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Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Lots of cleanups, mostly courtesy by Eric Biggers"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool
fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_rename()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_link()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_require_key()
fscrypt: remove unneeded empty fscrypt_operations structs
fscrypt: remove ->is_encrypted()
fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED()
fs, fscrypt: add an S_ENCRYPTED inode flag
fscrypt: clean up include file mess
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
fscrypt starts several async. crypto ops and waiting for them to
complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fscrypt_initialize(), which allocates the global bounce page pool when
an encrypted file is first accessed, uses "double-checked locking" to
try to avoid locking fscrypt_init_mutex. However, it doesn't use any
memory barriers, so it's theoretically possible for a thread to observe
a bounce page pool which has not been fully initialized. This is a
classic bug with "double-checked locking".
While "only a theoretical issue" in the latest kernel, in pre-4.8
kernels the pointer that was checked was not even the last to be
initialized, so it was easily possible for a crash (NULL pointer
dereference) to happen. This was changed only incidentally by the large
refactor to use fs/crypto/.
Solve both problems in a trivial way that can easily be backported: just
always take the mutex. It's theoretically less efficient, but it
shouldn't be noticeable in practice as the mutex is only acquired very
briefly once per encrypted file.
Later I'd like to make this use a helper macro like DO_ONCE(). However,
DO_ONCE() runs in atomic context, so we'd need to add a new macro that
allows blocking.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Introduce a helper function which prepares to look up the given dentry
in the given directory. If the directory is encrypted, it handles
loading the directory's encryption key, setting the dentry's ->d_op to
fscrypt_d_ops, and setting DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_WITH_KEY if the directory's
encryption key is available.
Note: once all filesystems switch over to this, we'll be able to move
fscrypt_d_ops and fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() to fscrypt_private.h.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Introduce a helper function which prepares to rename a file into a
possibly encrypted directory. It handles loading the encryption keys
for the source and target directories if needed, and it handles
enforcing that if the target directory (and the source directory for a
cross-rename) is encrypted, then the file being moved into the directory
has the same encryption policy as its containing directory.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Introduce a helper function which prepares to link an inode into a
possibly-encrypted directory. It handles setting up the target
directory's encryption key, then verifying that the link won't violate
the constraint that all files in an encrypted directory tree use the
same encryption policy.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Add a helper function which prepares to open a regular file which may be
encrypted. It handles setting up the file's encryption key, then
checking that the file's encryption policy matches that of its parent
directory (if the parent directory is encrypted). It may be set as the
->open() method or it can be called from another ->open() method.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
IS_ENCRYPTED() now gives the same information as
i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted() but is more efficient, since IS_ENCRYPTED()
is just a simple flag check. Prepare to remove ->is_encrypted() by
switching all callers to IS_ENCRYPTED().
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Filesystems have to include different header files based on whether they
are compiled with encryption support or not. That's nasty and messy.
Instead, rationalise the headers so we have a single include fscrypt.h
and let it decide what internal implementation to include based on the
__FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION define. Filesystems set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 1
before including linux/fscrypt.h if they are built with encryption
support. Otherwise, they must set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 0.
Add guards to prevent fscrypt_supp.h and fscrypt_notsupp.h from being
directly included by filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
[EB: use 1 and 0 rather than defined/undefined]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
When an fscrypt-encrypted file is opened, we request the file's master
key from the keyrings service as a logon key, then access its payload.
However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for
this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.
Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.
Fixes: 88bd6ccdcd ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.1+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This way we don't need a block_device structure to submit I/O. The
block_device has different life time rules from the gendisk and
request_queue and is usually only available when the block device node
is open. Other callers need to explicitly create one (e.g. the lightnvm
passthrough code, or the new nvme multipathing code).
For the actual I/O path all that we need is the gendisk, which exists
once per block device. But given that the block layer also does
partition remapping we additionally need a partition index, which is
used for said remapping in generic_make_request.
