Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> writes:
> This patch has locking problem. I've got lockdep splat under LTP.
>
> [ 6633.115456] ======================================================
> [ 6633.115502] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
> [ 6633.115553] 4.9.10-debug+ #9 Tainted: G L
> [ 6633.115584] -------------------------------------------------------
> [ 6633.115627] ksm02/284980 is trying to acquire lock:
> [ 6633.115659] (&sb->s_type->i_lock_key#4){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff816bc1ce>] igrab+0x1e/0x80
> [ 6633.115834] but task is already holding lock:
> [ 6633.115882] (sysctl_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff817e379b>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x6b/0x110
> [ 6633.116026] which lock already depends on the new lock.
> [ 6633.116026]
> [ 6633.116080]
> [ 6633.116080] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
> [ 6633.116117]
> -> #2 (sysctl_lock){+.+...}:
> -> #1 (&(&dentry->d_lockref.lock)->rlock){+.+...}:
> -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_lock_key#4){+.+...}:
>
> d_lock nests inside i_lock
> sysctl_lock nests inside d_lock in d_compare
>
> This patch adds i_lock nesting inside sysctl_lock.
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> replied:
> Once ->unregistering is set, you can drop sysctl_lock just fine. So I'd
> try something like this - use rcu_read_lock() in proc_sys_prune_dcache(),
> drop sysctl_lock() before it and regain after. Make sure that no inodes
> are added to the list ones ->unregistering has been set and use RCU list
> primitives for modifying the inode list, with sysctl_lock still used to
> serialize its modifications.
>
> Freeing struct inode is RCU-delayed (see proc_destroy_inode()), so doing
> igrab() is safe there. Since we don't drop inode reference until after we'd
> passed beyond it in the list, list_for_each_entry_rcu() should be fine.
I agree with Al Viro's analsysis of the situtation.
Fixes: d6cffbbe9a ("proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering")
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Tested-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Right now bprm_fill_uid() uses inode fetched from file_inode(bprm->file).
This in turn returns inode of lower filesystem (in a stacked filesystem
setup).
I was playing with modified patches of shiftfs posted by james bottomley
and realized that through shiftfs setuid bit does not take effect. And
reason being that we fetch uid/gid from inode of lower fs (and not from
shiftfs inode). And that results in following checks failing.
/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))
return;
uid/gid fetched from lower fs inode might not be mapped inside the user
namespace of container. So we need to look at uid/gid fetched from
upper filesystem (shiftfs in this particular case) and these should be
mapped and setuid bit can take affect.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Currently unregistering sysctl table does not prune its dentries.
Stale dentries could slowdown sysctl operations significantly.
For example, command:
# for i in {1..100000} ; do unshare -n -- sysctl -a &> /dev/null ; done
creates a millions of stale denties around sysctls of loopback interface:
# sysctl fs.dentry-state
fs.dentry-state = 25812579 24724135 45 0 0 0
All of them have matching names thus lookup have to scan though whole
hash chain and call d_compare (proc_sys_compare) which checks them
under system-wide spinlock (sysctl_lock).
# time sysctl -a > /dev/null
real 1m12.806s
user 0m0.016s
sys 1m12.400s
Currently only memory reclaimer could remove this garbage.
But without significant memory pressure this never happens.
This patch collects sysctl inodes into list on sysctl table header and
prunes all their dentries once that table unregisters.
Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> writes:
> On 10.02.2017 10:47, Al Viro wrote:
>> how about >> the matching stats *after* that patch?
>
> dcache size doesn't grow endlessly, so stats are fine
>
> # sysctl fs.dentry-state
> fs.dentry-state = 92712 58376 45 0 0 0
>
> # time sysctl -a &>/dev/null
>
> real 0m0.013s
> user 0m0.004s
> sys 0m0.008s
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Ever since mount propagation was introduced in cases where a mount in
propagated to parent mount mountpoint pair that is already in use the
code has placed the new mount behind the old mount in the mount hash
table.
This implementation detail is problematic as it allows creating
arbitrary length mount hash chains.
Furthermore it invalidates the constraint maintained elsewhere in the
mount code that a parent mount and a mountpoint pair will have exactly
one mount upon them. Making it hard to deal with and to talk about
this special case in the mount code.
