forked from Minki/linux
stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures
Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook
Ingo Molnar
parent
b0031f227e
commit
19952a9203
14
Makefile
14
Makefile
@ -595,10 +595,18 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN})
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endif
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# Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions
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ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
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# Handle stack protector mode.
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ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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stackp-flag := -fstack-protector
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ifeq ($(call cc-option, $(stackp-flag)),)
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$(warning Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR: \
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-fstack-protector not supported by compiler))
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endif
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else
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# Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default.
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stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
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endif
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
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# This warning generated too much noise in a regular build.
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# Use make W=1 to enable this warning (see scripts/Makefile.build)
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22
arch/Kconfig
22
arch/Kconfig
@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
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See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
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config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool
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help
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An arch should select this symbol if:
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- its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
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- it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
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config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
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depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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help
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This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
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feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
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the stack just before the return address, and validates
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the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
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overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
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overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
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neutralized via a kernel panic.
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This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
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gcc with the feature backported.
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config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
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bool
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help
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@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config ARM
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select HAVE_BPF_JIT
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select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
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select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
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select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
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select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
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select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
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@ -1856,18 +1857,6 @@ config SECCOMP
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
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help
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This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
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feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
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the stack just before the return address, and validates
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the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
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overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
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overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
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neutralized via a kernel panic.
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This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
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config SWIOTLB
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def_bool y
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@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
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KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
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endif
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ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
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KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fstack-protector
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endif
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ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
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KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian
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AS += -EB
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@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config MIPS
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select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if MODULES && 64BIT
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select CLONE_BACKWARDS
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select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
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select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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menu "Machine selection"
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@ -2322,19 +2323,6 @@ config SECCOMP
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
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help
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This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
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feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
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the stack just before the return address, and validates
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the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
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overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
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overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
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neutralized via a kernel panic.
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This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
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config USE_OF
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bool
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select OF
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@ -232,10 +232,6 @@ bootvars-y = VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \
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LDFLAGS += -m $(ld-emul)
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ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
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endif
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ifdef CONFIG_MIPS
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CHECKFLAGS += $(shell $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -dM -E -x c /dev/null | \
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egrep -vw '__GNUC_(|MINOR_|PATCHLEVEL_)_' | \
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@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ config SUPERH32
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select PERF_EVENTS
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select ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE if MMU
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select SPARSE_IRQ
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select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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config SUPERH64
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def_bool ARCH = "sh64"
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@ -695,20 +696,6 @@ config SECCOMP
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If unsure, say N.
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config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
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depends on SUPERH32
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help
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This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
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feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
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the stack just before the return address, and validates
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the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
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overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
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overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
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neutralized via a kernel panic.
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This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
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config SMP
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bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
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depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
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@ -199,10 +199,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER),y)
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
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endif
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ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector
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endif
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libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH32) := arch/sh/lib/ $(libs-y)
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libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH64) := arch/sh/lib64/ $(libs-y)
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@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config X86
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select RTC_LIB
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select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
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select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64
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select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
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def_bool y
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@ -1617,22 +1618,6 @@ config SECCOMP
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection"
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---help---
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This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
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feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
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the stack just before the return address, and validates
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the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
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overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
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overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
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neutralized via a kernel panic.
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This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
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gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically
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detected and for those versions, this configuration option is
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ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup)
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source kernel/Kconfig.hz
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config KEXEC
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@ -89,13 +89,11 @@ else
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args
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endif
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# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stack-protector support.
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ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh
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ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
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stackp-y := -fstack-protector
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KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y)
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else
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$(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support)
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ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y)
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$(warning stack-protector enabled but compiler support broken)
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endif
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endif
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