Linux 5.17-rc8

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Merge tag 'v5.17-rc8' into sched/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ingo Molnar 2022-03-15 10:28:12 +01:00
commit ccdbf33c23
689 changed files with 7408 additions and 2998 deletions

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@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@novell.com>
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@suse.com>
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <jslaby@suse.cz>
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> <xslaby@fi.muni.cz>
Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> <jszhang@marvell.com>
Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> <jhovold@gmail.com>
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> <johan@hovoldconsulting.com>
John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
@ -216,6 +218,7 @@ Koushik <raghavendra.koushik@neterion.com>
Krishna Manikandan <quic_mkrishn@quicinc.com> <mkrishn@codeaurora.org>
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <k.kozlowski.k@gmail.com>
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <k.kozlowski@samsung.com>
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> <khsieh@codeaurora.org>
Leonardo Bras <leobras.c@gmail.com> <leonardo@linux.ibm.com>
@ -333,6 +336,9 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <rdenis@simphalempin.com>
Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo@ribalda.com>
Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ribalda@kernel.org>
Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com>
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <guro@fb.com>
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <guroan@gmail.com>
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org> <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Rudolf Marek <R.Marek@sh.cvut.cz>
Rui Saraiva <rmps@joel.ist.utl.pt>

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@ -895,6 +895,12 @@ S: 3000 FORE Drive
S: Warrendale, Pennsylvania 15086
S: USA
N: Ludovic Desroches
E: ludovic.desroches@microchip.com
D: Maintainer for ARM/Microchip (AT91) SoC support
D: Author of ADC, pinctrl, XDMA and SDHCI drivers for this platform
S: France
N: Martin Devera
E: devik@cdi.cz
W: http://luxik.cdi.cz/~devik/qos/

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@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
---------------------------------------
@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
victim's data.
Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
Enhanced IBRS.
Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
Attack scenarios
----------------
@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
- Kernel status:
==================================== =================================
'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
==================================== =================================
======================================== =================================
'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation
'Mitigation: Retpolines' Use Retpoline thunks
'Mitigation: LFENCE' Use LFENCE instructions
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines' Hardware-focused + Retpolines
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE' Hardware-focused + LFENCE
======================================== =================================
- Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@ -583,12 +598,13 @@ kernel command line.
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline
replace indirect branches
retpoline,generic
google's original retpoline
retpoline,amd
AMD-specific minimal thunk
retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence
retpoline,generic Retpolines
retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch
retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence
eibrs enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
@ -599,7 +615,7 @@ kernel command line.
spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
cannot be disabled.
For spectre_v2_user see :doc:`/admin-guide/kernel-parameters`.
For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
@ -681,7 +697,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref6:
[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
ARM white papers:

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@ -5361,8 +5361,12 @@
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
retpoline,generic - Retpolines
retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch
retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence
eibrs - enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.

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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ There are four components to pagemap:
* Bit 56 page exclusively mapped (since 4.2)
* Bit 57 pte is uffd-wp write-protected (since 5.13) (see
:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst <userfaultfd>`)
* Bits 57-60 zero
* Bits 58-60 zero
* Bit 61 page is file-page or shared-anon (since 3.5)
* Bit 62 page swapped
* Bit 63 page present

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@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ And optionally
.resume - A pointer to a per-policy resume function which is called
with interrupts disabled and _before_ the governor is started again.
.ready - A pointer to a per-policy ready function which is called after
the policy is fully initialized.
.attr - A pointer to a NULL-terminated list of "struct freq_attr" which
allow to export values to sysfs.

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@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ title: Atmel AT91 device tree bindings.
maintainers:
- Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
- Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
- Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
- Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
description: |
Boards with a SoC of the Atmel AT91 or SMART family shall have the following

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Required properties:
- compatible: Should contain a chip-specific compatible string,
Chip-specific strings are of the form "fsl,<chip>-dcfg",
The following <chip>s are known to be supported:
ls1012a, ls1021a, ls1043a, ls1046a, ls2080a.
ls1012a, ls1021a, ls1043a, ls1046a, ls2080a, lx2160a
- reg : should contain base address and length of DCFG memory-mapped registers

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@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ description: |
sdx65
sm7225
sm8150
sdx65
sm8250
sm8350
sm8450
@ -228,11 +227,6 @@ properties:
- qcom,sdx65-mtp
- const: qcom,sdx65
- items:
- enum:
- qcom,sdx65-mtp
- const: qcom,sdx65
- items:
- enum:
- qcom,ipq6018-cp01

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@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Required properties:
* "fsl,ls1046a-clockgen"
* "fsl,ls1088a-clockgen"
* "fsl,ls2080a-clockgen"
* "fsl,lx2160a-clockgen"
Chassis-version clock strings include:
* "fsl,qoriq-clockgen-1.0": for chassis 1.0 clocks
* "fsl,qoriq-clockgen-2.0": for chassis 2.0 clocks

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@ -91,22 +91,7 @@ properties:
$ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/$defs/port-base
unevaluatedProperties: false
description:
MIPI DSI/DPI input.
properties:
endpoint:
$ref: /schemas/media/video-interfaces.yaml#
type: object
additionalProperties: false
properties:
remote-endpoint: true
bus-type:
enum: [1, 5]
default: 1
data-lanes: true
Video port for MIPI DSI input.
port@1:
$ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/port
@ -155,8 +140,6 @@ examples:
reg = <0>;
anx7625_in: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&mipi_dsi>;
bus-type = <5>;
data-lanes = <0 1 2 3>;
};
};

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@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
title: SiFive GPIO controller
maintainers:
- Yash Shah <yash.shah@sifive.com>
- Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
properties:

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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ patternProperties:
'^phy@[a-f0-9]+$':
$ref: ../phy/bcm-ns-usb2-phy.yaml
'^pin-controller@[a-f0-9]+$':
'^pinctrl@[a-f0-9]+$':
$ref: ../pinctrl/brcm,ns-pinmux.yaml
'^syscon@[a-f0-9]+$':
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ examples:
reg = <0x180 0x4>;
};
pin-controller@1c0 {
pinctrl@1c0 {
compatible = "brcm,bcm4708-pinmux";
reg = <0x1c0 0x24>;
reg-names = "cru_gpio_control";

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@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ properties:
clock-frequency:
const: 12288000
lochnagar-pinctrl:
pinctrl:
type: object
$ref: /schemas/pinctrl/cirrus,lochnagar.yaml#
@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ required:
- reg
- reset-gpios
- lochnagar-clk
- lochnagar-pinctrl
- pinctrl
additionalProperties: false
@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ examples:
clock-frequency = <32768>;
};
lochnagar-pinctrl {
pinctrl {
compatible = "cirrus,lochnagar-pinctrl";
gpio-controller;

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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ description: |
maintainers:
- Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
properties:
compatible:

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ title: OMAP USB2 PHY
maintainers:
- Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
properties:
compatible:

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@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ properties:
max bit rate supported in bps
minimum: 1
mux-states:
description:
mux controller node to route the signals from controller to
transceiver.
maxItems: 1
required:
- compatible
- '#phy-cells'
@ -53,4 +59,5 @@ examples:
max-bitrate = <5000000>;
standby-gpios = <&wakeup_gpio1 16 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
enable-gpios = <&main_gpio1 67 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
mux-states = <&mux0 1>;
};

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@ -107,9 +107,6 @@ properties:
additionalProperties: false
allOf:
- $ref: "pinctrl.yaml#"
required:
- pinctrl-0
- pinctrl-names

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@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
title: SiFive PWM controller
maintainers:
- Yash Shah <yash.shah@sifive.com>
- Sagar Kadam <sagar.kadam@sifive.com>
- Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>

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@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ title: SiFive L2 Cache Controller
maintainers:
- Sagar Kadam <sagar.kadam@sifive.com>
- Yash Shah <yash.shah@sifive.com>
- Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
description:

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@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ properties:
- const: st,stm32mp15-hsotg
- const: snps,dwc2
- const: samsung,s3c6400-hsotg
- const: intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg
reg:
maxItems: 1

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $schema: "http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#"
title: Bindings for the TI wrapper module for the Cadence USBSS-DRD controller
maintainers:
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
properties:
compatible:

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
title: TI Keystone Soc USB Controller
maintainers:
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
- Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
properties:
compatible:

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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Set the histogram bucket size (default *1*).
**-e**, **--entries** *N*
**-E**, **--entries** *N*
Set the number of entries of the histogram (default 256).

