When running 'perf trace' with an BPF object like:
# perf trace -e openat,tools/perf/examples/bpf/hello.c
the event parsing eventually calls llvm__get_kbuild_opts() that runs a
script and that ends up with SIGCHLD delivered to the 'perf trace'
handler, which assumes the workload process is done and quits 'perf
trace'.
Move the SIGCHLD handler setup directly to trace__run(), where the event
is parsed and the object is already compiled.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Christy Lee <christyc.y.lee@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220106222030.227499-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
* lockdep WARN due to missing lock nesting annotation
* NULL pointer dereference when accessing debugfs
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Two small fixes for x86:
- lockdep WARN due to missing lock nesting annotation
- NULL pointer dereference when accessing debugfs"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: Check for rmaps allocation
KVM: SEV: Mark nested locking of kvm->lock
amdgpu:
- suspend/resume fix
- fix runtime PM regression
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Merge tag 'drm-fixes-2022-01-07' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm
Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"There is only the amdgpu runtime pm regression fix in here:
amdgpu:
- suspend/resume fix
- fix runtime PM regression"
* tag 'drm-fixes-2022-01-07' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm:
drm/amdgpu: disable runpm if we are the primary adapter
fbdev: fbmem: add a helper to determine if an aperture is used by a fw fb
drm/amd/pm: keep the BACO feature enabled for suspend
Both source and dest vms' kvm->locks are held in sev_lock_two_vms.
Mark one with a different subtype to avoid false positives from lockdep.
Fixes: c9d61dcb0b (KVM: SEV: accept signals in sev_lock_two_vms)
Reported-by: Yiru Xu <xyru1999@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1641364863-26331-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
== Problem ==
Nathan Chancellor reported an oops when aceessing the
'sgx_total_bytes' sysfs file:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/YbzhBrimHGGpddDM@archlinux-ax161/
The sysfs output code accesses the sgx_numa_nodes[] array
unconditionally. However, this array is allocated during SGX
initialization, which only occurs on systems where SGX is
supported.
If the sysfs file is accessed on systems without SGX support,
sgx_numa_nodes[] is NULL and an oops occurs.
== Solution ==
To fix this, hide the entire nodeX/x86/ attribute group on
systems without SGX support using the ->is_visible attribute
group callback.
Unfortunately, SGX is initialized via a device_initcall() which
occurs _after_ the ->is_visible() callback. Instead of moving
SGX initialization earlier, call sysfs_update_group() during
SGX initialization to update the group visiblility.
This update requires moving the SGX sysfs code earlier in
sgx/main.c. There are no code changes other than the addition of
arch_update_sysfs_visibility() and a minor whitespace fixup to
arch_node_attr_is_visible() which checkpatch caught.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 50468e4313 ("x86/sgx: Add an attribute for the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220104171527.5E8416A8@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com
The PCI Write Barrier instruction ignores the registers encoded in it.
There is thus no need to explicitly set the register to zero or to
associate it with a variable at all. In the resulting binary this removes
an unnecessary lghi and it makes the code simpler.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Series "Separate struct slab from struct page" v4
This is originally an offshoot of the folio work by Matthew. One of the more
complex parts of the struct page definition are the parts used by the slab
allocators. It would be good for the MM in general if struct slab were its own
data type, and it also helps to prevent tail pages from slipping in anywhere.
As Matthew requested in his proof of concept series, I have taken over the
development of this series, so it's a mix of patches from him (often modified
by me) and my own.
One big difference is the use of coccinelle to perform the relatively trivial
parts of the conversions automatically and at once, instead of a larger number
of smaller incremental reviewable steps. Thanks to Julia Lawall and Luis
Chamberlain for all their help!
Another notable difference is (based also on review feedback) I don't represent
with a struct slab the large kmalloc allocations which are not really a slab,
but use page allocator directly. When going from an object address to a struct
slab, the code tests first folio slab flag, and only if it's set it converts to
struct slab. This makes the struct slab type stronger.
Finally, although Matthew's version didn't use any of the folio work, the
initial support has been merged meanwhile so my version builds on top of it
where appropriate. This eliminates some of the redundant compound_head()
being performed e.g. when testing the slab flag.
To sum up, after this series, struct page fields used by slab allocators are
moved from struct page to a new struct slab, that uses the same physical
storage. The availability of the fields is further distinguished by the
selected slab allocator implementation. The advantages include:
- Similar to folios, if the slab is of order > 0, struct slab always is
guaranteed to be the head page. Additionally it's guaranteed to be an actual
slab page, not a large kmalloc. This removes uncertainty and potential for
bugs.
