x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches.
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e6 ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Thomas Gleixner
parent
dbbe2ad02e
commit
4d8df8cbb9
@@ -1175,11 +1175,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
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return 0;
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return 0;
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/*
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/*
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* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
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* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
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* mode.
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* mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
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* by a previous prctl call.
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*/
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*/
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if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
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if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
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spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
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spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
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spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
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spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
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task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
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return -EPERM;
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return -EPERM;
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task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
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task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
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task_update_spec_tif(task);
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task_update_spec_tif(task);
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