For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.
For example, with only the "mds=off" option:
vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.
Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.
Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.
[ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]
Fixes: 1b42f01741 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Metadata runs are supposed to be aligned on 4k boundary (so that they work
efficiently with disks with 4k sectors). However, there was a programming
bug that makes them aligned on 128k boundary instead. The unused space is
wasted.
Fix this bug by providing a proper 4k alignment. In order to keep
existing volumes working, we introduce a new flag SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING
- when the flag is clear, we calculate the padding the old way. In order
to make sure that the old version cannot mount the volume created by the
new version, we increase superblock version to 4.
Also in order to not break with old integritysetup, we fix alignment
only if the parameter "fix_padding" is present when formatting the
device.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
This reverts commit 7f70ae564b.
Christoph H. notes that the information is redundant, and Paul W. agrees
with reverting.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
- Support for additional PMU topologies on HiSilicon platforms
- Support for CCN-512 interconnect PMU
- Support for AXI ID filtering in the IMX8 DDR PMU
- Support for the CCPI2 uncore PMU in ThunderX2
- Driver cleanup to use devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
* for-next/perf:
drivers/perf: hisi: update the sccl_id/ccl_id for certain HiSilicon platform
perf/imx_ddr: Dump AXI ID filter info to userspace
docs/perf: Add AXI ID filter capabilities information
perf/imx_ddr: Add driver for DDR PMU in i.MX8MPlus
perf/imx_ddr: Add enhanced AXI ID filter support
bindings: perf: imx-ddr: Add new compatible string
docs/perf: Add explanation for DDR_CAP_AXI_ID_FILTER_ENHANCED quirk
arm64: perf: Simplify the ARMv8 PMUv3 event attributes
drivers/perf: Add CCPI2 PMU support in ThunderX2 UNCORE driver.
Documentation: perf: Update documentation for ThunderX2 PMU uncore driver
Documentation: Add documentation for CCN-512 DTS binding
perf: arm-ccn: Enable stats for CCN-512 interconnect
perf/smmuv3: use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() to simplify code
perf/arm-cci: use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() to simplify code
perf/arm-ccn: use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() to simplify code
perf: xgene: use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() to simplify code
perf: hisi: use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() to simplify code
Since following path was merged in 5.4-rc3,
auto-tuning feature in threads-max does not exist any more.
Fix the admin-guide document as is.
kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace
b0f53dbc4b
Fixes: b0f53dbc4b ("kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace")
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Since following patch was merged 5.4-rc3, minimum value for
threads-max changed to 1.
kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace
b0f53dbc4b
Fixes: b0f53dbc4b ("kernel/sysctl.c: do not override max_threads provided by userspace")
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Given that EFI_MEMORY_SP is platform BIOS policy decision for marking
memory ranges as "reserved for a specific purpose" there will inevitably
be scenarios where the BIOS omits the attribute in situations where it
is desired. Unlike other attributes if the OS wants to reserve this
memory from the kernel the reservation needs to happen early in init. So
early, in fact, that it needs to happen before e820__memblock_setup()
which is a pre-requisite for efi_fake_memmap() that wants to allocate
memory for the updated table.
Introduce an x86 specific efi_fake_memmap_early() that can search for
attempts to set EFI_MEMORY_SP via efi_fake_mem and update the e820 table
accordingly.
The KASLR code that scans the command line looking for user-directed
memory reservations also needs to be updated to consider
"efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:0x40000" requests.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose".
The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is
reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for
any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev
scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can
be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique
node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in
the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the
reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be
disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with
efi=nosoftreserve.
As for this patch, define the common helpers to determine if the
EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute should be honored. The determination needs to be
made early to prevent the kernel from being loaded into soft-reserved
memory, or otherwise allowing early allocations to land there. Follow-on
changes are needed per architecture to leverage these helpers in their
respective mem-init paths.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
This fixes a flaw causing raid set extensions not to be synchronized
in case the MD bitmap resize required additional pages to be allocated.
Also share resize code in the raid constructor between
new size changes and those occuring during recovery.
