From 0f45aa18e65cf3d768082d7d86054a0d2a20bb18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2005 19:35:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/30] AUDIT: Allow filtering of user messages

Turn the field from a bitmask to an enumeration and add a list to allow
filtering of messages generated by userspace. We also define a list for
file system watches in anticipation of that feature.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 15 +++++--
 kernel/audit.c        | 36 +++++++++--------
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index bf2ad3ba72eb..b5bda24f7365 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -75,10 +75,15 @@
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
 /* Rule flags */
-#define AUDIT_PER_TASK 0x01	/* Apply rule at task creation (not syscall) */
-#define AUDIT_AT_ENTRY 0x02	/* Apply rule at syscall entry */
-#define AUDIT_AT_EXIT  0x04	/* Apply rule at syscall exit */
-#define AUDIT_PREPEND  0x10	/* Prepend to front of list */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_USER	0x00	/* Apply rule to user-generated messages */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_TASK	0x01	/* Apply rule at task creation (not syscall) */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY	0x02	/* Apply rule at syscall entry */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH	0x03	/* Apply rule to file system watches */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT	0x04	/* Apply rule at syscall exit */
+
+#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS	5
+
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND	0x10	/* Prepend to front of list */
 
 /* Rule actions */
 #define AUDIT_NEVER    0	/* Do not build context if rule matches */
@@ -230,6 +235,7 @@ extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
+extern int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type);
 #else
 #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -246,6 +252,7 @@ extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_filter_user(struct ({ 1; })
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index ef35166fdc29..f0bbfe073136 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -107,13 +107,6 @@ static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue;
 static struct task_struct *kauditd_task;
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(kauditd_wait);
 
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
-
 /* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
  * that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
  * auditsc.c */
@@ -376,6 +369,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
 	uid_t			loginuid; /* loginuid of sender */
 	struct audit_sig_info   sig_data;
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
 
 	err = audit_netlink_ok(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, msg_type);
 	if (err)
@@ -435,15 +429,25 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
-		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
-		if (!ab)
-			break;	/* audit_panic has been called */
-		audit_log_format(ab,
-				 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u"
-				 " msg='%.1024s'",
-				 pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
-		audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
-		audit_log_end(ab);
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+		if (tsk)
+			get_task_struct(tsk);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		if (!tsk)
+			return -ESRCH;
+
+		if (audit_filter_user(tsk, msg_type)) {
+			    ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
+			    if (ab) {
+				    audit_log_format(ab,
+						     "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
+						     pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
+				    audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
+				    audit_log_end(ab);
+			    }
+		}
+		put_task_struct(tsk);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e75f84e1a1a0..6b4fbb1c0129 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -167,9 +167,16 @@ struct audit_context {
 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
  * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
  * syscall exit time. */
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
+static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
 
 struct audit_entry {
 	struct list_head  list;
@@ -210,16 +217,15 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
  * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
  * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
-				 struct list_head *list)
+static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+				  struct list_head *list)
 {
-	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
-		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
+	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
 		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
 	} else {
 		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
 	}
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
@@ -245,7 +251,7 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	return -EFAULT;		/* No matching rule */
+	return -ENOENT;		/* No matching rule */
 }
 
 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called during
@@ -260,6 +266,8 @@ static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
 		return -1;
 	if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
 		return -1;
+	if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+		return -1;
 
 	d->flags	= s->flags;
 	d->action	= s->action;
@@ -275,23 +283,20 @@ static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 							uid_t loginuid)
 {
-	u32		   flags;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
 	int		   err = 0;
+	int i;
+	unsigned listnr;
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
 		/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
 		   always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
-		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
-			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
-		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
-			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
-		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
-			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+			list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
+				audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+						 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		}
 		audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
@@ -301,26 +306,20 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 			kfree(entry);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		flags = entry->rule.flags;
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
-			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
-			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
-			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
+		listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+		audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
 		audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
 				"auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
-		flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
-			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
-			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
-		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
-			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
-		audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				"auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+		listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+		if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+		if (!err)
+			audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				  "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -454,7 +453,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	enum audit_state   state;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return state;
@@ -490,6 +489,23 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
+int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	enum audit_state   state;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return state != AUDIT_DISABLED;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return 1; /* Audit by default */
+
+}
+
 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 						      int return_valid,
@@ -504,7 +520,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
 		enum audit_state state;
-		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
+		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
 		if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
 			context->auditable = 1;
 	}
@@ -876,7 +892,7 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 
 	state = context->state;
 	if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
-		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
+		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
 	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
 		return;
 

From d6e0e1585a1a9a15e48ec47206a809828afe4450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 16:02:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/30] AUDIT: Drop user-generated messages immediately while
 auditing disabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f0bbfe073136..ab6ac560cfe5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		if (!tsk)
 			return -ESRCH;
 
-		if (audit_filter_user(tsk, msg_type)) {
+		if (audit_enabled && audit_filter_user(tsk, msg_type)) {
 			    ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
 			    if (ab) {
 				    audit_log_format(ab,

From f7056d64ae101d910f965a2e39831f635ef7891b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 16:07:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/30] AUDIT: Really exempt auditd from having its actions
 audited.

