linux/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
Miklos Szeredi a082c6f680 ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin
Filesystems filter out extended attributes in the "trusted." domain for
unprivlieged callers.

Overlay calls underlying filesystem's method with elevated privs, so need
to do the filtering in overlayfs too.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2017-05-29 15:15:27 +02:00

480 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Novell Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as published by
* the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
#include "overlayfs.h"
int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int err;
struct dentry *upperdentry;
const struct cred *old_cred;
/*
* Check for permissions before trying to copy-up. This is redundant
* since it will be rechecked later by ->setattr() on upper dentry. But
* without this, copy-up can be triggered by just about anybody.
*
* We don't initialize inode->size, which just means that
* inode_newsize_ok() will always check against MAX_LFS_FILESIZE and not
* check for a swapfile (which this won't be anyway).
*/
err = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr);
if (err)
return err;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
if (!err) {
upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID))
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
revert_creds(old_cred);
if (!err)
ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
}
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
enum ovl_path_type type;
struct path realpath;
const struct cred *old_cred;
bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
int err;
type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* When all layers are on the same fs, all real inode number are
* unique, so we use the overlay st_dev, which is friendly to du -x.
*
* We also use st_ino of the copy up origin, if we know it.
* This guaranties constant st_dev/st_ino across copy up.
*
* If filesystem supports NFS export ops, this also guaranties
* persistent st_ino across mount cycle.
*/
if (ovl_same_sb(dentry->d_sb)) {
if (OVL_TYPE_ORIGIN(type)) {
struct kstat lowerstat;
u32 lowermask = STATX_INO | (!is_dir ? STATX_NLINK : 0);
ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
err = vfs_getattr(&realpath, &lowerstat,
lowermask, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
WARN_ON_ONCE(stat->dev != lowerstat.dev);
/*
* Lower hardlinks are broken on copy up to different
* upper files, so we cannot use the lower origin st_ino
* for those different files, even for the same fs case.
*/
if (is_dir || lowerstat.nlink == 1)
stat->ino = lowerstat.ino;
}
stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
} else if (is_dir) {
/*
* If not all layers are on the same fs the pair {real st_ino;
* overlay st_dev} is not unique, so use the non persistent
* overlay st_ino.
*
* Always use the overlay st_dev for directories, so 'find
* -xdev' will scan the entire overlay mount and won't cross the
* overlay mount boundaries.
*/
stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
stat->ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
}
/*
* It's probably not worth it to count subdirs to get the
* correct link count. nlink=1 seems to pacify 'find' and
* other utilities.
*/
if (is_dir && OVL_TYPE_MERGE(type))
stat->nlink = 1;
out:
revert_creds(old_cred);
return err;
}
int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
bool is_upper;
struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode, &is_upper);
const struct cred *old_cred;
int err;
/* Careful in RCU walk mode */
if (!realinode) {
WARN_ON(!(mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK));
return -ECHILD;
}
/*
* Check overlay inode with the creds of task and underlying inode
* with creds of mounter
*/
err = generic_permission(inode, mask);
if (err)
return err;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
if (!is_upper && !special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
/* Make sure mounter can read file for copy up later */
mask |= MAY_READ;
}
err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return err;
}
static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
const struct cred *old_cred;
const char *p;
if (!dentry)
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return p;
}
bool ovl_is_private_xattr(const char *name)
{
return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_PREFIX,
sizeof(OVL_XATTR_PREFIX) - 1) == 0;
}
int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
int err;
struct path realpath;
enum ovl_path_type type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
const struct cred *old_cred;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
if (!value && !OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type)) {
err = vfs_getxattr(realpath.dentry, name, NULL, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto out_drop_write;
}
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type))
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &realpath);
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
if (value)
err = vfs_setxattr(realpath.dentry, name, value, size, flags);
else {
WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
err = vfs_removexattr(realpath.dentry, name);
}
revert_creds(old_cred);
out_drop_write:
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
ssize_t res;
const struct cred *old_cred;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return res;