Bump the target version to define the change and document
it in Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/dm-raid.rst.
Reported-by: Steve D <steved424@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution. This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.
By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.
Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
I need to pick up the independent changes made to
Documentation/core-api/memory-allocation.rst to be able to merge further
work without creating a total mess.
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.
Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.
[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Prior to eed85ff4c0 ("PCI/DPC: Enable DPC only if AER is available"),
Linux handled DPC events regardless of whether firmware had granted it
ownership of AER or DPC, e.g., via _OSC.
PCIe r5.0, sec 6.2.10, recommends that the OS link control of DPC to
control of AER, so after eed85ff4c0, Linux handles DPC events only if it
has control of AER.
On platforms that do not grant OS control of AER via _OSC, Linux DPC
handling worked before eed85ff4c0 but not after.
To make Linux DPC handling work on those platforms the same way they did
before, add a "pcie_ports=dpc-native" kernel parameter that makes Linux
handle DPC events regardless of whether it has control of AER.
[bhelgaas: commit log, move pcie_ports_dpc_native to drivers/pci/]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191023192205.97024-1-olof@lixom.net
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Enable paravirtualization features when running under a hypervisor
supporting the PV_TIME_ST hypercall.
For each (v)CPU, we ask the hypervisor for the location of a shared
page which the hypervisor will use to report stolen time to us. We set
pv_time_ops to the stolen time function which simply reads the stolen
value from the shared page for a VCPU. We guarantee single-copy
atomicity using READ_ONCE which means we can also read the stolen
time for another VCPU than the currently running one while it is
potentially being updated by the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Previous docs mentioned 11 unsigned long fields, when the reality is that
we have 15 fields with a mix of unsigned long and unsigned int.
Signed-off-by: Albert Vaca Cintora <albertvaka@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
- Mention the driver name, which is also used in sysfs (dell_rbu)
- Rewrite the title to be more concise
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This document describes how an admin can use the dell_rbu driver, rather
than any in-kernel API details.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Since the "unordered guides" linked in admin-guide/index.rst are not
supposed to be in any particular order, let's sort them alphabetically
to avoid the risk of merge conflicts by spreading newly added lines more
evenly.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
- correct panic handling when running as a Xen guest
- cleanup the Xen grant driver to remove printing a pointer being
always NULL
- remove a soon to be wrong call of of_dma_configure()
* tag 'for-linus-5.4-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen: Stop abusing DT of_dma_configure API
xen/grant-table: remove unnecessary printing
x86/xen: Return from panic notifier
It appears that some smart quotes were changed to "???" by even smarter
software; change them to the dumb but legible variety.
Signed-off-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Convert the dm-dust documentation to ReST formatting, using literal
blocks for all of the shell command, shell output, and log output
examples.
Add dm-dust to index.rst.
Additionally, fix an annotation in the "querying for specific bad
blocks" section, on the "queryblock ... not found in badblocklist"
example, to properly state that the message appears when a given
block is not found.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Gurney <bgurney@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The printk_ratelimit value accepts seconds, not jiffies (though it is
converted into jiffies internally). Update documentation to reflect
this.
Also, remove the statement about allowing 1 message in 5 seconds since
bursts up to 10 messages are allowed by default.
Finally, while we are here, mention default value for
printk_ratelimit_burst too.
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Kernels booting on RISC-V can specify "earlycon" with no options on
the Linux command line, and the generic DT earlycon support will query
the "chosen/stdout-path" property (if present) to determine which
early console device to use. Document this appropriately in the
admin-guide.
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
cgroup v2 introduces two memory protection thresholds: memory.low
(best-effort) and memory.min (hard protection). While they generally do
what they say on the tin, there is a limitation in their implementation
that makes them difficult to use effectively: that cliff behaviour often
manifests when they become eligible for reclaim. This patch implements
more intuitive and usable behaviour, where we gradually mount more
reclaim pressure as cgroups further and further exceed their protection
thresholds.
