This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
fs/ecryptfs/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael A Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Slab constructors currently have a flags parameter that is never used. And
the order of the arguments is opposite to other slab functions. The object
pointer is placed before the kmem_cache pointer.
Convert
ctor(void *object, struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
to
ctor(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
throughout the kernel
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coupla fixes]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The functions that eventually call down to ecryptfs_read_lower(),
ecryptfs_decrypt_page(), and ecryptfs_copy_up_encrypted_with_header()
should have the responsibility of managing the page Uptodate
status. This patch gets rid of some of the ugliness that resulted from
trying to push some of the page flag setting too far down the stack.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace some magic numbers with sizeof() equivalents.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The switch to read_write.c routines and the persistent file make a number of
functions unnecessary. This patch removes them.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Update data types and add casts in order to avoid potential overflow
issues.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert readpage, prepare_write, and commit_write to use read_write.c
routines. Remove sync_page; I cannot think of a good reason for implementing
that in eCryptfs.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rather than open a new lower file for every eCryptfs file that is opened,
truncated, or setattr'd, instead use the existing lower persistent file for
the eCryptfs inode. Change truncate to use read_write.c functions. Change
ecryptfs_getxattr() to use the common ecryptfs_getxattr_lower() function.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Update the metadata read/write functions and grow_file() to use the
read_write.c routines. Do not open another lower file; use the persistent
lower file instead. Provide a separate function for
crypto.c::ecryptfs_read_xattr_region() to get to the lower xattr without
having to go through the eCryptfs getxattr.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch sets up and destroys the persistent lower file for each eCryptfs
inode.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace page encryption and decryption routines and inode size write routine
with versions that utilize the read_write.c functions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a set of functions through which all I/O to lower files is consolidated.
This patch adds a new inode_info reference to a persistent lower file for each
eCryptfs inode; another patch later in this series will set that up. This
persistent lower file is what the read_write.c functions use to call
vfs_read() and vfs_write() on the lower filesystem, so even when reads and
writes come in through aops->readpage and aops->writepage, we can satisfy them
without resorting to direct access to the lower inode's address space.
Several function declarations are going to be changing with this patchset.
For now, in order to keep from breaking the build, I am putting dummy
parameters in for those functions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The error paths and the module exit code need work. sysfs
unregistration is not the right place to tear down the crypto
subsystem, and the code to undo subsystem initializations on various
error paths is unnecessarily duplicated. This patch addresses those
issues.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no point to keeping a separate header_extent_size and an extent_size.
The total size of the header can always be represented as some multiple of
the regular data extent size.
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: ecryptfs: fix printk format warning]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs is currently just passing through splice reads to the lower
filesystem. This is obviously incorrect behavior; the decrypted data is
what needs to be read, not the lower encrypted data. I cannot think of any
good reason for eCryptfs to implement splice_read, so this patch points the
eCryptfs fops splice_read to use generic_file_splice_read.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> Please check that all the newly-added global symbols do indeed need
> to be global.
Change symbols in keystore.c and crypto.o to static if they do not
need to be global.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL;
>
> This initialisation looks like it's here to kill bogus gcc warning
> (if it is, it should have been commented). Please investigate
> uninitialized_var() and __maybe_unused sometime.
Remove some unnecessary variable initializations. There may be a few
more such intializations remaining in the code base; a future patch
will take care of those.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
From: mhalcrow@us.ibm.com <mhalcrow@halcrow.austin.ibm.com>
> > +/**
> > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key
> > + * with the given auth_tok.
> > *
> > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise.
> > */
>
> That comment purports to be a kerneldoc-style comment. But
>
> - kerneldoc doesn't support multiple lines on the introductory line
> which identifies the name of the function (alas). So you'll need to
> overflow 80 cols here.