We were only avoiding it on syscall exit before; now stop _everything_.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6b4fbb1c0129..48a39579c45c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -477,6 +477,9 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
 	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
 
+	if (audit_pid && ctx->pid == audit_pid)
+		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
@@ -494,6 +497,9 @@ int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type)
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state   state;
 
+	if (audit_pid && tsk->pid == audit_pid)
+		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
@@ -816,7 +822,7 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
 	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
-	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
 		audit_log_exit(context);
 
 	audit_free_context(context);
@@ -921,7 +927,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return;
 
-	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
 		audit_log_exit(context);
 
 	context->in_syscall = 0;

From ae7b961b1c943367dfe179411f120d7bf8eaba89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 16:11:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/30] AUDIT: Report lookup flags with path/inode records.

When LOOKUP_PARENT is used, the inode which results is not the inode
found at the pathname. Report the flags so that this doesn't generate
misleading audit records.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 fs/namei.c            |  2 +-
 include/linux/audit.h |  4 ++--
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 18 +++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a7f7f44119b3..6e888dd10461 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ int fastcall path_lookup(const char *name, unsigned int flags, struct nameidata
 out:
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context
 		     && nd && nd->dentry && nd->dentry->d_inode))
-		audit_inode(name, nd->dentry->d_inode);
+		audit_inode(name, nd->dentry->d_inode, flags);
 	return retval;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b5bda24f7365..5f812e4d01e4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
 extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
 extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
 extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
-extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode);
+extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
 
 				/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
 extern int  audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type);
 #define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_inode(n,i) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; })
 #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
 #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 48a39579c45c..031f979019d1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	uid_t		uid;
 	gid_t		gid;
 	dev_t		rdev;
+	unsigned	flags;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -792,6 +793,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
 		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
+			 
 		if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
 					     " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
@@ -1018,7 +1021,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 
 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup.  Called from
  * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
-void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1044,12 +1047,13 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
 		++context->ino_count;
 #endif
 	}
-	context->names[idx].ino  = inode->i_ino;
-	context->names[idx].dev	 = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
-	context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
-	context->names[idx].uid  = inode->i_uid;
-	context->names[idx].gid  = inode->i_gid;
-	context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+	context->names[idx].flags = flags;
+	context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
+	context->names[idx].dev	  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
+	context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
+	context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
 }
 
 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,

From f6a789d19858a951e7ff9e297a44b377c21b6c33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2005 16:22:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/30] AUDIT: Spawn kernel thread to list filter rules.

If we have enough rules to fill the netlink buffer space, it'll
deadlock because auditctl isn't ever actually going to read from the
socket until we return, and we aren't going to return until it
reads... so we spawn a kernel thread to spew out the list and then
exit.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h |  1 +
 kernel/audit.c        |  2 +-
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 5f812e4d01e4..5d1a9dda5acb 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
 					     int done, int multi,
 					     void *payload, int size);
 extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
 #else
 #define audit_log(c,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_start(c,t) ({ NULL; })
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index ab6ac560cfe5..c1ab8dbbb67b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(kauditd_wait);
 /* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
  * that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
  * auditsc.c */
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem);
+DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem);
 
 /* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting
  * audit records.  Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 031f979019d1..cb8a44945157 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 /* 0 = no checking
@@ -281,24 +282,60 @@ static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
+{
+	int pid, seq;
+	int *dest = _dest;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	int i;
+
+	pid = dest[0];
+	seq = dest[1];
+	kfree(dest);
+
+	down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+
+	/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+	   always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
+	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+	}
+	audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+	
+	up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 							uid_t loginuid)
 {
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	int *dest;
 	int		   err = 0;
-	int i;
 	unsigned listnr;
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
-		/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
-		   always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
-		for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
-			list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
-				audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-						 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+		 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+		 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+		 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+		 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+		 
+		dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dest)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		dest[0] = pid;
+		dest[1] = seq;
+
+		tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
+		if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+			kfree(dest);
+			err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
 		}
-		audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
 		if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))

From 4a4cd633b575609b741a1de7837223a2d9e1c34c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 14:56:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/30] AUDIT: Optimise the audit-disabled case for discarding
 user messages

Also exempt USER_AVC message from being discarded to preserve
existing behaviour for SE Linux.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h |  7 ++++---
 kernel/audit.c        | 30 +++++++++++++-----------------
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 5d1a9dda5acb..77adef640537 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST	1009	/* List all file/dir watches */
 #define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO	1010	/* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */
 
-#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG	1100	/* Userspace messages uninteresting to kernel */
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG	1100	/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
+#define AUDIT_USER_AVC		1107	/* We filter this differently */
 #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG	1199
  