Modify mount propagation to notice when there is already a mount at
the parent mount and mountpoint where a new mount is propagating to
and place that preexisting mount on top of the new mount.
Modify unmount propagation to notice when a mount that is being
unmounted has another mount on top of it (and no other children), and
to replace the unmounted mount with the mount on top of it.
Move the MNT_UMUONT test from __lookup_mnt_last into
__propagate_umount as that is the only call of __lookup_mnt_last where
MNT_UMOUNT may be set on any mount visible in the mount hash table.
These modifications allow:
- __lookup_mnt_last to be removed.
- attach_shadows to be renamed __attach_mnt and its shadow
handling to be removed.
- commit_tree to be simplified
- copy_tree to be simplified
The result is an easier to understand tree of mounts that does not
allow creation of arbitrary length hash chains in the mount hash table.
The result is also a very slight userspace visible difference in semantics.
The following two cases now behave identically, where before order
mattered:
case 1: (explicit user action)
B is a slave of A
mount something on A/a , it will propagate to B/a
and than mount something on B/a
case 2: (tucked mount)
B is a slave of A
mount something on B/a
and than mount something on A/a
Histroically umount A/a would fail in case 1 and succeed in case 2.
Now umount A/a succeeds in both configurations.
This very small change in semantics appears if anything to be a bug
fix to me and my survey of userspace leads me to believe that no programs
will notice or care of this subtle semantic change.
v2: Updated to mnt_change_mountpoint to not call dput or mntput
and instead to decrement the counts directly. It is guaranteed
that there will be other references when mnt_change_mountpoint is
called so this is safe.
v3: Moved put_mountpoint under mount_lock in attach_recursive_mnt
As the locking in fs/namespace.c changed between v2 and v3.
v4: Reworked the logic in propagate_mount_busy and __propagate_umount
that detects when a mount completely covers another mount.
v5: Removed unnecessary tests whose result is alwasy true in
find_topper and attach_recursive_mnt.
v6: Document the user space visible semantic difference.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b90fa9ae8f ("[PATCH] shared mount handling: bind and rbind")
Tested-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Michael Kerrisk <<mtk.manpages@gmail.com> writes:
I would like to write code that discovers the namespace setup on a live
system. The NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS ioctl() operations added in
Linux 4.9 provide much of what I want, but there are still a couple of
small pieces missing. Those pieces are added with this patch series.
Here's an example program that makes use of the new ioctl() operations.
8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---
/* ns_capable.c
(C) 2016 Michael Kerrisk, <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Licensed under the GNU General Public License v2 or later.
Test whether a process (identified by PID) might (subject to LSM checks)
have capabilities in a namespace (identified by a /proc/PID/ns/xxx file).
*/
} while (0)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } while (0)
/* Display capabilities sets of process with specified PID */
static void
show_cap(pid_t pid)
{
cap_t caps;
char *cap_string;
caps = cap_get_pid(pid);
if (caps == NULL)
errExit("cap_get_proc");
cap_string = cap_to_text(caps, NULL);
if (cap_string == NULL)
errExit("cap_to_text");
printf("Capabilities: %s\n", cap_string);
}
/* Obtain the effective UID pf the process 'pid' by
scanning its /proc/PID/file */
static uid_t
get_euid_of_process(pid_t pid)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
char line[1024];
int uid;
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%ld/status", (long) pid);
FILE *fp;
fp = fopen(path, "r");
if (fp == NULL)
errExit("fopen-/proc/PID/status");
for (;;) {
if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) == NULL) {
/* Should never happen... */
fprintf(stderr, "Failure scanning %s\n", path);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (strstr(line, "Uid:") == line) {
sscanf(line, "Uid: %*d %d %*d %*d", &uid);
return uid;
}
}
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ns_fd, userns_fd, pid_userns_fd;
