Commit Graph

2861 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vegard Nossum
30a46a4647 apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.

The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.

SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.

Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.

Fixes: bb646cdb12
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-07-08 10:26:25 +10:00
Dan Carpenter
38327424b4 KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized.  I've
added a check to fix that.

This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve.  There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():

 (1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory.  In practice, this is difficult
     to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
     attempt.

 (2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
     and it being tested for revocation.  In practice, this is difficult to
     time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
     from the request-key upcall process.  Further, users can only make use
     of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
     rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
     has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.

 (3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
     keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
     sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
     so that it fails with EDQUOT.

The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:

	echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
	keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t

The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system.  Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.

Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:

	kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
	RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8  EFLAGS: 00010092
	RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
	RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
	R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
	...
	Call Trace:
	  kfree+0xde/0x1bc
	  assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
	  __key_link_end+0x55/0x63
	  key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
	  keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
	  keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
	  SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
	  do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
	  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

Fixes: f70e2e0619 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-16 17:15:04 -10:00
Stephan Mueller
4693fc734d KEYS: Add placeholder for KDF usage with DH
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys.  Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.

[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
 had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
 requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]

Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-06-03 16:14:34 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
d102a56edb Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "Followups to the parallel lookup work:

   - update docs

   - restore killability of the places that used to take ->i_mutex
     killably now that we have down_write_killable() merged

   - Additionally, it turns out that I missed a prerequisite for
     security_d_instantiate() stuff - ->getxattr() wasn't the only thing
     that could be called before dentry is attached to inode; with smack
     we needed the same treatment applied to ->setxattr() as well"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separately
  switch xattr_handler->set() to passing dentry and inode separately
  restore killability of old mutex_lock_killable(&inode->i_mutex) users
  add down_write_killable_nested()
  update D/f/directory-locking
2016-05-27 17:14:05 -07:00
Al Viro
3767e255b3 switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separately
smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.

Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64.  Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.

Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-27 20:09:16 -04:00
Jann Horn
dca6b41491 Yama: fix double-spinlock and user access in atomic context
Commit 8a56038c2a ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups
when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain:

process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access
-> ptrace_may_access
task_lock(...) is taken
__ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check
-> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
-> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm
task_lock(...) is taken again

task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point,
spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current
process.

Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside
security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's
not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might
involve paging in userspace memory.

It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock
before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be
called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for
example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another
task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and
get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE,
a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time -
see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.)

Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below
security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to
the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the
"comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big
complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM
access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to
copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but
that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look
pretty random to the user.)

Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current
exits kernelspace the next time.

v2: Don't oops on PTRACE_TRACEME, call report_access under
task_lock(current). Also fix nonsensical comment. And don't use
GPF_ATOMIC for memory allocation with no locks held.
This patch is tested both for ptrace attach and ptrace traceme.

Fixes: 8a56038c2a ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-26 09:56:18 +10:00
Andy Shevchenko
b8b572789c security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c: use %pU to output UUID in printable format
Instead of open coded variant re-use extension that vsprintf.c provides
us for ages.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f4f27d0028 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...
2016-05-19 09:21:36 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a7fd20d1c4 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights:

   1) Support SPI based w5100 devices, from Akinobu Mita.

   2) Partial Segmentation Offload, from Alexander Duyck.

   3) Add GMAC4 support to stmmac driver, from Alexandre TORGUE.

   4) Allow cls_flower stats offload, from Amir Vadai.

   5) Implement bpf blinding, from Daniel Borkmann.

   6) Optimize _ASYNC_ bit twiddling on sockets, unless the socket is
      actually using FASYNC these atomics are superfluous.  From Eric
      Dumazet.

   7) Run TCP more preemptibly, also from Eric Dumazet.

   8) Support LED blinking, EEPROM dumps, and rxvlan offloading in mlx5e
      driver, from Gal Pressman.

   9) Allow creating ppp devices via rtnetlink, from Guillaume Nault.

  10) Improve BPF usage documentation, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

  11) Support tunneling offloads in qed, from Manish Chopra.

  12) aRFS offloading in mlx5e, from Maor Gottlieb.

  13) Add RFS and RPS support to SCTP protocol, from Marcelo Ricardo
      Leitner.

  14) Add MSG_EOR support to TCP, this allows controlling packet
      coalescing on application record boundaries for more accurate
      socket timestamp sampling.  From Martin KaFai Lau.