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_START      1200    /* Daemon startup record */
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type);
+extern int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type);
 #else
 #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type);
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_filter_user(struct ({ 1; })
+#define audit_filter_user(p,t) ({ 1; })
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c1ab8dbbb67b..09a37581213b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -429,25 +429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-		tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
-		if (tsk)
-			get_task_struct(tsk);
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-		if (!tsk)
-			return -ESRCH;
+		if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
+			return 0;
 
-		if (audit_enabled && audit_filter_user(tsk, msg_type)) {
-			    ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
-			    if (ab) {
-				    audit_log_format(ab,
-						     "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
-						     pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
-				    audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
-				    audit_log_end(ab);
-			    }
+		err = audit_filter_user(pid, msg_type);
+		if (err == 1) {
+			err = 0;
+			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
+			if (ab) {
+				audit_log_format(ab,
+						 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
+						 pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
+				audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+			}
 		}
-		put_task_struct(tsk);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index cb8a44945157..fc858b0c044a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -530,22 +530,33 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
-int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type)
+int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type)
 {
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state   state;
+	int ret = 1;
 
-	if (audit_pid && tsk->pid == audit_pid)
-		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+	if (tsk)
+		get_task_struct(tsk);
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	if (!tsk)
+		return -ESRCH;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return state != AUDIT_DISABLED;
+			if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+				ret = 0;
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
+	put_task_struct(tsk);
+
 	return 1; /* Audit by default */
 
 }

From 177bbc733a1d9c935bc3d6efd776a6699b29b1ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 15:01:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/30] Add audit subsystem to MAINTAINERS, for my sins.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index e3f0f3f157c9..10ca899693db 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -358,6 +358,13 @@ L:	linux-atm-general@lists.sourceforge.net
 W:	http://linux-atm.sourceforge.net
 S:	Maintained
 
+AUDIT SUBSYSTEM
+P:	David Woodhouse
+M:	dwmw2@infradead.org
+L:	linux-audit@redhat.com
+W:	http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/
+S:	Maintained
+
 ATMEL WIRELESS DRIVER
 P:	Simon Kelley
 M:	simon@thekelleys.org.uk

From 9ad9ad385be27fcc7c16d290d972c6173e780a61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 15:04:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/30] AUDIT: Wait for backlog to clear when generating
 messages.

Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the
amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be
GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to
60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately
abandoning the message.

The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll
suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h          |  8 ++---
 kernel/audit.c                 | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 kernel/auditsc.c               | 14 ++++----
 security/selinux/avc.c         |  4 +--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |  4 +--
 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 77adef640537..2f56546eb248 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -259,11 +259,11 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type);
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /* These are defined in audit.c */
 				/* Public API */
-extern void		    audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, int type,
-				      const char *fmt, ...)
-			    __attribute__((format(printf,3,4)));
+extern void		    audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
+				      int type, const char *fmt, ...)
+				      __attribute__((format(printf,4,5)));
 
-extern struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx,int type);
+extern struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask, int type);
 extern void		    audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 					     const char *fmt, ...)
 			    __attribute__((format(printf,2,3)));
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 09a37581213b..644ab825118b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist);
 static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue;
 static struct task_struct *kauditd_task;
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(kauditd_wait);
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait);
 
 /* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
  * that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct audit_buffer {
 	struct list_head     list;
 	struct sk_buff       *skb;	/* formatted skb ready to send */
 	struct audit_context *ctx;	/* NULL or associated context */
+	int		     gfp_mask;
 };
 
 static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid)
@@ -226,7 +228,7 @@ static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
 {
 	int old		 = audit_rate_limit;
 	audit_rate_limit = limit;
-	audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
 			"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
 			audit_rate_limit, old, loginuid);
 	return old;
@@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
 {
 	int old		 = audit_backlog_limit;
 	audit_backlog_limit = limit;
-	audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
 			audit_backlog_limit, old, loginuid);
 	return old;
@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid)
 	if (state != 0 && state != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	audit_enabled = state;
-	audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
 			audit_enabled, old, loginuid);
 	return old;
@@ -262,7 +264,7 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid)
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	audit_failure = state;
-	audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
 			audit_failure, old, loginuid);
 	return old;
@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
 
 	while (1) {
 		skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_queue);
+		wake_up(&audit_backlog_wait);
 		if (skb) {
 			if (audit_pid) {
 				int err = netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, audit_pid, 0);
@@ -417,7 +420,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
 			int old   = audit_pid;
 			audit_pid = status_get->pid;
-			audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 				"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
 				  audit_pid, old, loginuid);
 		}
@@ -435,7 +438,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		err = audit_filter_user(pid, msg_type);
 		if (err == 1) {
 			err = 0;
-			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, msg_type);
+			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
 			if (ab) {
 				audit_log_format(ab,
 						 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
@@ -522,7 +525,7 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
 	skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
 	audit_initialized = 1;
 	audit_enabled = audit_default;
-	audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
 	return 0;
 }
 __initcall(audit_init);
@@ -586,6 +589,7 @@ static struct audit_buffer * audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
 		goto err;
 