int nstype;
int next_fd;
struct stat pid_stat;
struct stat target_stat;
char *pid_str;
pid_t pid;
char path[PATH_MAX];
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s PID [ns-file]\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t'ns-file' is a /proc/PID/ns/xxxx file; "
"if omitted, use the namespace\n"
"\treferred to by standard input "
"(file descriptor 0)\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pid_str = argv[1];
pid = atoi(pid_str);
if (argc <= 2) {
ns_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
} else {
ns_fd = open(argv[2], O_RDONLY);
if (ns_fd == -1)
errExit("open-ns-file");
}
/* Get the relevant user namespace FD, which is 'ns_fd' if 'ns_fd' refers
to a user namespace, otherwise the user namespace that owns 'ns_fd' */
nstype = ioctl(ns_fd, NS_GET_NSTYPE);
if (nstype == -1)
errExit("ioctl-NS_GET_NSTYPE");
if (nstype == CLONE_NEWUSER) {
userns_fd = ns_fd;
} else {
userns_fd = ioctl(ns_fd, NS_GET_USERNS);
if (userns_fd == -1)
errExit("ioctl-NS_GET_USERNS");
}
/* Obtain 'stat' info for the user namespace of the specified PID */
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%s/ns/user", pid_str);
pid_userns_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (pid_userns_fd == -1)
errExit("open-PID");
if (fstat(pid_userns_fd, &pid_stat) == -1)
errExit("fstat-PID");
/* Get 'stat' info for the target user namesapce */
if (fstat(userns_fd, &target_stat) == -1)
errExit("fstat-PID");
/* If the PID is in the target user namespace, then it has
whatever capabilities are in its sets. */
if (pid_stat.st_dev == target_stat.st_dev &&
pid_stat.st_ino == target_stat.st_ino) {
printf("PID is in target namespace\n");
printf("Subject to LSM checks, it has the following capabilities\n");
show_cap(pid);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
/* Otherwise, we need to walk through the ancestors of the target
user namespace to see if PID is in an ancestor namespace */
for (;;) {
int f;
next_fd = ioctl(userns_fd, NS_GET_PARENT);
if (next_fd == -1) {
/* The error here should be EPERM... */
if (errno != EPERM)
errExit("ioctl-NS_GET_PARENT");
printf("PID is not in an ancestor namespace\n");
printf("It has no capabilities in the target namespace\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
if (fstat(next_fd, &target_stat) == -1)
errExit("fstat-PID");
/* If the 'stat' info for this user namespace matches the 'stat'
* info for 'next_fd', then the PID is in an ancestor namespace */
if (pid_stat.st_dev == target_stat.st_dev &&
pid_stat.st_ino == target_stat.st_ino)
break;
/* Next time round, get the next parent */
f = userns_fd;
userns_fd = next_fd;
close(f);
}
/* At this point, we found that PID is in an ancestor of the target
user namespace, and 'userns_fd' refers to the immediate descendant
user namespace of PID in the chain of user namespaces from PID to
the target user namespace. If the effective UID of PID matches the
owner UID of descendant user namespace, then PID has all
capabilities in the descendant namespace(s); otherwise, it just has
the capabilities that are in its sets. */
uid_t owner_uid, uid;
if (ioctl(userns_fd, NS_GET_OWNER_UID, &owner_uid) == -1) {
perror("ioctl-NS_GET_OWNER_UID");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
uid = get_euid_of_process(pid);
printf("PID is in an ancestor namespace\n");
if (owner_uid == uid) {
printf("And its effective UID matches the owner "
"of the namespace\n");
printf("Subject to LSM checks, PID has all capabilities in "
"that namespace!\n");
} else {
printf("But its effective UID does not match the owner "
"of the namespace\n");
printf("Subject to LSM checks, it has the following capabilities\n");
show_cap(pid);
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---
Michael Kerrisk (2):
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs/nsfs.c | 13 +++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 9 +++++++--
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
I'd like to write code that discovers the user namespace hierarchy on a
running system, and also shows who owns the various user namespaces.
Currently, there is no way of getting the owner UID of a user namespace.
Therefore, this patch adds a new NS_GET_CREATOR_UID ioctl() that fetches
the UID (as seen in the user namespace of the caller) of the creator of
the user namespace referred to by the specified file descriptor.