Note that all the block drivers generally want request_queue or
sometimes the gendisk, so this removes a layer of indirection all
over the stack.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
feature, which allows ext4 directories to support over 2 billion
directory entries (assuming ~64 byte file names; in practice, users
will run into practical performance limits first.) This feature was
originally written by the Lustre team, and credit goes to Artem
Blagodarenko from Seagate for getting this feature upstream.
The second major major feature allows ext4 to support extended
attribute values up to 64k. This feature was also originally from
Lustre, and has been enhanced by Tahsin Erdogan from Google with a
deduplication feature so that if multiple files have the same xattr
value (for example, Windows ACL's stored by Samba), only one copy will
be stored on disk for encoding and caching efficiency.
We also have the usual set of bug fixes, cleanups, and optimizations.
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Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o:
"The first major feature for ext4 this merge window is the largedir
feature, which allows ext4 directories to support over 2 billion
directory entries (assuming ~64 byte file names; in practice, users
will run into practical performance limits first.) This feature was
originally written by the Lustre team, and credit goes to Artem
Blagodarenko from Seagate for getting this feature upstream.
The second major major feature allows ext4 to support extended
attribute values up to 64k. This feature was also originally from
Lustre, and has been enhanced by Tahsin Erdogan from Google with a
deduplication feature so that if multiple files have the same xattr
value (for example, Windows ACL's stored by Samba), only one copy will
be stored on disk for encoding and caching efficiency.
We also have the usual set of bug fixes, cleanups, and optimizations"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (47 commits)
ext4: fix spelling mistake: "prellocated" -> "preallocated"
ext4: fix __ext4_new_inode() journal credits calculation
ext4: skip ext4_init_security() and encryption on ea_inodes
fs: generic_block_bmap(): initialize all of the fields in the temp bh
ext4: change fast symlink test to not rely on i_blocks
ext4: require key for truncate(2) of encrypted file
ext4: don't bother checking for encryption key in ->mmap()
ext4: check return value of kstrtoull correctly in reserved_clusters_store
ext4: fix off-by-one fsmap error on 1k block filesystems
ext4: return EFSBADCRC if a bad checksum error is found in ext4_find_entry()
ext4: return EIO on read error in ext4_find_entry
ext4: forbid encrypting root directory
ext4: send parallel discards on commit completions
ext4: avoid unnecessary stalls in ext4_evict_inode()
ext4: add nombcache mount option
ext4: strong binding of xattr inode references
ext4: eliminate xattr entry e_hash recalculation for removes
ext4: reserve space for xattr entries/names
quota: add get_inode_usage callback to transfer multi-inode charges
ext4: xattr inode deduplication
...
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Merge tag 'fscrypt_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add support for 128-bit AES and some cleanups to fscrypt"
* tag 'fscrypt_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: make ->dummy_context() return bool
fscrypt: add support for AES-128-CBC
fscrypt: inline fscrypt_free_filename()
ea_inode feature allows creating extended attributes that are up to
64k in size. Update __ext4_new_inode() to pick increased credit limits.
To avoid overallocating too many journal credits, update
__ext4_xattr_set_credits() to make a distinction between xattr create
vs update. This helps __ext4_new_inode() because all attributes are
known to be new, so we can save credits that are normally needed to
delete old values.
Also, have fscrypt specify its maximum context size so that we don't
end up allocating credits for 64k size.
Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
fscrypt provides facilities to use different encryption algorithms which
are selectable by userspace when setting the encryption policy. Currently,
only AES-256-XTS for file contents and AES-256-CBC-CTS for file names are
implemented. This is a clear case of kernel offers the mechanism and
userspace selects a policy. Similar to what dm-crypt and ecryptfs have.
This patch adds support for using AES-128-CBC for file contents and
AES-128-CBC-CTS for file name encryption. To mitigate watermarking
attacks, IVs are generated using the ESSIV algorithm. While AES-CBC is
actually slightly less secure than AES-XTS from a security point of view,
there is more widespread hardware support. Using AES-CBC gives us the
acceptable performance while still providing a moderate level of security
for persistent storage.