 	ab->ctx = ctx;
+	ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
 	nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb_put(ab->skb, NLMSG_SPACE(0));
 	nlh->nlmsg_type = type;
 	nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
@@ -644,17 +648,42 @@ static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  * syscall, then the syscall is marked as auditable and an audit record
  * will be written at syscall exit.  If there is no associated task, tsk
  * should be NULL. */
-struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int type)
+
+struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
+				     int type)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer	*ab	= NULL;
 	struct timespec		t;
 	unsigned int		serial;
+	int reserve;
 
 	if (!audit_initialized)
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (audit_backlog_limit
-	    && skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue) > audit_backlog_limit) {
+	if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
+		reserve = 0;
+	else
+		reserve = 5; /* Allow atomic callers to go up to five 
+				entries over the normal backlog limit */
+
+	while (audit_backlog_limit
+	       && skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue) > audit_backlog_limit + reserve) {
+		if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT) {
+			int ret = 1;
+			/* Wait for auditd to drain the queue a little */
+			DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
+			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+			add_wait_queue(&audit_backlog_wait, &wait);
+
+			if (audit_backlog_limit &&
+			    skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)
+				ret = schedule_timeout(HZ * 60);
+
+			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+			remove_wait_queue(&audit_backlog_wait, &wait);
+			if (ret)
+				continue;
+		}
 		if (audit_rate_check())
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
 			       "audit: audit_backlog=%d > "
@@ -665,7 +694,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int type)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	ab = audit_buffer_alloc(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, type);
+	ab = audit_buffer_alloc(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
 	if (!ab) {
 		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_log_start");
 		return NULL;
@@ -689,7 +718,7 @@ static inline int audit_expand(struct audit_buffer *ab, int extra)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb = ab->skb;
 	int ret = pskb_expand_head(skb, skb_headroom(skb), extra,
-				   GFP_ATOMIC);
+				   ab->gfp_mask);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_expand");
 		return 0;
@@ -808,7 +837,7 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
 		audit_log_format(ab, " %s", prefix);
 
 	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
-	path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, GFP_KERNEL);
+	path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask);
 	if (!path) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "<no memory>");
 		return;
@@ -849,12 +878,13 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 /* Log an audit record.  This is a convenience function that calls
  * audit_log_start, audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end.  It may be
  * called in any context. */
-void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, int type, const char *fmt, ...)
+void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask, int type, 
+	       const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	va_list args;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(ctx, type);
+	ab = audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
 	if (ab) {
 		va_start(args, fmt);
 		audit_log_vformat(ab, fmt, args);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fc858b0c044a..f463fd230846 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 		}
 		listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
 		audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-		audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
 				"auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
 		err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
 		if (!err)
-			audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 				  "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
 	audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
 
 	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -825,14 +825,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
 	}
 
 	if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_CWD);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
 		if (ab) {
 			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 	if (task->audit_context) {
 		struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
 		if (ab) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
 				"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 451502467a9b..2d088bb65ee8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
 	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
 					     0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
 
-	audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
 }
 
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			return;
 	}
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, AUDIT_AVC);
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
 	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index db845cbd5841..b5220a266dce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3419,7 +3419,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EINVAL) {
-			audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 				  "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
 				  " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
 				  nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index b6149147d5cb..2947cf85dc56 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
 		goto out;
 	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
 		goto out;
-	audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 	          "security_validate_transition:  denied for"
 	          " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
 	          o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
 		goto out;
 	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
 		goto out;
-	audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "security_compute_sid:  invalid context %s"
 		  " for scontext=%s"
 		  " tcontext=%s"

From 9470178e620fe8f512928eed34994572c1c44be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 15:40:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/30] AUDIT: Remove stray declaration of tsk from
 audit_receive_msg().

It's not used any more.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 644ab825118b..9af947a63ed1 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
 	uid_t			loginuid; /* loginuid of sender */
 	struct audit_sig_info   sig_data;
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 
 	err = audit_netlink_ok(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, msg_type);
 	if (err)

From 9e94e66a5bc739ab525ec0a26ba75300aaf154f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2005 18:33:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/30] AUDIT: No really, we don't want to audit auditd.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f463fd230846..20c7d8560af0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	context->return_valid = return_valid;
 	context->return_code  = return_code;
 
-	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
+	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable && tsk->pid != audit_pid) {
 		enum audit_state state;
 		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
 		if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)

From 993e2d4106e94dae6e8cfbeb32073bd12cdee203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 08:21:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/30] AUDIT: Return correct result from audit_filter_rules()

When the task refcounting was added to audit_filter_rules() it became
more of a problem that this function was violating the 'only one
return from each function' rule. In fixing it to use a variable to store
'ret' I stupidly neglected to actually change the 'return 1;' at the
end. This makes it not work very well.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 20c7d8560af0..7b123f0a9481 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	put_task_struct(tsk);
 