  15) Fix alignment of 64-bit netlink attributes across the board, from
      Nicolas Dichtel.

  16) Per-vlan stats in bridging, from Nikolay Aleksandrov.

  17) Several conversions of drivers to ethtool ksettings, from Philippe
      Reynes.

  18) Checksum neutral ILA in ipv6, from Tom Herbert.

  19) Factorize all of the various marvell dsa drivers into one, from
      Vivien Didelot

  20) Add VF support to qed driver, from Yuval Mintz"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1649 commits)
  Revert "phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m"
  Revert "phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional"
  r8169: default to 64-bit DMA on recent PCIe chips
  phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional
  phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m
  bpf: arm64: remove callee-save registers use for tmp registers
  asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions
  switchdev: pass pointer to fib_info instead of copy
  net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release()
  tipc: fix nametable publication field in nl compat
  drivers: net: Don't print unpopulated net_device name
  qed: add support for dcbx.
  ravb: Add missing free_irq() calls to ravb_close()
  qed: Remove a stray tab
  net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
  net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phydev from struct net_device
  bpf, doc: fix typo on bpf_asm descriptions
  stmmac: hardware TX COE doesn't work when force_thresh_dma_mode is set
  net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
  net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phydev from struct net_device
  ...
2016-05-17 16:26:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c52b76185b Merge branch 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro:
 "'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security
  methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the
  damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some
  enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea.

  Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..."

* 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  constify ima_d_path()
  constify security_sb_pivotroot()
  constify security_path_chroot()
  constify security_path_{link,rename}
  apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt
  constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink}
  constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir}
  apparmor: constify common_perm_...()
  apparmor: constify aa_path_link()
  apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm()
  constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod
  constify security_sb_mount()
  constify chown_common/security_path_chown
  tomoyo: constify assorted struct path *
  apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL
  constify vfs_truncate()
  constify security_path_truncate()
  [apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
2016-05-17 14:41:03 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7f427d3a60 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull parallel filesystem directory handling update from Al Viro.

This is the main parallel directory work by Al that makes the vfs layer
able to do lookup and readdir in parallel within a single directory.
That's a big change, since this used to be all protected by the
directory inode mutex.

The inode mutex is replaced by an rwsem, and serialization of lookups of
a single name is done by a "in-progress" dentry marker.

The series begins with xattr cleanups, and then ends with switching
filesystems over to actually doing the readdir in parallel (switching to
the "iterate_shared()" that only takes the read lock).

A more detailed explanation of the process from Al Viro:
 "The xattr work starts with some acl fixes, then switches ->getxattr to
  passing inode and dentry separately.  This is the point where the
  things start to get tricky - that got merged into the very beginning
  of the -rc3-based #work.lookups, to allow untangling the
  security_d_instantiate() mess.  The xattr work itself proceeds to
  switch a lot of filesystems to generic_...xattr(); no complications
  there.

  After that initial xattr work, the series then does the following:

   - untangle security_d_instantiate()

   - convert a bunch of open-coded lookup_one_len_unlocked() to calls of
     that thing; one such place (in overlayfs) actually yields a trivial
     conflict with overlayfs fixes later in the cycle - overlayfs ended
     up switching to a variant of lookup_one_len_unlocked() sans the
     permission checks.  I would've dropped that commit (it gets
     overridden on merge from #ovl-fixes in #for-next; proper resolution
     is to use the variant in mainline fs/overlayfs/super.c), but I
     didn't want to rebase the damn thing - it was fairly late in the
     cycle...

   - some filesystems had managed to depend on lookup/lookup exclusion
     for *fs-internal* data structures in a way that would break if we
     relaxed the VFS exclusion.  Fixing hadn't been hard, fortunately.

   - core of that series - parallel lookup machinery, replacing
     ->i_mutex with rwsem, making lookup_slow() take it only shared.  At
     that point lookups happen in parallel; lookups on the same name
     wait for the in-progress one to be done with that dentry.

     Surprisingly little code, at that - almost all of it is in
     fs/dcache.c, with fs/namei.c changes limited to lookup_slow() -
     making it use the new primitive and actually switching to locking
     shared.

