Merge branch 'next-ima-appraisal' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next

As requested by Mimi, this adds the IMA Appraisal feature.
This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2012-09-12 13:16:37 +10:00
commit 9ddf6aa8cb
20 changed files with 669 additions and 150 deletions

View File

@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ Description:
then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after
the file ima/policy is closed.
IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
for local measurement appraisal.
rule format: action [condition ...]
action: measure | dont_measure
action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise
condition:= base | lsm
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=] [fowner]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
@ -24,36 +27,50 @@ Description:
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
uid:= decimal value
fowner:=decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
default policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
# RAMFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
appraise fowner=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
open for read by root in do_filp_open.
open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal
policy appraises all files owned by root.
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
SELinux:
# SELINUX_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ

View File

@ -1051,6 +1051,14 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
ihash_entries= [KNL]
Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
ima_appraise= [IMA] appraise integrity measurements
Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "fix" }
default: "enforce"
ima_appraise_tcb [IMA]
The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
owned by uid=0.
ima_audit= [IMA]
Format: { "0" | "1" }
0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)

View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
/**
* inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
ima_inode_post_setattr(dentry);
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
}

View File

@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
}
ima_file_free(file);
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
!(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);

View File

@ -295,11 +295,13 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (error)
return error;
error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (error)
return error;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (error) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return error;
}
error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);

View File

@ -39,5 +39,32 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
#else
static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return;
}
static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_H */
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */

View File

@ -22,13 +22,14 @@ enum integrity_status {
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
#else
static inline int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
{
return 0;
return NULL;
}
static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)

View File

@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima"
#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX

View File

@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
XATTR_NAME_IMA,
#endif
XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
NULL

View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "integrity.h"
static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
int iint_initialized;
@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock);
while (n) {
iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
@ -63,9 +61,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
if (!IS_IMA(inode))
return NULL;
spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
return iint;
}
@ -74,59 +72,53 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
}
/**
* integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode
* integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
* @inode: pointer to the inode
* @return: allocated iint
*
* Caller must lock i_mutex
*/
int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
{
struct rb_node **p;
struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL;
struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint;
int rc;
struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!new_iint)
return -ENOMEM;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (iint)
return iint;
new_iint->inode = inode;
new_node = &new_iint->rb_node;
iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!iint)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
rb_node);
rc = -EEXIST;
if (inode < test_iint->inode)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (inode > test_iint->inode)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
goto out_err;
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
}
iint->inode = inode;
node = &iint->rb_node;
inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
return 0;
out_err:
spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */
iint_free(new_iint);
return rc;
write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
return iint;
}
/**
@ -142,10 +134,10 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
if (!IS_IMA(inode))
return;
spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
iint_free(iint);
}
@ -157,7 +149,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}

View File

@ -56,3 +56,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
default y
help
Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
config IMA_APPRAISE
bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
depends on IMA
default n
help
This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
and configure EVM.
For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
<http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
If unsure, say N.

View File

@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o

View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
extern int ima_initialized;
extern int ima_used_chip;
extern char *ima_hash;
extern int ima_appraise;
/* IMA inode template definition */
struct ima_template_data {
@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
}
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file);
@ -123,14 +125,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
/* IMA policy related functions */
enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
int flags);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
void ima_delete_rules(void);
/* Appraise integrity measurements */
#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
#else
static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file)
{
}
#endif
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES

View File

@ -9,13 +9,17 @@
* License.
*
* File: ima_api.c
* Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
* and store_template.
* Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
* appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
/*
@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ err_out:
}
/**
* ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
* ima_must_appraise_or_measure - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
* @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ err_out:
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
* Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
* or other error, return an error code.
*/
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE;
if (!ima_appraise)
flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
}
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int must_measure;
must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
}
/*
@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file)
{
int result = -EEXIST;
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
if (!result)
iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
if (!result) {
iint->version = i_version;
iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
}
}
if (result)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
filename, "collect_data", "failed",
result, 0);
return result;
}
@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
int violation = 0;
if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
return;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
@ -174,7 +196,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
}
memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
(strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);

View File

@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
*
* Author:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
/*
* ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
*
* Return 1 to appraise
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
}
static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
__vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0);
}
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
* Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
* Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
const char *op = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
int rc;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
return iint->ima_status;
rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
0, GFP_NOFS);
if (rc <= 0) {
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
cause = "missing-hash";
status =
(inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
goto out;
}
status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
|| (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
cause = "missing-HMAC";
else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
cause = "invalid-HMAC";
goto out;
}
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (rc) {
cause = "invalid-hash";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value));
print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
(u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
sizeof iint->ima_xattr);
break;
}
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
iint->ima_xattr.digest,
IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
} else if (rc) {
cause = "invalid-signature";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
} else {
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
default:
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
cause = "unknown-ima-data";
break;
}
out:
if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
(!xattr_value ||
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
op, cause, rc, 0);
} else {
iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
}
iint->ima_status = status;
kfree(xattr_value);
return status;
}
/*
* ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
*/
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
int rc = 0;
/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
return;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
if (rc < 0)
return;
ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
}
/**
* ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
*
* Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
*
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise, rc;
if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
|| !inode->i_op->removexattr)
return;
must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (iint) {
if (must_appraise)
iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
else
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
}
if (!must_appraise)
rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
return;
}
/*
* ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
*
* Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
*/
static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
return;
}
int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
int result;
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
if (result == 1) {
ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
int result;
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
if (result == 1) {
ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
result = 0;
}
return result;
}