-	return 1; /* Audit by default */
+	return ret; /* Audit by default */
 
 }
 

From 5bb289b5a0becb53ac3e1d60815ff8b779296b73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 14:14:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/30] AUDIT: Clean up user message filtering

Don't look up the task by its pid and then use the syscall filtering
helper. Just implement our own filter helper which operates solely on
the information in the netlink_skb_parms.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h |  5 ++--
 kernel/audit.c        |  2 +-
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2f56546eb248..38999f827a36 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info {
 struct audit_buffer;
 struct audit_context;
 struct inode;
+struct netlink_skb_parms;
 
 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type);
+extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
 #else
 #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type);
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_filter_user(p,t) ({ 1; })
+#define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; })
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 9af947a63ed1..6f1784dd80af 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
 			return 0;
 
-		err = audit_filter_user(pid, msg_type);
+		err = audit_filter_user(&NETLINK_CB(skb), msg_type);
 		if (err == 1) {
 			err = 0;
 			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7b123f0a9481..34a990223c9e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 /* 0 = no checking
@@ -530,35 +531,62 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
-int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type)
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+			      struct audit_rule *rule,
+			      enum audit_state *state)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+		u32 value  = rule->values[i];
+		int result = 0;
+
+		switch (field) {
+		case AUDIT_PID:
+			result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_UID:
+			result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_GID:
+			result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+			result = (cb->loginuid == value);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+			result = !result;
+		if (!result)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	switch (rule->action) {
+	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
+	case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
+	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state   state;
 	int ret = 1;
 
-	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-	tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
-	if (tsk)
-		get_task_struct(tsk);
-	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-	if (!tsk)
-		return -ESRCH;
-
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
-		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+		if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
 			if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
 				ret = 0;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	put_task_struct(tsk);
 
 	return ret; /* Audit by default */
-
 }
 
 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */

From e1b09eba2686eca94a3a188042b518df6044a3c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 17:24:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/30] AUDIT: Use KERN_NOTICE for printk of audit records

They aren't errors.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 6f1784dd80af..2617d0552400 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
 					audit_pid = 0;
 				}
 			} else {
-				printk(KERN_ERR "%s\n", skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0));
+				printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s\n", skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0));
 				kfree_skb(skb);
 			}
 		} else {
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 			ab->skb = NULL;
 			wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
 		} else {
-			printk("%s\n", ab->skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0));
+			printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s\n", ab->skb->data + NLMSG_SPACE(0));
 		}
 	}
 	audit_buffer_free(ab);

From 13774024da8ebdf17212c0f5a83f5b0681a649eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@yahoo.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2005 13:49:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/30] AUDIT: Fix definition of audit_log_start() if audit not
 enabled

audit_log_start() seems to take 3 arguments, but its defined to take
only 2 when AUDIT is turned off.

security/selinux/avc.c:553:75: macro "audit_log_start" passed 3 arguments, but takes just 2

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 38999f827a36..c22405fc2ddf 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
 extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
 #else
 #define audit_log(c,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_log_start(c,t) ({ NULL; })
+#define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
 #define audit_log_vformat(b,f,a) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_format(b,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_end(b) do { ; } while (0)

From 7b430437c0de81681ecfa8efa8f55823df733529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2005 13:50:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/30] AUDIT: Fix definition of audit_log() if audit not
 enabled

audit_log() also takes an extra argument, although it's a vararg
function so the compiler didn't really notice.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index c22405fc2ddf..d68e85580a53 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
 extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
 extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
 #else
-#define audit_log(c,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
 #define audit_log_vformat(b,f,a) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_format(b,f,...) do { ; } while (0)

From ac4cec443a80bfde829516e7a7db10f7325aa528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2005 14:08:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/30] AUDIT: Stop waiting for backlog after audit_panic()
 happens

We force a rate-limit on auditable events by making them wait for space
on the backlog queue. However, if auditd really is AWOL then this could
potentially bring the entire system to a halt, depending on the audit
rules in effect.

Firstly, make sure the wait time is honoured correctly -- it's the
maximum time the process should wait, rather than the time to wait
_each_ time round the loop. We were getting re-woken _each_ time a
packet was dequeued, and the timeout was being restarted each time.

Secondly, reset the wait time after audit_panic() is called. In general
this will be reset to zero, to allow progress to be made. If the system
is configured to _actually_ panic on audit_panic() then that will
already have happened; otherwise we know that audit records are being
lost anyway.