Especially low-powered embedded devices with crypto accelerators such as
CAAM or CESA often only support AES-CBC. Since using AES-CBC over AES-XTS
is basically thought of a last resort, we use AES-128-CBC over AES-256-CBC
since it has less encryption rounds and yields noticeable better
performance starting from a file size of just a few kB.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walter <dwalter@sigma-star.at>
[david@sigma-star.at: addressed review comments]
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
fscrypt_free_filename() only needs to do a kfree() of crypto_buf.name,
which works well as an inline function. We can skip setting the various
pointers to NULL, since no user cares about it (the name is always freed
just before it goes out of scope).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Replace bi_error with a new bi_status to allow for a clear conversion.
Note that device mapper overloaded bi_error with a private value, which
we'll have to keep arround at least for now and thus propagate to a
proper blk_status_t value.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Introduce a helper function fscrypt_match_name() which tests whether a
fscrypt_name matches a directory entry. Also clean up the magic numbers
and document things properly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
When accessing an encrypted directory without the key, userspace must
operate on filenames derived from the ciphertext names, which contain
arbitrary bytes. Since we must support filenames as long as NAME_MAX,
we can't always just base64-encode the ciphertext, since that may make
it too long. Currently, this is solved by presenting long names in an
abbreviated form containing any needed filesystem-specific hashes (e.g.
to identify a directory block), then the last 16 bytes of ciphertext.
This needs to be sufficient to identify the actual name on lookup.
However, there is a bug. It seems to have been assumed that due to the
use of a CBC (ciphertext block chaining)-based encryption mode, the last
16 bytes (i.e. the AES block size) of ciphertext would depend on the
full plaintext, preventing collisions. However, we actually use CBC
with ciphertext stealing (CTS), which handles the last two blocks
specially, causing them to appear "flipped". Thus, it's actually the
second-to-last block which depends on the full plaintext.
This caused long filenames that differ only near the end of their
plaintexts to, when observed without the key, point to the wrong inode
and be undeletable. For example, with ext4:
# echo pass | e4crypt add_key -p 16 edir/
# seq -f "edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
# find edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
100000
# sync
# echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
# keyctl new_session
# find edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
2004
# rm -rf edir/
rm: cannot remove 'edir/_A7nNFi3rhkEQlJ6P,hdzluhODKOeWx5V': Structure needs cleaning
...
To fix this, when presenting long encrypted filenames, encode the
second-to-last block of ciphertext rather than the last 16 bytes.
Although it would be nice to solve this without depending on a specific
encryption mode, that would mean doing a cryptographic hash like SHA-256
which would be much less efficient. This way is sufficient for now, and
it's still compatible with encryption modes like HEH which are strong
pseudorandom permutations. Also, changing the presented names is still
allowed at any time because they are only provided to allow applications
to do things like delete encrypted directories. They're not designed to
be used to persistently identify files --- which would be hard to do
anyway, given that they're encrypted after all.
For ease of backports, this patch only makes the minimal fix to both
ext4 and f2fs. It leaves ubifs as-is, since ubifs doesn't compare the
ciphertext block yet. Follow-on patches will clean things up properly
and make the filesystems use a shared helper function.
Fixes: 5de0b4d0cd ("ext4 crypto: simplify and speed up filename encryption")
Reported-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To mitigate some types of offline attacks, filesystem encryption is
designed to enforce that all files in an encrypted directory tree use
the same encryption policy (i.e. the same encryption context excluding
the nonce). However, the fscrypt_has_permitted_context() function which
enforces this relies on comparing struct fscrypt_info's, which are only
available when we have the encryption keys. This can cause two
incorrect behaviors:
1. If we have the parent directory's key but not the child's key, or
vice versa, then fscrypt_has_permitted_context() returned false,
causing applications to see EPERM or ENOKEY. This is incorrect if
the encryption contexts are in fact consistent. Although we'd
normally have either both keys or neither key in that case since the
master_key_descriptors would be the same, this is not guaranteed
because keys can be added or removed from keyrings at any time.
