leandrof/linux
1
0
Fork 0
forked from Minki/linux
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Browse Source 
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
  with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e.  security labels are inherited
  from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).

  The rest of the changes are maintenance"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
  tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
  evm: audit integrity metadata failures
  integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
  evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
  maintainers:  add Dmitry Kasatkin
  Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
  Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
  Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
  Smack: Improve access check performance
  Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
  tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
  maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
  tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
  tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
  security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
  apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
  apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
  apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
  apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2013-07-03 14:04:58 -07:00
commit f39d420f67
40 changed files with 1012 additions and 637 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

10
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -1129,11 +1129,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
owned by uid=0.
ima_audit= [IMA]
Format: { "0" | "1" }
0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
ima_hash= [IMA]
Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
default: "sha1"
@ -1160,6 +1155,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
int_pln_enable [x86] Enable power limit notification interrupt
integrity_audit=[IMA]
Format: { "0" | "1" }
0 -- basic integrity auditing messages. (Default)
1 -- additional integrity auditing messages.
intel_iommu= [DMAR] Intel IOMMU driver (DMAR) option
on
Enable intel iommu driver.

7
MAINTAINERS
View File

@ -4001,7 +4001,8 @@ S: Maintained
F: arch/ia64/
IBM Power in-Nest Crypto Acceleration
M: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: drivers/crypto/nx/
@ -4130,6 +4131,7 @@ F: drivers/ipack/
INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
M: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/ima/
@ -8282,7 +8284,8 @@ S: Odd fixes
F: drivers/media/usb/tm6000/
TPM DEVICE DRIVER
M: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Leonidas Da Silva Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Ashley Lai <ashley@ashleylai.com>
M: Rajiv Andrade <mail@srajiv.net>
W: http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net
M: Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>

2
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
View File

@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
* Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
* release all allocated structures.
*/
static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);

2
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
View File

@ -272,7 +272,6 @@ typedef union {
struct tpm_output_header out;
} tpm_cmd_header;
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
struct tpm_pcrread_out {
u8 pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
@ -333,6 +332,7 @@ extern struct tpm_chip* tpm_register_hardware(struct device *,
const struct tpm_vendor_specific *);
extern int tpm_open(struct inode *, struct file *);
extern int tpm_release(struct inode *, struct file *);
extern void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev);
extern void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *);
extern ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
loff_t *);

4
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
View File

@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/i2c.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include "tpm.h"
@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ struct tpm_inf_dev {
};
static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev;
static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
/*
* iic_tpm_read() - read from TPM register
@ -744,11 +742,9 @@ static int tpm_tis_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
return -ENODEV;
}
client->driver = &tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
tpm_dev.client = client;
rc = tpm_tis_i2c_init(&client->dev);
if (rc != 0) {
client->driver = NULL;
tpm_dev.client = NULL;
rc = -ENODEV;
}

17
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
View File

@ -884,12 +884,19 @@ static int __init init_tis(void)
rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
return PTR_ERR(pdev);
if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
platform_device_unregister(pdev);
platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(pdev)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(pdev);
goto err_dev;
}
rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0);
if (rc)
goto err_init;
return 0;
err_init:
platform_device_unregister(pdev);
err_dev:
platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
return rc;
}

3
include/linux/security.h
View File

@ -1392,7 +1392,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
* Returns a string containing all relevant security context information
* On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
* context for the given @inode.
*
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
* @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.

2
include/linux/tpm.h
View File

@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__
#define __LINUX_TPM_H__
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
/*
* Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
*/

16
mm/shmem.c
View File

@ -1936,6 +1936,13 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
if (inode) {
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
if (error) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
#endif
error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
&dentry->d_name,
shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
@ -1945,15 +1952,8 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
return error;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
if (error) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
#else
error = 0;
#endif
dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);

2
security/apparmor/audit.c
View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
"HINT",
"STATUS",
"ERROR",
"KILLED"
"KILLED",
"AUTO"
};

