openssl: Update to pristine 1.0.2n (security update)

2024-11-13 15:42:40 +00:00 · 2018-01-13 13:39:08 +01:00 · 2018-01-13 13:39:08 +01:00 · 00abb1f201
commit 00abb1f201
parent de0b31edd5
74 changed files with 890 additions and 363 deletions
--- a/thirdparty/README.md
+++ b/thirdparty/README.md
@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ Files extracted from the upstream source:
 ## openssl

 - Upstream: https://www.openssl.org
- Version: 1.0.2l
+- Version: 1.0.2n
 - License: OpenSSL license / BSD-like

 Files extracted from the upstream source:
@ -344,11 +344,14 @@ Files extracted from the upstream source:
    -o -name "*.gcc" -o -name "*.in" -o -name "*.lnx" -o -name "*.m4" \
    -o -name "*.pl" -o -name "*.pod" -o -name "*.s" -o -name "*.sh" \
    -o -name "*.sol" -o -name "*test*" \) -delete
-  cd openssl; for file in *.h; do find ../{crypto,ssl} -name "$file" -delete; done
+  cd openssl; for file in *.h; do find ../{crypto,ssl} -name "$file" -delete; done; cd ..
  ```
  For the rest check the `git status` and decide.
 - e_os.h
- Apply the Godot-specific patches in the `patches/` folder.
+- MacOS/buildinf.h
+- LICENSE
+- Apply the Godot-specific patches in the `patches/` folder
+  (make sure not to commit .orig/.rej files generated by `patch`)


 ## opus
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/LICENSE
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/LICENSE
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  LICENSE ISSUES
  ==============

-  The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a dual license, i.e. both the conditions of
+  The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a double license, i.e. both the conditions of
  the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit.
  See below for the actual license texts. Actually both licenses are BSD-style
  Open Source licenses. In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  ---------------

 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2017 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c
@ -94,8 +94,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
            TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
            /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */
            size_t index = 0, len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1;
+            size_t amount;

-            wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR));
+            /*
+             * Size check
+             * The reasoning is that absolutely worst case, each byte in
+             * extdir will take up one TCHAR each, so the maximum size in
+             * bytes that we can tolerate is MAX_PATH TCHARs...  not counting
+             * the ending NUL.
+             */
+            if ((len_0 - 1) > MAX_PATH * sizeof(TCHAR)) {
+                free(*ctx);
+                *ctx = NULL;
+                errno = EINVAL;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            amount = len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR);
+            wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(amount);
            if (wdir == NULL) {
                if (extdirbuf != NULL) {
                    free(extdirbuf);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
@ -136,6 +137,11 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
        goto err;
    }

+    if (len > INT_MAX) {
+        i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
    if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) {
        if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
            return (NULL);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x)
    int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1;

    n = i2d(x, NULL);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
    b = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(n);
    if (b == NULL) {
        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* asn1t.h */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Internal ASN1 template structures and functions: not for application use */
+
+void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                            int combine);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c
@ -61,9 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                                   int combine);
+#include "asn1_int.h"

 /* Free up an ASN1 structure */

@ -77,8 +75,7 @@ void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
    asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, 0);
 }

-static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                                   int combine)
+void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine)
 {
    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt;
    const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include "asn1_int.h"

 static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
                                    int combine);
@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
    return 1;

 memerr2:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
 memerr:
    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
    return 0;

 auxerr2:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine);
 auxerr:
    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c
@ -523,19 +523,11 @@ static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname,

 int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name)
 {
-    X509_NAME *in;
-
-    if (!xn || !name)
-        return (0);
-
-    if (*xn != name) {
-        in = X509_NAME_dup(name);
-        if (in != NULL) {
-            X509_NAME_free(*xn);
-            *xn = in;
-        }
-    }
-    return (*xn != NULL);
+    if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    X509_NAME_free(*xn);
+    *xn = name;
+    return 1;
 }

 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
@ -106,10 +106,14 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void)
    X509_PKEY *ret = NULL;
    ASN1_CTX c;

-    M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret, X509_PKEY);
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PKEY));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        c.line = __LINE__;
+        goto err;
+    }
    ret->version = 0;
-    M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_algor, X509_ALGOR_new);
-    M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_pkey, M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new);
+    ret->enc_algor = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    ret->enc_pkey = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
    ret->dec_pkey = NULL;
    ret->key_length = 0;
    ret->key_data = NULL;
@ -117,8 +121,15 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void)
    ret->cipher.cipher = NULL;
    memset(ret->cipher.iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
    ret->references = 1;
-    return (ret);
-    M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW);
+    if (ret->enc_algor == NULL || ret->enc_pkey == NULL) {
+        c.line = __LINE__;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    return ret;
+err:
+    X509_PKEY_free(ret);
+    ASN1_MAC_H_err(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, c.line);
+    return NULL;
 }

 void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *x)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
                if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
                    short int *num;
                    num = va_arg(args, short int *);
-                    *num = currlen;
+                    *num = (short int)currlen;
                } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { /* XXX */
                    long int *num;
                    num = va_arg(args, long int *);
@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
    if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
        if (value < 0) {
            signvalue = '-';
-            uvalue = -(unsigned LLONG)value;
+            uvalue = 0 - (unsigned LLONG)value;
        } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)
            signvalue = '+';
        else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@ -145,10 +145,11 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
    int i, bits, ret = 0;
    BIGNUM *v, *rr;

-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
        BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
    }

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
@ -245,7 +246,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
    if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
 # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
        if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg
-            && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
+            && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)
+            && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
            BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
            ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL);
        } else
@ -277,10 +280,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
    BN_RECP_CTX recp;

-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
    }

    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
@ -411,7 +416,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
    BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;

-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
