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b24413180f
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
326 lines
9.2 KiB
C
326 lines
9.2 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* linux/fs/attr.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* changes by Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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/**
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* setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
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* @dentry: dentry to check
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* @attr: attributes to change
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*
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* Check if we are allowed to change the attributes contained in @attr
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* in the given dentry. This includes the normal unix access permission
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* checks, as well as checks for rlimits and others. The function also clears
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* SGID bit from mode if user is not allowed to set it. Also file capabilities
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* and IMA extended attributes are cleared if ATTR_KILL_PRIV is set.
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*
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* Should be called as the first thing in ->setattr implementations,
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* possibly after taking additional locks.
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*/
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int setattr_prepare(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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/*
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* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
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* ATTR_FORCE.
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
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int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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/* If force is set do it anyway. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
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goto kill_priv;
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/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
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(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
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!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
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(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
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(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Also check the setgid bit! */
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if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
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inode->i_gid) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
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attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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/* Check for setting the inode time. */
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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kill_priv:
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/* User has permission for the change */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
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int error;
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error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_prepare);
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/**
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* inode_newsize_ok - may this inode be truncated to a given size
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* @inode: the inode to be truncated
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* @offset: the new size to assign to the inode
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* @Returns: 0 on success, -ve errno on failure
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok will check filesystem limits and ulimits to check that the
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* new inode size is within limits. inode_newsize_ok will also send SIGXFSZ
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* when necessary. Caller must not proceed with inode size change if failure is
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* returned. @inode must be a file (not directory), with appropriate
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* permissions to allow truncate (inode_newsize_ok does NOT check these
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* conditions).
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*/
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int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
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{
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if (inode->i_size < offset) {
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unsigned long limit;
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limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
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if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
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goto out_sig;
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if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
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goto out_big;
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} else {
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/*
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* truncation of in-use swapfiles is disallowed - it would
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* cause subsequent swapout to scribble on the now-freed
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* blocks.
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*/
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if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
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return -ETXTBSY;
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}
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return 0;
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out_sig:
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send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
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out_big:
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return -EFBIG;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_newsize_ok);
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/**
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* setattr_copy - copy simple metadata updates into the generic inode
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* @inode: the inode to be updated
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* @attr: the new attributes
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*
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* setattr_copy must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* setattr_copy updates the inode's metadata with that specified
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* in attr. Noticeably missing is inode size update, which is more complex
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* as it requires pagecache updates.
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*
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* The inode is not marked as dirty after this operation. The rationale is
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* that for "simple" filesystems, the struct inode is the inode storage.
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* The caller is free to mark the inode dirty afterwards if needed.
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*/
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void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
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{
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
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inode->i_uid = attr->ia_uid;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
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inode->i_gid = attr->ia_gid;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
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inode->i_atime = timespec_trunc(attr->ia_atime,
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inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
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inode->i_mtime = timespec_trunc(attr->ia_mtime,
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inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
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inode->i_ctime = timespec_trunc(attr->ia_ctime,
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inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
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if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
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mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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inode->i_mode = mode;
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
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/**
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* notify_change - modify attributes of a filesytem object
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* @dentry: object affected
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* @iattr: new attributes
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* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
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*
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* The caller must hold the i_mutex on the affected object.
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*
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* If notify_change discovers a delegation in need of breaking,
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* it will return -EWOULDBLOCK and return a reference to the inode in
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* delegated_inode. The caller should then break the delegation and
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* retry. Because breaking a delegation may take a long time, the
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* caller should drop the i_mutex before doing so.
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*
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* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
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* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
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* to be NFS exported. Also, passing NULL is fine for callers holding
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* the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
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* that case.
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*/
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int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
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int error;
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struct timespec now;
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
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* times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
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error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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}
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
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umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
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/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
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if (is_sxid(amode))
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inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
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}
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now = current_time(inode);
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attr->ia_ctime = now;
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
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attr->ia_atime = now;
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
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attr->ia_mtime = now;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
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error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
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if (error < 0)
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return error;
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if (error == 0)
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
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}
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/*
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* We now pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to the lower level setattr function so
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* that the function has the ability to reinterpret a mode change
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* that's due to these bits. This adds an implicit restriction that
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* no function will ever call notify_change with both ATTR_MODE and
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* ATTR_KILL_S*ID set.
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*/
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if ((ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) &&
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(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
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BUG();
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
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if (mode & S_ISUID) {
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
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attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
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}
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}
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SGID) {
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if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
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attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode;
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}
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attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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}
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if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
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* namespace of the superblock.
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
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!kuid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_uid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
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!kgid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_gid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
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* gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
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*/
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !uid_valid(inode->i_uid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
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if (error)
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return error;
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error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
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if (error)
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return error;
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if (inode->i_op->setattr)
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error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
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else
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error = simple_setattr(dentry, attr);
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if (!error) {
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fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
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ima_inode_post_setattr(dentry);
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evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
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}
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return error;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
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