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linux/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <asm/sgx.h>
#include "encl.h"
#include "encls.h"
#include "sgx.h"
static int sgx_encl_lookup_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
struct sgx_backing *backing);
x86/sgx: Fix race between reclaimer and page fault handler Haitao reported encountering a WARN triggered by the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction faulting with a #GP. The WARN is encountered when the reclaimer evicts a range of pages from the enclave when the same pages are faulted back right away. Consider two enclave pages (ENCLAVE_A and ENCLAVE_B) sharing a PCMD page (PCMD_AB). ENCLAVE_A is in the enclave memory and ENCLAVE_B is in the backing store. PCMD_AB contains just one entry, that of ENCLAVE_B. Scenario proceeds where ENCLAVE_A is being evicted from the enclave while ENCLAVE_B is faulted in. sgx_reclaim_pages() { ... /* * Reclaim ENCLAVE_A */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get a reference to ENCLAVE_A's * shmem page where enclave page * encrypted data will be stored * as well as a reference to the * enclave page's PCMD data page, * PCMD_AB. * Release mutex before writing * any data to the shmem pages. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...); encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); /* * Fault ENCLAVE_B */ sgx_vma_fault() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get reference to * ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * as well as PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...) /* * Load page back into * enclave via ELDU. */ /* * Release reference to * ENCLAVE_B' shmem page and * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...); /* * PCMD_AB is found empty so * it and ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * are truncated. */ /* Truncate ENCLAVE_B backing page */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); /* Truncate PCMD_AB */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); ... } mutex_lock(&encl->lock); encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; /* * Write encrypted contents of * ENCLAVE_A to ENCLAVE_A shmem * page and its PCMD data to * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...) /* * Reference to PCMD_AB is * dropped and it is truncated. * ENCLAVE_A's PCMD data is lost. */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } What happens next depends on whether it is ENCLAVE_A being faulted in or ENCLAVE_B being evicted - but both end up with ENCLS[ELDU] faulting with a #GP. If ENCLAVE_A is faulted then at the time sgx_encl_get_backing() is called a new PCMD page is allocated and providing the empty PCMD data for ENCLAVE_A would cause ENCLS[ELDU] to #GP If ENCLAVE_B is evicted first then a new PCMD_AB would be allocated by the reclaimer but later when ENCLAVE_A is faulted the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction would #GP during its checks of the PCMD value and the WARN would be encountered. Noting that the reclaimer sets SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED at the time it obtains a reference to the backing store pages of an enclave page it is in the process of reclaiming, fix the race by only truncating the PCMD page after ensuring that no page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being reclaimed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 08999b2489b4 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page") Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ed20a5db516aa813873268e125680041ae11dfcf.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-12 14:51:00 -07:00
#define PCMDS_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd))
/*
* 32 PCMD entries share a PCMD page. PCMD_FIRST_MASK is used to
* determine the page index associated with the first PCMD entry
* within a PCMD page.
*/
#define PCMD_FIRST_MASK GENMASK(4, 0)
/**
* reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd() - Query if any enclave page associated with
* a PCMD page is in process of being reclaimed.
* @encl: Enclave to which PCMD page belongs
* @start_addr: Address of enclave page using first entry within the PCMD page
*
* When an enclave page is reclaimed some Paging Crypto MetaData (PCMD) is
* stored. The PCMD data of a reclaimed enclave page contains enough
* information for the processor to verify the page at the time
* it is loaded back into the Enclave Page Cache (EPC).
*
* The backing storage to which enclave pages are reclaimed is laid out as
* follows:
* Encrypted enclave pages:SECS page:PCMD pages
*
* Each PCMD page contains the PCMD metadata of
* PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) enclave pages.
*
* A PCMD page can only be truncated if it is (a) empty, and (b) not in the
* process of getting data (and thus soon being non-empty). (b) is tested with
* a check if an enclave page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being
* reclaimed.
*
* The reclaimer sets the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED flag when it
* intends to reclaim that enclave page - it means that the PCMD page
* associated with that enclave page is about to get some data and thus
* even if the PCMD page is empty, it should not be truncated.
*
* Context: Enclave mutex (&sgx_encl->lock) must be held.
* Return: 1 if the reclaimer is about to write to the PCMD page
* 0 if the reclaimer has no intention to write to the PCMD page
*/
static int reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long start_addr)
{
int reclaimed = 0;
int i;
/*
* PCMD_FIRST_MASK is based on number of PCMD entries within
* PCMD page being 32.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(PCMDS_PER_PAGE != 32);
for (i = 0; i < PCMDS_PER_PAGE; i++) {
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
unsigned long addr;
addr = start_addr + i * PAGE_SIZE;
/*
* Stop when reaching the SECS page - it does not
* have a page_array entry and its reclaim is
* started and completed with enclave mutex held so
* it does not use the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED
* flag.
*/
if (addr == encl->base + encl->size)
break;
entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
if (!entry)
continue;
/*
* VA page slot ID uses same bit as the flag so it is important
* to ensure that the page is not already in backing store.
*/
if (entry->epc_page &&
(entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)) {
reclaimed = 1;
break;
}
}
return reclaimed;
}
/*
* Calculate byte offset of a PCMD struct associated with an enclave page. PCMD's
* follow right after the EPC data in the backing storage. In addition to the
* visible enclave pages, there's one extra page slot for SECS, before PCMD
* structs.