        return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
    }

@ -1217,10 +1224,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
 #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
                (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))

-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
    }

    bn_check_top(p);
@ -1348,10 +1356,12 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
    /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
    BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];

-    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+    if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0
+            || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
        /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
    }

    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
    memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
 #endif

+    if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+        BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
    a->top = b->top;
    a->neg = b->neg;
    bn_check_top(a);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
        tmod.dmax = 2;
        tmod.neg = 0;

+        if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+            BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
        mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;

 # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@ -1032,46 +1032,6 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
            rr->top = top;
            goto end;
        }
-# if 0
-        if (i == 1 && !BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) {
-            BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)b;
-            if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, al) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            tmp_bn->d[bl] = 0;
-            bl++;
-            i--;
-        } else if (i == -1 && !BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) {
-            BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)a;
-            if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, bl) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            tmp_bn->d[al] = 0;
-            al++;
-            i++;
-        }
-        if (i == 0) {
-            /* symmetric and > 4 */
-            /* 16 or larger */
-            j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
-            j = 1 << (j - 1);
-            k = j + j;
-            t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-            if (al == j) {      /* exact multiple */
-                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al, t->d);
-            } else {
-                if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al - j, j, t->d);
-            }
-            rr->top = top;
-            goto end;
-        }
-# endif
    }
 #endif                          /* BN_RECURSION */
    if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (t == NULL)
+        goto err;

    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
        if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
@ -255,10 +257,12 @@ int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
    int ret = 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    if (!Xp1)
+    if (Xp1 == NULL)
        Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    if (!Xp2)
+    if (Xp2 == NULL)
        Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL)
+        goto error;

    if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0))
        goto error;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@ -469,11 +469,18 @@ void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, void *ptr)
    }
 }

+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+extern int FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *));
+#endif
+
 int CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *))
 {
    if (threadid_callback)
        return 0;
    threadid_callback = func;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(func);
+#endif
    return 1;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c
@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
 * ====================================================================
 */

+#include <e_os.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@ -185,3 +188,4 @@ int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
    return rv;
 }
+#endif
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@ -207,7 +207,11 @@ static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE:
        if (p1 == -2)
            return dctx->kdf_type;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE)
+#else
        if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42)
+#endif
            return -2;
        dctx->kdf_type = p1;
        return 1;
@ -448,7 +452,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
            return ret;
        *keylen = ret;
        return 1;
-    } else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) {
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) {
        unsigned char *Z = NULL;
        size_t Zlen = 0;
        if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid)
@ -479,6 +485,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
        }
        return ret;
    }
+#endif
    return 1;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
    unsigned char *penc = NULL;
    int penclen;
    ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;

    dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
    if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
@ -159,8 +160,11 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
        goto err;
    }

-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
-                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
        return 1;

 err:
@ -258,6 +262,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
        goto dsaerr;
    }

+    BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
    if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
        goto dsaerr;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
    } else {
        p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
        q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+        if (q == NULL)
+            goto err;
    }

    if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1))
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@ -224,7 +224,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 {
    BN_CTX *ctx;
    BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
+    BIGNUM l, m;
    int ret = 0;
+    int q_bits;

    if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
@ -233,6 +235,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,

    BN_init(&k);
    BN_init(&kq);
+    BN_init(&l);
+    BN_init(&m);

    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
@ -243,6 +247,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
        goto err;

+    /* Preallocate space */
+    q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
+        goto err;
+
    /* Get random k */
    do
        if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
@ -263,25 +274,24 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
    /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */

    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-        if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
+        /*
+         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+         * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the modulus.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
+         */
+        if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
+            || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
            goto err;

        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

-        /*
-         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
-         * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
-         * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
-         * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
-         */
-
-        if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
-            goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
-            if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
-                goto err;
-        }
-
        K = &kq;
    } else {
        K = &k;
@ -314,7 +324,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    BN_clear_free(&k);
    BN_clear_free(&kq);
-    return (ret);
+    BN_clear_free(&l);
+    BN_clear_free(&m);
+    return ret;
 }

 static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
        BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
    if (mont != NULL)
        BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+    if (one != NULL)
+        BN_free(one);
    return ret;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
    return (zero | two224m96p1 | two225m97p2);
 }

-static limb felem_is_zero_int(const felem in)
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
 {
    return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@ -1391,7 +1391,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[ /* num */ ][3],
                                             sizeof(felem),
                                             tmp_felems,
                                             (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                             felem_is_zero_int,
