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bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack

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Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.

 39: (bf) r3 = r10
 40: (07) r3 += -216
 41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)   // slow read
 42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0  // verifier inserts this instruction
 43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3   // this store becomes slow due to r8
 44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)   // cpu speculatively executes this load
 45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0)    // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
                                 // is now sanitized

Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
 e5: mov    %rbp,%rdx
 e8: add    $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
 ef: mov    0x0(%r13),%r14
 f3: movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
 fb: mov    %rdx,0x0(%r14)
 ff: mov    0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2018-05-15 09:27:05 -07:00 committed by Thomas Gleixner
parent 240da953fc
commit af86ca4e30
2 changed files with 57 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
View File

@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
};
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
};

59
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
View File

@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
*/
static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
int off, int size, int value_regno)
int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
@ -1017,8 +1017,33 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno];
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC &&
!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off;
int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
/* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer
* which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or
* an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639
* (speculative store bypass)
* Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive
* store of zero.
*/
if (*poff && *poff != soff) {
/* disallow programs where single insn stores
* into two different stack slots, since verifier
* cannot sanitize them
*/
verbose(env,
"insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d",
insn_idx, *poff, soff);
return -EINVAL;
}
*poff = soff;
}
state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
}
} else {
u8 type = STACK_MISC;
@ -1694,7 +1719,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
value_regno);
value_regno, insn_idx);
else
err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
value_regno);
@ -5169,6 +5194,34 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
else
continue;
if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) {
struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
/* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero.
* There are no memory dependencies for this store,
* since it's only using frame pointer and immediate
* constant of zero
*/
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP,
env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off,
0),
/* the original STX instruction will immediately
* overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value
*/
*insn,
};
cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
delta += cnt - 1;
env->prog = new_prog;
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;