44
security/apparmor/context.c
View File

@ -68,6 +68,23 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
aa_get_profile(new->onexec);
}
/**
* aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile
* @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: counted reference to @task's profile
*/
struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct aa_profile *p;
rcu_read_lock();
p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task));
rcu_read_unlock();
return p;
}
/**
* aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
* @profile: new profile (NOT NULL)
@ -76,7 +93,7 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
*/
int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
{
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
struct cred *new;
BUG_ON(!profile);
@ -87,17 +104,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
cxt = new->security;
if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
cxt = cred_cxt(new);
if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
* clear out context state
*/
aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->previous = NULL;
cxt->onexec = NULL;
cxt->token = 0;
}
aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
* is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping
* @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping
@ -123,7 +136,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
cxt = new->security;
cxt = cred_cxt(new);
aa_get_profile(profile);
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->onexec = profile;
@ -150,7 +163,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
return -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(!profile);
cxt = new->security;
cxt = cred_cxt(new);
if (!cxt->previous) {
/* transfer refcount */
cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
cxt = new->security;
cxt = cred_cxt(new);
if (cxt->token != token) {
abort_creds(new);
return -EACCES;
@ -205,11 +218,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
}
/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
/* ref has been transfered so avoid putting ref in clear_task_cxt */
cxt->previous = NULL;
cxt->token = 0;
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->onexec = NULL;
/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
commit_creds(new);
return 0;

26
security/apparmor/domain.c
View File

@ -62,17 +62,14 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
struct aa_profile *to_profile)
{
struct task_struct *tracer;
const struct cred *cred = NULL;
struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
if (tracer) {
if (tracer)
/* released below */
cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
}
tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
/* not ptraced */
if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
@ -82,8 +79,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (cred)
put_cred(cred);
aa_put_profile(tracerp);
return error;
}
@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
cxt = bprm->cred->security;
cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
BUG_ON(!cxt);
profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
@ -443,6 +439,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
} else {
error = -ENOENT;
info = "profile not found";
/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
}
}
} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
@ -514,11 +512,7 @@ x_clear:
cxt->profile = new_profile;
/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->previous = NULL;
cxt->onexec = NULL;
cxt->token = 0;
aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
audit:
error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
@ -557,7 +551,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
@ -634,7 +628,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
/* released below */
cred = get_current_cred();
cxt = cred->security;
cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
previous_profile = cxt->previous;
@ -750,7 +744,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
bool permtest)
{
const struct cred *cred;
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct file_perms perms = {};
@ -770,7 +763,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
}
cred = get_current_cred();
cxt = cred->security;
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
/*

12
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
#define __APPARMOR_H
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "match.h"
@ -64,9 +65,18 @@ extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
/* fn's in lib */
char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);
void *kvmalloc(size_t size);
void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
void kvfree(void *buffer);
static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
{
return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
}
static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
{
return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
}
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring

61
security/apparmor/include/context.h
View File

@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
#include "policy.h"
#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security
#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred())
/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
* @perms: the permission the file was opened with
*
@ -80,23 +83,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task);
/**
* __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
* @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL)
*
* If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
*/
static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/**
* aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
@ -108,11 +96,35 @@ static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
*/
static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
}
/**
* __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile
* @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count
*
* If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
*/
static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
{
return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task));
}
/**
* __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
* @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL)
*
* If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
*/
static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
{
return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task));
}
/**
* __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
*
@ -136,7 +148,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
*/
static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
{
const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
struct aa_profile *profile;
BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
@ -151,4 +163,17 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
return profile;
}
/**
* aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt
* @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
*/
static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
{
aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->previous = NULL;
cxt->onexec = NULL;
cxt->token = 0;
}
#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */

14
security/apparmor/include/file.h
View File

@ -186,11 +186,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
}
#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
/* from namei.c */
#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
/**
* aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
* @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
@ -199,8 +194,13 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
*/
static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
{
int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
int flags = file->f_flags;
u32 perms = 0;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
perms |= MAY_WRITE;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
perms |= MAY_READ;
if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;