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
The **rtla osnoise** tool is an interface for the *osnoise* tracer. The
*osnoise* tracer dispatches a kernel thread per-cpu. These threads read the
time in a loop while with preemption, softirq and IRQs enabled, thus
allowing all the sources of operating systme noise during its execution.
allowing all the sources of operating system noise during its execution.
The *osnoise*'s tracer threads take note of the delta between each time
read, along with an interference counter of all sources of interference.
At the end of each period, the *osnoise* tracer displays a summary of

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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ default). The reason for reducing the runtime is to avoid starving the
**rtla** tool. The tool is also set to run for *one minute*. The output
histogram is set to group outputs in buckets of *10us* and *25* entries::
[root@f34 ~/]# rtla osnoise hist -P F:1 -c 0-11 -r 900000 -d 1M -b 10 -e 25
[root@f34 ~/]# rtla osnoise hist -P F:1 -c 0-11 -r 900000 -d 1M -b 10 -E 25
# RTLA osnoise histogram
# Time unit is microseconds (us)
# Duration: 0 00:01:00

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@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ CPUfreq核心层注册一个cpufreq_driver结构体。
.resume - 一个指向per-policy恢复函数的指针该函数在关中断且在调节器再一次启动前被
调用。
.ready - 一个指向per-policy准备函数的指针该函数在策略完全初始化之后被调用。
.attr - 一个指向NULL结尾的"struct freq_attr"列表的指针,该列表允许导出值到
sysfs。

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@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ documentation when it pops into existence).
-------------------
:Capability: KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP
:Architectures: mips, ppc, s390
:Architectures: mips, ppc, s390, x86
:Type: vcpu ioctl
:Parameters: struct kvm_enable_cap (in)
:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
@ -6997,6 +6997,20 @@ indicated by the fd to the VM this is called on.
This is intended to support intra-host migration of VMs between userspace VMMs,
upgrading the VMM process without interrupting the guest.
7.30 KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
-------------------------------
:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
:Architectures: ppc
:Type: vm
This capability indicates that the kernel supports the mode 3 setting for the
"Address Translation Mode on Interrupt" aka "Alternate Interrupt Location"
resource that is controlled with the H_SET_MODE hypercall.
This capability allows a guest kernel to use a better-performance mode for
handling interrupts and system calls.
8. Other capabilities.
======================

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@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ F: drivers/phy/mediatek/
ARM/Microchip (AT91) SoC support
M: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
M: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
M: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
W: http://www.linux4sam.org
@ -2572,7 +2572,7 @@ F: sound/soc/rockchip/
N: rockchip
ARM/SAMSUNG S3C, S5P AND EXYNOS ARM ARCHITECTURES
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
R: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@ N: stm32
N: stm
ARM/Synaptics SoC support
M: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
M: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
M: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Maintained
@ -3905,7 +3905,7 @@ M: Scott Branden <sbranden@broadcom.com>
M: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Maintained
T: git git://github.com/broadcom/cygnus-linux.git
T: git git://github.com/broadcom/stblinux.git
F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/northstar2/*
F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/*
F: drivers/clk/bcm/clk-ns*
@ -4913,7 +4913,8 @@ F: kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
CONTROL GROUP - MEMORY RESOURCE CONTROLLER (MEMCG)
M: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
M: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
M: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
M: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
M: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
L: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
S: Maintained
@ -7011,12 +7012,6 @@ L: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/edac/sb_edac.c
EDAC-SIFIVE
M: Yash Shah <yash.shah@sifive.com>
L: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: drivers/edac/sifive_edac.c
EDAC-SKYLAKE
M: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
L: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
@ -7749,8 +7744,7 @@ M: Qiang Zhao <qiang.zhao@nxp.com>
L: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/soc/fsl/qe/
F: include/soc/fsl/*qe*.h
F: include/soc/fsl/*ucc*.h
F: include/soc/fsl/qe/
FREESCALE QUICC ENGINE UCC ETHERNET DRIVER
M: Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
@ -7781,6 +7775,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/misc/fsl,dpaa2-console.yaml
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/fsl/
F: drivers/soc/fsl/
F: include/linux/fsl/
F: include/soc/fsl/
FREESCALE SOC FS_ENET DRIVER
M: Pantelis Antoniou <pantelis.antoniou@gmail.com>
@ -11680,7 +11675,7 @@ F: drivers/iio/proximity/mb1232.c
MAXIM MAX17040 FAMILY FUEL GAUGE DRIVERS
R: Iskren Chernev <iskren.chernev@gmail.com>
R: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
R: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
R: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
R: Matheus Castello <matheus@castello.eng.br>
L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
@ -11690,7 +11685,7 @@ F: drivers/power/supply/max17040_battery.c
MAXIM MAX17042 FAMILY FUEL GAUGE DRIVERS
R: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
R: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
R: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
R: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
R: Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <sebastian.krzyszkowiak@puri.sm>
R: Purism Kernel Team <kernel@puri.sm>
@ -11735,7 +11730,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/power/supply/maxim,max77976.yaml
F: drivers/power/supply/max77976_charger.c
MAXIM MUIC CHARGER DRIVERS FOR EXYNOS BASED BOARDS
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
@ -11744,7 +11739,7 @@ F: drivers/power/supply/max77693_charger.c
MAXIM PMIC AND MUIC DRIVERS FOR EXYNOS BASED BOARDS
M: Chanwoo Choi <cw00.choi@samsung.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
@ -12433,7 +12428,7 @@ F: include/linux/memblock.h
F: mm/memblock.c
MEMORY CONTROLLER DRIVERS
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/krzk/linux-mem-ctrl.git
@ -13570,7 +13565,7 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/nexthop.h
F: net/ipv4/nexthop.c
NFC SUBSYSTEM
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
L: linux-nfc@lists.01.org (subscribers-only)
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
@ -13704,7 +13699,7 @@ F: scripts/nsdeps
NTB AMD DRIVER
M: Sanjay R Mehta <sanju.mehta@amd.com>
M: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com>
L: linux-ntb@googlegroups.com
L: ntb@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
F: drivers/ntb/hw/amd/
@ -13712,7 +13707,7 @@ NTB DRIVER CORE
M: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
M: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
M: Allen Hubbe <allenbh@gmail.com>
L: linux-ntb@googlegroups.com
L: ntb@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
W: https://github.com/jonmason/ntb/wiki
T: git git://github.com/jonmason/ntb.git
@ -13724,13 +13719,13 @@ F: tools/testing/selftests/ntb/
NTB IDT DRIVER
M: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
L: linux-ntb@googlegroups.com
L: ntb@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
F: drivers/ntb/hw/idt/
NTB INTEL DRIVER
M: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
L: linux-ntb@googlegroups.com
L: ntb@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
W: https://github.com/davejiang/linux/wiki
T: git https://github.com/davejiang/linux.git
@ -13884,7 +13879,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/nxp,pf8x00-regulator.yaml
F: drivers/regulator/pf8x00-regulator.c
NXP PTN5150A CC LOGIC AND EXTCON DRIVER
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/extcon/extcon-ptn5150.yaml
@ -15310,7 +15305,7 @@ F: drivers/pinctrl/renesas/
PIN CONTROLLER - SAMSUNG
M: Tomasz Figa <tomasz.figa@gmail.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Sylwester Nawrocki <s.nawrocki@samsung.com>
R: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
@ -15574,6 +15569,7 @@ M: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux.git sysctl-next
F: fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
F: include/linux/sysctl.h
F: kernel/sysctl-test.c
@ -16080,8 +16076,8 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/qcom,nandc.yaml
F: drivers/mtd/nand/raw/qcom_nandc.c
QUALCOMM RMNET DRIVER
M: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
M: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
M: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <quic_subashab@quicinc.com>
M: Sean Tranchetti <quic_stranche@quicinc.com>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/networking/device_drivers/cellular/qualcomm/rmnet.rst
@ -16373,6 +16369,7 @@ F: drivers/watchdog/realtek_otto_wdt.c
REALTEK RTL83xx SMI DSA ROUTER CHIPS
M: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
M: Alvin Šipraga <alsi@bang-olufsen.dk>
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/realtek-smi.txt
F: drivers/net/dsa/realtek-smi*
@ -16951,7 +16948,7 @@ W: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/
F: drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_*
S3C ADC BATTERY DRIVER
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
S: Odd Fixes
F: drivers/power/supply/s3c_adc_battery.c
@ -16996,7 +16993,7 @@ F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
F: security/safesetid/
SAMSUNG AUDIO (ASoC) DRIVERS
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Sylwester Nawrocki <s.nawrocki@samsung.com>
L: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
@ -17004,7 +17001,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/samsung*
F: sound/soc/samsung/
SAMSUNG EXYNOS PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (RNG) DRIVER
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
@ -17039,7 +17036,7 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/platform/x86/samsung-laptop.c
SAMSUNG MULTIFUNCTION PMIC DEVICE DRIVERS
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
@ -17065,7 +17062,7 @@ F: drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/
F: include/media/drv-intf/s3c_camif.h
SAMSUNG S3FWRN5 NFC DRIVER
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com>
L: linux-nfc@lists.01.org (subscribers-only)
S: Maintained
@ -17087,7 +17084,7 @@ S: Supported
F: drivers/media/i2c/s5k5baf.c
SAMSUNG S5P Security SubSystem (SSS) DRIVER
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vz@mleia.com>
L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
@ -17122,7 +17119,7 @@ F: include/linux/clk/samsung.h
F: include/linux/platform_data/clk-s3c2410.h
SAMSUNG SPI DRIVERS
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
M: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
M: Andi Shyti <andi@etezian.org>
L: linux-spi@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
@ -17766,8 +17763,10 @@ M: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
M: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
M: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
R: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
S: Maintained
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab.git
F: include/linux/sl?b*.h
F: mm/sl?b*
@ -21470,7 +21469,6 @@ THE REST
M: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
S: Buried alive in reporters
Q: http://patchwork.kernel.org/project/LKML/list/
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
F: *
F: */