These two tunables can't be exposed via AUDIT_GET and AUDIT_SET because
those aren't particularly well-designed. It probably should have been
done by sysctls or sysfs anyway -- one for a later patch.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2617d0552400..b683f2b5e866 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ static int	audit_rate_limit;
 
 /* Number of outstanding audit_buffers allowed. */
 static int	audit_backlog_limit = 64;
+static int	audit_backlog_wait_time = 60 * HZ;
+static int	audit_backlog_wait_overflow = 0;
 
 /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
 uid_t		audit_sig_uid = -1;
@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
 	struct timespec		t;
 	unsigned int		serial;
 	int reserve;
+	unsigned long timeout_start = jiffies;
 
 	if (!audit_initialized)
 		return NULL;
@@ -667,8 +670,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
 
 	while (audit_backlog_limit
 	       && skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue) > audit_backlog_limit + reserve) {
-		if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT) {
-			int ret = 1;
+		if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT && audit_backlog_wait_time
+		    && time_before(jiffies, timeout_start + audit_backlog_wait_time)) {
+
 			/* Wait for auditd to drain the queue a little */
 			DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
 			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
@@ -676,12 +680,11 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
 
 			if (audit_backlog_limit &&
 			    skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)
-				ret = schedule_timeout(HZ * 60);
+				schedule_timeout(timeout_start + audit_backlog_wait_time - jiffies);
 
 			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 			remove_wait_queue(&audit_backlog_wait, &wait);
-			if (ret)
-				continue;
+			continue;
 		}
 		if (audit_rate_check())
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
@@ -690,6 +693,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, int gfp_mask,
 			       skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue),
 			       audit_backlog_limit);
 		audit_log_lost("backlog limit exceeded");
+		audit_backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_overflow;
+		wake_up(&audit_backlog_wait);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 

From 21af6c4f2aa5f63138871b4ddd77d7ebf2588c9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2005 14:10:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/30] AUDIT: Really don't audit auditd.

The pid in the audit context isn't always set up. Use tsk->pid when
checking whether it's auditd in audit_filter_syscall(), instead of
ctx->pid. Remove a band-aid which did the same elsewhere.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 34a990223c9e..0fdd90194ecc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
 	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
 
-	if (audit_pid && ctx->pid == audit_pid)
+	if (audit_pid && tsk->pid == audit_pid)
 		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	context->return_valid = return_valid;
 	context->return_code  = return_code;
 
-	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable && tsk->pid != audit_pid) {
+	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
 		enum audit_state state;
 		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
 		if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)

From ad3f9a2238e401a1fc493b8c91341f9e57940eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2005 15:28:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/30] Fix positioning of audit in MAINTAINERS.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index a47b74102479..6b2de371f0fb 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -363,13 +363,6 @@ L:	linux-atm-general@lists.sourceforge.net
 W:	http://linux-atm.sourceforge.net
 S:	Maintained
 
-AUDIT SUBSYSTEM
-P:	David Woodhouse
-M:	dwmw2@infradead.org
-L:	linux-audit@redhat.com
-W:	http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/
-S:	Maintained
-
 ATMEL WIRELESS DRIVER
 P:	Simon Kelley
 M:	simon@thekelleys.org.uk
@@ -378,7 +371,10 @@ W:	http://atmelwlandriver.sourceforge.net/
 S:	Maintained
 
 AUDIT SUBSYSTEM
-L:	linux-audit@redhat.com (subscribers-only)
+P:	David Woodhouse
+M:	dwmw2@infradead.org
+L:	linux-audit@redhat.com
+W:	http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/
 S:	Maintained
 
 AX.25 NETWORK LAYER

From 6c8c8ba5d7e31b37d0184c388183a6039a672417 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Victor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2005 22:26:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 19/30] [AUDIT] Fix sparse warning about gfp_mask type

Fix the sparse warning "implicit cast to nocast type"

Signed-off-by: Victor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>
Signed-off-by: Domen Puncer <domen@coderock.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index b683f2b5e866..518a833b676a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 }
 
 static struct audit_buffer * audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
-						int gfp_mask, int type)
+						unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask, int type)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;

From 582edda586120004d0fb67113115fa442a0a1571 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2005 22:39:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/30] AUDIT: Exempt the whole auditd thread-group from
 auditing and not just the one thread.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0fdd90194ecc..86d91fe2d93a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
 	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
 
-	if (audit_pid && tsk->pid == audit_pid)
+	if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_tgid)
 		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 	extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
 	extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
 
-	if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
+	if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
 		if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
 			struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
 			audit_sig_pid = current->pid;

From f55619642e863990d5a46cf2c2c840170d22a9f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2005 22:47:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 21/30] AUDIT: Avoid scheduling in idle thread When we flush a
 pending syscall audit record due to audit_free(), we might be doing that in
 the context of the idle thread. So use GFP_ATOMIC

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 86d91fe2d93a..517b253f1efe 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 /* 0 = no checking
@@ -778,13 +779,13 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, unsigned int gfp_mask)
 {
 	int i;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
 	audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -900,9 +901,11 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return;
 
 	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
-	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
+	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
+	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
+	 * in the context of the idle thread */
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context);
+		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
 
 	audit_free_context(context);
 }
@@ -1007,7 +1010,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 		return;
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context);
+		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	context->in_syscall = 0;
 	context->auditable  = 0;

From 351bb722590b2329ac5e72c4b824b8b6ce6e3082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2005 14:40:06 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 22/30] AUDIT: Fix compile error in audit_filter_syscall

We didn't rename it to audit_tgid after all. Except once... Doh.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 517b253f1efe..242d45e53738 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
 	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
 
-	if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_tgid)
+	if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
 		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();

From d5b454f2c40c9efd0cc113bc3220ebcb66b7c022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2005 12:56:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 23/30] AUDIT: Fix livelock in audit_serial().