                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                             felem_assign,
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small)
    return result;
 }

-static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const smallfelem small)
+static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const void *small)
 {
    return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@ -1979,7 +1979,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3],
                                             sizeof(smallfelem),
                                             tmp_smallfelems,
                                             (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                             smallfelem_is_zero_int,
                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                             smallfelem_assign,
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in)
    return is_zero;
 }

-static int felem_is_zero_int(const felem in)
+static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in)
 {
    return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1));
 }
@ -1787,7 +1787,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[][3],
                                             sizeof(felem),
                                             tmp_felems,
                                             (void (*)(void *))felem_one,
-                                             (int (*)(const void *))
                                             felem_is_zero_int,
                                             (void (*)(void *, const void *))
                                             felem_assign,
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
@ -225,9 +225,16 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key)
             */
            ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
            ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+        } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdh_data_dup,
+                                              ecdh_data_free,
+                                              ecdh_data_free) != ecdh_data) {
+            /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */
+            ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
+            return NULL;
        }
-    } else
+    } else {
        ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
    if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdh_data->flags & ECDH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
        && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
@ -203,9 +203,16 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key)
             */
            ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
            ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+        } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdsa_data_dup,
+                                              ecdsa_data_free,
+                                              ecdsa_data_free) != ecdsa_data) {
+            /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */
+            ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
+            return NULL;
        }
-    } else
+    } else {
        ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
    if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdsa_data->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
        && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
    EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
    const EC_GROUP *group;
    int ret = 0;
+    int order_bits;

    if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@ -126,6 +127,13 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
        goto err;
    }

+    /* Preallocate space */
+    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+        goto err;
+
    do {
        /* get random k */
        do
@ -139,13 +147,19 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
        /*
         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
         * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
+         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
         */
-
-        if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
+        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
            goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
-            if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
-                goto err;

        /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e)
 #endif
    ENGINE_register_RAND(e);
    ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e);
+    ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
    return 1;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/err/err.c
@ -725,6 +725,8 @@ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line)
    }
 #endif
    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;

    es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
    if (es->top == es->bottom)
@ -742,6 +744,8 @@ void ERR_clear_error(void)
    ERR_STATE *es;

    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;

    for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
        err_clear(es, i);
@ -806,6 +810,8 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
    unsigned long ret;

    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;

    if (inc && top) {
        if (file)
@ -1016,7 +1022,6 @@ void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid)

 ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
 {
-    static ERR_STATE fallback;
    ERR_STATE *ret, tmp, *tmpp = NULL;
    int i;
    CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
@ -1030,7 +1035,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
    if (ret == NULL) {
        ret = (ERR_STATE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ERR_STATE));
        if (ret == NULL)
-            return (&fallback);
+            return NULL;
        CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&ret->tid, &tid);
        ret->top = 0;
        ret->bottom = 0;
@ -1042,7 +1047,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
        /* To check if insertion failed, do a get. */
        if (ERRFN(thread_get_item) (ret) != ret) {
            ERR_STATE_free(ret); /* could not insert it */
-            return (&fallback);
+            return NULL;
        }
        /*
         * If a race occured in this function and we came second, tmpp is the
@ -1066,10 +1071,10 @@ void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
    int i;

    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return;

    i = es->top;
-    if (i == 0)
-        i = ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;

    err_clear_data(es, i);
    es->err_data[i] = data;
@ -1121,6 +1126,8 @@ int ERR_set_mark(void)
    ERR_STATE *es;

    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;

    if (es->bottom == es->top)
        return 0;
@ -1133,6 +1140,8 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
    ERR_STATE *es;

    es = ERR_get_state();
+    if (es == NULL)
+        return 0;

    while (es->bottom != es->top
           && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) {
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@ -579,12 +579,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
            maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
            maxpad &= 255;

-            ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);

            inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
-            mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
-            inp_len &= mask;
-            ret &= (int)mask;

            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@ -507,10 +507,12 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
         * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
         * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
         * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
+         * But SHAEXT-capable go ahead...
         */
-        if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
-            ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
-             | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) &&    /* "Intel CPU"? */
+        if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 29)) ||         /* SHAEXT? */
+             ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32))) && /* AVX? */
+              ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32)))   /* XOP? */
+               | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 30))))) &&  /* "Intel CPU"? */
            plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
            (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
            SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
@ -590,12 +592,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
            maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
            maxpad &= 255;

-            ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+            ret &= mask;
+            /*
+             * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must
+             * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However,
+             * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make
+             * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic.