View File

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
struct scatterlist sg[1];
loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
char *rbuf;
int rc;
int rc, read = 0;
rc = init_desc(&desc);
if (rc != 0)
@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
read = 1;
}
i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
kfree(rbuf);
if (!rc)
rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
if (read)
file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
out:
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
return rc;

View File

@ -22,12 +22,19 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include "ima.h"
int ima_initialized;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
#else
int ima_appraise;
#endif
char *ima_hash = "sha1";
static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
{
@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
int rc;
int must_measure;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
@ -67,8 +74,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
goto out;
}
rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_measure)
goto out;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
@ -100,17 +107,21 @@ out:
}
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
iint->version != inode->i_version)
iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
iint->version != inode->i_version) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
/**
@ -140,29 +151,37 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
int rc = 0;
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
retry:
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint) {
rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
return rc;
}
/* Determine if in appraise/measurement policy,
* returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE bitmask. */
action = ima_must_appraise_or_measure(inode, mask, function);
if (!action)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
if (rc != 0)
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
goto out;
/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED) */
iint->flags |= action;
action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED)) >> 1);
/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
if (!action) {
if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
rc = iint->ima_status;
goto out;
}
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
@ -177,11 +196,16 @@ retry:
pathname = NULL;
}
}
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
!pathname ? filename : pathname);
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
!pathname ? filename : pathname);
kfree(pathbuf);
out:
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
return rc;
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
}
/**
@ -197,14 +221,14 @@ out:
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
int rc;
int rc = 0;
if (!file)
return 0;
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
return 0;
return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
/**
@ -228,7 +252,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
(strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
return 0;
return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
/**
@ -249,7 +273,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
FILE_CHECK);
return 0;
return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);

View File

@ -24,22 +24,30 @@
#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 1 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
#define DONT_MEASURE 2
#define MEASURE_MASK 3
#define APPRAISE 4 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
#define DONT_APPRAISE 8
#define APPRAISE_MASK 12
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
};
struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
struct ima_rule_entry {
struct list_head list;
enum ima_action action;
int action;
unsigned int flags;
enum ima_hooks func;
int mask;
unsigned long fsmagic;
uid_t uid;
uid_t fowner;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
int type; /* audit type */
@ -48,7 +56,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
*/
/*
@ -57,7 +65,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
* and running executables.
*/
static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@ -75,19 +83,41 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
static struct list_head *ima_measure;
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = 0,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
};
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static struct list_head *ima_rules;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
{
ima_use_tcb = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
{
ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
/**
* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
@ -98,7 +128,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@ -114,6 +144,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid)
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && rule->fowner != inode->i_uid)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid, sid;
@ -163,39 +195,58 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
* as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
* change.)
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
int flags)
{
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
bool rc;
list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
if (rc)
return entry->action;
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
continue;
action |= (entry->action & (IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_MEASURE));
actmask &= (entry->action & APPRAISE_MASK) ?
~APPRAISE_MASK : ~MEASURE_MASK;
if (!actmask)
break;
}
return 0;
return action;
}
/**
* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
*
* ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
* the new measure_policy_rules.
* ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
* the new ima_policy_rules.
*/
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
int i, entries;
int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
if (ima_use_tcb)
entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
else
entries = 0;
measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
if (i < measure_entries)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
else {
int j = i - measure_entries;
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
&ima_default_rules);
}
}
ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
}
/**
@ -212,8 +263,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
cause = "complete";
result = 0;
}
@ -224,14 +275,17 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
enum {
Opt_err = -1,
Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
};
static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_measure, "measure"},
{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
{Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
{Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@ -242,10 +296,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
{
int result;
@ -269,7 +324,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *p;
@ -278,6 +333,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->uid = -1;
entry->fowner = -1;
entry->action = UNKNOWN;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@ -306,11 +362,27 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
break;
case Opt_appraise:
ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
result = -EINVAL;
entry->action = APPRAISE;
break;
case Opt_dont_appraise:
ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
result = -EINVAL;
entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
break;
case Opt_func:
ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
if (entry->func)
result = -EINVAL;
result = -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
@ -375,6 +447,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
}
break;
case Opt_fowner:
ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
if (entry->fowner != -1) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
entry->fowner = (uid_t) lnum;
if (entry->fowner != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
}
break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
@ -426,7 +515,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
}
/**
* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
*
* Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
@ -436,12 +525,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
const char *op = "update_policy";
char *p;
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "already exists",
-EACCES, audit_info);
@ -474,9 +563,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
return result;
}
mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
return len;
}
@ -484,12 +573,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
void ima_delete_rules(void)
{
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
list_del(&entry->list);
kfree(entry);
}
mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
}

View File

@ -16,7 +16,12 @@
#include <crypto/sha.h>
/* iint cache flags */
#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x01
#define IMA_MEASURED 0x02
#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x04
#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x08
#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x10
#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x20
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@ -35,8 +40,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
unsigned char flags;
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
enum integrity_status ima_status;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
};

View File

@ -571,6 +571,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
@ -606,6 +609,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);