This cliff edge behaviour happens because we only choose whether or not
to reclaim based on whether the memcg is within its protection limits
(see the use of mem_cgroup_protected in shrink_node), but we don't vary
our reclaim behaviour based on this information. Imagine the following
timeline, with the numbers the lruvec size in this zone:
1. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=999999. 0 pages may be scanned.
2. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000000. 0 pages may be scanned.
3. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000001. 1000001* pages may be
scanned. (?!)
* Of course, we won't usually scan all available pages in the zone even
without this patch because of scan control priority, over-reclaim
protection, etc. However, as shown by the tests at the end, these
techniques don't sufficiently throttle such an extreme change in input,
so cliff-like behaviour isn't really averted by their existence alone.
Here's an example of how this plays out in practice. At Facebook, we are
trying to protect various workloads from "system" software, like
configuration management tools, metric collectors, etc (see this[0] case
study). In order to find a suitable memory.low value, we start by
determining the expected memory range within which the workload will be
comfortable operating. This isn't an exact science -- memory usage deemed
"comfortable" will vary over time due to user behaviour, differences in
composition of work, etc, etc. As such we need to ballpark memory.low,
but doing this is currently problematic:
1. If we end up setting it too low for the workload, it won't have
*any* effect (see discussion above). The group will receive the full
weight of reclaim and won't have any priority while competing with the
less important system software, as if we had no memory.low configured
at all.
2. Because of this behaviour, we end up erring on the side of setting
it too high, such that the comfort range is reliably covered. However,
protected memory is completely unavailable to the rest of the system,
so we might cause undue memory and IO pressure there when we *know* we
have some elasticity in the workload.
3. Even if we get the value totally right, smack in the middle of the
comfort zone, we get extreme jumps between no pressure and full
pressure that cause unpredictable pressure spikes in the workload due
to the current binary reclaim behaviour.
With this patch, we can set it to our ballpark estimation without too much
worry. Any undesirable behaviour, such as too much or too little reclaim
pressure on the workload or system will be proportional to how far our
estimation is off. This means we can set memory.low much more
conservatively and thus waste less resources *without* the risk of the
workload falling off a cliff if we overshoot.
As a more abstract technical description, this unintuitive behaviour
results in having to give high-priority workloads a large protection
buffer on top of their expected usage to function reliably, as otherwise
we have abrupt periods of dramatically increased memory pressure which
hamper performance. Having to set these thresholds so high wastes
resources and generally works against the principle of work conservation.
In addition, having proportional memory reclaim behaviour has other
benefits. Most notably, before this patch it's basically mandatory to set
memory.low to a higher than desirable value because otherwise as soon as
you exceed memory.low, all protection is lost, and all pages are eligible
to scan again. By contrast, having a gradual ramp in reclaim pressure
means that you now still get some protection when thresholds are exceeded,
which means that one can now be more comfortable setting memory.low to
lower values without worrying that all protection will be lost. This is
important because workingset size is really hard to know exactly,
especially with variable workloads, so at least getting *some* protection
if your workingset size grows larger than you expect increases user
confidence in setting memory.low without a huge buffer on top being
needed.
Thanks a lot to Johannes Weiner and Tejun Heo for their advice and
assistance in thinking about how to make this work better.
In testing these changes, I intended to verify that:
1. Changes in page scanning become gradual and proportional instead of
binary.
To test this, I experimented stepping further and further down
memory.low protection on a workload that floats around 19G workingset
when under memory.low protection, watching page scan rates for the
workload cgroup:
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
| memory.low | test (pgscan/s) | control (pgscan/s) | % of control |
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
| 21G | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| 17G | 867 | 3799 | 23% |
| 12G | 1203 | 3543 | 34% |
| 8G | 2534 | 3979 | 64% |
| 4G | 3980 | 4147 | 96% |
| 0 | 3799 | 3980 | 95% |
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
As you can see, the test kernel (with a kernel containing this
patch) ramps up page scanning significantly more gradually than the
control kernel (without this patch).
2. More gradual ramp up in reclaim aggression doesn't result in
premature OOMs.
To test this, I wrote a script that slowly increments the number of
pages held by stress(1)'s --vm-keep mode until a production system
entered severe overall memory contention. This script runs in a highly
protected slice taking up the majority of available system memory.