+             */
+            pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad);

            inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
-            mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1)));
-            inp_len &= mask;
-            ret &= (int)mask;

            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8;
            key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify)
 int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
                           int verify)
 {
-    int ret;
+    int ret = -1;
    char buff[BUFSIZ];
    UI *ui;

@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
        prompt = prompt_string;
    ui = UI_new();
    if (ui == NULL)
-        return -1;
-    UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
-                        (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
-    if (verify)
-        UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0,
-                             buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
-                             buf);
+        return ret;
+    if (UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
+                            (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len) < 0
+        || (verify
+            && UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, min,
+                                    (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
+                                    buf) < 0))
+        goto end;
    ret = UI_process(ui);
-    UI_free(ui);
    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
+ end:
+    UI_free(ui);
    return ret;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@ -589,3 +589,170 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
    pmeth->ctrl = ctrl;
    pmeth->ctrl_str = ctrl_str;
 }
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pinit = pmeth->init;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_CTX *src))
+{
+    *pcopy = pmeth->copy;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    *pcleanup = pmeth->cleanup;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pparamgen_init)
+        *pparamgen_init = pmeth->paramgen_init;
+    if (pparamgen)
+        *pparamgen = pmeth->paramgen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               EVP_PKEY *pkey))
+{
+    if (pkeygen_init)
+        *pkeygen_init = pmeth->keygen_init;
+    if (pkeygen)
+        *pkeygen = pmeth->keygen;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                           const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                           size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (psign_init)
+        *psign_init = pmeth->sign_init;
+    if (psign)
+        *psign = pmeth->sign;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t siglen,
+                                               const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_init)
+        *pverify_init = pmeth->verify_init;
+    if (pverify)
+        *pverify = pmeth->verify;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                    *ctx),
+                                      int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                               *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char
+                                                               *sig,
+                                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                                               const unsigned
+                                                               char *tbs,
+                                                               size_t tbslen))
+{
+    if (pverify_recover_init)
+        *pverify_recover_init = pmeth->verify_recover_init;
+    if (pverify_recover)
+        *pverify_recover = pmeth->verify_recover;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *sig,
+                                                 size_t *siglen,
+                                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (psignctx_init)
+        *psignctx_init = pmeth->signctx_init;
+    if (psignctx)
+        *psignctx = pmeth->signctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                     int siglen,
+                                                     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx))
+{
+    if (pverifyctx_init)
+        *pverifyctx_init = pmeth->verifyctx_init;
+    if (pverifyctx)
+        *pverifyctx = pmeth->verifyctx;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *out,
+                                                   size_t *outlen,
+                                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                                   size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pencrypt_init)
+        *pencrypt_init = pmeth->encrypt_init;
+    if (pencryptfn)
+        *pencryptfn = pmeth->encrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen))
+{
+    if (pdecrypt_init)
+        *pdecrypt_init = pmeth->decrypt_init;
+    if (pdecrypt)
+        *pdecrypt = pmeth->decrypt;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *key,
+                                               size_t *keylen))
+{
+    if (pderive_init)
+        *pderive_init = pmeth->derive_init;
+    if (pderive)
+        *pderive = pmeth->derive;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                           void *p2),
+                            int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const char *type,
+                                               const char *value))
+{
+    if (pctrl)
+        *pctrl = pmeth->ctrl;
+    if (pctrl_str)
+        *pctrl_str = pmeth->ctrl_str;
+}
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
@ -473,7 +473,14 @@ static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
    if (j < mx)
        mx = j;
    if (mx > 0) {
-        if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, NULL))
+        /*
+         * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid
+         * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element
+         * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign
+         * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the
+         * proper size
+         */
+        if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1)))
            goto skip;
        storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
        if (!storage)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/* WARNING: do not edit! */
-/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in */
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_BN_CONF_H
-# define HEADER_BN_CONF_H
-
-/*
- * The contents of this file are not used in the UEFI build, as
- * both 32-bit and 64-bit builds are supported from a single run
- * of the Configure script.
- */
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-
-#endif
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-/* WARNING: do not edit! */
-/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in */
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
-# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
-
-# define DSO_EXTENSION ".so"
-#endif
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@ -101,6 +101,24 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>

+/*
+ * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing
+ * alogrithm:
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing
+ *
+ * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table
+ * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223
+ * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
+ *
+ * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
+ * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as
+ * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first
+ * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt."
+ *
+ * The CACM paper is available here:
+ * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf
+ */
+
 const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;

 #undef MIN_NODES
@ -108,7 +126,7 @@ const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 #define UP_LOAD         (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */
 #define DOWN_LOAD       (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */

-static void expand(_LHASH *lh);
+static int expand(_LHASH *lh);
 static void contract(_LHASH *lh);
 static LHASH_NODE **getrn(_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash);

@ -182,8 +200,9 @@ void *lh_insert(_LHASH *lh, void *data)
    void *ret;

    lh->error = 0;
-    if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes))
-        expand(lh);
+    if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)
+            && !expand(lh))
+        return NULL;

    rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);

@ -300,19 +319,37 @@ void lh_doall_arg(_LHASH *lh, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE func, void *arg)
    doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE)0, func, arg);
 }

-static void expand(_LHASH *lh)
+static int expand(_LHASH *lh)
 {
    LHASH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np;
-    unsigned int p, i, j;
-    unsigned long hash, nni;
+    unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j;
+    unsigned long hash;
+
+    nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+    p = lh->p;
+    pmax = lh->pmax;
+    if (p + 1 >= pmax) {
+        j = nni * 2;