>
> - the function args weren't documented
>
> But the return value is! People regularly forget to do that. And
> they frequently forget to document the locking prerequisites and the
> permissible calling contexts (process/might_sleep/hardirq, etc)
>
> (please check all ecryptfs kerneldoc for this stuff sometime)
This patch cleans up some of the existing comments and makes a couple
of line break tweaks. There is more work to do to bring eCryptfs into
full kerneldoc-compliance.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void)
>
> ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;)
Grammatical fix for some function names.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
> > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
>
> Maybe the compiler can optimise those two statements, but we'd
> normally provide it with some manual help.
This patch provides the compiler with some manual help for
optimizing the setting of some flags.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> > + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0);
> > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
>
> That's odd-looking. If it was a bug for num_global_auth_toks to be
> zero, and if that mutex protects num_global_auth_toks then as soon
> as the lock gets dropped, another thread can make
> num_global_auth_toks zero, hence the bug is present. Perhaps?
That was serving as an internal sanity check that should not have made
it into the final patch set in the first place. This patch removes it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:557: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:690: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:836: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1472: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1778: warning: passing argument 2 of 'write_tag_11_packet' from incompatible pointer type
fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options':
fs/ecryptfs/main.c:363: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Trivial updates to comment and debug statement.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up the Tag 11 writing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly. It looks like the packet length was 1 shorter than it should have
been, chopping off the last byte of the key identifier. This is largely
inconsequential, since it is not much more likely that a key identifier
collision will occur with 7 bytes rather than 8. This patch fixes the packet
to use the full number of bytes that were originally intended to be used for
the key identifier.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up the Tag 11 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly. Pay attention to *8* bytes for the key identifier (literal data),
no more, no less.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up the Tag 3 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly. Initialize the new auth_tok's flags.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce kmem_cache objects for handling multiple keys per inode. Add calls
in the module init and exit code to call the key list
initialization/destruction functions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping the authentication token list.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat
contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for
encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode
inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function.
This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat
struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various
inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed
from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any
time before or after mounting.
Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to
be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out
packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly
expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
prepare/commit_write no longer returns AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE since OCFS2 and
GFS2 were converted to the new aops, so we can make some simplifications
for that.
[michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch make processing netlink user -> kernel messages synchronious.
This change was inspired by the talk with Alexey Kuznetsov about current
netlink messages processing. He says that he was badly wrong when introduced
asynchronious user -> kernel communication.
The call netlink_unicast is the only path to send message to the kernel
netlink socket. But, unfortunately, it is also used to send data to the
user.
Before this change the user message has been attached to the socket queue
and sk->sk_data_ready was called. The process has been blocked until all
pending messages were processed. The bad thing is that this processing
may occur in the arbitrary process context.
This patch changes nlk->data_ready callback to get 1 skb and force packet
processing right in the netlink_unicast.
Kernel -> user path in netlink_unicast remains untouched.
EINTR processing for in netlink_run_queue was changed. It forces rtnl_lock
drop, but the process remains in the cycle until the message will be fully
processed. So, there is no need to use this kludges now.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace,
this includes the controlling kernel sockets.
This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols
to only support the initial network namespace. Request
by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED.
As they would if the kernel did not have the support for
that netlink protocol compiled in.
As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network
namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets
to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces.
The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation
at hash table insertion and hash table look up time.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This will avoid a possible fault in ecryptfs_sync_page().
In the function, eCryptfs calls sync_page() method of a lower filesystem
without checking its existence. However, there are many filesystems that
don't have this method including network filesystems such as NFS, AFS, and
so forth. They may fail when an eCryptfs page is waiting for lock.
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When ecryptfs_lookup() is called against special files, eCryptfs generates
the following errors because it tries to treat them like regular eCryptfs
files.
Error opening lower file for lower_dentry [0xffff810233a6f150], lower_mnt [0xffff810235bb4c80], and flags [0x8000]
Error opening lower_file to read header region
Error attempting to read the [user.ecryptfs] xattr from the lower file; return value = [-95]
Valid metadata not found in header region or xattr region; treating file as unencrypted
For instance, the problem can be reproduced by the steps below.
# mkdir /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# mknod /mnt/crypt/c0 c 0 0
# umount /mnt/crypt
# mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# ls -l /mnt/crypt
This patch fixes it by adding a check similar to directories and
symlinks.