- It's not possible to accidentally use fields of the slab implementation that's
not configured.
- Other subsystems cannot use slab's fields in struct page anymore (some
existing non-slab usages had to be adjusted in this series), so slab
implementations have more freedom in rearranging them in the struct slab.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220104001046.12263-1-vbabka@suse.cz/
- Revert the patch fixing the DM related crash causing a widespread
regression for kernel ULPs. A proper fix just didn't appear this cycle
due to the holidays
- Missing NULL check on alloc in uverbs
- Double free in rxe error paths
- Fix a new kernel-infoleak report when forming ah_attr's without GRH's in
ucma
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma
Pull rdma fixes from Jason Gunthorpe:
"Last pull for 5.16, the reversion has been known for a while now but
didn't get a proper fix in time. Looks like we will have several
info-leak bugs to take care of going foward.
- Revert the patch fixing the DM related crash causing a widespread
regression for kernel ULPs. A proper fix just didn't appear this
cycle due to the holidays
- Missing NULL check on alloc in uverbs
- Double free in rxe error paths
- Fix a new kernel-infoleak report when forming ah_attr's without
GRH's in ucma"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma:
RDMA/core: Don't infoleak GRH fields
RDMA/uverbs: Check for null return of kmalloc_array
Revert "RDMA/mlx5: Fix releasing unallocated memory in dereg MR flow"
RDMA/rxe: Prevent double freeing rxe_map_set()
At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt
to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it
for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent
getrandom(GRND_INSECURE).
(And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as
maxwarn>0.)
crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at
crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in
the RNG state array to write).
As far as I understand:
- crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same
exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have
non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we
can get into the RNG immediately"
- crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be
cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every
time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff;
we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input
pool"
- crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now,
but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure".
The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom
fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll
never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to
prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG
inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided;
crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security
anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait
until crng_init==2.
This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get
rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for
a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted
to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead.
Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of
every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2).
This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already
extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which
is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so
forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already
relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious
problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND
is going to alleviate things.
And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're
already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in
crng_init_try_arch_early().
Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by
370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by
extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of
RDRAND.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only
initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize().
However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool
beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically
initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Rather than an awkward combination of ifdefs and __maybe_unused, we can
ensure more source gets parsed, regardless of the configuration, by
using IS_ENABLED for the CONFIG_NUMA conditional code. This makes things
cleaner and easier to follow.
I've confirmed that on !CONFIG_NUMA, we don't wind up with excess code
by accident; the generated object file is the same.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
We print out "crng init done" for !TRUST_CPU, so we should also print
out the same for TRUST_CPU.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However,
usually it is only called once for an initial 64-byte push, so bootloader
entropy will not mix any bytes into the input pool. So it's conceivable
that crng_init==1 when crng_initialize_primary() is called later, but
then the input pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will
be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's
bad.
In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call
crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later
crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing.
In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty
pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted
bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool.
[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
When crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), we
currently will advance to crng_init==1 once we've acquired 64 bytes, and
then throw away the rest of the buffer. Usually, that is not a problem:
When add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called via EFI or DT during
setup_arch(), there won't be any IRQ randomness. Therefore, the 64 bytes
passed by EFI exactly matches what is needed to advance to crng_init==1.
Usually, DT seems to pass 64 bytes as well -- with one notable exception
being kexec, which hands over 128 bytes of entropy to the kexec'd kernel.
In that case, we'll advance to crng_init==1 once 64 of those bytes are
consumed by crng_fast_load(), but won't continue onward feeding in bytes
to progress to crng_init==2. This commit fixes the issue by feeding
any leftover bytes into the next phase in add_hwgenerator_randomness().
[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
If the bootloader supplies sufficient material and crng_reseed() is called
very early on, but not too early that wqs aren't available yet, then we
might transition to crng_init==2 before rand_initialize()'s call to
crng_initialize_primary() made. Then, when crng_initialize_primary() is
called, if we're trusting the CPU's RDRAND instructions, we'll
needlessly reinitialize the RNG and emit a message about it. This is
mostly harmless, as numa_crng_init() will allocate and then free what it
just allocated, and excessive calls to invalidate_batched_entropy()
aren't so harmful. But it is funky and the extra message is confusing,
so avoid the re-initialization all together by checking for crng_init <
2 in crng_initialize_primary(), just as we already do in crng_reseed().