+        n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j));
+        if (n == NULL) {
+            lh->error++;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        lh->b = n;
+        memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni));
+        lh->pmax = nni;
+        lh->num_alloc_nodes = j;
+        lh->num_expand_reallocs++;
+        lh->p = 0;
+    } else {
+        lh->p++;
+    }

    lh->num_nodes++;
    lh->num_expands++;
-    p = (int)lh->p++;
    n1 = &(lh->b[p]);
-    n2 = &(lh->b[p + (int)lh->pmax]);
-    *n2 = NULL;                 /* 27/07/92 - eay - undefined pointer bug */
-    nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
+    n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]);
+    *n2 = NULL;

    for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
@ -330,25 +367,7 @@ static void expand(_LHASH *lh)
        np = *n1;
    }

-    if ((lh->p) >= lh->pmax) {
-        j = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes * 2;
-        n = (LHASH_NODE **)OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b,
-                                           (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j));
-        if (n == NULL) {
-            lh->error++;
-            lh->num_nodes--;
-            lh->p = 0;
-            return;
-        }
-        /* else */
-        for (i = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes; i < j; i++) /* 26/02/92 eay */
-            n[i] = NULL;        /* 02/03/92 eay */
-        lh->pmax = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
-        lh->num_alloc_nodes = j;
-        lh->num_expand_reallocs++;
-        lh->p = 0;
-        lh->b = n;
-    }
+    return 1;
 }

 static void contract(_LHASH *lh)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                    goto end;
                }
            }
+        } else if (certs != NULL) {
+            untrusted = certs;
        } else {
            untrusted = bs->certs;
        }
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher)
              ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9'))))
            break;
 #else
-        if (!(isupper(c) || (c == '-') || isdigit(c)))
+        if (!(isupper((unsigned char)c) || (c == '-')
+            || isdigit((unsigned char)c)))
            break;
 #endif
        header++;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
    }
    p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
    X509_SIG_free(p8);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
    if (!p8inf)
        return NULL;
    ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c
@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb,
        }
        p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen);
        X509_SIG_free(p8);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen);
        if (!p8inf)
            goto p8err;
        ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 {
    STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
    X509 *x = NULL;
+
+    if (pkey)
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    if (cert)
+        *cert = NULL;
+
    /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */

    if (!p12) {
@ -92,11 +98,6 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
        return 0;
    }

-    if (pkey)
-        *pkey = NULL;
-    if (cert)
-        *cert = NULL;
-
    /* Check the mac */

    /*
@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

    if (!ocerts) {
        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
    }

    if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
@ -163,10 +164,14 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

 err:

-    if (pkey && *pkey)
+    if (pkey) {
        EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
-    if (cert && *cert)
+        *pkey = NULL;
+    }
+    if (cert) {
        X509_free(*cert);
+        *cert = NULL;
+    }
    if (x)
        X509_free(x);
    if (ocerts)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE);
 #  endif                        /* 1 */
 # endif                         /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */

+#define NOTTOOLONG(start) ((GetTickCount() - (start)) < MAXDELAY)
+
 #if !defined(UWP_ENABLED) // -- GODOT --
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
@ -469,9 +471,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                                do
                                    RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
                                while (heap_next(&hentry)
-                                       && (!good
-                                           || (GetTickCount() - starttime) <
-                                           MAXDELAY)
+                                       && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                                       && --entrycnt > 0);
                            }
                        }
@ -483,8 +483,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                            ex_cnt_limit--;
                        }
                    } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
-                             && (!good
-                                 || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)
+                             && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                             && ex_cnt_limit > 0);
                }
 #  else
@ -499,11 +498,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                            do
                                RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
                            while (heap_next(&hentry)
+                                   && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))
                                   && --entrycnt > 0);
                        }
                    } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
-                             && (!good
-                                 || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                             && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
                }
 #  endif

@ -521,8 +520,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                    do
                        RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9);
                    while (process_next(handle, &p)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));

                /* thread walking */
                /*
@ -536,8 +534,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                    do
                        RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6);
                    while (thread_next(handle, &t)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));

                /* module walking */
                /*
@ -551,8 +548,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
                    do
                        RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9);
                    while (module_next(handle, &m)
-                           && (!good
-                               || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+                           && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)));
                if (close_snap)
                    close_snap(handle);
                else
@ -713,14 +709,13 @@ static void readscreen(void)
    hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);

    /* Get bitmap properties */
-    GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR) & bm);
-    size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
-
-    bi.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
+    GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(bm), (LPSTR)&bm);
+    size = (unsigned int)4 * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmWidth;
+    bi.biSize = sizeof(bi);
    bi.biWidth = bm.bmWidth;
    bi.biHeight = bm.bmHeight;
-    bi.biPlanes = bm.bmPlanes;
-    bi.biBitCount = bm.bmBitsPixel;
+    bi.biPlanes = 1;
+    bi.biBitCount = 32;
    bi.biCompression = BI_RGB;
    bi.biSizeImage = 0;
    bi.biXPelsPerMeter = 0;
@ -736,7 +731,7 @@ static void readscreen(void)

            /* Copy the bits of the current line range into the buffer */
            GetDIBits(hScrDC, hBitmap, y, n,
-                      bmbits, (BITMAPINFO *) & bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);
+                      bmbits, (LPBITMAPINFO)&bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);

            /* Get the hash of the bitmap */
            MD(bmbits, size, md);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
    return 2;
 }

+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
                                        X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
 {
@ -791,7 +792,6 @@ static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
    return pss;
 }

-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
 {
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
    int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

+    /*
+     * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values.
+     */
+    if (bits < 16) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL)
        goto err;
@ -161,21 +171,10 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
        goto err;
    for (;;) {
-        /*
-         * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
-         * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
-         * bail if it happens 3 times.