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 17
SUBLEVEL = 0
EXTRAVERSION = -rc5
EXTRAVERSION = -rc8
NAME = Superb Owl
# *DOCUMENTATION*

View File

@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
};
pinctrl_fwqspid_default: fwqspid_default {
function = "FWQSPID";
function = "FWSPID";
groups = "FWQSPID";
};

View File

@ -290,6 +290,7 @@
hvs: hvs@7e400000 {
compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-hvs";
reg = <0x7e400000 0x8000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};

View File

@ -158,6 +158,24 @@
status = "disabled";
};
/* Unusable as clockevent because if unreliable oscillator, allow to idle */
&timer1_target {
/delete-property/ti,no-reset-on-init;
/delete-property/ti,no-idle;
timer@0 {
/delete-property/ti,timer-alwon;
};
};
/* Preferred timer for clockevent */
&timer12_target {
ti,no-reset-on-init;
ti,no-idle;
timer@0 {
/* Always clocked by secure_32k_fck */
};
};
&twl_gpio {
ti,use-leds;
/*

View File

@ -14,36 +14,3 @@
display2 = &tv0;
};
};
/* Unusable as clocksource because of unreliable oscillator */
&counter32k {
status = "disabled";
};
/* Unusable as clockevent because if unreliable oscillator, allow to idle */
&timer1_target {
/delete-property/ti,no-reset-on-init;
/delete-property/ti,no-idle;
timer@0 {
/delete-property/ti,timer-alwon;
};
};
/* Preferred always-on timer for clocksource */
&timer12_target {
ti,no-reset-on-init;
ti,no-idle;
timer@0 {
/* Always clocked by secure_32k_fck */
};
};
/* Preferred timer for clockevent */
&timer2_target {
ti,no-reset-on-init;
ti,no-idle;
timer@0 {
assigned-clocks = <&gpt2_fck>;
assigned-clock-parents = <&sys_ck>;
};
};

View File

@ -718,8 +718,8 @@
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 35 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
assigned-clocks = <&cru SCLK_HDMI_PHY>;
assigned-clock-parents = <&hdmi_phy>;
clocks = <&cru SCLK_HDMI_HDCP>, <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
clock-names = "isfr", "iahb", "cec";
clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_HDCP>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "cec";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&hdmii2c_xfer &hdmi_hpd &hdmi_cec>;
resets = <&cru SRST_HDMI_P>;

View File

@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
crypto: cypto-controller@ff8a0000 {
crypto: crypto@ff8a0000 {
compatible = "rockchip,rk3288-crypto";
reg = <0x0 0xff8a0000 0x0 0x4000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 48 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;

View File

@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
/ {
/* Version of Nyan Big with 1080p panel */
panel {
compatible = "auo,b133htn01";
host1x@50000000 {
dpaux@545c0000 {
aux-bus {
panel: panel {
compatible = "auo,b133htn01";
};
};
};
};
};

View File

@ -13,12 +13,15 @@
"google,nyan-big-rev1", "google,nyan-big-rev0",
"google,nyan-big", "google,nyan", "nvidia,tegra124";
panel: panel {
compatible = "auo,b133xtn01";
power-supply = <&vdd_3v3_panel>;
backlight = <&backlight>;
ddc-i2c-bus = <&dpaux>;
host1x@50000000 {
dpaux@545c0000 {
aux-bus {
panel: panel {
compatible = "auo,b133xtn01";
backlight = <&backlight>;
};
};
};
};
mmc@700b0400 { /* SD Card on this bus */

View File

@ -15,12 +15,15 @@
"google,nyan-blaze-rev0", "google,nyan-blaze",
"google,nyan", "nvidia,tegra124";
panel: panel {
compatible = "samsung,ltn140at29-301";
power-supply = <&vdd_3v3_panel>;
backlight = <&backlight>;
ddc-i2c-bus = <&dpaux>;
host1x@50000000 {
dpaux@545c0000 {
aux-bus {
panel: panel {
compatible = "samsung,ltn140at29-301";
backlight = <&backlight>;
};
};
};
};
sound {

View File

@ -48,6 +48,13 @@
dpaux@545c0000 {
vdd-supply = <&vdd_3v3_panel>;
status = "okay";
aux-bus {
panel: panel {
compatible = "lg,lp129qe";
backlight = <&backlight>;
};
};
};
};
@ -1080,13 +1087,6 @@
};
};
panel: panel {
compatible = "lg,lp129qe";
power-supply = <&vdd_3v3_panel>;
backlight = <&backlight>;
ddc-i2c-bus = <&dpaux>;
};
vdd_mux: regulator-mux {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "+VDD_MUX";

View File

@ -107,6 +107,16 @@
.endm
#endif
#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 7
.macro dsb, args
mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4
.endm
.macro isb, args
mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 4
.endm
#endif
.macro asm_trace_hardirqs_off, save=1
#if defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS)
.if \save

View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H
#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H
enum {
SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
};
enum {
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8,
};
enum {
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8),
};
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods);
#else
static inline void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state,
unsigned int methods)
{}
#endif
int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method);
#endif

View File

@ -26,6 +26,19 @@
#define ARM_MMU_DISCARD(x) x
#endif
/*
* ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS:
* https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD
#define NOCROSSREFS
#endif
/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */
#define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \
sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \
sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section)
#define PROC_INFO \
. = ALIGN(4); \
__proc_info_begin = .; \
@ -110,19 +123,31 @@
* only thing that matters is their relative offsets
*/
#define ARM_VECTORS \
__vectors_start = .; \
.vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { \
*(.vectors) \
__vectors_lma = .; \
OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) { \
.vectors { \
*(.vectors) \
} \
.vectors.bhb.loop8 { \
*(.vectors.bhb.loop8) \
} \
.vectors.bhb.bpiall { \
*(.vectors.bhb.bpiall) \
} \
} \
. = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors); \
__vectors_end = .; \
ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); \
ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8); \
ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall); \
. = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) + \
SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + \
SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall); \
\
__stubs_start = .; \
.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) { \
__stubs_lma = .; \
.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { \
*(.stubs) \
} \
. = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs); \
__stubs_end = .; \
ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs); \
. = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs); \
\
PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors));

View File

@ -106,4 +106,6 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC) += smccc-call.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += spectre.o
extra-y := $(head-y) vmlinux.lds