*/
static inline pgoff_t sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long page_index)
{
pgoff_t epc_end_off = encl->size + sizeof(struct sgx_secs);
return epc_end_off + page_index * sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd);
}
/*
* Free a page from the backing storage in the given page index.
*/
static inline void sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(encl->backing);
shmem_truncate_range(inode, PFN_PHYS(page_index), PFN_PHYS(page_index) + PAGE_SIZE - 1);
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
/*
* ELDU: Load an EPC page as unblocked. For more info, see "OS Management of EPC
* Pages" in the SDM.
*/
static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
{
unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
pgoff_t page_index, page_pcmd_off;
x86/sgx: Fix race between reclaimer and page fault handler Haitao reported encountering a WARN triggered by the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction faulting with a #GP. The WARN is encountered when the reclaimer evicts a range of pages from the enclave when the same pages are faulted back right away. Consider two enclave pages (ENCLAVE_A and ENCLAVE_B) sharing a PCMD page (PCMD_AB). ENCLAVE_A is in the enclave memory and ENCLAVE_B is in the backing store. PCMD_AB contains just one entry, that of ENCLAVE_B. Scenario proceeds where ENCLAVE_A is being evicted from the enclave while ENCLAVE_B is faulted in. sgx_reclaim_pages() { ... /* * Reclaim ENCLAVE_A */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get a reference to ENCLAVE_A's * shmem page where enclave page * encrypted data will be stored * as well as a reference to the * enclave page's PCMD data page, * PCMD_AB. * Release mutex before writing * any data to the shmem pages. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...); encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); /* * Fault ENCLAVE_B */ sgx_vma_fault() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get reference to * ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * as well as PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...) /* * Load page back into * enclave via ELDU. */ /* * Release reference to * ENCLAVE_B' shmem page and * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...); /* * PCMD_AB is found empty so * it and ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * are truncated. */ /* Truncate ENCLAVE_B backing page */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); /* Truncate PCMD_AB */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); ... } mutex_lock(&encl->lock); encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; /* * Write encrypted contents of * ENCLAVE_A to ENCLAVE_A shmem * page and its PCMD data to * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...) /* * Reference to PCMD_AB is * dropped and it is truncated. * ENCLAVE_A's PCMD data is lost. */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } What happens next depends on whether it is ENCLAVE_A being faulted in or ENCLAVE_B being evicted - but both end up with ENCLS[ELDU] faulting with a #GP. If ENCLAVE_A is faulted then at the time sgx_encl_get_backing() is called a new PCMD page is allocated and providing the empty PCMD data for ENCLAVE_A would cause ENCLS[ELDU] to #GP If ENCLAVE_B is evicted first then a new PCMD_AB would be allocated by the reclaimer but later when ENCLAVE_A is faulted the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction would #GP during its checks of the PCMD value and the WARN would be encountered. Noting that the reclaimer sets SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED at the time it obtains a reference to the backing store pages of an enclave page it is in the process of reclaiming, fix the race by only truncating the PCMD page after ensuring that no page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being reclaimed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 08999b2489b4 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page") Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ed20a5db516aa813873268e125680041ae11dfcf.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-12 14:51:00 -07:00
unsigned long pcmd_first_page;
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
struct sgx_backing b;
bool pcmd_page_empty;
u8 *pcmd_page;
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
int ret;
if (secs_page)
page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base);
else
page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size);
x86/sgx: Fix race between reclaimer and page fault handler Haitao reported encountering a WARN triggered by the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction faulting with a #GP. The WARN is encountered when the reclaimer evicts a range of pages from the enclave when the same pages are faulted back right away. Consider two enclave pages (ENCLAVE_A and ENCLAVE_B) sharing a PCMD page (PCMD_AB). ENCLAVE_A is in the enclave memory and ENCLAVE_B is in the backing store. PCMD_AB contains just one entry, that of ENCLAVE_B. Scenario proceeds where ENCLAVE_A is being evicted from the enclave while ENCLAVE_B is faulted in. sgx_reclaim_pages() { ... /* * Reclaim ENCLAVE_A */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get a reference to ENCLAVE_A's * shmem page where enclave page * encrypted data will be stored * as well as a reference to the * enclave page's PCMD data page, * PCMD_AB. * Release mutex before writing * any data to the shmem pages. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...); encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); /* * Fault ENCLAVE_B */ sgx_vma_fault() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * Get reference to * ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * as well as PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(...) /* * Load page back into * enclave via ELDU. */ /* * Release reference to * ENCLAVE_B' shmem page and * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...); /* * PCMD_AB is found empty so * it and ENCLAVE_B's shmem page * are truncated. */ /* Truncate ENCLAVE_B backing page */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); /* Truncate PCMD_AB */ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); ... } mutex_lock(&encl->lock); encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; /* * Write encrypted contents of * ENCLAVE_A to ENCLAVE_A shmem * page and its PCMD data to * PCMD_AB. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(...) /* * Reference to PCMD_AB is * dropped and it is truncated. * ENCLAVE_A's PCMD data is lost. */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } What happens next depends on whether it is ENCLAVE_A being faulted in or ENCLAVE_B being evicted - but both end up with ENCLS[ELDU] faulting with a #GP. If ENCLAVE_A is faulted then at the time sgx_encl_get_backing() is called a new PCMD page is allocated and providing the empty PCMD data for ENCLAVE_A would cause ENCLS[ELDU] to #GP If ENCLAVE_B is evicted first then a new PCMD_AB would be allocated by the reclaimer but later when ENCLAVE_A is faulted the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction would #GP during its checks of the PCMD value and the WARN would be encountered. Noting that the reclaimer sets SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED at the time it obtains a reference to the backing store pages of an enclave page it is in the process of reclaiming, fix the race by only truncating the PCMD page after ensuring that no page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being reclaimed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 08999b2489b4 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page") Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ed20a5db516aa813873268e125680041ae11dfcf.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-12 14:51:00 -07:00
/*
* Address of enclave page using the first entry within the PCMD page.