2. If we have neither the parent's key nor the child's key, then
fscrypt_has_permitted_context() returned true, causing applications
to see no error (or else an error for some other reason). This is
incorrect if the encryption contexts are in fact inconsistent, since
in that case we should deny access.
To fix this, retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts if we are unable
to set up both fscrypt_infos.
While this slightly hurts performance when accessing an encrypted
directory tree without the key, this isn't a case we really need to be
optimizing for; access *with* the key is much more important.
Furthermore, the performance hit is barely noticeable given that we are
already retrieving the fscrypt_context and doing two keyring searches in
fscrypt_get_encryption_info(). If we ever actually wanted to optimize
this case we might start by caching the fscrypt_contexts.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This commit exposes the necessary constants and structures for a
userspace program to pass filesystem encryption keys into the keyring.
The fscrypt_key structure was already part of the kernel ABI, this
change just makes it so programs no longer have to redeclare these
structures (like e4crypt in e2fsprogs currently does).
Note that we do not expose the other FS_*_KEY_SIZE constants as they are
not necessary. Only XTS is supported for contents_encryption_mode, so
currently FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE bytes of key material must always be passed to
the kernel.
This commit also removes __packed from fscrypt_key as it does not
contain any implicit padding and does not refer to an on-disk structure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The functions in fs/crypto/*.c are only called by filesystems configured
with encryption support. Since the ->get_context(), ->set_context(),
and ->empty_dir() operations are always provided in that case (and must
be, otherwise there would be no way to get/set encryption policies, or
in the case of ->get_context() even access encrypted files at all),
there is no need to check for these operations being NULL and we can
remove these unneeded checks.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt
Pull fscrypto fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"A code cleanup and bugfix for fs/crypto"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: eliminate ->prepare_context() operation
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
The only use of the ->prepare_context() fscrypt operation was to allow
ext4 to evict inline data from the inode before ->set_context().
However, there is no reason why this cannot be done as simply the first
step in ->set_context(), and in fact it makes more sense to do it that
way because then the policy modes and flags get validated before any
real work is done. Therefore, merge ext4_prepare_context() into
ext4_set_context(), and remove ->prepare_context().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d5 ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When a completion is declared on-stack we have to use
COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK().
Fixes: 0b81d07790 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs
tree to fs/crypto")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Previously, each filesystem configured without encryption support would
define all the public fscrypt functions to their notsupp_* stubs. This
list of #defines had to be updated in every filesystem whenever a change
was made to the public fscrypt functions. To make things more
maintainable now that we have three filesystems using fscrypt, split the
old header fscrypto.h into several new headers. fscrypt_supp.h contains
the real declarations and is included by filesystems when configured
with encryption support, whereas fscrypt_notsupp.h contains the inline
stubs and is included by filesystems when configured without encryption
support. fscrypt_common.h contains common declarations needed by both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
res is assigned to sizeof(ctx), however, this is unused and res
is updated later on without that assigned value to res ever being
used. Remove this redundant assignment.
Fixes CoverityScan CID#1395546 "Unused value"
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
There was an unnecessary amount of complexity around requesting the
filesystem-specific key prefix. It was unclear why; perhaps it was
envisioned that different instances of the same filesystem type could
use different key prefixes, or that key prefixes could be binary.
However, neither of those things were implemented or really make sense
at all. So simplify the code by making key_prefix a const char *.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Currently, the test_dummy_encryption ext4 mount option, which exists
only to test encrypted I/O paths with xfstests, overrides all
per-inode encryption keys with a fixed key.
This change minimizes test_dummy_encryption-specific code path changes
by supplying a fake context for directories which are not encrypted
for use when creating new directories, files, or symlinks. This
allows us to properly exercise the keyring lookup, derivation, and
context inheritance code paths.