View File

@ -1002,12 +1002,11 @@ vector_\name:
sub lr, lr, #\correction
.endif
@
@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) and spsr_<exception>
@ (parent CPSR)
@
@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
stmia sp, {r0, lr} @ save r0, lr
mrs lr, spsr
@ Save spsr_<exception> (parent CPSR)
2: mrs lr, spsr
str lr, [sp, #8] @ save spsr
@
@ -1028,6 +1027,44 @@ vector_\name:
movs pc, lr @ branch to handler in SVC mode
ENDPROC(vector_\name)
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
.subsection 1
.align 5
vector_bhb_loop8_\name:
.if \correction
sub lr, lr, #\correction
.endif
@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
stmia sp, {r0, lr}
@ bhb workaround
mov r0, #8
3: b . + 4
subs r0, r0, #1
bne 3b
dsb
isb
b 2b
ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_\name)
vector_bhb_bpiall_\name:
.if \correction
sub lr, lr, #\correction
.endif
@ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
stmia sp, {r0, lr}
@ bhb workaround
mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL
@ isb not needed due to "movs pc, lr" in the vector stub
@ which gives a "context synchronisation".
b 2b
ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_\name)
.previous
#endif
.align 2
@ handler addresses follow this label
1:
@ -1036,6 +1073,10 @@ ENDPROC(vector_\name)
.section .stubs, "ax", %progbits
@ This must be the first word
.word vector_swi
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
.word vector_bhb_loop8_swi
.word vector_bhb_bpiall_swi
#endif
vector_rst:
ARM( swi SYS_ERROR0 )
@ -1150,8 +1191,10 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
* FIQ "NMI" handler
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Handle a FIQ using the SVC stack allowing FIQ act like NMI on x86
* systems.
* systems. This must be the last vector stub, so lets place it in its own
* subsection.
*/
.subsection 2
vector_stub fiq, FIQ_MODE, 4
.long __fiq_usr @ 0 (USR_26 / USR_32)
@ -1184,6 +1227,30 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
W(b) vector_irq
W(b) vector_fiq
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
.section .vectors.bhb.loop8, "ax", %progbits
.L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start:
W(b) vector_rst
W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_und
W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start + 0x1004
W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_pabt
W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_dabt
W(b) vector_addrexcptn
W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_irq
W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_fiq
.section .vectors.bhb.bpiall, "ax", %progbits
.L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start:
W(b) vector_rst
W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_und
W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start + 0x1008
W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_pabt
W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_dabt
W(b) vector_addrexcptn
W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_irq
W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_fiq
#endif
.data
.align 2

View File

@ -153,6 +153,29 @@ ENDPROC(ret_from_fork)
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
.align 5
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
ENTRY(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
stmia sp, {r0 - r12}
mov r8, #8
1: b 2f
2: subs r8, r8, #1
bne 1b
dsb
isb
b 3f
ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
.align 5
ENTRY(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
stmia sp, {r0 - r12}
mcr p15, 0, r8, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL
isb
b 3f
ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
#endif
.align 5
ENTRY(vector_swi)
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
@ -160,6 +183,7 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
#else
sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
stmia sp, {r0 - r12} @ Calling r0 - r12
3:
ARM( add r8, sp, #S_PC )
ARM( stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^ ) @ Calling sp, lr
THUMB( mov r8, sp )

View File

@ -154,22 +154,38 @@ static int kgdb_compiled_brk_fn(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
return 0;
}
static struct undef_hook kgdb_brkpt_hook = {
static struct undef_hook kgdb_brkpt_arm_hook = {
.instr_mask = 0xffffffff,
.instr_val = KGDB_BREAKINST,
.cpsr_mask = MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_mask = PSR_T_BIT | MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_val = SVC_MODE,
.fn = kgdb_brk_fn
};
static struct undef_hook kgdb_compiled_brkpt_hook = {
static struct undef_hook kgdb_brkpt_thumb_hook = {
.instr_mask = 0xffff,
.instr_val = KGDB_BREAKINST & 0xffff,
.cpsr_mask = PSR_T_BIT | MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_val = PSR_T_BIT | SVC_MODE,
.fn = kgdb_brk_fn
};
static struct undef_hook kgdb_compiled_brkpt_arm_hook = {
.instr_mask = 0xffffffff,
.instr_val = KGDB_COMPILED_BREAK,
.cpsr_mask = MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_mask = PSR_T_BIT | MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_val = SVC_MODE,
.fn = kgdb_compiled_brk_fn
};
static struct undef_hook kgdb_compiled_brkpt_thumb_hook = {
.instr_mask = 0xffff,
.instr_val = KGDB_COMPILED_BREAK & 0xffff,
.cpsr_mask = PSR_T_BIT | MODE_MASK,
.cpsr_val = PSR_T_BIT | SVC_MODE,
.fn = kgdb_compiled_brk_fn
};
static int __kgdb_notify(struct die_args *args, unsigned long cmd)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = args->regs;
@ -210,8 +226,10 @@ int kgdb_arch_init(void)
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_hook);
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_hook);
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_arm_hook);
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_thumb_hook);
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_arm_hook);
register_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_thumb_hook);
return 0;
}
@ -224,8 +242,10 @@ int kgdb_arch_init(void)
*/
void kgdb_arch_exit(void)
{
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_hook);
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_hook);
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_arm_hook);
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_brkpt_thumb_hook);
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_arm_hook);
unregister_undef_hook(&kgdb_compiled_brkpt_thumb_hook);
unregister_die_notifier(&kgdb_notifier);
}

71
arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <asm/spectre.h>
static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
static unsigned int spectre_v2_state;
static unsigned int spectre_v2_methods;
void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int method)
{
if (state > spectre_v2_state)
spectre_v2_state = state;
spectre_v2_methods |= method;
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
const char *method;
if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Not affected");
if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable");
if (_unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
switch (spectre_v2_methods) {
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
method = "Branch predictor hardening";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
method = "I-cache invalidation";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
method = "Firmware call";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
method = "History overwrite";
break;
default:
method = "Multiple mitigations";
break;
}
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s\n", method);
}

View File

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@ -789,10 +790,59 @@ static inline void __init kuser_init(void *vectors)
}
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
static void copy_from_lma(void *vma, void *lma_start, void *lma_end)
{
memcpy(vma, lma_start, lma_end - lma_start);
}
static void flush_vectors(void *vma, size_t offset, size_t size)
{
unsigned long start = (unsigned long)vma + offset;
unsigned long end = start + size;
flush_icache_range(start, end);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method)
{
extern char __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start[], __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end[];
extern char __vectors_bhb_loop8_start[], __vectors_bhb_loop8_end[];
void *vec_start, *vec_end;
if (system_state >= SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM) {
pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB workaround too late - system vulnerable\n",
smp_processor_id());
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
switch (method) {
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
vec_start = __vectors_bhb_loop8_start;
vec_end = __vectors_bhb_loop8_end;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
vec_start = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start;
vec_end = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end;
break;
default:
pr_err("CPU%u: unknown Spectre BHB state %d\n",
smp_processor_id(), method);
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
copy_from_lma(vectors_page, vec_start, vec_end);
flush_vectors(vectors_page, 0, vec_end - vec_start);
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
#endif
void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
unsigned long vectors = (unsigned long)vectors_base;
extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[];
extern char __vectors_start[], __vectors_end[];
unsigned i;
@ -813,17 +863,20 @@ void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
* into the vector page, mapped at 0xffff0000, and ensure these
* are visible to the instruction stream.
*/
memcpy((void *)vectors, __vectors_start, __vectors_end - __vectors_start);
memcpy((void *)vectors + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end - __stubs_start);
copy_from_lma(vectors_base, __vectors_start, __vectors_end);
copy_from_lma(vectors_base + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end);
kuser_init(vectors_base);
flush_icache_range(vectors, vectors + PAGE_SIZE * 2);
flush_vectors(vectors_base, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2);
}
#else /* ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M */
void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
{
/*
* on V7-M there is no need to copy the vector table to a dedicated
* memory area. The address is configurable and so a table in the kernel
* image can be used.
*/
#endif
}
#endif

View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ menuconfig ARCH_MSTARV7
depends on ARCH_MULTI_V7
select ARM_GIC
select ARM_HEAVY_MB
select HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER
select MST_IRQ
select MSTAR_MSC313_MPLL
help

View File

@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
config CPU_SPECTRE
bool
select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
@ -850,6 +851,16 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
If unsure, say Y.
config HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
depends on CPU_SPECTRE
default y
help
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When
taking an exception, a sequence of branches overwrites the branch
history, or branch history is invalidated.
config TLS_REG_EMUL
bool
select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS

View File

@ -212,12 +212,14 @@ early_param("ecc", early_ecc);
static int __init early_cachepolicy(char *p)
{
pr_warn("cachepolicy kernel parameter not supported without cp15\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("cachepolicy", early_cachepolicy);
static int __init noalign_setup(char *__unused)
{
pr_warn("noalign kernel parameter not supported without cp15\n");
return 1;
}
__setup("noalign", noalign_setup);