}
static bool ovl_can_list(const char *s)
{
/* List all non-trusted xatts */
if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
return true;
/* Never list trusted.overlay, list other trusted for superuser only */
return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
{
struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry);
ssize_t res;
size_t len;
char *s;
const struct cred *old_cred;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
revert_creds(old_cred);
if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
return res;
/* filter out private xattrs */
for (s = list, len = res; len;) {
size_t slen = strnlen(s, len) + 1;
/* underlying fs providing us with an broken xattr list? */
if (WARN_ON(slen > len))
return -EIO;
len -= slen;
if (!ovl_can_list(s)) {
res -= slen;
memmove(s, s + slen, len);
} else {
s += slen;
}
}
return res;
}
struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode, NULL);
const struct cred *old_cred;
struct posix_acl *acl;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) || !IS_POSIXACL(realinode))
return NULL;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return acl;
}
static bool ovl_open_need_copy_up(int flags, enum ovl_path_type type,
struct dentry *realdentry)
{
if (OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type))
return false;
if (special_file(realdentry->d_inode->i_mode))
return false;
if (!(OPEN_FMODE(flags) & FMODE_WRITE) && !(flags & O_TRUNC))
return false;
return true;
}
int ovl_open_maybe_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int file_flags)
{
int err = 0;
struct path realpath;
enum ovl_path_type type;
type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
if (ovl_open_need_copy_up(file_flags, type, realpath.dentry)) {
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (!err) {
err = ovl_copy_up_flags(dentry, file_flags);
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
}
}
return err;
}
int ovl_update_time(struct inode *inode, struct timespec *ts, int flags)
{
struct dentry *alias;
struct path upperpath;
if (!(flags & S_ATIME))
return 0;
alias = d_find_any_alias(inode);
if (!alias)
return 0;
ovl_path_upper(alias, &upperpath);
if (upperpath.dentry) {
touch_atime(&upperpath);
inode->i_atime = d_inode(upperpath.dentry)->i_atime;
}
dput(alias);
return 0;
}
static const struct inode_operations ovl_file_inode_operations = {
.setattr = ovl_setattr,
.permission = ovl_permission,
.getattr = ovl_getattr,
.listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
.get_acl = ovl_get_acl,
.update_time = ovl_update_time,
};
static const struct inode_operations ovl_symlink_inode_operations = {
.setattr = ovl_setattr,
.get_link = ovl_get_link,
.getattr = ovl_getattr,
.listxattr = ovl_listxattr,
.update_time = ovl_update_time,
};
/*
* It is possible to stack overlayfs instance on top of another
* overlayfs instance as lower layer. We need to annonate the
* stackable i_mutex locks according to stack level of the super
* block instance. An overlayfs instance can never be in stack
* depth 0 (there is always a real fs below it). An overlayfs
* inode lock will use the lockdep annotaion ovl_i_mutex_key[depth].
*
* For example, here is a snip from /proc/lockdep_chains after
* dir_iterate of nested overlayfs:
*
* [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth] (stack_depth=2)
* [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]#2 (stack_depth=1)
* [...] &type->i_mutex_dir_key (stack_depth=0)
*/
#define OVL_MAX_NESTING FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
static inline void ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(struct inode *inode)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING];
int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth - 1;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= OVL_MAX_NESTING))
depth = 0;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]);
else
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_key[depth]);
#endif
}
static void ovl_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
{
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mode = mode;
inode->i_flags |= S_NOCMTIME;
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
inode->i_acl = inode->i_default_acl = ACL_DONT_CACHE;
#endif
ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations;
break;
case S_IFDIR:
inode->i_op = &ovl_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &ovl_dir_operations;
break;
case S_IFLNK:
inode->i_op = &ovl_symlink_inode_operations;
break;
default:
inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations;
init_special_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
break;
}
}
struct inode *ovl_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (inode)
ovl_fill_inode(inode, mode, rdev);
return inode;
}
static int ovl_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *data)
{
return ovl_inode_real(inode, NULL) == data;
}
static int ovl_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *data)
{
inode->i_private = (void *) (((unsigned long) data) | OVL_ISUPPER_MASK);
return 0;
}
struct inode *ovl_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *realinode)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) realinode,
ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, realinode);
if (inode && inode->i_state & I_NEW) {
ovl_fill_inode(inode, realinode->i_mode, realinode->i_rdev);
set_nlink(inode, realinode->i_nlink);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
}
return inode;
}