Before mounting a file system using test_dummy_encryption, userspace
must execute the following shell commands:
mode='\x00\x00\x00\x00'
raw="$(printf ""\\\\x%02x"" $(seq 0 63))"
if lscpu | grep "Byte Order" | grep -q Little ; then
size='\x40\x00\x00\x00'
else
size='\x00\x00\x00\x40'
fi
key="${mode}${raw}${size}"
keyctl new_session
echo -n -e "${key}" | keyctl padd logon fscrypt:4242424242424242 @s
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
That way we can get rid of the direct dependency on CONFIG_BLOCK.
Fixes: d475a50745 ("ubifs: Add skeleton for fscrypto")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
It was possible for the ->get_context() operation to fail with a
specific error code, which was then not returned to the caller of
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY or FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY. Make sure
to pass through these error codes. Also reorganize the code so that
->get_context() only needs to be called one time when setting an
encryption policy, and handle contexts of unrecognized sizes more
appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Several warning messages were not rate limited and were user-triggerable
from FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY. These shouldn't really have been
there in the first place, but either way they aren't as useful now that
the error codes have been improved. So just remove them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fail with EEXIST when the file already uses
a different encryption policy. This is more descriptive than EINVAL,
which was ambiguous with some of the other error cases.
I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous error
code of EINVAL, which was never documented anywhere.
This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fail with ENOTDIR when the file descriptor
does not refer to a directory. This is more descriptive than EINVAL,
which was ambiguous with some of the other error cases.
I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous error
code of EINVAL, which was never documented anywhere, and in some buggy
kernels did not exist at all as the S_ISDIR() check was missing.
This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
attempting to create a file in an encrypted directory that hasn't been
"unlocked" fail with ENOKEY. Previously, several error codes were used
for this case, including ENOENT, EACCES, and EPERM, and they were not
consistent between and within filesystems. ENOKEY is a better choice
because it expresses that the failure is due to lacking the encryption
key. It also matches the error code returned when trying to open an
encrypted regular file without the key.
I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous
inconsistent error codes, which were never documented anywhere.
This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Attempting to link a device node, named pipe, or socket file into an
encrypted directory through rename(2) or link(2) always failed with
EPERM. This happened because fscrypt_has_permitted_context() saw that
the file was unencrypted and forbid creating the link. This behavior
was unexpected because such files are never encrypted; only regular
files, directories, and symlinks can be encrypted.
To fix this, make fscrypt_has_permitted_context() always return true on
special files.
This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset.
Fixes: 9bd8212f98 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Commit f1c131b454: "crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher" now fails
the setkey operation if the AES key is the same as the tweak key.
Previously this check was only done if FIPS mode is enabled. Now this
check is also done if weak key checking was requested. This is
reasonable, but since we were using the dummy key which was a constant
series of 0x42 bytes, it now caused dummy encrpyption test mode to
fail.
Fix this by using 0x42... and 0x24... for the two keys, so they are
different.
Fixes: f1c131b454
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
... to better explain its purpose after introducing in-place encryption
without bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Since fscrypt users can now indicated if fscrypt_encrypt_page() should
use a bounce page, we can delay the bounce page pool initialization util
it is really needed. That is until fscrypt_operations has no
FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES flag set.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Rename the FS_CFLG_INPLACE_ENCRYPTION flag to FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES which,
when set, indicates that the fs uses pages under its own control as
opposed to writeback pages which require locking and a bounce buffer for
encryption.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
In case of in-place encryption fscrypt_ctx was allocated but never
released. Since we don't need it for in-place encryption, we skip
allocating it.
Fixes: 1c7dcf69ee ("fscrypt: Add in-place encryption mode")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Actually use the fs-provided index instead of always using page->index
which is only set for page-cache pages.
Fixes: 9c4bb8a3a9 ("fscrypt: Let fs select encryption index/tweak")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