*/
pcmd_first_page = PFN_PHYS(page_index & ~PCMD_FIRST_MASK) + encl->base;
page_pcmd_off = sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(encl, page_index);
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
ret = sgx_encl_lookup_backing(encl, page_index, &b);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (ret)
return ret;
pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.contents);
pcmd_page = kmap_atomic(b.pcmd);
pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)pcmd_page + b.pcmd_offset;
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (secs_page)
pginfo.secs = (u64)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_page);
else
pginfo.secs = 0;
ret = __eldu(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page),
sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl_page->va_page->epc_page) + va_offset);
if (ret) {
if (encls_failed(ret))
ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ELDU");
ret = -EFAULT;
}
memset(pcmd_page + b.pcmd_offset, 0, sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd));
set_page_dirty(b.pcmd);
/*
* The area for the PCMD in the page was zeroed above. Check if the
* whole page is now empty meaning that all PCMD's have been zeroed:
*/
pcmd_page_empty = !memchr_inv(pcmd_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
get_page(b.pcmd);
x86/sgx: Disconnect backing page references from dirty status SGX uses shmem backing storage to store encrypted enclave pages and their crypto metadata when enclave pages are moved out of enclave memory. Two shmem backing storage pages are associated with each enclave page - one backing page to contain the encrypted enclave page data and one backing page (shared by a few enclave pages) to contain the crypto metadata used by the processor to verify the enclave page when it is loaded back into the enclave. sgx_encl_put_backing() is used to release references to the backing storage and, optionally, mark both backing store pages as dirty. Managing references and dirty status together in this way results in both backing store pages marked as dirty, even if only one of the backing store pages are changed. Additionally, waiting until the page reference is dropped to set the page dirty risks a race with the page fault handler that may load outdated data into the enclave when a page is faulted right after it is reclaimed. Consider what happens if the reclaimer writes a page to the backing store and the page is immediately faulted back, before the reclaimer is able to set the dirty bit of the page: sgx_reclaim_pages() { sgx_vma_fault() { ... sgx_encl_get_backing(); ... ... sgx_reclaimer_write() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* Write data to backing store */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } mutex_lock(&encl->lock); __sgx_encl_eldu() { ... /* * Enclave backing store * page not released * nor marked dirty - * contents may not be * up to date. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(); ... /* * Enclave data restored * from backing store * and PCMD pages that * are not up to date. * ENCLS[ELDU] faults * because of MAC or PCMD * checking failure. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(); } ... /* set page dirty */ sgx_encl_put_backing(); ... mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } } Remove the option to sgx_encl_put_backing() to set the backing pages as dirty and set the needed pages as dirty right after receiving important data while enclave mutex is held. This ensures that the page fault handler can get up to date data from a page and prepares the code for a following change where only one of the backing pages need to be marked as dirty. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1728ab54b4be ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer") Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/8922e48f-6646-c7cc-6393-7c78dcf23d23@intel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa9f98986923f43e72ef4c6702a50b2a0b3c42e3.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-12 14:50:57 -07:00
sgx_encl_put_backing(&b);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, page_index);
if (pcmd_page_empty && !reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(encl, pcmd_first_page)) {
sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, PFN_DOWN(page_pcmd_off));
pcmd_page = kmap_atomic(b.pcmd);
if (memchr_inv(pcmd_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
pr_warn("PCMD page not empty after truncate.\n");
kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
}
put_page(b.pcmd);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
return ret;
}
static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
{
unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
int ret;
epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false);
if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
return epc_page;
ret = __sgx_encl_eldu(encl_page, epc_page, secs_page);
if (ret) {
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
sgx_free_va_slot(encl_page->va_page, va_offset);
list_move(&encl_page->va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
return epc_page;
}
static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
struct sgx_encl_page *entry)
{
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
/* Entry successfully located. */
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (entry->epc_page) {
if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
return entry;
}
if (!(encl->secs.epc_page)) {
epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(&encl->secs, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
}
epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(entry, encl->secs.epc_page);
if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
encl->secs_child_cnt++;
sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
return entry;
}
static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long vm_flags)
{
unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
if (!entry)
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
/*
* Verify that the page has equal or higher build time
* permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
* VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
*/
if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
}
struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr)
{
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
if (!entry)
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
}
x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available. The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful. If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address. Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a254a58eabea053803277449b24b6e4963a3883b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:52 -07:00
/**
* sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
* @vma: VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
* @encl: enclave accessing the page
* @addr: address that triggered the page fault
*
* When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
* on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
* ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
*
* Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
* successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
*/
static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
{
vm_fault_t vmret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
unsigned long phys_addr;
u64 secinfo_flags;
int ret;
if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
/*
* Ignore internal permission checking for dynamically added pages.
* They matter only for data added during the pre-initialization
* phase. The enclave decides the permissions by the means of
* EACCEPT, EACCEPTCOPY and EMODPE.