21
security/apparmor/include/match.h
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
* Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@ -16,25 +16,30 @@
#define __AA_MATCH_H
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#define DFA_NOMATCH 0
#define DFA_START 1
#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
/**
* The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
* file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
* info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
* used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
* the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
* slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
* new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
* (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
* package).
*
*
* The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
* are arranged for flexibility. We convert the table data to host native
* byte order.
*
* The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
* tables.
*/
#define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D
#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1 /* DEF Table is recursive */
struct table_set_header {
u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */
@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
#define YYTD_DATA32 4
#define YYTD_DATA64 8
/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
* first flags
*/
#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)

16
security/apparmor/include/policy.h
View File

@ -32,13 +32,13 @@
extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
#define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \
((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \
((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode) \
((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) || \
((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \
((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \
((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct aa_ns_acct {
* @acct: accounting for the namespace
* @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
* @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
* @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
*
* An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
* which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between
@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
struct aa_ns_acct acct;
struct aa_profile *unconfined;
struct list_head sub_ns;
atomic_t uniq_null;
};
/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
@ -148,7 +150,6 @@ struct aa_policydb {
* @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
* @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
* @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
* @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
* @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
* @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
* @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
@ -184,7 +185,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
int xmatch_len;
u32 sid;
enum audit_mode audit;
enum profile_mode mode;
u32 flags;

1
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
View File

@ -21,6 +21,5 @@
int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */

4
security/apparmor/include/sid.h
View File

@ -16,7 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
struct aa_profile;
/* sid value that will not be allocated */
#define AA_SID_INVALID 0
#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID
u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);

13
security/apparmor/ipc.c
View File

@ -95,23 +95,18 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
* - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
*/
struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
/* cred released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
int error = 0;
tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
/* lcred released below */
const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);
struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
put_cred(lcred);
aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
}
put_cred(cred);
aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
return error;
}

44
security/apparmor/lib.c
View File

@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
*ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
if (split) {
/* overwrite ':' with \0 */
*split = 0;
name = skip_spaces(split + 1);
*split++ = 0;
if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
split += 2;
name = skip_spaces(split);
} else
/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
name = NULL;
@ -75,15 +77,16 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
}
/**
* kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
* @size: size of allocation
* __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
* @size: how many bytes of memory are required
* @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
*
* Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
*
* It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
* what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
*/
void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
void *buffer = NULL;
@ -92,31 +95,21 @@ void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
/* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!buffer) {
/* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size
* when allocated via vmalloc
*/
if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct))
size = sizeof(struct work_struct);
buffer = vmalloc(size);
if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
buffer = vzalloc(size);
else
buffer = vmalloc(size);
}
return buffer;
}
/**
* do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory
* @work: data to be freed
*
* The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point
* the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing
* needs to be delayed until safe.
*/
static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
{
vfree(work);
}
/**
* kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc
* @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL)
@ -125,13 +118,8 @@ static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
*/
void kvfree(void *buffer)
{
if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) {
/* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space
* as the work_struct
*/
struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer;
INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree);
schedule_work(work);
} else
if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer))
vfree(buffer);
else
kfree(buffer);
}

69
security/apparmor/lsm.c
View File

@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
*/
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
cred->security = NULL;
aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
}
/*
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
if (!cxt)
return -ENOMEM;
cred->security = cxt;
cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
return 0;
}
@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
if (!cxt)
return -ENOMEM;
aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
new->security = cxt;
aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
return 0;
}
@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
}
@ -469,7 +469,6 @@ static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int mask = 0;
if (!file || !file->f_security)
@ -486,7 +485,6 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
}
@ -507,11 +505,9 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
@ -533,6 +529,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
@ -576,30 +574,31 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
aad.error = -EINVAL;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
}
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
else
goto fail;
} else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
fail:
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
aad.error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
return -EINVAL;
}
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
@ -886,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
return -ENOMEM;
cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
cred->security = cxt;
cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
return 0;
}
@ -915,8 +914,11 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
if (error) {
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
goto set_init_cxt_out;
goto register_security_out;
}
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
@ -930,9 +932,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
return error;
set_init_cxt_out:
aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security);
register_security_out:
aa_free_root_ns();