Watching vmstat revealed that page scanning continued essentially
nominally between test and control, without causing forward reclaim
progress to become arrested.
[0]: https://facebookmicrosites.github.io/cgroup2/docs/overview.html#case-study-the-fbtax2-project
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comments to fit in 80 cols]
[chris@chrisdown.name: handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201045711.GA18302@chrisdown.name
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124014455.GA6396@chrisdown.name
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.
This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.
There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.
Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.
Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Add device links after the devices are created (but before they are
probed) by looking at common DT bindings like clocks and
interconnects.
Automatically adding device links for functional dependencies at the
framework level provides the following benefits:
- Optimizes device probe order and avoids the useless work of
attempting probes of devices that will not probe successfully
(because their suppliers aren't present or haven't probed yet).
For example, in a commonly available mobile SoC, registering just
one consumer device's driver at an initcall level earlier than the
supplier device's driver causes 11 failed probe attempts before the
consumer device probes successfully. This was with a kernel with all
the drivers statically compiled in. This problem gets a lot worse if
all the drivers are loaded as modules without direct symbol
dependencies.
- Supplier devices like clock providers, interconnect providers, etc
need to keep the resources they provide active and at a particular
state(s) during boot up even if their current set of consumers don't
request the resource to be active. This is because the rest of the
consumers might not have probed yet and turning off the resource
before all the consumers have probed could lead to a hang or
undesired user experience.
Some frameworks (Eg: regulator) handle this today by turning off
"unused" resources at late_initcall_sync and hoping all the devices
have probed by then. This is not a valid assumption for systems with
loadable modules. Other frameworks (Eg: clock) just don't handle
this due to the lack of a clear signal for when they can turn off
resources. This leads to downstream hacks to handle cases like this
that can easily be solved in the upstream kernel.
By linking devices before they are probed, we give suppliers a clear
count of the number of dependent consumers. Once all of the
consumers are active, the suppliers can turn off the unused
resources without making assumptions about the number of consumers.
By default we just add device-links to track "driver presence" (probe
succeeded) of the supplier device. If any other functionality provided
by device-links are needed, it is left to the consumer/supplier
devices to change the link when they probe.
kbuild test robot reported clang error about missing const
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904211126.47518-4-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The earlycon options without arguments is supposed to work on all
device tree platforms, not just arm64.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Sphinx is currently outputting a warning where
the file 'imx-ddr.rst' is not included in the
documentation index. Additionally, the code
highlighting and doc formatting can be slightly
improved.
Signed-off-by: Adam Zerella <adam.zerella@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The current cgroup-v2.rst file contains an incorrect description of when
memory is reclaimed from a cgroup that is using the 'memory.low'
mechanism. This fix simply corrects the text to reflect the actual
implementation.
Fixes: 7854207fe9 ("mm/docs: describe memory.low refinements")
Signed-off-by: Jon Haslam <jonhaslam@fb.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
- a few hot fixes
- ocfs2 updates
- almost all of -mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kmemleak, kasan,
cleanups, debug, pagecache, memcg, gup, pagemap, memory-hotplug,
sparsemem, vmalloc, initialization, z3fold, compaction, mempolicy,
oom-kill, hugetlb, migration, thp, mmap, madvise, shmem, zswap,
zsmalloc)
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (132 commits)
mm/zsmalloc.c: fix a -Wunused-function warning
zswap: do not map same object twice
zswap: use movable memory if zpool support allocate movable memory
zpool: add malloc_support_movable to zpool_driver
shmem: fix obsolete comment in shmem_getpage_gfp()
mm/madvise: reduce code duplication in error handling paths
mm: mmap: increase sockets maximum memory size pgoff for 32bits
mm/mmap.c: refine find_vma_prev() with rb_last()
riscv: make mmap allocation top-down by default
mips: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization
mips: replace arch specific way to determine 32bit task with generic version
mips: adjust brk randomization offset to fit generic version
mips: use STACK_TOP when computing mmap base address
mips: properly account for stack randomization and stack guard gap
arm: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization
arm: use STACK_TOP when computing mmap base address
arm: properly account for stack randomization and stack guard gap
arm64, mm: make randomization selected by generic topdown mmap layout
arm64, mm: move generic mmap layout functions to mm
arm64: consider stack randomization for mmap base only when necessary
...
