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Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

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Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
 "This fixes the following issues:

   - Fix pointer size when caam is used with AArch64 boot loader on
     AArch32 kernel.

   - Fix ahash state corruption in marvell driver.

   - Fix buggy algif_aed tag handling.

   - Prevent mcryptd from being used with incompatible algorithms which
     can cause crashes"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: algif_aead - fix uninitialized variable warning
  crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
  crypto: algif_aead - fix AEAD tag memory handling
  crypto: caam - fix pointer size for AArch64 boot loader, AArch32 kernel
  crypto: marvell - Don't corrupt state of an STD req for re-stepped ahash
  crypto: marvell - Don't copy hash operation twice into the SRAM
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2016-12-10 09:47:13 -08:00
commit 045169816b
4 changed files with 57 additions and 37 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

59
crypto/algif_aead.c
View File

@ -81,7 +81,11 @@ static inline bool aead_sufficient_data(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned as = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + as;
/*
* The minimum amount of memory needed for an AEAD cipher is
* the AAD and in case of decryption the tag.
*/
return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? 0 : as);
}
static void aead_reset_ctx(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
@ -416,7 +420,7 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
unsigned int i, reqlen = GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm);
int err = -ENOMEM;
unsigned long used;
size_t outlen;
size_t outlen = 0;
size_t usedpages = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
@ -426,12 +430,15 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
goto unlock;
}
used = ctx->used;
outlen = used;
if (!aead_sufficient_data(ctx))
goto unlock;
used = ctx->used;
if (ctx->enc)
outlen = used + as;
else
outlen = used - as;
req = sock_kmalloc(sk, reqlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!req))
goto unlock;
@ -445,7 +452,7 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
aead_request_set_ad(req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
aead_async_cb, sk);
used -= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? as : 0);
used -= ctx->aead_assoclen;
/* take over all tx sgls from ctx */
areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * sgl->cur,
@ -461,7 +468,7 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
areq->tsgls = sgl->cur;
/* create rx sgls */
while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
while (outlen > usedpages && iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
(outlen - usedpages));
@ -491,16 +498,14 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
last_rsgl = rsgl;
/* we do not need more iovecs as we have sufficient memory */
if (outlen <= usedpages)
break;
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
}
err = -EINVAL;
/* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
if (usedpages < outlen)
goto free;
if (usedpages < outlen) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto unlock;
}
aead_request_set_crypt(req, areq->tsgl, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used,
areq->iv);
@ -571,6 +576,7 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
goto unlock;
}
/* data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage */
used = ctx->used;
/*
@ -585,16 +591,27 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
if (!aead_sufficient_data(ctx))
goto unlock;
outlen = used;
/*
* Calculate the minimum output buffer size holding the result of the
* cipher operation. When encrypting data, the receiving buffer is
* larger by the tag length compared to the input buffer as the
* encryption operation generates the tag. For decryption, the input
* buffer provides the tag which is consumed resulting in only the
* plaintext without a buffer for the tag returned to the caller.
*/
if (ctx->enc)
outlen = used + as;
else
outlen = used - as;
/*
* The cipher operation input data is reduced by the associated data
* length as this data is processed separately later on.
*/
used -= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? as : 0);
used -= ctx->aead_assoclen;
/* convert iovecs of output buffers into scatterlists */
while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
while (outlen > usedpages && iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
(outlen - usedpages));
@ -621,16 +638,14 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
last_rsgl = rsgl;
/* we do not need more iovecs as we have sufficient memory */
if (outlen <= usedpages)
break;
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
}
err = -EINVAL;
/* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
if (usedpages < outlen)
if (usedpages < outlen) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto unlock;
}
sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + sgl->cur - 1);
aead_request_set_crypt(&ctx->aead_req, sgl->sg, ctx->first_rsgl.sgl.sg,

19
crypto/mcryptd.c
View File

@ -254,18 +254,22 @@ out_free_inst:
goto out;
}
static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
static inline bool mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return;
if ((algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if ((algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
return false;
*type |= algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
*mask |= algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if (*type & *mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL)
return true;
else
return false;
}
static int mcryptd_hash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
@ -492,7 +496,8 @@ static int mcryptd_create_hash(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
u32 mask = 0;
int err;
mcryptd_check_internal(tb, &type, &mask);
if (!mcryptd_check_internal(tb, &type, &mask))
return -EINVAL;
halg = ahash_attr_alg(tb[1], type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(halg))

5
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
View File

@ -558,8 +558,9 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* Enable DECO watchdogs and, if this is a PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT kernel,
* long pointers in master configuration register
*/
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_AWCACHE_MASK, MCFGR_AWCACHE_CACH |
MCFGR_AWCACHE_BUFF | MCFGR_WDENABLE | MCFGR_LARGE_BURST |
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_AWCACHE_MASK | MCFGR_LONG_PTR,
MCFGR_AWCACHE_CACH | MCFGR_AWCACHE_BUFF |
MCFGR_WDENABLE | MCFGR_LARGE_BURST |
(sizeof(dma_addr_t) == sizeof(u64) ? MCFGR_LONG_PTR : 0));
/*

11
drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c
View File

@ -168,12 +168,11 @@ static void mv_cesa_ahash_std_step(struct ahash_request *req)
mv_cesa_adjust_op(engine, &creq->op_tmpl);
memcpy_toio(engine->sram, &creq->op_tmpl, sizeof(creq->op_tmpl));
digsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
for (i = 0; i < digsize / 4; i++)
writel_relaxed(creq->state[i], engine->regs + CESA_IVDIG(i));
mv_cesa_adjust_op(engine, &creq->op_tmpl);
memcpy_toio(engine->sram, &creq->op_tmpl, sizeof(creq->op_tmpl));
if (!sreq->offset) {
digsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
for (i = 0; i < digsize / 4; i++)
writel_relaxed(creq->state[i], engine->regs + CESA_IVDIG(i));
}
if (creq->cache_ptr)
memcpy_toio(engine->sram + CESA_SA_DATA_SRAM_OFFSET,