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, multiple calls
to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer
dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical
problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via
devicetree.
On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is
executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1.
On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead,
wait_event_interruptible() and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called.
If the entropy count for that second seed is large enough, that proceeds
to crng_reseed().
However, both wait_event_interruptible() and crng_reseed() depends
(at least in numa_crng_init()) on workqueues. Therefore, test whether
system_wq is already initialized, which is a sufficient indicator that
workqueue_init_early() has progressed far enough.
If we wind up hitting the !system_wq case, we later want to do what
would have been done there when wqs are up, so set a flag, and do that
work later from the rand_initialize() call.
Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <iivanov@suse.de>
Fixes: 18b915ac6b ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: added crng_need_done state and related logic.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
By using `char` instead of `unsigned char`, certain platforms will sign
extend the byte when `w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate)` is called,
meaning that bit 7 is overrepresented when mixing. This isn't a real
problem (unless the mixer itself is already broken) since it's still
invertible, but it's not quite correct either. Fix this by using an
explicit unsigned type.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This commit addresses one of the lower hanging fruits of the RNG: its
usage of SHA1.
BLAKE2s is generally faster, and certainly more secure, than SHA1, which
has [1] been [2] really [3] very [4] broken [5]. Additionally, the
current construction in the RNG doesn't use the full SHA1 function, as
specified, and allows overwriting the IV with RDRAND output in an
undocumented way, even in the case when RDRAND isn't set to "trusted",
which means potential malicious IV choices. And its short length means
that keeping only half of it secret when feeding back into the mixer
gives us only 2^80 bits of forward secrecy. In other words, not only is
the choice of hash function dated, but the use of it isn't really great
either.
This commit aims to fix both of these issues while also keeping the
general structure and semantics as close to the original as possible.
Specifically:
a) Rather than overwriting the hash IV with RDRAND, we put it into
BLAKE2's documented "salt" and "personal" fields, which were
specifically created for this type of usage.
b) Since this function feeds the full hash result back into the
entropy collector, we only return from it half the length of the
hash, just as it was done before. This increases the
construction's forward secrecy from 2^80 to a much more
comfortable 2^128.
c) Rather than using the raw "sha1_transform" function alone, we
instead use the full proper BLAKE2s function, with finalization.
This also has the advantage of supplying 16 bytes at a time rather than
SHA1's 10 bytes, which, in addition to having a faster compression
function to begin with, means faster extraction in general. On an Intel
i7-11850H, this commit makes initial seeding around 131% faster.
BLAKE2s itself has the nice property of internally being based on the
ChaCha permutation, which the RNG is already using for expansion, so
there shouldn't be any issue with newness, funkiness, or surprising CPU
behavior, since it's based on something already in use.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/010.pdf
[2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2005/36210017/36210017.pdf
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/967.pdf
[4] https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf
[5] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-leurent.pdf
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it
is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the
right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the
generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch
library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do
need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather
than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
_extract_crng() does plain loads of crng->init_time and
crng_global_init_time, which causes undefined behavior if
crng_reseed() and RNDRESEEDCRNG modify these corrently.
Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to make the behavior defined.
Don't fix the race on crng->init_time by protecting it with crng->lock,
since it's not a problem for duplicate reseedings to occur. I.e., the
lockless access with READ_ONCE() is fine.
Fixes: d848e5f8e1 ("random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG")
Fixes: e192be9d9a ("random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
extract_crng() and crng_backtrack_protect() load crng_node_pool with a
plain load, which causes undefined behavior if do_numa_crng_init()
modifies it concurrently.
Fix this by using READ_ONCE(). Note: as per the previous discussion
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211219025139.31085-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u,
READ_ONCE() is believed to be sufficient here, and it was requested that
it be used here instead of smp_load_acquire().
Also change do_numa_crng_init() to set crng_node_pool using
cmpxchg_release() instead of mb() + cmpxchg(), as the former is
sufficient here but is more lightweight.
Fixes: 1e7f583af6 ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The __IRQF_TIMER bit from the flags argument was used in
add_interrupt_randomness() to distinguish the timer interrupt from other
interrupts. This is no longer the case.
Remove the flags argument from __handle_irq_event_percpu().
