pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
		
							parent
							
								
									06e5801b8c
								
							
						
					
					
						commit
						ab676b7d6f
					
				| @ -1325,6 +1325,9 @@ out: | |||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) | static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) | ||||||
| { | { | ||||||
|  | 	/* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */ | ||||||
|  | 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | ||||||
|  | 		return -EPERM; | ||||||
| 	pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about " | 	pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about " | ||||||
| 			"to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the " | 			"to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the " | ||||||
| 			"linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n"); | 			"linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n"); | ||||||
|  | |||||||
		Loading…
	
		Reference in New Issue
	
	Block a user