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linux/security/Kconfig
Linus Torvalds a430d95c5e lsm/stable-6.12 PR 20240911 
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Move the LSM framework to static calls

   This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
   calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
   due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
   static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
   date.

 - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM

   This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
   plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
   from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
   IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
   execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
   storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
   IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
   fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
   from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
   maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
   widely posted over several years.

   Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
   over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
   maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
   start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
   etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
   directly during the next merge window.

 - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework

   Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
   various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
   or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
   individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.

   Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
   minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
   across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
   Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
   been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
   standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
   provides a XFRM LSM implementation.

 - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN

   The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
   problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
   associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
   be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
   these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
   same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
   does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
   block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.

 - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook

   Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
   associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
   it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
   folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
   creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
   Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
   is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
   released due to RCU.

   Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
   action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
   we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
   called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
   callback.

 - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns

   The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
   negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
   handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
   confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
   properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
   convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.

 - Various cleanups and improvements

   A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
   IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
   minor style fixups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
  security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
  fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
  lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
  lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
  ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
  lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
  lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
  kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
  init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
  MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
  documentation: add IPE documentation
  ipe: kunit test for parser
  scripts: add boot policy generation program
  ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
  fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
  ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
  dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
  ipe: add permissive toggle
  ...
2024-09-16 18:19:47 +02:00

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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#
# Security configuration
#
menu "Security options"
source "security/keys/Kconfig"
config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
default n
help
This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
syslog via dmesg(8).
If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
choice
prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
help
Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
capability.
This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
require actual active ptrace attachment.
Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
help
This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
help
This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
bool "Never"
help
Never override memory mapping permissions
endchoice
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
depends on MULTIUSER
help
This allows you to choose different security modules to be
configured into your kernel.
If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
model will be used.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITYFS
bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
help
This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_NETWORK
bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY
help
This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement socket and networking access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
help
This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement Infiniband access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
help
This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement per-packet access controls based on labels
derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
IPSec.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_PATH
bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
depends on SECURITY
help
This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
implement pathname based access controls.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config INTEL_TXT
bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
help
This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
will have no effect.
Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
of the kernel itself.
Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
about Intel(R) TXT.
See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
default 65536
help
This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
this low address space will need the permission specific to the
systems running LSM.
config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
imply STRICT_DEVMEM
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
config FORTIFY_SOURCE
bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
help
Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
help
By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
calls through a single executable that can not have its name
changed.
Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
"real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
and choose what real programs are called.
If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
disabled, choose this option and then set
STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
help
The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
line.
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
source "security/smack/Kconfig"
source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
choice
prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
endchoice
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
If unsure, leave this as the default.
source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
endmenu
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