   - parallel readdir stuff - first of all, we provide the exclusion on
     per-struct file basis, same as we do for read() vs lseek() for
     regular files.  That takes care of most of the needed exclusion in
     readdir/readdir; however, these guys are trickier than lookups, so
     I went for switching them one-by-one.  To do that, a new method
     '->iterate_shared()' is added and filesystems are switched to it
     as they are either confirmed to be OK with shared lock on directory
     or fixed to be OK with that.  I hope to kill the original method
     come next cycle (almost all in-tree filesystems are switched
     already), but it's still not quite finished.

   - several filesystems get switched to parallel readdir.  The
     interesting part here is dealing with dcache preseeding by readdir;
     that needs minor adjustment to be safe with directory locked only
     shared.

     Most of the filesystems doing that got switched to in those
     commits.  Important exception: NFS.  Turns out that NFS folks, with
     their, er, insistence on VFS getting the fuck out of the way of the
     Smart Filesystem Code That Knows How And What To Lock(tm) have
     grown the locking of their own.  They had their own homegrown
     rwsem, with lookup/readdir/atomic_open being *writers* (sillyunlink
     is the reader there).  Of course, with VFS getting the fuck out of
     the way, as requested, the actual smarts of the smart filesystem
     code etc. had become exposed...

   - do_last/lookup_open/atomic_open cleanups.  As the result, open()
     without O_CREAT locks the directory only shared.  Including the
     ->atomic_open() case.  Backmerge from #for-linus in the middle of
     that - atomic_open() fix got brought in.

   - then comes NFS switch to saner (VFS-based ;-) locking, killing the
     homegrown "lookup and readdir are writers" kinda-sorta rwsem.  All
     exclusion for sillyunlink/lookup is done by the parallel lookups
     mechanism.  Exclusion between sillyunlink and rmdir is a real rwsem
     now - rmdir being the writer.

     Result: NFS lookups/readdirs/O_CREAT-less opens happen in parallel
     now.

   - the rest of the series consists of switching a lot of filesystems
     to parallel readdir; in a lot of cases ->llseek() gets simplified
     as well.  One backmerge in there (again, #for-linus - rockridge
     fix)"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (74 commits)
  ext4: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  hfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  hfsplus: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  hostfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  hpfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  hpfs: handle allocation failures in hpfs_add_pos()
  gfs2: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  f2fs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  afs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  befs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  befs: constify stuff a bit
  isofs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  get_acorn_filename(): deobfuscate a bit
  btrfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  logfs: no need to lock directory in lseek
  switch ecryptfs to ->iterate_shared
  9p: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  fat: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  romfs, squashfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
  more trivial ->iterate_shared conversions
  ...
2016-05-17 11:01:31 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
91e8d0cbc9 Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A rather small set of patches from the timer departement:

   - Some more y2038 work
   - Yet another new clocksource driver
   - The usual set of small fixes, cleanups and enhancements"

* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  clocksource/drivers/tegra: Remove unused suspend/resume code
  clockevents/driversi/mps2: add MPS2 Timer driver
  dt-bindings: document the MPS2 timer bindings
  clocksource/drivers/mtk_timer: Add __init attribute
  clockevents/drivers/dw_apb_timer: Implement ->set_state_oneshot_stopped()
  time: Introduce do_sys_settimeofday64()
  security: Introduce security_settime64()
  clocksource: Add missing include of of.h.
2016-05-17 09:49:28 -07:00
Kees Cook
b937190c40 LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-17 20:10:30 +10:00
Al Viro
0e0162bb8c Merge branch 'ovl-fixes' into for-linus
Backmerge to resolve a conflict in ovl_lookup_real();
"ovl_lookup_real(): use lookup_one_len_unlocked()" instead,
but it was too late in the cycle to rebase.
2016-05-17 02:17:59 -04:00
David S. Miller
e800072c18 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
In netdevice.h we removed the structure in net-next that is being
changes in 'net'.  In macsec.c and rtnetlink.c we have overlaps
between fixes in 'net' and the u64 attribute changes in 'net-next'.

The mlx5 conflicts have to do with vxlan support dependencies.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-09 15:59:24 -04:00
James Morris
a6926cc989 Merge branch 'stable-4.7' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2016-05-06 09:31:34 +10:00
James Morris
0250abcd72 Merge tag 'keys-next-20160505' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2016-05-06 09:29:00 +10:00
Sasha Levin
74f430cd0f Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
Access reporting often happens from atomic contexes. Avoid
lockups when allocating memory for command lines.