View File

@ -6,8 +6,35 @@
#include <asm/cp15.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/system_misc.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
{
struct arm_smccc_res res;
arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
switch ((int)res.a0) {
case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
default:
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
}
#else
static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
{
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
@ -36,13 +63,61 @@ static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
}
static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
{
const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu))
return;
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
switch (method) {
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
break;
}
if (spectre_v2_method)
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
#else
static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
{
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n",
smp_processor_id());
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
#endif
static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void)
{
unsigned int state, method = 0;
switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8:
@ -51,69 +126,133 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
break;
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B53:
/* Requires no workaround */
state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
break;
default:
/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) {
state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
break;
fallthrough;
/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
struct arm_smccc_res res;
}
arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
return;
fallthrough;
/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72:
state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
break;
switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC;
break;
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC;
break;
default:
state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method);
spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
static int spectre_bhb_method;
static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method)
{
switch (method) {
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
return "loop";
case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
return "BPIALL";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
{
if (spectre_bhb_method != method) {
if (spectre_bhb_method) {
pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n",
smp_processor_id());
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
spectre_bhb_method = method;
}
if (spectre_v2_method)
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n",
smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
#else
static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
{
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
#endif
static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void)
{
unsigned int state, method = 0;
switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72:
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8;
break;
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
break;
default:
state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
break;
}
if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method);
spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
}
static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
u32 mask, const char *msg)
{
@ -142,16 +281,17 @@ static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
{
if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6)))
cpu_v7_spectre_init();
cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
}
void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
{
if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0)))
cpu_v7_spectre_init();
cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
}
void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
{
cpu_v7_spectre_init();
cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init();
}

View File

@ -1253,9 +1253,6 @@ config HW_PERF_EVENTS
def_bool y
depends on ARM_PMU
config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT
def_bool y
# Supported by clang >= 7.0
config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
@ -1384,6 +1381,15 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
If unsure, say Y.
config MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
bool "Mitigate Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
default y
help
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation.
When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches
or a firmware call overwrites the branch history.
config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
default y

View File

@ -543,8 +543,7 @@
<0x02000000 0x00 0x50000000 0x00 0x50000000 0x0 0x08000000>,
<0x42000000 0x40 0x00000000 0x40 0x00000000 0x1 0x00000000>;
/* Standard AXI Translation entries as programmed by EDK2 */
dma-ranges = <0x02000000 0x0 0x2c1c0000 0x0 0x2c1c0000 0x0 0x00040000>,
<0x02000000 0x0 0x80000000 0x0 0x80000000 0x0 0x80000000>,
dma-ranges = <0x02000000 0x0 0x80000000 0x0 0x80000000 0x0 0x80000000>,
<0x43000000 0x8 0x00000000 0x8 0x00000000 0x2 0x00000000>;
#interrupt-cells = <1>;
interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 7>;

View File

@ -707,7 +707,6 @@
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_VPU_DEC_ROOT>;
assigned-clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_VPU_BUS>;
assigned-clock-parents = <&clk IMX8MM_SYS_PLL1_800M>;
resets = <&src IMX8MQ_RESET_VPU_RESET>;
};
pgc_vpu_g1: power-domain@7 {

View File

@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
scmi_sensor: protocol@15 {
reg = <0x15>;
#thermal-sensor-cells = <0>;
#thermal-sensor-cells = <1>;
};
};
};

View File

@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
};
usb0: usb@ffb00000 {
compatible = "snps,dwc2";
compatible = "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg", "snps,dwc2";
reg = <0xffb00000 0x40000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 93 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
phys = <&usbphy0>;
@ -515,7 +515,7 @@
};
usb1: usb@ffb40000 {
compatible = "snps,dwc2";
compatible = "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg", "snps,dwc2";
reg = <0xffb40000 0x40000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 94 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
phys = <&usbphy0>;

View File

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
aliases {
spi0 = &spi0;
ethernet0 = &eth0;
ethernet1 = &eth1;
mmc0 = &sdhci0;
mmc1 = &sdhci1;
@ -138,7 +139,9 @@
/*
* U-Boot port for Turris Mox has a bug which always expects that "ranges" DT property
* contains exactly 2 ranges with 3 (child) address cells, 2 (parent) address cells and
* 2 size cells and also expects that the second range starts at 16 MB offset. If these
* 2 size cells and also expects that the second range starts at 16 MB offset. Also it
* expects that first range uses same address for PCI (child) and CPU (parent) cells (so
* no remapping) and that this address is the lowest from all specified ranges. If these
* conditions are not met then U-Boot crashes during loading kernel DTB file. PCIe address
* space is 128 MB long, so the best split between MEM and IO is to use fixed 16 MB window
* for IO and the rest 112 MB (64+32+16) for MEM, despite that maximal IO size is just 64 kB.
@ -147,6 +150,9 @@
* https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/cb2ddb291ee6fcbddd6d8f4ff49089dfe580f5d7
* https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/c64ac3b3185aeb3846297ad7391fc6df8ecd73bf
* https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/4a82fca8e330157081fc132a591ebd99ba02ee33
* Bug related to requirement of same child and parent addresses for first range is fixed
* in U-Boot version 2022.04 by following commit:
* https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/1fd54253bca7d43d046bba4853fe5fafd034bc17
*/
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

View File

@ -499,7 +499,7 @@
* (totaling 127 MiB) for MEM.
*/
ranges = <0x82000000 0 0xe8000000 0 0xe8000000 0 0x07f00000 /* Port 0 MEM */
0x81000000 0 0xefff0000 0 0xefff0000 0 0x00010000>; /* Port 0 IO */
0x81000000 0 0x00000000 0 0xefff0000 0 0x00010000>; /* Port 0 IO */
interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 7>;
interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &pcie_intc 0>,
<0 0 0 2 &pcie_intc 1>,

View File

@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@
#iommu-cells = <1>;
nvidia,memory-controller = <&mc>;
status = "okay";
status = "disabled";
};
smmu: iommu@12000000 {

View File

@ -807,3 +807,8 @@
qcom,snoc-host-cap-8bit-quirk;
};
&crypto {
/* FIXME: qce_start triggers an SError */
status= "disable";
};

View File

@ -35,6 +35,24 @@
clock-frequency = <32000>;
#clock-cells = <0>;
};
ufs_phy_rx_symbol_0_clk: ufs-phy-rx-symbol-0 {
compatible = "fixed-clock";
clock-frequency = <1000>;
#clock-cells = <0>;
};
ufs_phy_rx_symbol_1_clk: ufs-phy-rx-symbol-1 {
compatible = "fixed-clock";
clock-frequency = <1000>;
#clock-cells = <0>;
};
ufs_phy_tx_symbol_0_clk: ufs-phy-tx-symbol-0 {
compatible = "fixed-clock";
clock-frequency = <1000>;
#clock-cells = <0>;
};
};
cpus {
@ -603,9 +621,9 @@
<0>,
<0>,
<0>,
<0>,
<0>,
<0>,
<&ufs_phy_rx_symbol_0_clk>,
<&ufs_phy_rx_symbol_1_clk>,
<&ufs_phy_tx_symbol_0_clk>,
<0>,
<0>;
};
@ -1923,8 +1941,8 @@
<75000000 300000000>,
<0 0>,
<0 0>,
<75000000 300000000>,
<75000000 300000000>;
<0 0>,
<0 0>;
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -726,7 +726,7 @@
compatible = "qcom,sm8450-smmu-500", "arm,mmu-500";
reg = <0 0x15000000 0 0x100000>;
#iommu-cells = <2>;
#global-interrupts = <2>;
#global-interrupts = <1>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 65 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
@ -813,6 +813,7 @@
<GIC_SPI 412 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 421 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 707 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 423 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 424 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 425 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 690 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
@ -1072,9 +1073,10 @@
<&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_MASTER_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_AGGRE_USB3_PRIM_AXI_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_MOCK_UTMI_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_SLEEP_CLK>;
<&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_SLEEP_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_USB3_0_CLKREF_EN>;
clock-names = "cfg_noc", "core", "iface", "mock_utmi",
"sleep";
"sleep", "xo";
assigned-clocks = <&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_MOCK_UTMI_CLK>,
<&gcc GCC_USB30_PRIM_MASTER_CLK>;

View File

@ -711,7 +711,7 @@
clock-names = "pclk", "timer";
};
dmac: dmac@ff240000 {
dmac: dma-controller@ff240000 {
compatible = "arm,pl330", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x0 0xff240000 0x0 0x4000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 1 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,

View File

@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
dmac: dmac@ff1f0000 {
dmac: dma-controller@ff1f0000 {
compatible = "arm,pl330", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x0 0xff1f0000 0x0 0x4000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 0 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,

