFS.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant
users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future
where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a
file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as
well, thus violating its semantics.
[ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ...
untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ]
The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and
exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations
falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone.
Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Someone's tab key is emitting spaces. Attempt to repair some of the damage.
Cc: <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Reworked from a patch by Mingming Cao and Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-By: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Mingming Cao originally did this work, and Shaggy reproduced it using some
scripts from her.
Signed-off-by: Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Start of the ext4 patch series. See Documentation/filesystems/ext4.txt for
details.
This is a simple copy of the files in fs/ext3 to fs/ext4 and
/usr/incude/linux/ext3* to /usr/include/ex4*
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