If the supplied file descriptor does not refer to a user namespace,
the operation fails with the error EINVAL. If the owner UID does
not have a mapping in the caller's user namespace return the
overflow UID as that appears easier to deal with in practice
in user-space applications.
-- EWB Changed the handling of unmapped UIDs from -EOVERFLOW
back to the overflow uid. Per conversation with
Michael Kerrisk after examining his test code.
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To support unprivileged users mounting filesystems two permission
checks have to be performed: a test to see if the user allowed to
create a mount in the mount namespace, and a test to see if
the user is allowed to access the specified filesystem.
The automount case is special in that mounting the original filesystem
grants permission to mount the sub-filesystems, to any user who
happens to stumble across the their mountpoint and satisfies the
ordinary filesystem permission checks.
Attempting to handle the automount case by using override_creds
almost works. It preserves the idea that permission to mount
the original filesystem is permission to mount the sub-filesystem.
Unfortunately using override_creds messes up the filesystems
ordinary permission checks.
Solve this by being explicit that a mount is a submount by introducing
vfs_submount, and using it where appropriate.
vfs_submount uses a new mount internal mount flags MS_SUBMOUNT, to let
sget and friends know that a mount is a submount so they can take appropriate
action.
sget and sget_userns are modified to not perform any permission checks
on submounts.
follow_automount is modified to stop using override_creds as that
has proven problemantic.
do_mount is modified to always remove the new MS_SUBMOUNT flag so
that we know userspace will never by able to specify it.
autofs4 is modified to stop using current_real_cred that was put in
there to handle the previous version of submount permission checking.
cifs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to vfs_submount.
debugfs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to
trace_automount by adding a new parameter. To make this change easier
a new typedef debugfs_automount_t is introduced to capture the type of
the debugfs automount function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 069d5ac9ae ("autofs: Fix automounts by using current_real_cred()->uid")
Fixes: aeaa4a79ff ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds")
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
may_create() rejects creation of inodes with ids which lack a
mapping into s_user_ns. However for O_CREAT may_o_create() is
is used instead. Add a similar check there.
Fixes: 036d523641 ("vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Linux 4.9 added two ioctl() operations that can be used to discover:
* the parental relationships for hierarchical namespaces (user and PID)
[NS_GET_PARENT]
* the user namespaces that owns a specified non-user-namespace
[NS_GET_USERNS]
For no good reason that I can glean, NS_GET_USERNS was made synonymous
with NS_GET_PARENT for user namespaces. It might have been better if
NS_GET_USERNS had returned an error if the supplied file descriptor
referred to a user namespace, since it suggests that the caller may be
confused. More particularly, if it had generated an error, then I wouldn't
need the new ioctl() operation proposed here. (On the other hand, what
I propose here may be more generally useful.)
I would like to write code that discovers namespace relationships for
the purpose of understanding the namespace setup on a running system.
In particular, given a file descriptor (or pathname) for a namespace,
N, I'd like to obtain the corresponding user namespace. Namespace N
might be a user namespace (in which case my code would just use N) or
a non-user namespace (in which case my code will use NS_GET_USERNS to
get the user namespace associated with N). The problem is that there
is no way to tell the difference by looking at the file descriptor
(and if I try to use NS_GET_USERNS on an N that is a user namespace, I
get the parent user namespace of N, which is not what I want).
This patch therefore adds a new ioctl(), NS_GET_NSTYPE, which, given
a file descriptor that refers to a user namespace, returns the
namespace type (one of the CLONE_NEW* constants).
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Instead of making the files owned by the GLOBAL_ROOT_USER. Make
non-dumpable files whose mm has always lived in a user namespace owned
by the user namespace root. This allows the container root to have
things work as expected in a container.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This patchset converts inotify to using the newly introduced
per-userns sysctl infrastructure.
Currently the inotify instances/watches are being accounted in the
user_struct structure. This means that in setups where multiple
users in unprivileged containers map to the same underlying
real user (i.e. pointing to the same user_struct) the inotify limits
are going to be shared as well, allowing one user(or application) to exhaust
all others limits.
Fix this by switching the inotify sysctls to using the
per-namespace/per-user limits. This will allow the server admin to
set sensible global limits, which can further be tuned inside every
individual user namespace. Additionally, in order to preserve the
sysctl ABI make the existing inotify instances/watches sysctls
modify the values of the initial user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add MS_KERNMOUNT to the flags that are passed.
