forked from Minki/linux
seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV. Since commit98f368e9e2
("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's use it! Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes:e2cfabdfd0
("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/tracehook.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
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@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
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* behavior of privileged children.
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*/
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if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
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security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
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CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
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!ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
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/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
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