*/
secinfo_flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr - encl->base, secinfo_flags);
if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false);
if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
if (PTR_ERR(epc_page) == -EBUSY)
vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto err_out_unlock;
}
va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, false);
if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
if (PTR_ERR(va_page) == -EBUSY)
vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available. The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful. If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address. Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a254a58eabea053803277449b24b6e4963a3883b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:52 -07:00
goto err_out_epc;
}
x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available. The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful. If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address. Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a254a58eabea053803277449b24b6e4963a3883b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:52 -07:00
if (va_page)
list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
* running without encl->lock
*/
if (ret)
goto err_out_shrink;
pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
pginfo.metadata = 0;
ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
if (ret)
goto err_out;
encl_page->encl = encl;
encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
encl->secs_child_cnt++;
sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
/*
* Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
* would find page ready for a PTE.
*/
vmret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
err_out:
xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
err_out_shrink:
sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
err_out_epc:
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
err_out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
kfree(encl_page);
return vmret;
}
static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
unsigned long phys_addr;
struct sgx_encl *encl;
vm_fault_t ret;
encl = vma->vm_private_data;
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
/*
* It's very unlikely but possible that allocating memory for the
* mm_list entry of a forked process failed in sgx_vma_open(). When
* this happens, vm_private_data is set to NULL.
*/
if (unlikely(!encl))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization. Pages can be added during enclave runtime. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave, architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming pages if no free pages are available. The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful. If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on the now initialized address. Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a254a58eabea053803277449b24b6e4963a3883b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:52 -07:00
/*
* The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
* are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
* the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
* a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
* enclave that will be checked for right away.
*/
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
(!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY)
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(vma->vm_mm, entry);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
/*
* It's possible but unlikely that vm_private_data is NULL. This can
* happen in a grandchild of a process, when sgx_encl_mm_add() had
* failed to allocate memory in this callback.
*/
if (unlikely(!encl))
return;
if (sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm))
vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
}
/**
* sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed
* @encl: an enclave pointer
* @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive
* @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive
* @vm_flags: VMA flags
*
* Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify
* that the permissions requested by a subset of {VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC}
* do not contain any permissions that are not contained in the build time
* permissions of any of the enclave pages within the given address range.
*
* An enclave creator must declare the strongest permissions that will be
* needed for each enclave page. This ensures that mappings have the identical
* or weaker permissions than the earlier declared permissions.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -EACCES otherwise
*/
int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags)
{
unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
struct sgx_encl_page *page;
unsigned long count = 0;
int ret = 0;
XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start));
x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Before an enclave is initialized the enclave's memory range is unknown. The enclave's memory range is learned at the time it is created via the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl() where the provided memory range is obtained from an earlier mmap() of /dev/sgx_enclave. After an enclave is initialized its memory can be mapped into user space (mmap()) from where it can be entered at its defined entry points. With the enclave's memory range known after it is initialized there is no reason why it should be possible to map memory outside this range. Lock down access to the initialized enclave's memory range by denying any attempt to map memory outside its memory range. Locking down the memory range also makes adding pages to an initialized enclave more efficient. Pages are added to an initialized enclave by accessing memory that belongs to the enclave's memory range but not yet backed by an enclave page. If it is possible for user space to map memory that does not form part of the enclave then an access to this memory would eventually fail. Failures range from a prompt general protection fault if the access was an ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave, or a page fault via the vDSO if it was another access from within the enclave, or a SIGBUS (also resulting from a page fault) if the access was from outside the enclave. Disallowing invalid memory to be mapped in the first place avoids preventable failures. Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6391460d75ae79cea2e81eef0f6ffc03c6e9cfe7.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:53 -07:00
/* Disallow mapping outside enclave's address range. */
if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) &&
(start < encl->base || end > encl->base + encl->size))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might
* conflict with the enclave page permissions.
*/
if (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)
return -EACCES;
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
xas_lock(&xas);
xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) {
if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
ret = -EACCES;
break;
}
/* Reschedule on every XA_CHECK_SCHED iteration. */
if (!(++count % XA_CHECK_SCHED)) {
xas_pause(&xas);
xas_unlock(&xas);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
cond_resched();
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
xas_lock(&xas);
}
}
xas_unlock(&xas);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return ret;
}
static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
{
return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
}
static int sgx_encl_debug_read(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
unsigned long addr, void *data)
{
unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
int ret;
ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
if (ret)
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
unsigned long addr, void *data)
{
unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
int ret;
ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
if (ret)
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
/*
* Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
*/
static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long vm_flags)
{
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
for ( ; ; ) {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vm_flags);
if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
break;
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
}
if (IS_ERR(entry))
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
return entry;
}
static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
void *buf, int len, int write)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL;
char data[sizeof(unsigned long)];
unsigned long align;
int offset;
int cnt;
int ret = 0;
int i;
/*
* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
* to NULL.
*/
if (!encl)
return -EFAULT;
if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
vma->vm_flags);
if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
break;
}
align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long));
offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1);
cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset;
cnt = min(cnt, len - i);
ret = sgx_encl_debug_read(encl, entry, align, data);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (write) {
memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt);
ret = sgx_encl_debug_write(encl, entry, align, data);
if (ret)
goto out;
} else {
memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
if (ret)
break;
}
return ret < 0 ? ret : i;
}
const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
.fault = sgx_vma_fault,
.mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
.open = sgx_vma_open,
.access = sgx_vma_access,
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
};
/**
* sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
* @ref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
*
* Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the
* enclave and the instance itself.