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Since commit
ee3e00e9e7 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The section at the top of random.c which documents the input functions
available does not document add_hwgenerator_randomness() which might lead
a reader to overlook it. Add a brief note about it.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[Jason: reorganize position of function in doc comment and also document
add_bootloader_randomness() while we're at it.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This is handy not just for humans, but also so that the 0-day bot can
automatically test posted mailing list patches against the right tree.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
- Fix missing prototypes in sample module for direct functions
- Fix check of valid buffer in get_trace_buf()
- Fix annotations of percpu pointers.
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Merge tag 'trace-v5.16-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Three minor tracing fixes:
- Fix missing prototypes in sample module for direct functions
- Fix check of valid buffer in get_trace_buf()
- Fix annotations of percpu pointers"
* tag 'trace-v5.16-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Tag trace_percpu_buffer as a percpu pointer
tracing: Fix check for trace_percpu_buffer validity in get_trace_buf()
ftrace/samples: Add missing prototypes direct functions
When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check
should use the cgroup namespace of the latter task. Add a test for it.
Tested-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check
should use the credentials of the latter task. Add a test for it.
Tested-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
0644 is an odd perm to create a cgroup which is a directory. Use the regular
0755 instead. This is necessary for euid switching test case.
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as
whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of
the write - the PID. This currently uses current's cgroup namespace which is
a potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less
privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that
it created.
This patch makes cgroup remember the cgroup namespace at the time of open
and uses it for migration permission checks instad of current's. Note that
this only applies to cgroup2 as cgroup1 doesn't have namespace support.
This also fixes a use-after-free bug on cgroupns reported in
https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000048c15c05d0083397@google.com
Note that backporting this fix also requires the preceding patch.
Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+50f5cf33a284ce738b62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000048c15c05d0083397@google.com
Fixes: 5136f6365c ("cgroup: implement "nsdelegate" mount option")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
of->priv is currently used by each interface file implementation to store
private information. This patch collects the current two private data usages
into struct cgroup_file_ctx which is allocated and freed by the common path.
This allows generic private data which applies to multiple files, which will
be used to in the following patch.
Note that cgroup_procs iterator is now embedded as procs.iter in the new
cgroup_file_ctx so that it doesn't need to be allocated and freed
separately.
v2: union dropped from cgroup_file_ctx and the procs iterator is embedded in
cgroup_file_ctx as suggested by Linus.
v3: Michal pointed out that cgroup1's procs pidlist uses of->priv too.
Converted. Didn't change to embedded allocation as cgroup1 pidlists get
stored for caching.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as
whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of
the write - the PID. This currently uses current's credentials which is a
potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less
privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that
it created.
This patch makes both cgroup2 and cgroup1 process migration interfaces to
use the credentials saved at the time of open (file->f_cred) instead of
current's.
Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 187fe84067 ("cgroup: require write perm on common ancestor when moving processes on the default hierarchy")
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
When performing an I2C transfer where the last message was a write KASAN
would complain:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mpc_i2c_do_action+0x154/0x630
Read of size 2 at addr c814e310 by task swapper/2/0
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G B 5.16.0-rc8 #1
Call Trace:
[e5ee9d50] [c08418e8] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x6c (unreliable)
[e5ee9d70] [c02f8a14] print_address_description.constprop.13+0x64/0x3b0
[e5ee9da0] [c02f9030] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x204
[e5ee9de0] [c0c76ee4] mpc_i2c_do_action+0x154/0x630
[e5ee9e30] [c0c782c4] mpc_i2c_isr+0x164/0x240
[e5ee9e60] [c00f3a04] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf4/0x3b0
[e5ee9ec0] [c00f3d40] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x80/0x110
[e5ee9f40] [c00f3e48] handle_irq_event+0x78/0xd0
[e5ee9f60] [c00fcfec] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x19c/0x370
[e5ee9fa0] [c00f1d84] generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80
[e5ee9fc0] [c0006b54] __do_irq+0x64/0x200
[e5ee9ff0] [c0007958] __do_IRQ+0xe8/0x1c0
[c812dd50] [e3eaab20] 0xe3eaab20
[c812dd90] [c0007a4c] do_IRQ+0x1c/0x30
[c812dda0] [c0000c04] ExternalInput+0x144/0x160
--- interrupt: 500 at arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
NIP: c000b684 LR: c000b684 CTR: c0019688
REGS: c812ddb0 TRAP: 0500 Tainted: G B (5.16.0-rc8)
MSR: 00029002 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 22000488 XER: 20000000
GPR00: c10ef7fc c812de90 c80ff200 c2394718 00000001 00000001 c10e3f90 00000003
GPR08: 00000000 c0019688 c2394718 fc7d625b 22000484 00000000 21e17000 c208228c
GPR16: e3e99284 00000000 ffffffff c2390000 c001bac0 c2082288 c812df60 c001ba60
GPR24: c23949c0 00000018 00080000 00000004 c80ff200 00000002 c2348ee4 c2394718
NIP [c000b684] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
LR [c000b684] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
--- interrupt: 500
[c812de90] [c10e3f90] rcu_eqs_enter.isra.60+0xc0/0x110 (unreliable)
[c812deb0] [c10ef7fc] default_idle_call+0xbc/0x230
[c812dee0] [c00af0e8] do_idle+0x1c8/0x200
[c812df10] [c00af3c0] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
[c812df20] [c001e010] start_secondary+0x5d0/0xba0
[c812dff0] [c00028a0] __secondary_start+0x90/0xdc
This happened because we would overrun the i2c->msgs array on the final
interrupt for the I2C STOP. This didn't happen if the last message was a
read because there is no interrupt in that case. Ensure that we only
access the current message if we are not processing a I2C STOP
condition.