Fixes: 8a56038c2a ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
2016-05-04 10:54:05 -07:00
David Howells
d55201ce08 Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-next
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted.  That's currently a two-step process:

 (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
     the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
     assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
     upon them.

     This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
     if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
     certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
     consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.

     If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
     will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
     no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.

 (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
     KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
     with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it.  This was meant to be the
     system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
     A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
     keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
     permit it.

These patches change that:

 (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
     when the trust is evaluated only.

 (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
     restrict what may be added to that keyring.  This is called whenever a
     key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
     created in one keyring and then linked across.

     This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
     payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation.  It
     is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
     keyrings such as the system keyrings.

     [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
         optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
         so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.

 (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
     restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
     contents of the system keyring.

     A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.

 (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
     so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
     root of the trust relationship.

 (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
     key_preparsed_payload::trusted.

This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.

Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:

 (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
     only.  It carries only keys built in to the kernel.  It may be where
     UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
     secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.

 (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
     is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.

     (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
         be vouched for by either ring of system keys.

 (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
     the new secondary keyring.

 (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
     that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.

 (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
     is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
     restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
     system keyrings.

     If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
     the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
     the builtin system keyring only.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 17:20:20 +01:00
Mimi Zohar
cf90ea9340 ima: fix the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration ordering
This patch fixes the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration
ordering used for displaying the IMA policy.

Fixes: d9ddf077bb ("ima: support for kexec image and initramfs")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-04 18:46:00 +10:00
Mimi Zohar
05d1a717ec ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files"
stopped identifying empty files as new files.  However new empty files
can be created using the mknodat syscall.  On systems with IMA-appraisal
enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended
attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in
order to write the file data contents.  This patch defines a new hook
named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using
mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written.

In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature
are considered "immutable" and can not be modified.  The file contents
need to be written, before signing the file.  This patch relaxes this
requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written
before the file contents.

Changelog:
- defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima
  (based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments)
- removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0)
  (based on Al's review)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
2016-05-01 09:23:52 -04:00
Mimi Zohar
42a4c60319 ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to
re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file"
status nor the security.ima xattr.  The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and
IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific.  This patch
only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags.

With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the
file signature on new files.

Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
2016-05-01 09:23:52 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
c2316dbf12 selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
The execstack check was only being applied on the main
process stack.  Thread stacks allocated via mmap were
only subject to the execmem permission check.  Augment
the check to apply to the current thread stack as well.
Note that this does NOT prevent making a different thread's
stack executable.

Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-26 15:47:57 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
8e4ff6f228 selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.

This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.

Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-26 15:41:43 -04:00
Baolin Wang
457db29bfc security: Introduce security_settime64()
security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
function to use the 64bit types.

This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
converted.

None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
the patch is not making any functional changes.

Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
[jstultz: Reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-04-22 11:48:30 -07:00
Kees Cook
9b091556a0 LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00
Kees Cook
8a56038c2a Yama: consolidate error reporting
Use a common error reporting function for Yama violation reports, and give
more detail into the process command lines.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21 10:47:26 +10:00
Roopa Prabhu
10c9ead9f3 rtnetlink: add new RTM_GETSTATS message to dump link stats
This patch adds a new RTM_GETSTATS message to query link stats via netlink
from the kernel. RTM_NEWLINK also dumps stats today, but RTM_NEWLINK
returns a lot more than just stats and is expensive in some cases when
frequent polling for stats from userspace is a common operation.

RTM_GETSTATS is an attempt to provide a light weight netlink message
to explicity query only link stats from the kernel on an interface.
The idea is to also keep it extensible so that new kinds of stats can be
added to it in the future.

This patch adds the following attribute for NETDEV stats:
struct nla_policy ifla_stats_policy[IFLA_STATS_MAX + 1] = {
        [IFLA_STATS_LINK_64]  = { .len = sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats64) },
};

Like any other rtnetlink message, RTM_GETSTATS can be used to get stats of
a single interface or all interfaces with NLM_F_DUMP.

Future possible new types of stat attributes:
link af stats:
    - IFLA_STATS_LINK_IPV6  (nested. for ipv6 stats)
    - IFLA_STATS_LINK_MPLS  (nested. for mpls/mdev stats)
extended stats:
    - IFLA_STATS_LINK_EXTENDED (nested. extended software netdev stats like bridge,
      vlan, vxlan etc)
    - IFLA_STATS_LINK_HW_EXTENDED (nested. extended hardware stats which are
      available via ethtool today)

This patch also declares a filter mask for all stat attributes.
User has to provide a mask of stats attributes to query. filter mask
can be specified in the new hdr 'struct if_stats_msg' for stats messages.
Other important field in the header is the ifindex.