23
security/apparmor/match.c
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
* Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/match.h"
#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
/**
* unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
* @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
@ -30,7 +32,7 @@
*
* Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
*
* NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc)
* NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
*/
static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
{
@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
if (bsize < tsize)
goto out;
table = kvmalloc(tsize);
table = kvzalloc(tsize);
if (table) {
*table = th;
if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
@ -137,8 +139,7 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
goto out;
/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
"bounds error\n");
goto out;
@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
for (; len; len--) {
pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
for (; len; len--) {
pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
while (*str) {
pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
while (*str) {
pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
@ -409,14 +410,14 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
state = def[state];
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else

2
security/apparmor/path.c
View File

@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
if (info && error) {
if (error == -ENOENT)
*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
else if (error == -ESTALE)
else if (error == -EACCES)
*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";

181
security/apparmor/policy.c
View File

@ -87,7 +87,6 @@
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
#include "include/sid.h"
/* root profile namespace */
@ -292,7 +291,6 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
if (!ns->unconfined)
goto fail_unconfined;
ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
PFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
@ -303,6 +301,8 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
*/
ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
return ns;
fail_unconfined:
@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
/* released when @new is freed */
new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent);
new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns);
new->sid = old->sid;
__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new);
/* inherit children */
list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) {
@ -635,83 +634,6 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
aa_put_namespace(ns);
}
/**
* aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
* @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
*/
struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!profile)
return NULL;
if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
kzfree(profile);
return NULL;
}
/* refcount released by caller */
return profile;
}
/**
* aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
* @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
* @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
*
* Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
* the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid.
*
* null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
* hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
* not in use.
*
* Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
*/
struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
char *name;
u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid();
/* freed below */
name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!name)
goto fail;
sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid);
profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
kfree(name);
if (!profile)
goto fail;
profile->sid = sid;
profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
if (hat)
profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
/* released on free_profile */
profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
/* refcount released by caller */
return profile;
fail:
aa_free_sid(sid);
return NULL;
}
/**
* free_profile - free a profile
* @profile: the profile to free (MAYBE NULL)
@ -749,7 +671,6 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
@ -790,6 +711,81 @@ void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref)
free_profile(p);
}
/**
* aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
* @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
*/
struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!profile)
return NULL;
if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
kzfree(profile);
return NULL;
}
/* refcount released by caller */
return profile;
}
/**
* aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
* @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
* @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
*
* Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
* the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>.
*
* null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
* hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
* not in use.
*
* Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
*/
struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
char *name;
int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null);
/* freed below */
name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!name)
goto fail;
sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq);
profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
kfree(name);
if (!profile)
goto fail;
profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
if (hat)
profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
/* released on free_profile */
profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
/* refcount released by caller */
return profile;
fail:
return NULL;
}
/* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
/**
@ -972,7 +968,6 @@ static void __add_new_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_policy *policy,
profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy);
__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile);
/* released on free_profile */
profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
}
@ -1110,14 +1105,8 @@ audit:
if (!error) {
if (rename_profile)
__replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile);
if (old_profile) {
/* when there are both rename and old profiles
* inherit old profiles sid
*/
if (rename_profile)
aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid);
if (old_profile)
__replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile);
}
if (!(old_profile || rename_profile))
__add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile);
}
@ -1167,14 +1156,12 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
if (fqname[0] == ':') {
char *ns_name;
name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
if (ns_name) {
/* released below */
ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
if (!ns) {
info = "namespace does not exist";
error = -ENOENT;
goto fail;
}
/* released below */
ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
if (!ns) {
info = "namespace does not exist";
error = -ENOENT;
goto fail;
}
} else
/* released below */

4
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
View File

@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "include/match.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
#include "include/sid.h"
/*
* The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
@ -290,6 +289,9 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
return res;
}
#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
/**
* verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
* @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)

6
security/apparmor/procattr.c
View File

@ -163,9 +163,3 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test)
name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
}
int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname)
{
/* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
return -ENOTSUPP;
}

15
security/apparmor/resource.c
View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
@ -90,17 +91,25 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct aa_profile *task_profile;
int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)));
rcu_read_unlock();
/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
* processes. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
* that the task is setting the resource of the current process
* profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
* that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
* the same profile.
*/
if ((task != current->group_leader) ||
if (profile != task_profile ||
(profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
error = -EACCES;
aa_put_profile(task_profile);
return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
}