View File

@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
sound: sound {
compatible = "rockchip,rk3399-gru-sound";
rockchip,cpu = <&i2s0 &i2s2>;
rockchip,cpu = <&i2s0 &spdif>;
};
};
@ -437,10 +437,6 @@ ap_i2c_audio: &i2c8 {
status = "okay";
};
&i2s2 {
status = "okay";
};
&io_domains {
status = "okay";
@ -537,6 +533,17 @@ ap_i2c_audio: &i2c8 {
vqmmc-supply = <&ppvar_sd_card_io>;
};
&spdif {
status = "okay";
/*
* SPDIF is routed internally to DP; we either don't use these pins, or
* mux them to something else.
*/
/delete-property/ pinctrl-0;
/delete-property/ pinctrl-names;
};
&spi1 {
status = "okay";

View File

@ -232,6 +232,7 @@
&usbdrd_dwc3_0 {
dr_mode = "otg";
extcon = <&extcon_usb3>;
status = "okay";
};

View File

@ -25,6 +25,13 @@
};
};
extcon_usb3: extcon-usb3 {
compatible = "linux,extcon-usb-gpio";
id-gpio = <&gpio1 RK_PC2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&usb3_id>;
};
clkin_gmac: external-gmac-clock {
compatible = "fixed-clock";
clock-frequency = <125000000>;
@ -422,9 +429,22 @@
<4 RK_PA3 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>;
};
};
usb3 {
usb3_id: usb3-id {
rockchip,pins =
<1 RK_PC2 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>;
};
};
};
&sdhci {
/*
* Signal integrity isn't great at 200MHz but 100MHz has proven stable
* enough.
*/
max-frequency = <100000000>;
bus-width = <8>;
mmc-hs400-1_8v;
mmc-hs400-enhanced-strobe;

View File

@ -1881,10 +1881,10 @@
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>,
<&cru SCLK_HDMI_SFR>,
<&cru PLL_VPLL>,
<&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>,
<&cru PCLK_VIO_GRF>,
<&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "vpll", "grf", "cec";
<&cru PLL_VPLL>;
clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "cec", "grf", "vpll";
power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_HDCP>;
reg-io-width = <4>;
rockchip,grf = <&grf>;

View File

@ -285,8 +285,6 @@
vcc_ddr: DCDC_REG3 {
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-min-microvolt = <1100000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1100000>;
regulator-initial-mode = <0x2>;
regulator-name = "vcc_ddr";
regulator-state-mem {

View File

@ -32,13 +32,11 @@
clocks = <&cru SCLK_GMAC0>, <&cru SCLK_GMAC0_RX_TX>,
<&cru SCLK_GMAC0_RX_TX>, <&cru CLK_MAC0_REFOUT>,
<&cru ACLK_GMAC0>, <&cru PCLK_GMAC0>,
<&cru SCLK_GMAC0_RX_TX>, <&cru CLK_GMAC0_PTP_REF>,
<&cru PCLK_XPCS>;
<&cru SCLK_GMAC0_RX_TX>, <&cru CLK_GMAC0_PTP_REF>;
clock-names = "stmmaceth", "mac_clk_rx",
"mac_clk_tx", "clk_mac_refout",
"aclk_mac", "pclk_mac",
"clk_mac_speed", "ptp_ref",
"pclk_xpcs";
"clk_mac_speed", "ptp_ref";
resets = <&cru SRST_A_GMAC0>;
reset-names = "stmmaceth";
rockchip,grf = <&grf>;

View File

@ -651,7 +651,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
dmac0: dmac@fe530000 {
dmac0: dma-controller@fe530000 {
compatible = "arm,pl330", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x0 0xfe530000 0x0 0x4000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
@ -662,7 +662,7 @@
#dma-cells = <1>;
};
dmac1: dmac@fe550000 {
dmac1: dma-controller@fe550000 {
compatible = "arm,pl330", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x0 0xfe550000 0x0 0x4000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 16 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,

View File

@ -108,6 +108,13 @@
hint #20
.endm
/*
* Clear Branch History instruction
*/
.macro clearbhb
hint #22
.endm
/*
* Speculation barrier
*/
@ -850,4 +857,50 @@ alternative_endif
#endif /* GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_DEFAULT */
.macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop tmp
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter
mov \tmp, #32 // Patched to correct the immediate
alternative_cb_end
.Lspectre_bhb_loop\@:
b . + 4
subs \tmp, \tmp, #1
b.ne .Lspectre_bhb_loop\@
sb
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
.endm
.macro mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop tmp
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable
b .L_spectre_bhb_loop_done\@ // Patched to NOP
alternative_cb_end
__mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop \tmp
.L_spectre_bhb_loop_done\@:
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
.endm
/* Save/restores x0-x3 to the stack */
.macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]!
mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3
alternative_cb smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0
alternative_cb_end
ldp x2, x3, [sp], #16
ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
.endm
.macro mitigate_spectre_bhb_clear_insn
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_clearbhb
/* Patched to NOP when not supported */
clearbhb
isb
alternative_cb_end
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
.endm
#endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */

View File

@ -637,6 +637,35 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void)
return id_aa64mmfr0_mixed_endian_el0(read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1));
}
static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope)
{
u64 pfr0;
u8 csv2_val;
if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
pfr0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
else
pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
csv2_val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0,
ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT);
return csv2_val == 3;
}
static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope)
{
u64 isar2;
if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
else
isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2,
ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT);
}
const struct cpumask *system_32bit_el0_cpumask(void);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_mismatched_32bit_el0);

View File

@ -73,10 +73,14 @@
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B
#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D
#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1 0xD40
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78 0xD41
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1 0xD44
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510 0xD46
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2 0xD48
#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2 0xD49
#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C 0xD4B
#define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000
@ -117,10 +121,14 @@
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A510 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2)
#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C)
#define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
#define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
#define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)

View File

@ -62,9 +62,11 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT3,
FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT2,
FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1,
FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA,
FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT,
#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT))
#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1))
#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses,

View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum aarch64_insn_hint_cr_op {
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PSB = 0x11 << 5,
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_TSB = 0x12 << 5,
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CSDB = 0x14 << 5,
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CLEARBHB = 0x16 << 5,
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTI = 0x20 << 5,
AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTIC = 0x22 << 5,

View File

@ -714,6 +714,11 @@ static inline void kvm_init_host_cpu_context(struct kvm_cpu_context *cpu_ctxt)
ctxt_sys_reg(cpu_ctxt, MPIDR_EL1) = read_cpuid_mpidr();
}
static inline bool kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors(void)
{
return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A);
}
void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {}

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#ifndef __ASM_MTE_KASAN_H
#define __ASM_MTE_KASAN_H
#include <asm/compiler.h>
#include <asm/mte-def.h>
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

View File

@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings;
#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P010 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P011 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY
#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC /* PAGE_EXECONLY if Enhanced PAN */
#define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P110 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P111 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings;
#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY
#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC /* PAGE_EXECONLY if Enhanced PAN */
#define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
#define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC

View File

@ -1017,17 +1017,6 @@ static inline bool arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte(void)
}
#define arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte
static inline pgprot_t arch_filter_pgprot(pgprot_t prot)
{
if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN))
return prot;
if (pgprot_val(prot) != pgprot_val(PAGE_EXECONLY))
return prot;
return PAGE_READONLY_EXEC;
}
static inline bool pud_sect_supported(void)
{
return PAGE_SIZE == SZ_4K;

View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#ifndef __ASM_RWONCE_H
#define __ASM_RWONCE_H
#ifdef CONFIG_LTO
#if defined(CONFIG_LTO) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
#include <asm/alternative-macros.h>
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
})
#endif /* !BUILD_VDSO */
#endif /* CONFIG_LTO */
#endif /* CONFIG_LTO && !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#include <asm-generic/rwonce.h>

View File

@ -23,4 +23,9 @@ extern char __mmuoff_data_start[], __mmuoff_data_end[];
extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[], __entry_tramp_text_end[];
extern char __relocate_new_kernel_start[], __relocate_new_kernel_end[];
static inline size_t entry_tramp_text_size(void)
{
return __entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start;
}
#endif /* __ASM_SECTIONS_H */

View File

@ -93,5 +93,9 @@ void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk);
enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope);
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */

View File

@ -773,6 +773,7 @@
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1
/* id_aa64isar2 */
#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT 28
#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT 4
#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT 0
@ -904,6 +905,7 @@
#endif
/* id_aa64mmfr1 */
#define ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT 60
#define ID_AA64MMFR1_AFP_SHIFT 44
#define ID_AA64MMFR1_ETS_SHIFT 36
#define ID_AA64MMFR1_TWED_SHIFT 32