-         */
-        unsigned int degenerate = 0;
        do {
            if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
                goto err;
-        } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
-        if (degenerate == 3) {
-            ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-            goto err;
-        }
+        } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
        if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
            goto err;
        if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@ -237,10 +237,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
 cleanup:
-    if (db != NULL)
+    if (db != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);
        OPENSSL_free(db);
-    if (em != NULL)
+    }
+    if (em != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
        OPENSSL_free(em);
+    }
    return mlen;
 }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@ -255,8 +255,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
     * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
     * information at the API boundary.
-     * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
-     * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
     */
    if (!good) {
        mlen = -1;
@ -266,8 +264,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);

 err:
-    if (em != NULL)
+    if (em != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
        OPENSSL_free(em);
+    }
    if (mlen == -1)
        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
               RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@ -180,27 +180,25 @@ static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
 * FIPS mode.
 */

-static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+static int pkey_fips_check_rsa(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                               const EVP_MD **pmgf1md)
 {
-    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
-    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
    int rv = -1;
+
    if (!FIPS_mode())
        return 0;
    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
        rv = 0;
    if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
        return -1;
-    if (rctx->md) {
-        const EVP_MD *fmd;
-        fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
-        if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+    if (*pmd != NULL) {
+        *pmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmd));
+        if (*pmd == NULL || !((*pmd)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
            return rv;
    }
-    if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) {
-        const EVP_MD *fmd;
-        fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md));
-        if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+    if (*pmgf1md != NULL) {
+        *pmgf1md = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmgf1md));
+        if (*pmgf1md == NULL || !((*pmgf1md)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
            return rv;
    }
    return 1;
@ -214,27 +212,27 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
    int ret;
    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md;

 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-    ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+    ret = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md);
    if (ret < 0) {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
        return -1;
    }
 #endif

-    if (rctx->md) {
-        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+    if (md != NULL) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
            return -1;
        }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
        if (ret > 0) {
            unsigned int slen;
-            ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
-                                       rctx->pad_mode,
-                                       rctx->saltlen,
-                                       rctx->mgf1md, sig, &slen);
+            ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode,
+                                       rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, &slen);
            if (ret > 0)
                *siglen = slen;
            else
@ -243,12 +241,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
        }
 #endif

-        if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+        if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_mdc2) {
            unsigned int sltmp;
            if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
                return -1;
-            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
-                                             tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+                                             rsa);

            if (ret <= 0)
                return ret;
@ -263,23 +261,20 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
                return -1;
            }
            memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
-            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+            rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md));
            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
                                      sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
            unsigned int sltmp;
-            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
-                           tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+            ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
            if (ret <= 0)
                return ret;
            ret = sltmp;
        } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
                return -1;
-            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
-                                                rctx->tbuf, tbs,
-                                                rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
-                                                rctx->saltlen))
+            if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+                                                md, mgf1md, rctx->saltlen))
                return -1;
            ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
                                      sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
@ -348,32 +343,31 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 {
    RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
    RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+    const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md;
+    const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md;
    size_t rslen;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-    int rv;
-    rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+    int rv = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md);
+
    if (rv < 0) {
        RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY,
               RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
        return -1;
    }
 #endif
-    if (rctx->md) {
+    if (md != NULL) {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
        if (rv > 0) {
-            return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
-                                          tbs, tbslen,
-                                          rctx->md,
-                                          rctx->pad_mode,
-                                          rctx->saltlen,
-                                          rctx->mgf1md, sig, siglen);
+            return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode,
+                                          rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, siglen);

        }
 #endif
        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
-            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+            return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen,
                              sig, siglen, rsa);
-        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+        if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
            return -1;
        }
@ -388,8 +382,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
                                     rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
            if (ret <= 0)
                return 0;
-            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
-                                            rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, md, mgf1md,
                                            rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
            if (ret <= 0)
                return 0;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c
@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ int UI_process(UI *ui)
            }
        }
    }
+
 err:
    if (ui->meth->ui_close_session != NULL
        && ui->meth->ui_close_session(ui) <= 0)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
                goto reconsider;
            } else
 #endif
-            if (bits >= 8) {
+            if (bits > 8) {
                b = ((inp[0] << inpgap) | (inp[1] >> (8 - inpgap)));
                b &= 0xff;
                if (bitrem)
@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
                }
                if (bitrem)
                    c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem);
-            } else {            /* remaining less than 8 bits */
+            } else {            /* remaining less than or equal to 8 bits */

                b = (inp[0] << inpgap) & 0xff;
                if (bitrem)
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
            if (!hent) {
                hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH));
                if (hent == NULL) {
+                    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
                    X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                    goto finish;
                }
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@ -92,12 +92,12 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp,
                        long argl, char **ret)
 {
    int ok = 0;
-    char *file;
+    const char *file;

    switch (cmd) {
    case X509_L_FILE_LOAD:
        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
-            file = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
+            file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env());
            if (file)
                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file,
                                              X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)

    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
        for (;;) {
-            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, "");
            if (x == NULL) {
                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                     PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)

    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) {
        for (;;) {
-            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, "");
            if (x == NULL) {
                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                     PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) {
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
        return 0;
    }
-    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, "");
    BIO_free(in);
    if (!inf) {
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