*/
void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount);
struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
unsigned long index;
xa_for_each(&encl->page_array, index, entry) {
if (entry->epc_page) {
/*
* The page and its radix tree entry cannot be freed
* if the page is being held by the reclaimer.
*/
if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
continue;
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
encl->secs_child_cnt--;
entry->epc_page = NULL;
}
kfree(entry);
/* Invoke scheduler to prevent soft lockups. */
cond_resched();
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
}
xa_destroy(&encl->page_array);
if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) {
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
}
while (!list_empty(&encl->va_pages)) {
va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
list);
list_del(&va_page->list);
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
kfree(va_page);
}
if (encl->backing)
fput(encl->backing);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list));
/* Detect EPC page leak's. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt);
WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page);
kfree(encl);
}
/*
* 'mm' is exiting and no longer needs mmu notifications.
*/
static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL;
/*
* The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved
* off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok.
*/
spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) {
if (tmp == encl_mm) {
list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
if (tmp == encl_mm) {
synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu);
mmu_notifier_put(mn);
}
}
static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn)
{
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
x86/sgx: Maintain encl->refcount for each encl->mm_list entry This has been shown in tests: [ +0.000008] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7620 at kernel/rcu/srcutree.c:374 cleanup_srcu_struct+0xed/0x100 This is essentially a use-after free, although SRCU notices it as an SRCU cleanup in an invalid context. == Background == SGX has a data structure (struct sgx_encl_mm) which keeps per-mm SGX metadata. This is separate from struct sgx_encl because, in theory, an enclave can be mapped from more than one mm. sgx_encl_mm includes a pointer back to the sgx_encl. This means that sgx_encl must have a longer lifetime than all of the sgx_encl_mm's that point to it. That's usually the case: sgx_encl_mm is freed only after the mmu_notifier is unregistered in sgx_release(). However, there's a race. If the process is exiting, sgx_mmu_notifier_release() can be called in parallel with sgx_release() instead of being called *by* it. The mmu_notifier path keeps encl_mm alive past when sgx_encl can be freed. This inverts the lifetime rules and means that sgx_mmu_notifier_release() can access a freed sgx_encl. == Fix == Increase encl->refcount when encl_mm->encl is established. Release this reference when encl_mm is freed. This ensures that encl outlives encl_mm. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 1728ab54b4be ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer") Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210207221401.29933-1-jarkko@kernel.org
2021-02-08 00:14:01 +02:00
/* 'encl_mm' is going away, put encl_mm->encl reference: */
kref_put(&encl_mm->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
kfree(encl_mm);
}
static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = {
.release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release,
.free_notifier = sgx_mmu_notifier_free,
};
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL;
struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp;
int idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) {
if (tmp->mm == mm) {
encl_mm = tmp;
break;
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
return encl_mm;
}
int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
int ret;
/*
* Even though a single enclave may be mapped into an mm more than once,
* each 'mm' only appears once on encl->mm_list. This is guaranteed by
* holding the mm's mmap lock for write before an mm can be added or
* remove to an encl->mm_list.
*/
mmap_assert_write_locked(mm);
/*
* It's possible that an entry already exists in the mm_list, because it
* is removed only on VFS release or process exit.
*/
if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm))
return 0;
encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!encl_mm)
return -ENOMEM;
x86/sgx: Maintain encl->refcount for each encl->mm_list entry This has been shown in tests: [ +0.000008] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7620 at kernel/rcu/srcutree.c:374 cleanup_srcu_struct+0xed/0x100 This is essentially a use-after free, although SRCU notices it as an SRCU cleanup in an invalid context. == Background == SGX has a data structure (struct sgx_encl_mm) which keeps per-mm SGX metadata. This is separate from struct sgx_encl because, in theory, an enclave can be mapped from more than one mm. sgx_encl_mm includes a pointer back to the sgx_encl. This means that sgx_encl must have a longer lifetime than all of the sgx_encl_mm's that point to it. That's usually the case: sgx_encl_mm is freed only after the mmu_notifier is unregistered in sgx_release(). However, there's a race. If the process is exiting, sgx_mmu_notifier_release() can be called in parallel with sgx_release() instead of being called *by* it. The mmu_notifier path keeps encl_mm alive past when sgx_encl can be freed. This inverts the lifetime rules and means that sgx_mmu_notifier_release() can access a freed sgx_encl. == Fix == Increase encl->refcount when encl_mm->encl is established. Release this reference when encl_mm is freed. This ensures that encl outlives encl_mm. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 1728ab54b4be ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer") Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210207221401.29933-1-jarkko@kernel.org
2021-02-08 00:14:01 +02:00
/* Grab a refcount for the encl_mm->encl reference: */
kref_get(&encl->refcount);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
encl_mm->encl = encl;
encl_mm->mm = mm;
encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops;
ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm);
if (ret) {
kfree(encl_mm);
return ret;
}
spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
/* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). */
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
smp_wmb();
encl->mm_list_version++;
spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
return 0;
}
/**
* sgx_encl_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave
* @encl: the enclave
*
* Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
* mappings are present before they can succeed. For example, ENCLS[EWB]
* copies a page from the enclave page cache to regular main memory but
* it fails if it cannot ensure that there are no cached
* linear-to-physical address mappings referring to the page.