Cgroup v1 memcg controller has exposed a dedicated kmem limit to users
which turned out to be really a bad idea because there are paths which
cannot shrink the kernel memory usage enough to get below the limit (e.g.
because the accounted memory is not reclaimable). There are cases when
the failure is even not allowed (e.g. __GFP_NOFAIL). This means that the
kmem limit is in excess to the hard limit without any way to shrink and
thus completely useless. OOM killer cannot be invoked to handle the
situation because that would lead to a premature oom killing.
As a result many places might see ENOMEM returning from kmalloc and result
in unexpected errors. E.g. a global OOM killer when there is a lot of
free memory because ENOMEM is translated into VM_FAULT_OOM in #PF path and
therefore pagefault_out_of_memory would result in OOM killer.
Please note that the kernel memory is still accounted to the overall limit
along with the user memory so removing the kmem specific limit should
still allow to contain kernel memory consumption. Unlike the kmem one,
though, it invokes memory reclaim and targeted memcg oom killing if
necessary.
Start the deprecation process by crying to the kernel log. Let's see
whether there are relevant usecases and simply return to EINVAL in the
second stage if nobody complains in few releases.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak documentation text]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190911151612.GI4023@dhcp22.suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Thomas Lindroth <thomas.lindroth@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The debug_pagealloc functionality is useful to catch buggy page allocator
users that cause e.g. use after free or double free. When page
inconsistency is detected, debugging is often simpler by knowing the call
stack of process that last allocated and freed the page. When page_owner
is also enabled, we record the allocation stack trace, but not freeing.
This patch therefore adds recording of freeing process stack trace to page
owner info, if both page_owner and debug_pagealloc are configured and
enabled. With only page_owner enabled, this info is not useful for the
memory leak debugging use case. dump_page() is adjusted to print the
info. An example result of calling __free_pages() twice may look like
this (note the page last free stack trace):
BUG: Bad page state in process bash pfn:13d8f8
page:ffffc31984f63e00 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x1affff800000000()
raw: 01affff800000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL)
prep_new_page+0x143/0x150
get_page_from_freelist+0x289/0x380
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
khugepaged+0x6e/0xc10
kthread+0xf9/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
page last free stack trace:
free_pcp_prepare+0x134/0x1e0
free_unref_page+0x18/0x90
khugepaged+0x7b/0xc10
kthread+0xf9/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 271 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4-2.g07a1a73-default+ #57
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x85/0xc0
bad_page.cold+0xba/0xbf
rmqueue_pcplist.isra.0+0x6c5/0x6d0
rmqueue+0x2d/0x810
get_page_from_freelist+0x191/0x380
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
__get_free_pages+0xd/0x30
__pud_alloc+0x2c/0x110
copy_page_range+0x4f9/0x630
dup_mmap+0x362/0x480
dup_mm+0x68/0x110
copy_process+0x19e1/0x1b40
_do_fork+0x73/0x310
__x64_sys_clone+0x75/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f10af854a10
...
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820131828.22684-5-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer:
- crypto and DM crypt advances that allow the crypto API to reclaim
implementation details that do not belong in DM crypt. The wrapper
template for ESSIV generation that was factored out will also be used
by fscrypt in the future.
- Add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification to the DM verity target.
- Add a new "clone" DM target that allows for efficient remote
replication of a device.
- Enhance DM bufio's cache to be tailored to each client based on use.
Clients that make heavy use of the cache get more of it, and those
that use less have reduced cache usage.
- Add a new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl to allow userspace to query the
version number of a DM target (even if the associated module isn't
yet loaded).
- Fix invalid memory access in DM zoned target.
- Fix the max_discard_sectors limit advertised by the DM raid target;
it was mistakenly storing the limit in bytes rather than sectors.