                      STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
 {
    int ret;
+    int calc_ret;
    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
    *ptree = NULL;
@ -800,16 +801,19 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,

    /* Tree is not empty: continue */

-    ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+    calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+
+    if (!calc_ret)
+        goto error;
+
+    ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
+
+    if (calc_ret == 2)
+        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);

    if (!ret)
        goto error;

-    if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
-        goto error;
-
-    if (ret == 2)
-        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);

    if (tree)
        *ptree = tree;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@ -130,10 +130,12 @@ static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi)
 */
 unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
 {
-    return ((f != NULL &&
-             f->addressFamily != NULL && f->addressFamily->data != NULL)
-            ? ((f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (f->addressFamily->data[1]))
-            : 0);
+    if (f == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->data == NULL
+            || f->addressFamily->length < 2)
+        return 0;
+    return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1];
 }

 /*
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen,
    oth = OTHERNAME_new();
    if (!oth)
        return 0;
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(oth->value);
    oth->type_id = oid;
    oth->value = value;
    GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, GEN_OTHERNAME, oth);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
@ -286,9 +286,9 @@ void *X509V3_get_d2i(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
 int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
                    int crit, unsigned long flags)
 {
-    int extidx = -1;
-    int errcode;
-    X509_EXTENSION *ext, *extmp;
+    int errcode, extidx = -1;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL, *extmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ret = NULL;
    unsigned long ext_op = flags & X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK;

    /*
@ -347,13 +347,21 @@ int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
        return 1;
    }

-    if (!*x && !(*x = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()))
-        return -1;
-    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(*x, ext))
-        return -1;
+    if ((ret = *x) == NULL
+         && (ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto m_fail;
+    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(ret, ext))
+        goto m_fail;

+    *x = ret;
    return 1;

+ m_fail:
+    if (ret != *x)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    return -1;
+
 err:
    if (!(flags & X509V3_ADD_SILENT))
        X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, errcode);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
@ -107,6 +107,47 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)

+/*
+ * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules.
+ * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
+ * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
+ * numeric constants below).
+ */
+static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+    for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) {
+        if (*s1 != *s2) {
+            unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2;
+
+            /* Convert to lower case */
+            if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c1 += 0x20;
+            if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
+                c2 += 0x20;
+
+            if (c1 == c2)
+                continue;
+
+            if (c1 < c2)
+                return -1;
+
+            /* c1 > c2 */
+            return 1;
+        } else if (*s1 == 0) {
+            /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+{
+    /* No portable definition of SIZE_MAX, so we use (size_t)(-1) instead */
+    return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, (size_t)(-1));
+}
+
 static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
                                  X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
 {
@ -384,7 +425,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
            return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
    }

-    if (strcasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;

    return X509_V_OK;
@ -404,7 +445,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
    if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
        if (eml->length > base->length) {
            emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
-            if (!strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+            if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0)
                return X509_V_OK;
        }
        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
@ -425,7 +466,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
    }
    emlptr = emlat + 1;
    /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
-    if (strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;

    return X509_V_OK;
@ -464,14 +505,14 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
    if (*baseptr == '.') {
        if (hostlen > base->length) {
            p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
-            if (!strncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length))
+            if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
                return X509_V_OK;
        }
        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
    }

    if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
-        || strncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
+        || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;

    return X509_V_OK;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void timestamp_print(BIO *out, SCT_TIMESTAMP timestamp)
    gen = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(gen, (time_t)0,
                             (int)(timestamp / 86400000),
-                             (timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
+                             (int)(timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
    /*
     * Note GeneralizedTime from ASN1_GENERALIZETIME_adj is always 15
     * characters long with a final Z. Update it with fractional seconds.
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/dh.h
@ -257,11 +257,13 @@ DH *DH_get_1024_160(void);
 DH *DH_get_2048_224(void);
 DH *DH_get_2048_256(void);

+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 /* RFC2631 KDF */
 int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                 const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen,
                 ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid,
                 const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md);
+# endif

 # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len) \
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/evp.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/evp.h
@ -1363,6 +1363,98 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
                                             const char *type,
                                             const char *value));

+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_CTX *src));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                                int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               EVP_PKEY *pkey));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                            int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                                           const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                           size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const unsigned char *sig,
+                                               size_t siglen,
+                                               const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                               size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                      int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                                    *ctx),
+                                      int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                               *ctx,
+                                                               unsigned char
+                                                               *sig,
+                                                               size_t *siglen,
+                                                               const unsigned
+                                                               char *tbs,
+                                                               size_t tbslen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                      EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                               int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *sig,
+                                                 size_t *siglen,
+                                                 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                                 int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                          EVP_MD_CTX *mctx),
+                                 int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                     const unsigned char *sig,
+                                                     int siglen,
+                                                     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                   unsigned char *out,
+                                                   size_t *outlen,
+                                                   const unsigned char *in,
+                                                   size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                               int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                               int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 unsigned char *out,
+                                                 size_t *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 size_t inlen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                              int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx),
+                              int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               unsigned char *key,
+                                               size_t *keylen));
+
+void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
+                            int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1,
+                                           void *p2),
+                            int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                               const char *type,
+                                               const char *value));
+
 void EVP_add_alg_module(void);

 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/opensslv.h
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
 * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
 *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