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ecryptfs_init() exits without doing any cleanup jobs if
ecryptfs_init_messaging() fails. In that case, eCryptfs leaves
sysfs entries, leaks memory, and causes an invalid page fault.
This patch fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When ecryptfs_lookup() is called against special files, eCryptfs generates
the following errors because it tries to treat them like regular eCryptfs
files.
Error opening lower file for lower_dentry [0xffff810233a6f150], lower_mnt [0xffff810235bb4c80], and flags
[0x8000]
Error opening lower_file to read header region
Error attempting to read the [user.ecryptfs] xattr from the lower file; return value = [-95]
Valid metadata not found in header region or xattr region; treating file as unencrypted
For instance, the problem can be reproduced by the steps below.
# mkdir /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# mknod /mnt/crypt/c0 c 0 0
# umount /mnt/crypt
# mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
# ls -l /mnt/crypt
This patch fixes it by adding a check similar to directories and
symlinks.
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix page index to offset conversion overflows in buffer layer, ecryptfs,
and ocfs2.
It would be nice to convert the whole tree to page_offset, but for now
just fix the bugs.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
There is another bug recently introduced into the ecryptfs_setattr()
function in 2.6.22. eCryptfs will attempt to treat special files like
regular eCryptfs files on chmod, chown, and so forth. This leads to a NULL
pointer dereference. This patch validates that the file is a regular file
before proceeding with operations related to the inode's crypt_stat.
Thanks to Ryusuke Konishi for finding this bug and suggesting the fix.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Following was uncovered by compiling the kernel with '-W' flag:
CC [M] fs/ecryptfs/inode.o
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_lookup’:
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:304: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_symlink’:
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:486: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
Function ecryptfs_encode_filename() can return -ENOMEM, so change the
variables to plain int, as in the first case the only real use actually
expects int, and in latter case there is no use beoynd the error check.
Signed-off-by: Mika Kukkonen <mikukkon@iki.fi>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sysfs is now completely out of driver/module lifetime game. After
deletion, a sysfs node doesn't access anything outside sysfs proper,
so there's no reason to hold onto the attribute owners. Note that
often the wrong modules were accounted for as owners leading to
accessing removed modules.
This patch kills now unnecessary attribute->owner. Note that with
this change, userland holding a sysfs node does not prevent the
backing module from being unloaded.
For more info regarding lifetime rule cleanup, please read the
following message.
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/510293
(tweaked by Greg to not delete the field just yet, to make it easier to
merge things properly.)
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
They can use generic_file_splice_read() instead. Since sys_sendfile() now
prefers that, there should be no change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
When one llseek's past the end of the file and then writes, every page past
the previous end of the file should be cleared. Trevor found that the code,
as is, does not assure that the very last page is always cleared. This patch
takes care of that.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Recent changes in eCryptfs have made it possible to get to ecryptfs_setattr()
with an uninitialized crypt_stat struct. This results in a wide and colorful
variety of unpleasantries. This patch properly initializes the crypt_stat
structure in ecryptfs_setattr() when it is necessary to do so.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch fixes the processes involved in wiping regions of the data during
truncate and write events, fixing a kernel hang in 2.6.22-rc4 while assuring
that zero values are written out to the appropriate locations during events in
which the i_size will change.
The range passed to ecryptfs_truncate() from ecryptfs_prepare_write() includes
the page that is the object of ecryptfs_prepare_write(). This leads to a
kernel hang as read_cache_page() is executed on the same page in the
ecryptfs_truncate() execution path. This patch remedies this by limiting the
range passed to ecryptfs_truncate() so as to exclude the page that is the
object of ecryptfs_prepare_write(); it also adds code to
ecryptfs_prepare_write() to zero out the region of its own page when writing
past the i_size position. This patch also modifies ecryptfs_truncate() so
that when a file is truncated to a smaller size, eCryptfs will zero out the
contents of the new last page from the new size through to the end of the last
page.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
