IB/core: Add mitigation for Spectre V1
Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and speculatively access memory that they should not. With a user supplied array index we like to play things safe by masking the value with the array size before it is used as an index. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731043957.GA1600@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/semaphore.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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@ -884,11 +885,14 @@ static int ib_umad_unreg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, u32 __user *arg)
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if (get_user(id, arg))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS)
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return -EINVAL;
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mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex);
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mutex_lock(&file->mutex);
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if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS || !__get_agent(file, id)) {
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id = array_index_nospec(id, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS);
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if (!__get_agent(file, id)) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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