 */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100020cfL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100020efL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips  25 May 2017"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2n-fips  7 Dec 2017"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2l  25 May 2017"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2n  7 Dec 2017"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/ssl.h
@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL_ST_BEFORE                   0x4000
 # define SSL_ST_OK                       0x03
 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE              (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
-# define SSL_ST_ERR                      0x05
+# define SSL_ST_ERR                      (0x05|SSL_ST_INIT)

 # define SSL_CB_LOOP                     0x01
 # define SSL_CB_EXIT                     0x02
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/symhacks.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/symhacks.h
@ -280,6 +280,8 @@
 #  define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf         OPENSSL_add_all_algo_conf
 #  undef EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover
 #  define EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover        EVP_PKEY_meth_set_vrfy_recover
+#  undef EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover
+#  define EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover        EVP_PKEY_meth_get_vrfy_recover

 /* Hack some long EC names */
 #  undef EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/tls1.h
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/openssl/tls1.h
@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
 */
 int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                               const char *label, size_t llen,
-                               const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+                               const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen,
                               int use_context);

 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/patches/uwp_fix.patch
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/patches/uwp_fix.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 diff --git a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
-index 06670ae01..cb4093128 100644
+index b4be3097e..bc2a7d201 100644
 --- a/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
 +++ b/thirdparty/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@
@ -22,15 +22,15 @@ index 06670ae01..cb4093128 100644
 typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) (HCRYPTPROV *, LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR,
                                             DWORD, DWORD);
 typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CRYPTGENRANDOM) (HCRYPTPROV, DWORD, BYTE *);
-@@ -196,6 +198,7 @@ typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE);
- #  endif                        /* 1 */
- # endif                         /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
+@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE);
+ 
+ #define NOTTOOLONG(start) ((GetTickCount() - (start)) < MAXDELAY)
 
 +#if !defined(UWP_ENABLED) // -- GODOT --
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
     MEMORYSTATUS m;
-@@ -580,6 +583,8 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
+@@ -576,6 +579,8 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
     return (1);
 }
 
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ index 06670ae01..cb4093128 100644
 int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
 {
     double add_entropy = 0;
-@@ -682,7 +687,7 @@ static void readtimer(void)
+@@ -678,7 +683,7 @@ static void readtimer(void)
 
 static void readscreen(void)
 {
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@ -735,7 +735,37 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
            s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
            s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
        } else {
+            /*
+             * Unrecognised version, we'll send a protocol version alert using
+             * our preferred version.
+             */
+            switch(s->client_version) {
+            default:
+                /*
+                 * Shouldn't happen
+                 * Fall through
+                 */
+            case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+                s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+                s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
+                break;
+            case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+                s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+                s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
+                break;
+            case TLS1_VERSION:
+                s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+                s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
+                break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+            case SSL3_VERSION:
+                s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+                s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
+                break;
+#endif
+            }
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
            goto err;
        }

--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@ -1324,10 +1324,16 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
-            tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+            i = tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+            if (i < 0)
+                return i;
+
+            rr->length = 0;
+            if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)
+                goto start;

            /* Exit and notify application to read again */
-            rr->length = 0;
            s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
            BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
            BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
@ -1427,7 +1433,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
        (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
        (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
        (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
-        !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+        !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
        /*
         * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
         */
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
        int decrypt_len;
        unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
-        size_t j;
+        size_t j, padding_len;

        /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
        if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
@ -2270,16 +2270,38 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
                       sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
            goto err;
-        decrypt_len =
-            RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-        ERR_clear_error();

        /*
-         * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
-         * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
+         * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
+         * the timing-sensitive code below.
         */
-        decrypt_good =
-            constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+        decrypt_len =
+            RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+        if (decrypt_len < 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+
+        /*
+         * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
+         * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
+         * PS is at least 8 bytes.
+         */
+        if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+        decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(p[0], 0) &
+                       constant_time_eq_int_8(p[1], 2);
+        for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
+            decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(p[j]);
+        }
+        decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(p[padding_len - 1]);
+        p += padding_len;

        /*
         * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
                   ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
                   ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #else
-            while (isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
+            while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #endif
            {
                ch = *(++l);
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@ -1825,15 +1825,15 @@ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,

 int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                               const char *label, size_t llen,
-                               const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+                               const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen,
                               int use_context)
 {
    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
        return -1;

    return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
-                                                       llen, p, plen,
-                                                       use_context);
+                                                       llen, context,
+                                                       contextlen, use_context);
 }

 static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
@ -3180,6 +3180,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
 #endif
    ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
    if (ocert) {
+        int i;
        /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */
        if (ssl->server) {
            ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs;
@ -3189,6 +3190,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
            ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
            ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
        }
+        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+            ssl->cert->pkeys[i].digest = ocert->pkeys[i].digest;
+        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
        ssl->cert->alpn_proposed = ocert->alpn_proposed;
        ssl->cert->alpn_proposed_len = ocert->alpn_proposed_len;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
    dest->srp_username = NULL;
 #endif
-    memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));

    /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
    dest->prev = NULL;
@ -275,6 +274,9 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
    if (src->peer != NULL)
        CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
    if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
        dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
@ -325,7 +327,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
    }
 # endif

-    if (ticket != 0) {
+    if (ticket != 0 && src->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
        dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
        if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
            goto err;
--- a/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/thirdparty/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
        s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
        s2n(3 + len, ret);
        s2n(1 + len, ret);
-        *ret++ = len;
+        *ret++ = (unsigned char)len;
        memcpy(ret, selected, len);
        ret += len;
    }