The tricks with atomic_t were bizarre. Just do it sensibly instead.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 518a833b676a..27ffcf363f8d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -610,26 +610,25 @@ err:
  * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
  * syscall entry to syscall exit.
  *
- * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
- *
  * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
  * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
  * all at syscall exit.  However, this could delay the reporting of
  * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
  * halts). */
+
 unsigned int audit_serial(void)
 {
-	static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
-	unsigned int a, b;
+	static spinlock_t serial_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+	static unsigned int serial = 0;
 
-	do {
-		a = atomic_read(&serial);
-		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
-			atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
-		b = atomic_read(&serial);
-	} while (b != a - 1);
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned int ret;
 
-	return 0xffffff - b;
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&serial_lock, flags);
+	ret = serial++;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&serial_lock, flags);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, 

From ce625a801664d8ed7344117bbb57510e4e0e872c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 14:24:46 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 24/30] AUDIT: Reduce contention in audit_serial() ... by
 generating serial numbers only if an audit context is actually _used_, rather
 than doing so at syscall entry even when the context isn't necessarily marked
 auditable.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c   | 4 +++-
 kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 27ffcf363f8d..d321e251d32b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -625,7 +625,9 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
 	unsigned int ret;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&serial_lock, flags);
-	ret = serial++;
+	do {
+		ret = ++serial;
+	} while (unlikely(!ret));
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&serial_lock, flags);
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 242d45e53738..46b45abceb9a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
 		return;
 
-	context->serial     = audit_serial();
+	context->serial     = 0;
 	context->ctime      = CURRENT_TIME;
 	context->in_syscall = 1;
 	context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
@@ -1138,6 +1138,8 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 		       struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
+	if (!ctx->serial)
+		ctx->serial = audit_serial();
 	t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
 	t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
 	*serial    = ctx->serial;

From 413a1c7520ad6207c9122a749983c500f29e3e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 14:45:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 25/30] AUDIT: Fix task refcount leak in audit_filter_syscall()

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 46b45abceb9a..a73176eaa57d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 	/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
 	 * called __put_task_struct. */
 	if (likely(!context))
-		return;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
 		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 		audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
 		tsk->audit_context = context;
 	}
+ out:
 	put_task_struct(tsk);
 }
 

From c3896495942392f1a792da1cafba7a573cbf6fc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 14:49:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 26/30] AUDIT: Speed up audit_filter_syscall() for the
 non-auditable case.

It was showing up fairly high on profiles even when no rules were set.
Make sure the common path stays as fast as possible.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a73176eaa57d..818ef9fdab3c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -513,20 +513,23 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					     struct list_head *list)
 {
 	struct audit_entry *e;
-	enum audit_state   state;
-	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+	enum audit_state state;
 
 	if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
 		return AUDIT_DISABLED;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- 		    && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return state;
-		}
+	if (!list_empty(list)) {
+		    int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+		    int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+		    list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+			    if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+				&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+				    rcu_read_unlock();
+				    return state;
+			    }
+		    }
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
@@ -1023,7 +1026,6 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 	} else {
 		audit_free_names(context);
 		audit_free_aux(context);
-		audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
 		tsk->audit_context = context;
 	}
  out:

From 3c789a19054034847afe80af2f23ebb0eebfbad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 16:05:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 27/30] AUDIT: Prevent duplicate syscall rules

The following patch against audit.81 prevents duplicate syscall rules in
a given filter list by walking the list on each rule add.

I also removed the unused struct audit_entry in audit.c and made the
static inlines in auditsc.c consistent.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/audit.c   |  5 ---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d321e251d32b..8376ec10cf24 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -142,11 +142,6 @@ static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid)
 	nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid;
 }
 
-struct audit_entry {
-	struct list_head  list;
-	struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
 static void audit_panic(const char *message)
 {
 	switch (audit_failure)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 818ef9fdab3c..488ba3dea8bb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -190,9 +190,36 @@ struct audit_entry {
 
 extern int audit_pid;
 
+/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called from 
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
+static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
+	    && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
+	    && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+		return -1;
+	if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+		return -1;
+	if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+		return -1;
+
+	d->flags	= s->flags;
+	d->action	= s->action;
+	d->field_count	= s->field_count;
+	for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
+		d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
+		d->values[i] = s->values[i];
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Check to see if two rules are identical.  It is called from
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and 
  * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
+static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -221,18 +248,37 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
  * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
  * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
 				  struct list_head *list)
 {
+	struct audit_entry  *entry;
+
+	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+	 * addition routine. */
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
+		if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
+			return -EEXIST;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
+		kfree(entry);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
 		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
 		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
 	} else {
 		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
+static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
 	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
 	kfree(e);
@@ -258,32 +304,6 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
 	return -ENOENT;		/* No matching rule */
 }
 