Use sget_userns and force &init_user_ns instead of calling sget so that
even if called from a weird context the internal filesystem will be
considered to be in the intial user namespace.
Luis Ressel reported that the the failure to pass MS_KERNMOUNT into
mount_pseudo broke his in development graphics driver that uses the
generic drm infrastructure. I am not certain the deriver was bug
free in it's usage of that infrastructure but since
mount_pseudo_xattr can never be triggered by userspace it is clearer
and less error prone, and less problematic for the code to be explicit.
Reported-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Tested-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire. At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.
Kristen Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> reported:
> This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
> attempt to free the same mountpoint. This occurs because some callers
> hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock. Some
> even hold both.
>
> In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
> put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
> a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.
Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.
I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock. The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.
d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set. This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce07d891a0 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that dax_iomap_fault() calls ->iomap_begin() without entry lock, we
can use transaction starting in ext4_iomap_begin() and thus simplify
ext4_dax_fault(). It also provides us proper retries in case of ENOSPC.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Currently ->iomap_begin() handler is called with entry lock held. If the
filesystem held any locks between ->iomap_begin() and ->iomap_end()
(such as ext4 which will want to hold transaction open), this would cause
lock inversion with the iomap_apply() from standard IO path which first
calls ->iomap_begin() and only then calls ->actor() callback which grabs
entry locks for DAX (if it faults when copying from/to user provided
buffers).
Fix the problem by nesting grabbing of entry lock inside ->iomap_begin()
- ->iomap_end() pair.
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
The only case when we do not finish the page fault completely is when we
are loading hole pages into a radix tree. Avoid this special case and
finish the fault in that case as well inside the DAX fault handler. It
will allow us for easier iomap handling.
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Currently dax_iomap_rw() takes care of invalidating page tables and
evicting hole pages from the radix tree when write(2) to the file
happens. This invalidation is only necessary when there is some block
allocation resulting from write(2). Furthermore in current place the
invalidation is racy wrt page fault instantiating a hole page just after
we have invalidated it.
So perform the page invalidation inside dax_iomap_actor() where we can
do it only when really necessary and after blocks have been allocated so
nobody will be instantiating new hole pages anymore.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Currently invalidate_inode_pages2_range() and invalidate_mapping_pages()
just delete all exceptional radix tree entries they find. For DAX this
is not desirable as we track cache dirtiness in these entries and when
they are evicted, we may not flush caches although it is necessary. This
can for example manifest when we write to the same block both via mmap
and via write(2) (to different offsets) and fsync(2) then does not
properly flush CPU caches when modification via write(2) was the last
one.
Create appropriate DAX functions to handle invalidation of DAX entries
for invalidate_inode_pages2_range() and invalidate_mapping_pages() and
wire them up into the corresponding mm functions.
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
So far we did not return BH_New buffers from ext2_get_blocks() when we
allocated and zeroed-out a block for DAX inode to avoid racy zeroing in
DAX code. This zeroing is gone these days so we can remove the
workaround.
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
No point in going through loops and hoops instead of just comparing the
values.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
ktime_set(S,N) was required for the timespec storage type and is still
useful for situations where a Seconds and Nanoseconds part of a time value
needs to be converted. For anything where the Seconds argument is 0, this
is pointless and can be replaced with a simple assignment.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
ktime is a union because the initial implementation stored the time in
scalar nanoseconds on 64 bit machine and in a endianess optimized timespec
variant for 32bit machines. The Y2038 cleanup removed the timespec variant
and switched everything to scalar nanoseconds. The union remained, but
become completely pointless.
Get rid of the union and just keep ktime_t as simple typedef of type s64.
The conversion was done with coccinelle and some manual mopping up.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
"This ncludes various cifs/smb3 bug fixes, mostly for stable as well.