15
security/integrity/Kconfig
View File

@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
usually only added from initramfs.
config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
default y
help
In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
1 - additional integrity auditing messages
Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
command line.
config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE

1
security/integrity/Makefile
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o

15
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
int evm_initialized;
static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
"pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
return -EPERM;
goto out;
}
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
out:
if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
-EPERM, 0);
return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
return -EPERM;
}

12
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
View File

@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
config IMA_AUDIT
bool "Enables auditing support"
depends on IMA
depends on AUDIT
default y
help
This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity
auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
the kernel command line.
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)

1
security/integrity/ima/Makefile
View File

@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o

14
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
};
extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
#else
static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname,
const char *op, const char *cause,
int result, int info)
{
}
#endif
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
void ima_cleanup(void);

14
security/integrity/integrity.h
View File

@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
/* declarations */
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
#else
static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname,
const char *op, const char *cause,
int result, int info)
{
}
#endif
/* set during initialization */
extern int iint_initialized;

12
security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c → security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
View File

@ -13,20 +13,20 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "ima.h"
#include "integrity.h"
static int ima_audit;
static int integrity_audit_info;
/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long audit;
if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
return;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);

162
security/smack/smack.h
View File

@ -28,71 +28,6 @@
#define SMK_LABELLEN 24
#define SMK_LONGLABEL 256
/*
* Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
* Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
* bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
* of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
* aside for the terminating null byte.
*/
#define SMK_CIPSOLEN 24
struct superblock_smack {
char *smk_root;
char *smk_floor;
char *smk_hat;
char *smk_default;
int smk_initialized;
};
struct socket_smack {
char *smk_out; /* outbound label */
char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
};
/*
* Inode smack data
*/
struct inode_smack {
char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
char *smk_task; /* label of the task */
char *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
struct task_smack {
char *smk_task; /* label for access control */
char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
};
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
/*
* A label access rule.
*/
struct smack_rule {
struct list_head list;
char *smk_subject;
char *smk_object;
int smk_access;
};
/*
* An entry in the table identifying hosts.
*/
struct smk_netlbladdr {
struct list_head list;
struct sockaddr_in smk_host; /* network address */
struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
char *smk_label; /* label */
};
/*
* This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
* not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
@ -125,6 +60,82 @@ struct smack_known {
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */
};
/*
* Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
* Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
* bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
* of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
* aside for the terminating null byte.
*/
#define SMK_CIPSOLEN 24
struct superblock_smack {
char *smk_root;
char *smk_floor;
char *smk_hat;
char *smk_default;
int smk_initialized;
};
struct socket_smack {
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */
char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
};
/*
* Inode smack data
*/
struct inode_smack {
char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label of the task */
struct smack_known *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
struct task_smack {
struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label for access control */
struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
};
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
/*
* A label access rule.
*/
struct smack_rule {
struct list_head list;
struct smack_known *smk_subject;
char *smk_object;
int smk_access;
};
/*
* An entry in the table identifying hosts.
*/
struct smk_netlbladdr {
struct list_head list;
struct sockaddr_in smk_host; /* network address */
struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
char *smk_label; /* label */
};
/*
* An entry in the table identifying ports.
*/
struct smk_port_label {
struct list_head list;
struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */
unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */
char *smk_in; /* incoming label */
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
};
/*
* Mount options
*/
@ -132,6 +143,7 @@ struct smack_known {
#define SMK_FSFLOOR "smackfsfloor="
#define SMK_FSHAT "smackfshat="
#define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot="
#define SMK_FSTRANS "smackfstransmute="
#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO"
@ -203,9 +215,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
char *smk_import(const char *, int);
@ -218,7 +230,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
*/
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern char *smack_net_ambient;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
extern char *smack_onlycap;
extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
@ -254,17 +266,17 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
* Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_task;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_forked;
}
@ -272,7 +284,7 @@ static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
*/
static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
{
return smk_of_task(current_security());
}
@ -283,9 +295,11 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
*/
static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
if (!capable(cap))
return 0;
if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known)
return 1;
return 0;
}