Fixes: 1538d82f46 ("i2c: mpc: Interrupt driven transfer")
Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
After commit 401fb12c68 ("mm/sl*b: Differentiate struct slab fields by
sl*b implementations"), we can reorder fields of struct slab depending
on slab allocator.
For now, page_mapcount_reset() is called because page->_mapcount and
slab->units have same offset. But this is not necessary for struct slab.
Use unused field for units instead.
Signed-off-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211212065241.GA886691@odroid
page->freelist is for the use of slab. Using page->index is the same
set of bits as page->freelist, and by using an integer instead of a
pointer, we can avoid casts.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
The ->freelist and ->units members of struct page are for the use of
slab only. I'm not particularly familiar with zsmalloc, so generate the
same code by using page->index to store 'page' (page->index and
page->freelist are at the same offset in struct page). This should be
cleaned up properly at some point by somebody who is familiar with
zsmalloc.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
The fields 'next' and 'slabs' are only used when CONFIG_SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
is enabled. We can put their definition to #ifdef to prevent accidental
use when disabled.
Currenlty show_slab_objects() and slabs_cpu_partial_show() contain code
accessing the slabs field that's effectively dead with
CONFIG_SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL=n through the wrappers slub_percpu_partial() and
slub_percpu_partial_read_once(), but to prevent a compile error, we need
to hide all this code behind #ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Before commit b47291ef02 ("mm, slub: change percpu partial accounting
from objects to pages") we had to fit two integer fields into a native
word size, so we used short int on 32-bit and int on 64-bit via #ifdef.
After that commit there is only one integer field, so we can simply
define it as int everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
With a struct slab definition separate from struct page, we can go
further and define only fields that the chosen sl*b implementation uses.
This means everything between __page_flags and __page_refcount
placeholders now depends on the chosen CONFIG_SL*B. Some fields exist in
all implementations (slab_list) but can be part of a union in some, so
it's simpler to repeat them than complicate the definition with ifdefs
even more.
The patch doesn't change physical offsets of the fields, although it
could be done later - for example it's now clear that tighter packing in
SLOB could be possible.
This should also prevent accidental use of fields that don't exist in
given implementation. Before this patch virt_to_cache() and
cache_from_obj() were visible for SLOB (albeit not used), although they
rely on the slab_cache field that isn't set by SLOB. With this patch
it's now a compile error, so these functions are now hidden behind
an #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> # kfence
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
The function sets some fields that are being moved from struct page to
struct slab so it needs to be converted.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
KASAN accesses some slab related struct page fields so we need to
convert it to struct slab. Some places are a bit simplified thanks to
kasan_addr_to_slab() encapsulating the PageSlab flag check through
virt_to_slab(). When resolving object address to either a real slab or
a large kmalloc, use struct folio as the intermediate type for testing
the slab flag to avoid unnecessary implicit compound_head().
[ vbabka@suse.cz: use struct folio, adjust to differences in previous
patches ]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Tested-by: Hyeongogn Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Use struct slab throughout the slob allocator. Where non-slab page can
appear use struct folio instead of struct page.