In the next week I expect that Germano will have some reconnection
fixes, and also I expect to have the remaining pieces of the snapshot
enablement and SMB3 ACLs, but wanted to get this set of bug fixes in"
* 'for-next' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
cifs_get_root shouldn't use path with tree name
Fix default behaviour for empty domains and add domainauto option
cifs: use %16phN for formatting md5 sum
cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
CIFS: Fix a possible double locking of mutex during reconnect
CIFS: Fix a possible memory corruption during reconnect
CIFS: Fix a possible memory corruption in push locks
CIFS: Fix missing nls unload in smb2_reconnect()
CIFS: Decrease verbosity of ioctl call
SMB3: parsing for new snapshot timestamp mount parm
Pull final vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
ufs: fix function declaration for ufs_truncate_blocks
fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
seq_file: reset iterator to first record for zero offset
vfs: fix isize/pos/len checks for reflink & dedupe
[iov_iter] fix iterate_all_kinds() on empty iterators
move aio compat to fs/aio.c
reorganize do_make_slave()
clone_private_mount() doesn't need to touch namespace_sem
remove a bogus claim about namespace_sem being held by callers of mnt_alloc_id()
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Merge tag 'befs-v4.10-rc1' of git://github.com/luisbg/linux-befs
Pull befs updates from Luis de Bethencourt:
"A series of small fixes and adding NFS export support"
* tag 'befs-v4.10-rc1' of git://github.com/luisbg/linux-befs:
befs: add NFS export support
befs: remove trailing whitespaces
befs: remove signatures from comments
befs: fix style issues in header files
befs: fix style issues in linuxvfs.c
befs: fix typos in linuxvfs.c
befs: fix style issues in io.c
befs: fix style issues in inode.c
befs: fix style issues in debug.c
sparse says:
fs/ufs/inode.c:1195:6: warning: symbol 'ufs_truncate_blocks' was not declared. Should it be static?
Note that the forward declaration in the file is already marked static.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it
then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are
"exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process
being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file
descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access
/proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link,
though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors
will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not
been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be
reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a
PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem
can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect
against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may
reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
Cc: dev@opencontainers.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.2+
Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If kernfs file is empty on a first read, successive read operations
using the same file descriptor will return no data, even when data is
available. Default kernfs 'seq_next' implementation advances iterator
position even when next object is not there. Kernfs 'seq_start' for
following requests will not return iterator as position is already on
the second object.
This defect doesn't allow to monitor badblocks sysfs files from MD raid.
They are initially empty but if data appears at some stage, userspace is
not able to read it.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Majchrzak <tomasz.majchrzak@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Strengthen the checking of pos/len vs. i_size, clarify the return values
for the clone prep function, and remove pointless code.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and fix the minor buglet in compat io_submit() - native one
kills ioctx as cleanup when put_user() fails. Get rid of
bogus compat_... in !CONFIG_AIO case, while we are at it - they
should simply fail with ENOSYS, same as for native counterparts.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Removing all trailing whitespaces in befs.
I was skeptic about tainting the history with this, but whitespace changes
can be ignored by using 'git blame -w' and 'git log -w'.
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
No idea why some comments have signatures. These predate git. Removing them
since they add noise and no information.
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Fixing checkpatch.pl issues in befs header files:
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+ befs_inode_addr iaddr;
+ iaddr.allocation_group = blockno >> BEFS_SB(sb)->ag_shift;
WARNING: space prohibited between function name and open parenthesis '('
+ return BEFS_SB(sb)->block_size / sizeof (befs_disk_inode_addr);
ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
+ const char *key, befs_off_t * value);
ERROR: Macros with complex values should be enclosed in parentheses
+#define PACKED __attribute__ ((__packed__))
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Fix the following type of checkpatch.pl issues:
WARNING: line over 80 characters
+static struct dentry *befs_lookup(struct inode *, struct dentry *, unsigned int);
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
+ if (!bi)$
WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line
+ if (!bi)$
WARNING: labels should not be indented
+ unacquire_bh:
WARNING: space prohibited between function name and open parenthesis '('
+ sizeof (struct befs_inode_info),
WARNING: braces {} are not necessary for single statement blocks
+ if (!*out) {
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
WARNING: Block comments use a trailing */ on a separate line
+ * in special cases */
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+ int token;
+ if (!*p)
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
+ if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, sb_block))) {
ERROR: space prohibited after that open parenthesis '('
+ if( befs_sb->num_blocks > ~((sector_t)0) ) {
ERROR: space prohibited before that close parenthesis ')'
+ if( befs_sb->num_blocks > ~((sector_t)0) ) {
ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '('
+ if( befs_sb->num_blocks > ~((sector_t)0) ) {
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Fixing the two following checkpatch.pl issues:
ERROR: trailing whitespace
+ * Based on portions of file.c and inode.c $
WARNING: labels should not be indented
+ error:
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Fixing the following checkpatch.pl errors and warning:
ERROR: trailing whitespace
+ * $
WARNING: Block comments use * on subsequent lines
+/*
+ Validates the correctness of the befs inode
ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
+befs_check_inode(struct super_block *sb, befs_inode * raw_inode,
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Commit 8924feff66 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
caused a regression when there were no more readers left on a pipe that
was being spliced into: rather than the expected SIGPIPE and -EPIPE
return value, the writer would end up waiting forever for space to free
up (which obviously was not going to happen with no readers around).