43
security/smack/smack_access.c
View File

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
srp->smk_subject == subject_label) {
srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
may = srp->smk_access;
break;
}
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
/**
* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
* @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
* @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
* @a : a pointer to the audit data
@ -115,10 +115,9 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
*
* Smack labels are shared on smack_list
*/
int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
struct smk_audit_info *a)
int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
int may = MAY_NOT;
int rc = 0;
@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
*
* A star subject can't access any object.
*/
if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) {
if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) {
rc = -EACCES;
goto out_audit;
}
@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
* An internet subject can access any object.
*/
if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known)
subject_known == &smack_known_web)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
* An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
* with the same label.
*/
if (subject_label == object_label)
if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A hat subject can read any object.
@ -157,7 +156,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
goto out_audit;
if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known)
if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat)
goto out_audit;
}
/*
@ -167,9 +166,9 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
* good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
* indicates there is no entry for this pair.
*/
skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label);
rcu_read_lock();
may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules);
may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label,
&subject_known->smk_rules);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
@ -179,7 +178,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
out_audit:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (a)
smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request,
rc, a);
#endif
return rc;
}
@ -198,20 +198,21 @@ out_audit:
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
int may;
int rc;
/*
* Check the global rule list
*/
rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
if (rc == 0) {
/*
* If there is an entry in the task's rule list
* it can further restrict access.
*/
may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
&tsp->smk_rules);
if (may < 0)
goto out_audit;
if ((mode & may) == mode)
@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
out_audit:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (a)
smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
#endif
return rc;
}
@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sap->attr.mls.cat)
return -ENOMEM;
sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
@ -513,10 +516,10 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
* smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
* @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
*
* Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
* Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
* otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
*/
char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return skp->smk_known;
return skp;
}
}
@ -533,7 +536,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
* of a secid that is not on the list.
*/
rcu_read_unlock();
return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
return &smack_known_invalid;
}
/**

686
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

53
security/smack/smackfs.c
View File

@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
* If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
* It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
*/
char *smack_net_ambient;
struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
/*
* This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct smack_master_list {
LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
struct smack_parsed_rule {
char *smk_subject;
struct smack_known *smk_subject;
char *smk_object;
int smk_access1;
int smk_access2;
@ -163,9 +163,11 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
*/
static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
struct smack_known *skp;
if (import) {
rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
return -1;
@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
kfree(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
return -1;
rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
rule->smk_subject = skp;
cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
if (cp == NULL)
@ -445,7 +447,6 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
struct list_head *rule_list,
struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_parsed_rule *rule;
char *data;
int datalen;
@ -505,12 +506,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free_rule;
}
if (rule_list == NULL) {
load = 1;
skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject);
rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
rule_list = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules;
rule_lock = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules_lock;
}
rc = smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock, load);
@ -579,13 +578,14 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
* because you should expect to be able to write
* anything you read back.
*/
if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
return;
if (srp->smk_access == 0)
return;
seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object);
seq_putc(s, ' ');
@ -738,9 +738,9 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
}
if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
NULL, NULL, &nai);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
else
rule += strlen(skp->smk_known);
rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
@ -1535,11 +1535,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
*/
mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1;
asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
if (cn >= asize)
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
smack_net_ambient, asize);
smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
asize);
else
rc = -EINVAL;
@ -1560,8 +1561,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *oldambient;
char *smack = NULL;
char *data;
int rc = count;
@ -1577,16 +1578,16 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
smack = smk_import(data, count);
if (smack == NULL) {
skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
if (skp == NULL) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
oldambient = smack_net_ambient;
smack_net_ambient = smack;
oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
smack_net_ambient = skp;
smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
@ -1645,7 +1646,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *data;
char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
int rc = count;
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
@ -1656,7 +1657,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
* would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
*/
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known)
return -EPERM;
data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
@ -1866,8 +1867,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (res)
return -EINVAL;
res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1,
NULL);
res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
rule.smk_access1, NULL);
data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
data[1] = '\0';