linux/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
Andy Lutomirski a4412fc948 seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing
The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but
it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was
enabled.  Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter
to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.

To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may
not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the
parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.

For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally
supports seccomp filters.  Fixing that would probably only be a
couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit
maintainers.

This will be a slight slowdown on some arches.  The right fix is to
pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the
syscall nr part be fast.

This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly.

Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-09-03 14:58:17 -07:00

355 lines
8.5 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2001 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
* Copyright 2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
*
* [ NOTE: this mechanism is now deprecated in favor of the vDSO. ]
*
* Thanks to hpa@transmeta.com for some useful hint.
* Special thanks to Ingo Molnar for his early experience with
* a different vsyscall implementation for Linux/IA32 and for the name.
*
* vsyscall 1 is located at -10Mbyte, vsyscall 2 is located
* at virtual address -10Mbyte+1024bytes etc... There are at max 4
* vsyscalls. One vsyscall can reserve more than 1 slot to avoid
* jumping out of line if necessary. We cannot add more with this
* mechanism because older kernels won't return -ENOSYS.
*
* Note: the concept clashes with user mode linux. UML users should
* use the vDSO.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/seqlock.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/topology.h>
#include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h>
#include <linux/getcpu.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/compat.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/topology.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "vsyscall_trace.h"
DEFINE_VVAR(int, vgetcpu_mode);
static enum { EMULATE, NATIVE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
{
if (str) {
if (!strcmp("emulate", str))
vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
else if (!strcmp("native", str))
vsyscall_mode = NATIVE;
else if (!strcmp("none", str))
vsyscall_mode = NONE;
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
early_param("vsyscall", vsyscall_setup);
static void warn_bad_vsyscall(const char *level, struct pt_regs *regs,
const char *message)
{
if (!show_unhandled_signals)
return;
printk_ratelimited("%s%s[%d] %s ip:%lx cs:%lx sp:%lx ax:%lx si:%lx di:%lx\n",
level, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
message, regs->ip, regs->cs,
regs->sp, regs->ax, regs->si, regs->di);
}
static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
{
int nr;
if ((addr & ~0xC00UL) != VSYSCALL_ADDR)
return -EINVAL;
nr = (addr & 0xC00UL) >> 10;
if (nr >= 3)
return -EINVAL;
return nr;
}
static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
{
/*
* XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
* sig_on_uaccess_error, this could go away.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (void __user *)ptr, size)) {
siginfo_t info;
struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
thread->error_code = 6; /* user fault, no page, write */
thread->cr2 = ptr;
thread->trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)ptr;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, current);
return false;
} else {
return true;
}
}
bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long caller;
int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
long ret;
/*
* No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
* trap to a high address, which means that we're in 64-bit user code.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(address != regs->ip);
if (vsyscall_mode == NONE) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
"vsyscall attempted with vsyscall=none");
return false;
}
vsyscall_nr = addr_to_vsyscall_nr(address);
trace_emulate_vsyscall(vsyscall_nr);
if (vsyscall_nr < 0) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
"misaligned vsyscall (exploit attempt or buggy program) -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround");
goto sigsegv;
}
if (get_user(caller, (unsigned long __user *)regs->sp) != 0) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
"vsyscall with bad stack (exploit attempt?)");
goto sigsegv;
}
tsk = current;
/*
* Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
*
* NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
* 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the
* vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at
* address 0".
*/
switch (vsyscall_nr) {
case 0:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday;
break;
case 1:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_time;
break;
case 2:
if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto check_fault;
}
syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu;
break;
}
/*
* Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value.
* See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt.
*
* We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance
* here doesn't matter.
*/
regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
tmp = secure_computing();
if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
"seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
do_exit(SIGSYS);
}
if (tmp)
goto do_ret; /* skip requested */
/*
* With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
* preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
*/
prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error;
current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1;
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (vsyscall_nr) {
case 0:
ret = sys_gettimeofday(
(struct timeval __user *)regs->di,
(struct timezone __user *)regs->si);
break;
case 1:
ret = sys_time((time_t __user *)regs->di);
break;
case 2:
ret = sys_getcpu((unsigned __user *)regs->di,
(unsigned __user *)regs->si,
NULL);
break;
}
current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
check_fault:
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
"vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
/*
* If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
* generate one here. (This should be impossible.)
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
goto sigsegv;
return true; /* Don't emulate the ret. */
}
regs->ax = ret;
do_ret:
/* Emulate a ret instruction. */
regs->ip = caller;
regs->sp += 8;
return true;
sigsegv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return true;
}
/*
* Assume __initcall executes before all user space. Hopefully kmod
* doesn't violate that. We'll find out if it does.
*/
static void vsyscall_set_cpu(int cpu)
{
unsigned long d;
unsigned long node = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
#endif
if (cpu_has(&cpu_data(cpu), X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
write_rdtscp_aux((node << 12) | cpu);
/*
* Store cpu number in limit so that it can be loaded quickly
* in user space in vgetcpu. (12 bits for the CPU and 8 bits for the node)
*/
d = 0x0f40000000000ULL;
d |= cpu;
d |= (node & 0xf) << 12;
d |= (node >> 4) << 48;
write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_PER_CPU, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
}
static void cpu_vsyscall_init(void *arg)
{
/* preemption should be already off */
vsyscall_set_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id());
}
static int
cpu_vsyscall_notifier(struct notifier_block *n, unsigned long action, void *arg)
{
long cpu = (long)arg;
if (action == CPU_ONLINE || action == CPU_ONLINE_FROZEN)
smp_call_function_single(cpu, cpu_vsyscall_init, NULL, 1);
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
void __init map_vsyscall(void)
{
extern char __vsyscall_page;
unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
vsyscall_mode == NATIVE
? PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL
: PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
(unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
}
static int __init vsyscall_init(void)
{
cpu_notifier_register_begin();
on_each_cpu(cpu_vsyscall_init, NULL, 1);
/* notifier priority > KVM */
__hotcpu_notifier(cpu_vsyscall_notifier, 30);
cpu_notifier_register_done();
return 0;
}
__initcall(vsyscall_init);