forked from Minki/linux
security/loadpin improvement
- Allow exclusion of specific file types (Ke Wu) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> iQJKBAABCgA0FiEEpcP2jyKd1g9yPm4TiXL039xtwCYFAl0kFSgWHGtlZXNjb29r QGNocm9taXVtLm9yZwAKCRCJcvTf3G3AJjQ+D/sFRaH6jqo1svYBmD1UZ8rSCYsq qXuBFfuZMNGkP2tWEXKVKc3+dKWxv+gHnXNO9K7lGeIQkH0LpEGy+ObqE+dnrdLp wjVF6gWuZJ2iKzD+ZgaQnN+AmXcuRz/0NHRE2xvmw1u7V2wvZQoEasTNNe+P8yIZ +VU9bTegdhZ0gEpPHbVyKNqOcRsX0cvReD5LsE5XTuNElTo3i0FH7tr+EXRAPnKU gxtr+LGGldyZ0w618tHuWTwZJWVZw9V9uxdxxfQ41qKoZGRA2bvG3h8PGE6AwwWo KrTEAHjiWoCXDzQgZuZpLPvpqkCcW71+jCCdqz3KKs0NS8zp1Rba6WVxcKFZioa5 ROqCxwt/8sJQDF/vI/pZOhG0SsADZdAduUAwR+oNJmy4Y8ZPBPSTzJHcIsV9zUVN /OhKljyta8H30XpIQN56eQgIYl+M4MqXqFmEkTNziYclpZR64Td1umMcb831va0J dAbxHK4v3Uf9/w5PqKsFkOECBwzaRT0colHPlEl77Qlh9lC6/cZrY2JtO9zr/f1D yvZwQMCW/qk0jikKUqbERCv2GH3DOrBUQrAxgm+GCbS4ZTAjIXHOjjLIJIJPDvBz jzkk/zgYJqW3LKwHIgdVw0Ilh4FnFS+SG4OLfUsH5uauaedU2t0exvFakEwtK3Uc LCI7pT0GGnM0EKbxQQ== =eVyy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull security/loadpin updates from Kees Cook: - Allow exclusion of specific file types (Ke Wu) * tag 'loadpin-v5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types
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c079512aad
@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
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created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
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a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
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sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
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It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
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command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
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included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
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as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
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different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
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``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
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still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
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full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
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defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
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@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
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}
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static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
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static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
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static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
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static struct super_block *pinned_root;
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
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@ -121,6 +123,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
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struct super_block *load_root;
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const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
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/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
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if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
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ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
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report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
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return 0;
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}
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/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
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if (!file) {
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if (!enforce) {
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@ -179,10 +188,47 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
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};
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static void __init parse_exclude(void)
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{
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int i, j;
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char *cur;
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/*
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* Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This
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* is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes
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* READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here.
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*/
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BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) !=
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ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
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BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) <
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ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
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cur = exclude_read_files[i];
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if (!cur)
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break;
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if (*cur == '\0')
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continue;
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for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) {
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if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
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pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
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kernel_read_file_str[j]);
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ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
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/*
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* Can not break, because one read_file_str
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* may map to more than on read_file_id.
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*/
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}
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}
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}
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}
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static int __init loadpin_init(void)
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{
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pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
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enforce ? "" : "not ");
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parse_exclude();
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security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
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return 0;
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}
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@ -195,3 +241,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
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/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
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module_param(enforce, int, 0);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
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module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
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