*
* SGX hardware flushes all cached linear-to-physical mappings on a CPU
* when an enclave is exited via ENCLU[EEXIT] or an Asynchronous Enclave
* Exit (AEX). Exiting an enclave will thus ensure cached linear-to-physical
* address mappings are cleared but coordination with the tracking done within
* the SGX hardware is needed to support the SGX functions that depend on this
* cache clearing.
*
* When the ENCLS[ETRACK] function is issued on an enclave the hardware
* tracks threads operating inside the enclave at that time. The SGX
* hardware tracking require that all the identified threads must have
* exited the enclave in order to flush the mappings before a function such
* as ENCLS[EWB] will be permitted
*
* The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that
* no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present:
* 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking.
* 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be
* accessing the enclave.
* 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and
* thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings.
* 4) Execute SGX function.
*
* Context: It is required to call this function after ENCLS[ETRACK].
* This will ensure that if any new mm appears (racing with
* sgx_encl_mm_add()) then the new mm will enter into the
* enclave with fresh linear-to-physical address mappings.
*
* It is required that all IPIs are completed before a new
* ENCLS[ETRACK] is issued so be sure to protect steps 1 to 3
* of the above flow with the enclave's mutex.
*
* Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl
*/
const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
{
cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
int idx;
cpumask_clear(cpumask);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
continue;
cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm));
mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
}
srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
return cpumask;
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
pgoff_t index)
{
struct address_space *mapping = encl->backing->f_mapping;
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask);
}
/**
* __sgx_encl_get_backing() - Pin the backing storage
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
* @encl: an enclave pointer
* @page_index: enclave page index
* @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
*
* Pin the backing storage pages for storing the encrypted contents and Paging
* Crypto MetaData (PCMD) of an enclave page.
*
* Return:
* 0 on success,
* -errno otherwise.
*/
static int __sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
struct sgx_backing *backing)
{
pgoff_t page_pcmd_off = sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(encl, page_index);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
struct page *contents;
struct page *pcmd;
contents = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, page_index);
if (IS_ERR(contents))
return PTR_ERR(contents);
pcmd = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, PFN_DOWN(page_pcmd_off));
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (IS_ERR(pcmd)) {
put_page(contents);
return PTR_ERR(pcmd);
}
backing->contents = contents;
backing->pcmd = pcmd;
backing->pcmd_offset = page_pcmd_off & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
return 0;
}
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
/*
* When called from ksgxd, returns the mem_cgroup of a struct mm stored
* in the enclave's mm_list. When not called from ksgxd, just returns
* the mem_cgroup of the current task.
*/
static struct mem_cgroup *sgx_encl_get_mem_cgroup(struct sgx_encl *encl)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL;
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
int idx;
/*
* If called from normal task context, return the mem_cgroup
* of the current task's mm. The remainder of the handling is for
* ksgxd.
*/
if (!current_is_ksgxd())
return get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
/*
* Search the enclave's mm_list to find an mm associated with
* this enclave to charge the allocation to.
*/
idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
continue;
memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(encl_mm->mm);
mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
break;
}
srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
/*
* In the rare case that there isn't an mm associated with
* the enclave, set memcg to the current active mem_cgroup.
* This will be the root mem_cgroup if there is no active
* mem_cgroup.
*/
if (!memcg)
return get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(NULL);
return memcg;
}
/**
* sgx_encl_alloc_backing() - create a new backing storage page
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
* @encl: an enclave pointer
* @page_index: enclave page index
* @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
*
* When called from ksgxd, sets the active memcg from one of the
* mms in the enclave's mm_list prior to any backing page allocation,
* in order to ensure that shmem page allocations are charged to the
* enclave. Create a backing page for loading data back into an EPC page with
* ELDU. This function takes a reference on a new backing page which
* must be dropped with a corresponding call to sgx_encl_put_backing().
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
*
* Return:
* 0 on success,
* -errno otherwise.
*/
int sgx_encl_alloc_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
struct sgx_backing *backing)
{
struct mem_cgroup *encl_memcg = sgx_encl_get_mem_cgroup(encl);
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = set_active_memcg(encl_memcg);
int ret;
ret = __sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, backing);
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
set_active_memcg(memcg);
mem_cgroup_put(encl_memcg);
return ret;
}
/**
* sgx_encl_lookup_backing() - retrieve an existing backing storage page
* @encl: an enclave pointer
* @page_index: enclave page index
* @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
*
* Retrieve a backing page for loading data back into an EPC page with ELDU.
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that it is appropriate to use
* sgx_encl_lookup_backing() rather than sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). If lookup is
* not used correctly, this will cause an allocation which is not accounted for.
* This function takes a reference on an existing backing page which must be
* dropped with a corresponding call to sgx_encl_put_backing().
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
*
* Return:
* 0 on success,
* -errno otherwise.
