forked from Minki/linux
xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
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up = nla_data(rp);
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ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
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if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
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/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
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* potential overflow. */
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if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
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xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
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replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
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