View File

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2022 ARM Ltd.
*/
#ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H
#define __ASM_VECTORS_H
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
extern char vectors[];
extern char tramp_vectors[];
extern char __bp_harden_el1_vectors[];
/*
* Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S:
* tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical
* 'full fat' vectors are used directly.
*/
enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
/*
* Perform the BHB loop mitigation, before branching to the canonical
* vectors.
*/
EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP,
/*
* Make the SMC call for firmware mitigation, before branching to the
* canonical vectors.
*/
EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW,
/*
* Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical
* vectors.
*/
EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN,
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
/*
* Remap the kernel before branching to the canonical vectors.
*/
EL1_VECTOR_KPTI,
};
#ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1
#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1
#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN -1
#endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
/* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */
DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector);
#ifndef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
#define TRAMP_VALIAS 0
#endif
static inline const char *
arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
{
if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
return (char *)TRAMP_VALIAS + SZ_2K * slot;
WARN_ON_ONCE(slot == EL1_VECTOR_KPTI);
return __bp_harden_el1_vectors + SZ_2K * slot;
}
#endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */

View File

@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ struct kvm_arm_copy_mte_tags {
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED 3
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED (1U << 4)
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3)
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL 0
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL 1
#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED 2
/* SVE registers */
#define KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE (0x15 << KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_SHIFT)

View File

@ -502,6 +502,13 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
.matches = has_spectre_v4,
.cpu_enable = spectre_v4_enable_mitigation,
},
{
.desc = "Spectre-BHB",
.capability = ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = is_spectre_bhb_affected,
.cpu_enable = spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 1418040",

View File

@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@ -85,6 +87,7 @@
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/vectors.h>
#include <asm/virt.h>
/* Kernel representation of AT_HWCAP and AT_HWCAP2 */
@ -110,6 +113,8 @@ DECLARE_BITMAP(boot_capabilities, ARM64_NPATCHABLE);
bool arm64_use_ng_mappings = false;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_use_ng_mappings);
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector) = vectors;
/*
* Permit PER_LINUX32 and execve() of 32-bit binaries even if not all CPUs
* support it?
@ -226,6 +231,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
};
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = {
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT, 4, 0),
ARM64_FTR_END,
};
@ -1590,6 +1596,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (__this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector) == vectors) {
const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(EL1_VECTOR_KPTI);
__this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v);
}
/*
* We don't need to rewrite the page-tables if either we've done
* it already or we have KASLR enabled and therefore have not

View File

@ -37,18 +37,21 @@
.macro kernel_ventry, el:req, ht:req, regsize:req, label:req
.align 7
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
.Lventry_start\@:
.if \el == 0
alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
/*
* This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is
* skipped by the trampoline vectors, to trigger the cleanup.
*/
b .Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@
.if \regsize == 64
mrs x30, tpidrro_el0
msr tpidrro_el0, xzr
.else
mov x30, xzr
.endif
alternative_else_nop_endif
.Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@:
.endif
#endif
sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
@ -95,11 +98,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
mrs x0, tpidrro_el0
#endif
b el\el\ht\()_\regsize\()_\label
.org .Lventry_start\@ + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot?
.endm
.macro tramp_alias, dst, sym
.macro tramp_alias, dst, sym, tmp
mov_q \dst, TRAMP_VALIAS
add \dst, \dst, #(\sym - .entry.tramp.text)
adr_l \tmp, \sym
add \dst, \dst, \tmp
adr_l \tmp, .entry.tramp.text
sub \dst, \dst, \tmp
.endm
/*
@ -116,7 +123,7 @@ alternative_cb_end
tbnz \tmp2, #TIF_SSBD, .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@
mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
mov w1, #\state
alternative_cb spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
alternative_cb smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0
alternative_cb_end
.L__asm_ssbd_skip\@:
@ -413,21 +420,26 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
ldp x24, x25, [sp, #16 * 12]
ldp x26, x27, [sp, #16 * 13]
ldp x28, x29, [sp, #16 * 14]
ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
.if \el == 0
alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
eret
alternative_else_nop_endif
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
bne 4f
msr far_el1, x30
tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native
msr far_el1, x29
tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native, x29
br x30
4:
tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat
tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat, x29
br x30
#endif
.else
ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
/* Ensure any device/NC reads complete */
alternative_insn nop, "dmb sy", ARM64_WORKAROUND_1508412
@ -594,12 +606,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_user)
.popsection // .entry.text
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
/*
* Exception vectors trampoline.
*/
.pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax"
// Move from tramp_pg_dir to swapper_pg_dir
.macro tramp_map_kernel, tmp
mrs \tmp, ttbr1_el1
@ -633,12 +639,47 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
*/
.endm
.macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64
.macro tramp_data_page dst
adr_l \dst, .entry.tramp.text
sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
.endm
.macro tramp_data_read_var dst, var
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
tramp_data_page \dst
add \dst, \dst, #:lo12:__entry_tramp_data_\var
ldr \dst, [\dst]
#else
ldr \dst, =\var
#endif
.endm
#define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0
#define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1
#define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2
#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN 3
.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb
.align 7
1:
.if \regsize == 64
msr tpidrro_el0, x30 // Restored in kernel_ventry
.endif
.if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
/*
* This sequence must appear before the first indirect branch. i.e. the
* ret out of tramp_ventry. It appears here because x30 is free.
*/
__mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30
.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
.if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
clearbhb
isb
.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
.if \kpti == 1
/*
* Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
* entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to
@ -648,46 +689,75 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
b .
2:
tramp_map_kernel x30
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
adr x30, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE
alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
ldr x30, [x30]
#else
ldr x30, =vectors
#endif
tramp_data_read_var x30, vectors
alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)]
prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)]
alternative_else_nop_endif
msr vbar_el1, x30
add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)
isb
.else
ldr x30, =vectors
.endif // \kpti == 1
.if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW
/*
* The firmware sequence must appear before the first indirect branch.
* i.e. the ret out of tramp_ventry. But it also needs the stack to be
* mapped to save/restore the registers the SMC clobbers.
*/
__mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw
.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW
add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4)
ret
.org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot?
.endm
.macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64
adr x30, tramp_vectors
tramp_data_read_var x30, this_cpu_vector
get_this_cpu_offset x29
ldr x30, [x30, x29]
msr vbar_el1, x30
tramp_unmap_kernel x30
ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
tramp_unmap_kernel x29
.if \regsize == 64
mrs x30, far_el1
mrs x29, far_el1
.endif
add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
eret
sb
.endm
.align 11
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(tramp_vectors)
.macro generate_tramp_vector, kpti, bhb
.Lvector_start\@:
.space 0x400
tramp_ventry
tramp_ventry
tramp_ventry
tramp_ventry
.rept 4
tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti, \bhb
.endr
.rept 4
tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti, \bhb
.endr
.endm
tramp_ventry 32
tramp_ventry 32
tramp_ventry 32
tramp_ventry 32
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
/*
* Exception vectors trampoline.
* The order must match __bp_harden_el1_vectors and the
* arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum.
*/
.pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax"
.align 11
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(tramp_vectors)
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE
SYM_CODE_END(tramp_vectors)
SYM_CODE_START(tramp_exit_native)
@ -704,12 +774,56 @@ SYM_CODE_END(tramp_exit_compat)
.pushsection ".rodata", "a"
.align PAGE_SHIFT
SYM_DATA_START(__entry_tramp_data_start)
__entry_tramp_data_vectors:
.quad vectors
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
.quad __sdei_asm_handler
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
__entry_tramp_data_this_cpu_vector:
.quad this_cpu_vector
SYM_DATA_END(__entry_tramp_data_start)
.popsection // .rodata
#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
/*
* Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when
* kpti is not in use.
*/
.macro generate_el1_vector, bhb
.Lvector_start\@:
kernel_ventry 1, t, 64, sync // Synchronous EL1t
kernel_ventry 1, t, 64, irq // IRQ EL1t
kernel_ventry 1, t, 64, fiq // FIQ EL1h
kernel_ventry 1, t, 64, error // Error EL1t
kernel_ventry 1, h, 64, sync // Synchronous EL1h
kernel_ventry 1, h, 64, irq // IRQ EL1h
kernel_ventry 1, h, 64, fiq // FIQ EL1h
kernel_ventry 1, h, 64, error // Error EL1h
.rept 4
tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, 0, \bhb
.endr
.rept 4
tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, 0, \bhb
.endr
.endm
/* The order must match tramp_vecs and the arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum. */
.pushsection ".entry.text", "ax"
.align 11
SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
.popsection
/*
* Register switch for AArch64. The callee-saved registers need to be saved
* and restored. On entry:
@ -835,14 +949,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
* Remember whether to unmap the kernel on exit.
*/
1: str x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_SDEI_TTBR1)]
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
adr x4, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE
add x4, x4, #:lo12:__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
ldr x4, [x4]
#else
ldr x4, =__sdei_asm_handler
#endif
tramp_data_read_var x4, __sdei_asm_handler
br x4
SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
@ -865,13 +972,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
.ltorg
.popsection // .entry.tramp.text
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
.pushsection ".rodata", "a"
SYM_DATA_START(__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler)
.quad __sdei_asm_handler
SYM_DATA_END(__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler)
.popsection // .rodata
#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
/*
@ -981,7 +1081,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
alternative_else_nop_endif
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
tramp_alias dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline
tramp_alias dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline, tmp=x3
br x5
#endif
SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_handler)