[ vbabka@suse.cz: don't introduce wrappers for PageSlobFree in mm/slab.h
just for the single callers being wrappers in mm/slob.c ]
[ Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>: fix NULL pointer deference ]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
page->memcg_data is used with MEMCG_DATA_OBJCGS flag only for slab pages
so convert all the related infrastructure to struct slab. Also use
struct folio instead of struct page when resolving object pointers.
This is not just mechanistic changing of types and names. Now in
mem_cgroup_from_obj() we use folio_test_slab() to decide if we interpret
the folio as a real slab instead of a large kmalloc, instead of relying
on MEMCG_DATA_OBJCGS bit that used to be checked in page_objcgs_check().
Similarly in memcg_slab_free_hook() where we can encounter
kmalloc_large() pages (here the folio slab flag check is implied by
virt_to_slab()). As a result, page_objcgs_check() can be dropped instead
of converted.
To avoid include cycles, move the inline definition of slab_objcgs()
from memcontrol.h to mm/slab.h.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>
Change cache_free_alien() to use slab_nid(virt_to_slab()). Otherwise
just update of comments and some remaining variable names.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
The majority of conversion from struct page to struct slab in SLAB
internals can be delegated to a coccinelle semantic patch. This includes
renaming of variables with 'page' in name to 'slab', and similar.
Big thanks to Julia Lawall and Luis Chamberlain for help with
coccinelle.
// Options: --include-headers --no-includes --smpl-spacing mm/slab.c
// Note: needs coccinelle 1.1.1 to avoid breaking whitespace, and ocaml for the
// embedded script
// build list of functions for applying the next rule
@initialize:ocaml@
@@
let ok_function p =
not (List.mem (List.hd p).current_element ["kmem_getpages";"kmem_freepages"])
// convert the type in selected functions
@@
position p : script:ocaml() { ok_function p };
@@
- struct page@p
+ struct slab
@@
@@
-PageSlabPfmemalloc(page)
+slab_test_pfmemalloc(slab)
@@
@@
-ClearPageSlabPfmemalloc(page)
+slab_clear_pfmemalloc(slab)
@@
@@
obj_to_index(
...,
- page
+ slab_page(slab)
,...)
// for all functions, change any "struct slab *page" parameter to "struct slab
// *slab" in the signature, and generally all occurences of "page" to "slab" in
// the body - with some special cases.
@@
identifier fn;
expression E;
@@
fn(...,
- struct slab *page
+ struct slab *slab
,...)
{
<...
(
- int page_node;
+ int slab_node;
|
- page_node
+ slab_node
|
- page_slab(page)
+ slab
|
- page_address(page)
+ slab_address(slab)
|
- page_size(page)
+ slab_size(slab)
|
- page_to_nid(page)
+ slab_nid(slab)
|
- virt_to_head_page(E)
+ virt_to_slab(E)
|
- page
+ slab
)
...>
}
// rename a function parameter
@@
identifier fn;
expression E;
@@
fn(...,
- int page_node
+ int slab_node
,...)
{
<...
- page_node
+ slab_node
...>
}
// functions converted by previous rules that were temporarily called using
// slab_page(E) so we want to remove the wrapper now that they accept struct
// slab ptr directly
@@
identifier fn =~ "index_to_obj";
expression E;
@@
fn(...,
- slab_page(E)
+ E
,...)
// functions that were returning struct page ptr and now will return struct
// slab ptr, including slab_page() wrapper removal
@@
identifier fn =~ "cache_grow_begin|get_valid_first_slab|get_first_slab";
expression E;
@@
fn(...)
{
<...
- slab_page(E)
+ E
...>
}
// rename any former struct page * declarations
@@
@@
struct slab *
-page
+slab
;
// all functions (with exceptions) with a local "struct slab *page" variable
// that will be renamed to "struct slab *slab"
@@
identifier fn !~ "kmem_getpages|kmem_freepages";
expression E;
@@
fn(...)
{
<...
(
- page_slab(page)
+ slab
|
- page_to_nid(page)
+ slab_nid(slab)
|
- kasan_poison_slab(page)
+ kasan_poison_slab(slab_page(slab))
|
- page_address(page)
+ slab_address(slab)
|
- page_size(page)
+ slab_size(slab)
|
- page->pages
+ slab->slabs
|
- page = virt_to_head_page(E)
+ slab = virt_to_slab(E)
|
- virt_to_head_page(E)
+ virt_to_slab(E)
|
- page
+ slab
)
...>
}
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
These functions sit at the boundary to page allocator. Also use folio
internally to avoid extra compound_head() when dealing with page flags.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