Fixes: 8924feff66 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Debugged-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.9
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Highlights include:
- Further attribute cache improvements to make revalidation more fine grained
- NFSv4 locking improvements
Bugfixes:
- nfs4_fl_prepare_ds must be careful about reporting success in files layout
- pNFS/flexfiles: Instead of marking a device inactive, remove it from the cache
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-4.10-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull more NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
- further attribute cache improvements to make revalidation more fine
grained
- NFSv4 locking improvements
Bugfixes:
- nfs4_fl_prepare_ds must be careful about reporting success in files
layout
- pNFS/flexfiles: Instead of marking a device inactive, remove it
from the cache"
* tag 'nfs-for-4.10-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFSv4: Retry the DELEGRETURN if the embedded GETATTR is rejected with EACCES
NFS: Retry the CLOSE if the embedded GETATTR is rejected with EACCES
NFSv4: Place the GETATTR operation before the CLOSE
NFSv4: Also ask for attributes when downgrading to a READ-only state
NFS: Don't abuse NFS_INO_REVAL_FORCED in nfs_post_op_update_inode_locked()
pNFS: Return RW layouts on OPEN_DOWNGRADE
NFSv4: Add encode/decode of the layoutreturn op in OPEN_DOWNGRADE
NFS: Don't disconnect open-owner on NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID
NFSv4: ensure __nfs4_find_lock_state returns consistent result.
NFSv4.1: nfs4_fl_prepare_ds must be careful about reporting success.
pNFS/flexfiles: delete deviceid, don't mark inactive
NFS: Clean up nfs_attribute_timeout()
NFS: Remove unused function nfs_revalidate_inode_rcu()
NFS: Fix and clean up the access cache validity checking
NFS: Only look at the change attribute cache state in nfs_weak_revalidate()
NFS: Clean up cache validity checking
NFS: Don't revalidate the file on close if we hold a delegation
NFSv4: Don't discard the attributes returned by asynchronous DELEGRETURN
NFSv4: Update the attribute cache info in update_changeattr
If our DELEGRETURN RPC call is rejected with an EACCES call, then we should
remove the GETATTR call from the compound RPC and retry.
This could potentially happen when there is a conflict between an
ACL denying attribute reads and our use of SP4_MACH_CRED.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
If our CLOSE RPC call is rejected with an EACCES call, then we should
remove the GETATTR call from the compound RPC and retry.
This could potentially happen when there is a conflict between an
ACL denying attribute reads and our use of SP4_MACH_CRED.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
In order to benefit from the DENY share lock protection, we should
put the GETATTR operation before the CLOSE. Otherwise, we might race
with a Windows machine that thinks it is now safe to modify the file.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
If we're downgrading from a READ+WRITE mode to a READ-only mode, then
ask for cache consistency attributes so that we avoid the revalidation
in nfs_close_context()
Fixes: 3947b74d0f ("NFSv4: Don't request a GETATTR on open_downgrade.")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
The NFS_INO_REVAL_FORCED flag now really only has meaning for the
case when we've just been handed a delegation for a file that was already
cached, and we're unsure about that cache.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