View File

@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_patch_vector_branch);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_update_va_mask);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_get_kimage_voffset);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_compute_final_ctr_el0);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(spectre_bhb_patch_wa3);
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(spectre_bhb_patch_clearbhb);
/* Global kernel state accessed by nVHE hyp code. */
KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_vgic_global_state);

View File

@ -18,15 +18,18 @@
*/
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/vectors.h>
#include <asm/virt.h>
/*
@ -96,14 +99,51 @@ static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(void)
return ret;
}
static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
{
switch (bhb_state) {
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
return "";
default:
case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
return ", but not BHB";
case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
return ", BHB";
}
}
static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state);
const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening";
switch (spectre_v2_state) {
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
/*
* Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report
* "Not affected" for Spectre-v2.
*/
v2_str = "CSV2";
fallthrough;
case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED && _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str);
case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
fallthrough;
default:
@ -554,9 +594,9 @@ void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
* Patch a NOP in the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with an SMC/HVC instruction
* to call into firmware to adjust the mitigation state.
*/
void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr,
__le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
void __init smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr,
__le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
u32 insn;
@ -770,3 +810,344 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
return -ENODEV;
}
}
/*
* Spectre BHB.
*
* A CPU is either:
* - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed
* in our "loop mitigated list".
* - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call.
* - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation.
* - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no
* software mitigation in the vectors is needed.
* - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected.
*/
static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
{
return spectre_bhb_state;
}
enum bhb_mitigation_bits {
BHB_LOOP,
BHB_FW,
BHB_HW,
BHB_INSN,
};
static unsigned long system_bhb_mitigations;
/*
* This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any
* SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer.
*/
u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope)
{
u8 k = 0;
static u8 max_bhb_k;
if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) {
static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
{},
};
static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
{},
};
static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
{},
};
if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list))
k = 32;
else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list))
k = 24;
else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list))
k = 8;
max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, k);
} else {
k = max_bhb_k;
}
return k;
}
static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
{
int ret;
struct arm_smccc_res res;
arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, &res);
ret = res.a0;
switch (ret) {
case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
default:
fallthrough;
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
}
}
static bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(int scope)
{
static bool system_affected;
enum mitigation_state fw_state;
bool has_smccc = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
{},
};
bool cpu_in_list = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(),
spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list);
if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
return system_affected;
fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
if (cpu_in_list || (has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)) {
system_affected = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
{
u64 mmfr1;
if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
mmfr1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
else
mmfr1 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(mmfr1,
ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT);
}
bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
return false;
if (supports_clearbhb(scope))
return true;
if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope))
return true;
if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(scope))
return true;
return false;
}
static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
{
const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(slot);
if (slot < 0)
return;
__this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v);
/*
* When KPTI is in use, the vectors are switched when exiting to
* user-space.
*/
if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
return;
write_sysreg(v, vbar_el1);
isb();
}
void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
enum mitigation_state fw_state, state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
struct bp_hardening_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
return;
if (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) {
/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_HW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
} else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
/*
* Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have ClearBHB
* added.
*/
if (!data->slot)
data->slot = HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT;
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations);
} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
/*
* Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have the
* branchy-loop added. A57/A72-r0 will already have selected
* the spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient for BHB
* too.
*/
if (!data->slot)
data->slot = HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT;
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations);
} else if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
if (fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) {
/*
* Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
* vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
* call, so needs upgrading to
* HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
*/
if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
data->slot += 1;
this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
/*
* The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
* made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
* bp_hardening callback.
*/
cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
}
}
update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state);
}
/* Patched to NOP when enabled */
void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr,
__le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
if (test_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations))
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
}
/* Patched to NOP when enabled */
void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_fw_mitigation_enabled(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr,
__le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
if (test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations))
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
}
/* Patched to correct the immediate */
void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
u8 rd;
u32 insn;
u16 loop_count = spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM);
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY))
return;
insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, loop_count, 0,
AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO);
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
}
/* Patched to mov WA3 when supported */
void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_wa3(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
u8 rd;
u32 insn;
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY) ||
!test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations))
return;
insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
insn = aarch64_insn_gen_logical_immediate(AARCH64_INSN_LOGIC_ORR,
AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_32BIT,
AARCH64_INSN_REG_ZR, rd,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(insn == AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT))
return;
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
}
/* Patched to NOP when not supported */
void __init spectre_bhb_patch_clearbhb(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
{
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 2);
if (test_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations))
return;
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
*updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
#define EBPF_WARN "Unprivileged eBPF is enabled, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
{
if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE ||
spectre_bhb_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
return;
if (!new_state)
pr_err("WARNING: %s", EBPF_WARN);
}
#endif

View File

@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ ASSERT(__hibernate_exit_text_end - (__hibernate_exit_text_start & ~(SZ_4K - 1))
<= SZ_4K, "Hibernate exit text too big or misaligned")
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) == PAGE_SIZE,
ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) <= 3*PAGE_SIZE,
"Entry trampoline text too big")
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM

View File

@ -1491,10 +1491,7 @@ static int kvm_init_vector_slots(void)
base = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
kvm_init_vector_slot(base, HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT);
if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A))
return 0;
if (!has_vhe()) {
if (kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors() && !has_vhe()) {
err = create_hyp_exec_mappings(__pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs),
__BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ, &base);
if (err)

View File

@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2
/* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */
eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2)
cbz w1, wa_epilogue
eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 ^ \
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3)
cbnz w1, el1_trap
wa_epilogue:
@ -192,7 +196,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_vector)
sub sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
stp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)]
alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_wa3
/* Patched to mov WA3 when supported */
mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
alternative_cb_end
smc #0
ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
add sp, sp, #(8 * 2)
@ -205,6 +212,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_vector)
spectrev2_smccc_wa1_smc
.else
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x0
mitigate_spectre_bhb_clear_insn
.endif
.if \indirect != 0
alternative_cb kvm_patch_vector_branch

View File

@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ int hyp_map_vectors(void)
phys_addr_t phys;
void *bp_base;
if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A))
if (!kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors()) {
__hyp_bp_vect_base = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs;
return 0;
}
phys = __hyp_pa(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
bp_base = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys,

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <uapi/linux/psci.h>
#include <kvm/arm_psci.h>
@ -24,6 +25,8 @@
#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/vectors.h>
/* VHE specific context */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_host_data, kvm_host_data);
@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__activate_traps);
static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
extern char vectors[]; /* kernel exception vectors */
const char *host_vectors = vectors;
___deactivate_traps(vcpu);
@ -81,7 +84,10 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", "isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT));
write_sysreg(CPACR_EL1_DEFAULT, cpacr_el1);
write_sysreg(vectors, vbar_el1);
if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
host_vectors = __this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector);
write_sysreg(host_vectors, vbar_el1);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__deactivate_traps);

View File

@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
break;
}
break;
case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
switch (arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state()) {
case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
break;
case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
break;
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
val[0] = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED;
break;
}
break;
case ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_FEATURES:
val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
break;

View File

@ -46,8 +46,7 @@ static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* specification (ARM DEN 0022A). This means all suspend states
* for KVM will preserve the register state.
*/
kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_wfi(vcpu);
return PSCI_RET_SUCCESS;
}
@ -406,7 +405,7 @@ int kvm_psci_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
int kvm_arm_get_fw_num_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return 3; /* PSCI version and two workaround registers */
return 4; /* PSCI version and three workaround registers */
}
int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
@ -420,6 +419,9 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, uindices++))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, uindices++))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
@ -459,6 +461,17 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
}
break;
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
switch (arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state()) {
case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL;
case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL;
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED;
}
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL;
}
return -EINVAL;
@ -475,6 +488,7 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
break;
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
break;
default:
@ -520,6 +534,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
}
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
if (val & ~KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK)
return -EINVAL;

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