*/
static int sgx_encl_lookup_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
struct sgx_backing *backing)
{
return __sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, backing);
x86/sgx: Set active memcg prior to shmem allocation When the system runs out of enclave memory, SGX can reclaim EPC pages by swapping to normal RAM. These backing pages are allocated via a per-enclave shared memory area. Since SGX allows unlimited over commit on EPC memory, the reclaimer thread can allocate a large number of backing RAM pages in response to EPC memory pressure. When the shared memory backing RAM allocation occurs during the reclaimer thread context, the shared memory is charged to the root memory control group, and the shmem usage of the enclave is not properly accounted for, making cgroups ineffective at limiting the amount of RAM an enclave can consume. For example, when using a cgroup to launch a set of test enclaves, the kernel does not properly account for 50% - 75% of shmem page allocations on average. In the worst case, when nearly all allocations occur during the reclaimer thread, the kernel accounts less than a percent of the amount of shmem used by the enclave's cgroup to the correct cgroup. SGX stores a list of mm_structs that are associated with an enclave. Pick one of them during reclaim and charge that mm's memcg with the shmem allocation. The one that gets picked is arbitrary, but this list almost always only has one mm. The cases where there is more than one mm with different memcg's are not worth considering. Create a new function - sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). This function is used whenever a new backing storage page needs to be allocated. Previously the same function was used for page allocation as well as retrieving a previously allocated page. Prior to backing page allocation, if there is a mm_struct associated with the enclave that is requesting the allocation, it is set as the active memory control group. [ dhansen: - fix merge conflict with ELDU fixes - check against actual ksgxd_tsk, not ->mm ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220520174248.4918-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
2022-05-20 10:42:47 -07:00
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
/**
* sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage
* @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
*/
x86/sgx: Disconnect backing page references from dirty status SGX uses shmem backing storage to store encrypted enclave pages and their crypto metadata when enclave pages are moved out of enclave memory. Two shmem backing storage pages are associated with each enclave page - one backing page to contain the encrypted enclave page data and one backing page (shared by a few enclave pages) to contain the crypto metadata used by the processor to verify the enclave page when it is loaded back into the enclave. sgx_encl_put_backing() is used to release references to the backing storage and, optionally, mark both backing store pages as dirty. Managing references and dirty status together in this way results in both backing store pages marked as dirty, even if only one of the backing store pages are changed. Additionally, waiting until the page reference is dropped to set the page dirty risks a race with the page fault handler that may load outdated data into the enclave when a page is faulted right after it is reclaimed. Consider what happens if the reclaimer writes a page to the backing store and the page is immediately faulted back, before the reclaimer is able to set the dirty bit of the page: sgx_reclaim_pages() { sgx_vma_fault() { ... sgx_encl_get_backing(); ... ... sgx_reclaimer_write() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* Write data to backing store */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } mutex_lock(&encl->lock); __sgx_encl_eldu() { ... /* * Enclave backing store * page not released * nor marked dirty - * contents may not be * up to date. */ sgx_encl_get_backing(); ... /* * Enclave data restored * from backing store * and PCMD pages that * are not up to date. * ENCLS[ELDU] faults * because of MAC or PCMD * checking failure. */ sgx_encl_put_backing(); } ... /* set page dirty */ sgx_encl_put_backing(); ... mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } } Remove the option to sgx_encl_put_backing() to set the backing pages as dirty and set the needed pages as dirty right after receiving important data while enclave mutex is held. This ensures that the page fault handler can get up to date data from a page and prepares the code for a following change where only one of the backing pages need to be marked as dirty. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1728ab54b4be ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer") Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/8922e48f-6646-c7cc-6393-7c78dcf23d23@intel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa9f98986923f43e72ef4c6702a50b2a0b3c42e3.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-12 14:50:57 -07:00
void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing)
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
{
put_page(backing->pcmd);
put_page(backing->contents);
}
static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
void *data)
{
pte_t pte;
int ret;
ret = pte_young(*ptep);
if (ret) {
pte = pte_mkold(*ptep);
set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte);
}
return ret;
}
/**
* sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit
* @mm: mm_struct that is checked
* @page: enclave page to be tested for recent access
*
* Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the enclave page and
* clears it.
*
* Return: 1 if the page has been recently accessed and 0 if not.
*/
int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct sgx_encl_page *page)
{
unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int ret;
ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma);
if (ret)
return 0;
if (encl != vma->vm_private_data)
return 0;
ret = apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE,
sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
return ret;
}
struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long offset,
u64 secinfo_flags)
{
struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
unsigned long prot;
encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!encl_page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
encl_page->encl = encl;
prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
_calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
_calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
/*
* TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
* permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
* values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
*/
if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
/* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
return encl_page;
}
/**
* sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave
* @encl: the enclave
* @addr: page aligned pointer to single page for which PTEs will be removed
*
* Multiple VMAs may have an enclave page mapped. Remove the PTE mapping
* @addr from each VMA. Ensure that page fault handler is ready to handle
* new mappings of @addr before calling this function.
*/
void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long mm_list_version;
struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int idx, ret;
do {
mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version;
/* Pairs with smp_wmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */
smp_rmb();
idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
continue;
mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma);
if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data)
zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
}
srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
} while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version));
}
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
/**
* sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page
x86/sgx: Support VA page allocation without reclaiming struct sgx_encl should be protected with the mutex sgx_encl->lock. One exception is sgx_encl->page_cnt that is incremented (in sgx_encl_grow()) when an enclave page is added to the enclave. The reason the mutex is not held is to allow the reclaimer to be called directly if there are no EPC pages (in support of a new VA page) available at the time. Incrementing sgx_encl->page_cnt without sgc_encl->lock held is currently (before SGX2) safe from concurrent updates because all paths in which sgx_encl_grow() is called occur before enclave initialization and are protected with an atomic operation on SGX_ENCL_IOCTL. SGX2 includes support for dynamically adding pages after enclave initialization where the protection of SGX_ENCL_IOCTL is not available. Make direct reclaim of EPC pages optional when new VA pages are added to the enclave. Essentially the existing "reclaim" flag used when regular EPC pages are added to an enclave becomes available to the caller when used to allocate VA pages instead of always being "true". When adding pages without invoking the reclaimer it is possible to do so with sgx_encl->lock held, gaining its protection against concurrent updates to sgx_encl->page_cnt after enclave initialization. No functional change. Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/42c5934c229982ee67982bb97c6ab34bde758620.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:50 -07:00
* @reclaim: Reclaim EPC pages directly if none available. Enclave
* mutex should not be held if this is set.
