This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.
This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.
Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence
build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be
used uninitialized' warnings. Silence these by returning after the BUG().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The filename_trans rule processing has some printk(KERN_ERR ) messages
which were intended as debug aids in creating the code but weren't removed
before it was submitted. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Initialize policydb.process_class once all symtabs read from policy image,
so that it could be used to setup the role_trans.tclass field when a lower
version policy.X is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Commit 6f5317e730 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument
to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object
managers.
If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel.
In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched
kernel.
Thanks,
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com>
[manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If kernel policy version is >= 26, then write the class field of the
role_trans structure into the binary reprensentation.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If kernel policy version is >= 26, then the binary representation of
the role_trans structure supports specifying the class for the current
subject or the newly created object.
If kernel policy version is < 26, then the class field would be default
to the process class.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but
takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer.
Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a
problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works
much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special
case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()
selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.
Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or
EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new
key that key_alloc() is about to allocate. The operation may reject the
description if it wishes with an error of its choosing. If it does this, the
key will not be allocated.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code
amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount
operation. Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from
the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the
current superblock.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove
options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining
options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the
SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls
into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed
to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where
this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will
print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using
xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and
ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called
and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means
and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop
# mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp
/dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0
# mount -o remount /mnt/tmp
mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option
# dmesg
EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value
This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The security context for the newly created socket shares the same
user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different
type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant
policy package.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
[fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.
The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
"socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
In tomoyo_check_open_permission() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error
recalculating already calculated pathname when checking allow_rewrite
permission. As a result, memory will leak whenever a file is opened for writing
without O_APPEND flag. Also, performance will degrade because TOMOYO is
calculating pathname regardless of profile configuration.
This patch fixes the leak and performance degrade.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This reverts commit 242631c49d.
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check
permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl. In commit
242631c49d the SELinux code stopped trying to understand
individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to
determine in we should check read or write for that operation. This
same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO).
But this suggestion is total rubbish. The ioctl access bits are
actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the
ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the
object the ioctl is being performed upon.
Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example. FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as:
FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap)
So it has access bits R and W. What this really means is that the
kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap. It has
nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform
on the file itself!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel
definitions.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the
multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after
forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding.
A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context,
but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook,
the packet is going to be forwarded.
With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet
forwarding.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just
called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these
functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads
to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last
is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks
for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc accidentally checks the xfrm domain of
interpretation against the selinux context algorithm. This patch
fixes this by checking ctx_alg against the selinux context algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The original ima_must_measure() function based its results on cached
iint information, which required an iint be allocated for all files.
Currently, an iint is allocated only for files in policy. As a result,
for those files in policy, ima_must_measure() is now called twice: once
to determine if the inode is in the measurement policy and, the second
time, to determine if it needs to be measured/re-measured.
The second call to ima_must_measure() unnecessarily checks to see if
the file is in policy. As we already know the file is in policy, this
patch removes the second unnecessary call to ima_must_measure(), removes
the vestige iint parameter, and just checks the iint directly to determine
if the inode has been measured or needs to be measured/re-measured.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Now that i_readcount is maintained by the VFS layer, remove the
imbalance checking in IMA. Cleans up the IMA code nicely.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR,
as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer.
Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it
belongs.
Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other
subsystems to use i_readcount.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
interaction between the global and local rule lists.
Instead of going through one and then the other, which
missed the important case where a rule specified that
there should be no access, combine the access limitations
where there is a rule in each list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().
Fix these bugs by
(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().
(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call
through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file
system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more.
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for
/proc/sys returned
-r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
instead of
-r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling:
1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/
commit 77b14db502
[PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support
2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table:
commit 3fbfa98112
[PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply
labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did
not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/
inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by
selinux.
commit bbaca6c2e7
[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
commit 86a71dbd3e
[PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux
Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook
that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry.
We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the
proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this
patch). With this patch:
* we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private
* we don't need the sysclt security hook
* we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode.
We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a
proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like
'/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does
know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label).
PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code
because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example
from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.
There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Fix __key_link_end()'s attempt to fix up the quota if an error occurs.
There are two erroneous cases: Firstly, we always decrease the quota if
the preallocated replacement keyring needs cleaning up, irrespective of
whether or not we should (we may have replaced a pointer rather than
adding another pointer).
Secondly, we never clean up the quota if we added a pointer without the
keyring storage being extended (we allocate multiple pointers at a time,
even if we're not going to use them all immediately).
We handle this by setting the bottom bit of the preallocation pointer in
__key_link_begin() to indicate that the quota needs fixing up, which is
then passed to __key_link() (which clears the whole thing) and
__key_link_end().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One failure path in security/keys/trusted.c::trusted_update() does
not free 'new_p' while the others do. This patch makes sure we also free
it in the remaining path (if datablob_parse() returns different from
Opt_update).
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based
security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