- Small optimizations and cleanups in DM writecache target.
- Various fixes and cleanups in DM core, DM raid1 and space map portion
of DM persistent data library.
* tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: (22 commits)
dm: introduce DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION
dm bufio: introduce a global cache replacement
dm bufio: remove old-style buffer cleanup
dm bufio: introduce a global queue
dm bufio: refactor adjust_total_allocated
dm bufio: call adjust_total_allocated from __link_buffer and __unlink_buffer
dm: add clone target
dm raid: fix updating of max_discard_sectors limit
dm writecache: skip writecache_wait for pmem mode
dm stats: use struct_size() helper
dm crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
dm crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
dm space map common: remove check for impossible sm_find_free() return value
dm raid1: use struct_size() with kzalloc()
dm writecache: optimize performance by sorting the blocks for writeback_all
dm writecache: add unlikely for getting two block with same LBA
dm writecache: remove unused member pointer in writeback_struct
dm zoned: fix invalid memory access
dm verity: add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification
...
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"This is a bit late, partly due to me travelling, and partly due to a
power outage knocking out some of my test systems *while* I was
travelling.
- Initial support for running on a system with an Ultravisor, which
is software that runs below the hypervisor and protects guests
against some attacks by the hypervisor.
- Support for building the kernel to run as a "Secure Virtual
Machine", ie. as a guest capable of running on a system with an
Ultravisor.
- Some changes to our DMA code on bare metal, to allow devices with
medium sized DMA masks (> 32 && < 59 bits) to use more than 2GB of
DMA space.
- Support for firmware assisted crash dumps on bare metal (powernv).
- Two series fixing bugs in and refactoring our PCI EEH code.
- A large series refactoring our exception entry code to use gas
macros, both to make it more readable and also enable some future
optimisations.
As well as many cleanups and other minor features & fixups.
Thanks to: Adam Zerella, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Andrew
Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Anshuman Khandual,
Balbir Singh, Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe
JAILLET, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig,
Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Gibson, David Hildenbrand,
Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario, Ganesh Goudar, Gautham R. Shenoy, Greg
Kurz, Guerney Hunt, Gustavo Romero, Halil Pasic, Hari Bathini, Joakim
Tjernlund, Jonathan Neuschafer, Jordan Niethe, Leonardo Bras, Lianbo
Jiang, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mahesh Salgaonkar,
Masahiro Yamada, Maxiwell S. Garcia, Michael Anderson, Nathan
Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nicholas Piggin, Oliver
O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Ram Pai, Ravi Bangoria, Reza Arbab, Ryan Grimm,
Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Segher Boessenkool, Sukadev Bhattiprolu,
Thiago Bauermann, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Thomas Gleixner, Tom
Lendacky, Vasant Hegde"
* tag 'powerpc-5.4-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (264 commits)
powerpc/mm/mce: Keep irqs disabled during lockless page table walk
powerpc: Use ftrace_graph_ret_addr() when unwinding
powerpc/ftrace: Enable HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR
ftrace: Look up the address of return_to_handler() using helpers
powerpc: dump kernel log before carrying out fadump or kdump
docs: powerpc: Add missing documentation reference
powerpc/xmon: Fix output of XIVE IPI
powerpc/xmon: Improve output of XIVE interrupts
powerpc/mm/radix: remove useless kernel messages
powerpc/fadump: support holes in kernel boot memory area
powerpc/fadump: remove RMA_START and RMA_END macros
powerpc/fadump: update documentation about option to release opalcore
powerpc/fadump: consider f/w load area
powerpc/opalcore: provide an option to invalidate /sys/firmware/opal/core file
powerpc/opalcore: export /sys/firmware/opal/core for analysing opal crashes
powerpc/fadump: update documentation about CONFIG_PRESERVE_FA_DUMP
powerpc/fadump: add support to preserve crash data on FADUMP disabled kernel
powerpc/fadump: improve how crashed kernel's memory is reserved
powerpc/fadump: consider reserved ranges while releasing memory
powerpc/fadump: make crash memory ranges array allocation generic
...