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
*
* Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page.
*
* Return:
* a VA page,
* -errno otherwise
*/
x86/sgx: Support VA page allocation without reclaiming struct sgx_encl should be protected with the mutex sgx_encl->lock. One exception is sgx_encl->page_cnt that is incremented (in sgx_encl_grow()) when an enclave page is added to the enclave. The reason the mutex is not held is to allow the reclaimer to be called directly if there are no EPC pages (in support of a new VA page) available at the time. Incrementing sgx_encl->page_cnt without sgc_encl->lock held is currently (before SGX2) safe from concurrent updates because all paths in which sgx_encl_grow() is called occur before enclave initialization and are protected with an atomic operation on SGX_ENCL_IOCTL. SGX2 includes support for dynamically adding pages after enclave initialization where the protection of SGX_ENCL_IOCTL is not available. Make direct reclaim of EPC pages optional when new VA pages are added to the enclave. Essentially the existing "reclaim" flag used when regular EPC pages are added to an enclave becomes available to the caller when used to allocate VA pages instead of always being "true". When adding pages without invoking the reclaimer it is possible to do so with sgx_encl->lock held, gaining its protection against concurrent updates to sgx_encl->page_cnt after enclave initialization. No functional change. Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/42c5934c229982ee67982bb97c6ab34bde758620.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:50 -07:00
struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(bool reclaim)
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
{
struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
int ret;
x86/sgx: Support VA page allocation without reclaiming struct sgx_encl should be protected with the mutex sgx_encl->lock. One exception is sgx_encl->page_cnt that is incremented (in sgx_encl_grow()) when an enclave page is added to the enclave. The reason the mutex is not held is to allow the reclaimer to be called directly if there are no EPC pages (in support of a new VA page) available at the time. Incrementing sgx_encl->page_cnt without sgc_encl->lock held is currently (before SGX2) safe from concurrent updates because all paths in which sgx_encl_grow() is called occur before enclave initialization and are protected with an atomic operation on SGX_ENCL_IOCTL. SGX2 includes support for dynamically adding pages after enclave initialization where the protection of SGX_ENCL_IOCTL is not available. Make direct reclaim of EPC pages optional when new VA pages are added to the enclave. Essentially the existing "reclaim" flag used when regular EPC pages are added to an enclave becomes available to the caller when used to allocate VA pages instead of always being "true". When adding pages without invoking the reclaimer it is possible to do so with sgx_encl->lock held, gaining its protection against concurrent updates to sgx_encl->page_cnt after enclave initialization. No functional change. Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/42c5934c229982ee67982bb97c6ab34bde758620.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2022-05-10 11:08:50 -07:00
epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, reclaim);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
ret = __epa(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
if (ret) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "EPA returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
2020-11-13 00:01:32 +02:00
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
}
return epc_page;
}
/**
* sgx_alloc_va_slot - allocate a VA slot
* @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
*
* Allocates a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
*
* Return: offset of the slot inside the VA page
*/
unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
{
int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
if (slot < SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)
set_bit(slot, va_page->slots);
return slot << 3;
}
/**
* sgx_free_va_slot - free a VA slot
* @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
* @offset: offset of the slot inside the VA page
*
* Frees a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
*/
void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset)
{
clear_bit(offset >> 3, va_page->slots);
}
/**
* sgx_va_page_full - is the VA page full?
* @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
*
* Return: true if all slots have been taken
*/
bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
{
int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
return slot == SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT;
}
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() EREMOVE takes a page and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail, as it would indicate a use-after-free of EPC pages. Rather than add the page back to the pool of available EPC pages, the kernel intentionally leaks the page to avoid additional errors in the future. However, KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail. Specifically, it is legitimate that EREMOVE returns SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for EPC assigned to KVM guest, because KVM/kernel doesn't track SECS pages. To allow SGX/KVM to introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper and to let the SGX virtualization code use the allocator directly, break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. Rename the original sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page(), indicating that it is used to free an EPC page assigned to a host enclave. Replace sgx_free_epc_page() with sgx_encl_free_epc_page() in all call sites so there's no functional change. At the same time, improve the error message when EREMOVE fails, and add documentation to explain to the user what that failure means and to suggest to the user what to do when this bug happens in the case it happens. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos and sanitize text, simplify. ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210325093057.122834-1-kai.huang@intel.com
2021-03-25 22:30:57 +13:00
/**
* sgx_encl_free_epc_page - free an EPC page assigned to an enclave
* @page: EPC page to be freed
*
* Free an EPC page assigned to an enclave. It does EREMOVE for the page, and
* only upon success, it puts the page back to free page list. Otherwise, it
* gives a WARNING to indicate page is leaked.
*/
void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
{
int ret;
WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
if (WARN_ONCE(ret, EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE, ret, ret))
return;
sgx_free_epc_page(page);
}