This api can also include attributes for global stats (eg tcp) in the future.
When global stats are included in a stats msg, the ifindex in the header
must be zero. A single stats message cannot contain both global and
netdev specific stats. To easily distinguish them, netdev specific stat
attributes name are prefixed with IFLA_STATS_LINK_

Without any attributes in the filter_mask, no stats will be returned.

This patch has been tested with mofified iproute2 ifstat.

Suggested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-20 15:43:42 -04:00
Paul Moore
1ac4247626 selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if
the security server is not yet initialized.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19 16:37:27 -04:00
Paul Moore
20cdef8d57 selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay
the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19 16:37:07 -04:00
Paul Moore
2c97165bef selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security
label when we are in the process of setting it.

Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19 16:36:28 -04:00
Prarit Bhargava
0fd71a620b selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with
in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG().  This patch changes this to
index which isn't a type.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-14 11:24:50 -04:00
Mat Martineau
ddbb411487 KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.

Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.

The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
that the values are only needed in userspace.

Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.

Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
Kirill Marinushkin
13100a72f4 Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted
Solved TODO task: big keys saved to shmem file are now stored encrypted.
The encryption key is randomly generated and saved to payload[big_key_data].

Signed-off-by: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
David Howells
898de7d0f2 KEYS: user_update should use copy of payload made during preparsing
The payload preparsing routine for user keys makes a copy of the payload
provided by the caller and stashes it in the key_preparsed_payload struct for
->instantiate() or ->update() to use.  However, ->update() takes another copy
of this to attach to the keyring.  ->update() should be using this directly
and clearing the pointer in the preparse data.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
Andreas Ziegler
93da17b185 security: integrity: Remove select to deleted option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
Commit d43de6c780 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to
the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA,
but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.

Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
David Howells
56104cf2b8 IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by
userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the
system trusted keyrings.

EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if
no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the
signature doesn't match.  Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned.

If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is
the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled.  Intermediate keys
between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to
the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain -
provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings.

The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its
own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:49:15 +01:00
David Howells
77f68bac94 KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful.  Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.

Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().

Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:44:15 +01:00
David Howells
a511e1af8b KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:43 +01:00
David Howells
5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
Al Viro
ce23e64013 ->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate arguments
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-11 00:48:00 -04:00
Paolo Abeni
3c9d6296b7 security: drop the unused hook skb_owned_by
The skb_owned_by hook was added with the commit ca10b9e9a8
("selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook") and later removed
when said commit was reverted.

Later on, when switching to list of hooks, a field named
'skb_owned_by' was included into the security_hook_head struct,
but without any users nor caller.

This commit removes the said left-over field.

Fixes: b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-11 12:21:43 +10:00
Al Viro
fc64005c93 don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sb
... and neither can ever be NULL

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-10 17:11:51 -04:00
Jeff Vander Stoep
61d612ea73 selinux: restrict kernel module loading
Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load.
Add module_load permission to the system class.

Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the
finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has
permission module_load for the target type.
Example for finit_module:

allow foo bar_file:system module_load;

Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when
calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source
type has permission module_load with itself as the target object
because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process.
Example for init_module:

allow foo foo:system module_load;

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05 16:11:56 -04:00
Paul Moore
0c6181cb30 selinux: consolidate the ptrace parent lookup code
We lookup the tracing parent in two places, using effectively the
same code, let's consolidate it.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05 16:11:02 -04:00
Paul Moore
4b57d6bcd9 selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if
the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED.  Also adjust the
revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not
INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05 16:10:55 -04:00
Paul Moore
899134f2f6 selinux: don't revalidate inodes in selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
We don't have to worry about socket inodes being invalidated so
use inode_security_novalidate() to fetch the inode's security blob.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05 16:10:52 -04:00
Al Viro
81cd8896a6 constify ima_d_path()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-28 00:47:52 -04:00
Al Viro
3b73b68c05 constify security_sb_pivotroot()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-28 00:47:52 -04:00
Al Viro
77b286c0d2 constify security_path_chroot()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-28 00:47:51 -04:00