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called during
- * AUDIT_ADD. */
-static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
-	    && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
-	    && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
-		return -1;
-	if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
-		return -1;
-	if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-		return -1;
-
-	d->flags	= s->flags;
-	d->action	= s->action;
-	d->field_count	= s->field_count;
-	for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
-		d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
-		d->values[i] = s->values[i];
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
 {
 	int pid, seq;
@@ -313,7 +333,6 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 							uid_t loginuid)
 {
-	struct audit_entry *entry;
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	int *dest;
 	int		   err = 0;
@@ -340,16 +359,14 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 		}
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
-		if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
-			kfree(entry);
+		listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+		if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-		audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
-				"auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+
+		err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+		if (!err)
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				  "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
 		listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;

From 17888225c2f392bfdbac6c7f0713cbd9a4d02b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2005 10:23:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/30] Fix missing audit_syscall_exit() on ppc64 sigsuspend
 exit path

When we leave sigsuspend() directly into a signal handler, we don't want
to go via the normal syscall exit path -- it'll corrupt r4 and r5 which
are supposed to be giving information to the signal handler, and it'll
give us one more single-step SIGTRAP than we need if single-stepping is
in operation.

However, we _should_ be calling audit_syscall_exit(), which would
normally get invoked in that patch. It's not wonderfully pretty, but I
suspect the best answer is just to call it directly...

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 arch/ppc64/kernel/asm-offsets.c |  1 +
 arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S       | 16 ++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/ppc64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index abb9e5b5da03..6f910fa2746f 100644
--- a/arch/ppc64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/ppc64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ int main(void)
 	DEFINE(THREAD_USED_VR, offsetof(struct thread_struct, used_vr));
 #endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
 	DEFINE(MM, offsetof(struct task_struct, mm));
+	DEFINE(AUDITCONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, audit_context));
 
 	DEFINE(DCACHEL1LINESIZE, offsetof(struct ppc64_caches, dline_size));
 	DEFINE(DCACHEL1LOGLINESIZE, offsetof(struct ppc64_caches, log_dline_size));
diff --git a/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
index b61572eb2a71..ae5d563ad93a 100644
--- a/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -276,12 +276,20 @@ _GLOBAL(ppc64_rt_sigsuspend)
 _GLOBAL(ppc32_rt_sigsuspend)
 	bl	.save_nvgprs
 	bl	.sys32_rt_sigsuspend
-	/* If sigsuspend() returns zero, we are going into a signal handler */
 70:	cmpdi	0,r3,0
-	beq	.ret_from_except
-	/* If it returned -EINTR, we need to return via syscall_exit to set
+	/* If it returned an error, we need to return via syscall_exit to set
 	   the SO bit in cr0 and potentially stop for ptrace. */
-	b	syscall_exit
+	bne	syscall_exit
+	/* If sigsuspend() returns zero, we are going into a signal handler. We
+	   may need to call audit_syscall_exit() to mark the exit from sigsuspend() */
+	ld	r3,PACACURRENT(r13)
+	ld	r4,AUDITCONTEXT(r3)
+	cmpdi	0,r4,0
+	beq	.ret_from_except	/* No audit_context: Leave immediately. */
+	li	r4, 2			/* AUDITSC_FAILURE */
+	li	r5,-4			/* It's always -EINTR */
+	bl	.audit_syscall_exit
+	b	.ret_from_except
 
 _GLOBAL(ppc_fork)
 	bl	.save_nvgprs

From b01f2cc1c37ac3d5ca313c90370a586dffe5aca9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2005 10:25:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 29/30] [AUDIT] Allow filtering on system call success _or_
 failure

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 488ba3dea8bb..88696f639aab 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -440,8 +440,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				result = (ctx->return_code == value);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
-			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
-				result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
+				if (value)
+					result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+				else
+					result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
 			if (ctx) {

From b6ddc518520887a62728b0414efbf802a9dfdd55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2005 08:09:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 30/30] Fix build failure on ppc64 without CONFIG_AUDIT

We shouldn't call audit_syscall_exit() unless it actually exists.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
---
 arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
index ae5d563ad93a..14cd56ac40dd 100644
--- a/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ _GLOBAL(ppc32_rt_sigsuspend)
 	bne	syscall_exit
 	/* If sigsuspend() returns zero, we are going into a signal handler. We
 	   may need to call audit_syscall_exit() to mark the exit from sigsuspend() */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	ld	r3,PACACURRENT(r13)
 	ld	r4,AUDITCONTEXT(r3)
 	cmpdi	0,r4,0
@@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ _GLOBAL(ppc32_rt_sigsuspend)
 	li	r4, 2			/* AUDITSC_FAILURE */
 	li	r5,-4			/* It's always -EINTR */
 	bl	.audit_syscall_exit
+#endif
 	b	.ret_from_except
 
 _GLOBAL(ppc_fork)