[PATCH] dm-crypt: zero key before freeing it

Zap the memory before freeing it so we don't leave crypto information
around in memory.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Rompf <stefan@loplof.de>
Acked-by: Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
Acked-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Rompf 2006-01-06 00:20:08 -08:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 0b56306e56
commit 9d3520a339

View File

@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ bad3:
bad2:
crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
bad1:
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
kfree(cc);
return -EINVAL;
}
@ -706,6 +708,9 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr(cc);
crypto_free_tfm(cc->tfm);
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
kfree(cc);
}