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667495de21
- binfmt_elf: Dump smaller VMAs first in ELF cores (Brian Mak) - binfmt_elf: mseal address zero (Jeff Xu) - binfmt_elf, coredump: Log the reason of the failed core dumps (Roman Kisel) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRSPkdeREjth1dHnSE2KwveOeQkuwUCZufubAAKCRA2KwveOeQk uyBPAQC2sM6j4xEEjyVkUZMmtumhyHMWtYmkqTmP8SbFn0Q3eQD/Yh9iyRng6Kmc jYm7RumqQkT+wrjXXKlazuJN9w7knAU= =UuX5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'execve-v6.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull execve updates from Kees Cook: - binfmt_elf: Dump smaller VMAs first in ELF cores (Brian Mak) - binfmt_elf: mseal address zero (Jeff Xu) - binfmt_elf, coredump: Log the reason of the failed core dumps (Roman Kisel) * tag 'execve-v6.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: binfmt_elf: mseal address zero binfmt_elf: Dump smaller VMAs first in ELF cores binfmt_elf, coredump: Log the reason of the failed core dumps coredump: Standartize and fix logging
316 lines
7.1 KiB
C
316 lines
7.1 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Implement mseal() syscall.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2023,2024 Google, Inc.
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*
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* Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
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*/
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#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
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#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static inline bool vma_is_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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return (vma->vm_flags & VM_SEALED);
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}
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static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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vm_flags_set(vma, VM_SEALED);
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}
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/*
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* check if a vma is sealed for modification.
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* return true, if modification is allowed.
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*/
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static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior)
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{
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switch (behavior) {
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case MADV_FREE:
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case MADV_DONTNEED:
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case MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED:
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case MADV_REMOVE:
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case MADV_DONTFORK:
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case MADV_WIPEONFORK:
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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/* check anonymous mapping. */
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if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
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return false;
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/*
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* check for non-writable:
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* PROT=RO or PKRU is not writeable.
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*/
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if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) ||
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!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, true, false, false))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified.
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* the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory).
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* return true, if it is allowed.
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*/
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bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
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/* going through each vma to check. */
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for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
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if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma)))
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return false;
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}
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/* Allow by default. */
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified by madvise.
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* the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory).
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* return true, if it is allowed.
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*/
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bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
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int behavior)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
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if (!is_madv_discard(behavior))
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return true;
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/* going through each vma to check. */
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for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end)
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if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)))
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return false;
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/* Allow by default. */
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return true;
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}
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static int mseal_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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struct vm_area_struct **prev, unsigned long start,
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unsigned long end, vm_flags_t newflags)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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vm_flags_t oldflags = vma->vm_flags;
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if (newflags == oldflags)
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goto out;
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vma = vma_modify_flags(vmi, *prev, vma, start, end, newflags);
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if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
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goto out;
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}
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set_vma_sealed(vma);
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out:
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*prev = vma;
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Check for do_mseal:
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* 1> start is part of a valid vma.
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* 2> end is part of a valid vma.
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* 3> No gap (unallocated address) between start and end.
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* 4> map is sealable.
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*/
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static int check_mm_seal(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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unsigned long nstart = start;
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VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
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/* going through each vma to check. */
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for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
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if (vma->vm_start > nstart)
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/* unallocated memory found. */
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (vma->vm_end >= end)
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return 0;
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nstart = vma->vm_end;
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}
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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/*
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* Apply sealing.
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*/
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static int apply_mm_seal(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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unsigned long nstart;
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struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
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VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
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vma = vma_iter_load(&vmi);
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/*
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* Note: check_mm_seal should already checked ENOMEM case.
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* so vma should not be null, same for the other ENOMEM cases.
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*/
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prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
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if (start > vma->vm_start)
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prev = vma;
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nstart = start;
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for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
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int error;
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unsigned long tmp;
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vm_flags_t newflags;
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newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_SEALED;
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tmp = vma->vm_end;
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if (tmp > end)
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tmp = end;
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error = mseal_fixup(&vmi, vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
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if (error)
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return error;
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nstart = vma_iter_end(&vmi);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* mseal(2) seals the VM's meta data from
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* selected syscalls.
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*
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* addr/len: VM address range.
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*
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* The address range by addr/len must meet:
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* start (addr) must be in a valid VMA.
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* end (addr + len) must be in a valid VMA.
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* no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
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* start (addr) must be page aligned.
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*
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* len: len will be page aligned implicitly.
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*
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* Below VMA operations are blocked after sealing.
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* 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking
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* the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty
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* space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new
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* set of attributes.
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* 2> Moving or expanding a different vma into the current location,
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* via mremap().
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* 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
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* 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
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* specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
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* the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
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* merging to expand a sealed VMA.
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* 5> mprotect and pkey_mprotect.
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* 6> Some destructive madvice() behavior (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
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* for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
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* memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
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* effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
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*
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* flags: reserved.
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*
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* return values:
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* zero: success.
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* -EINVAL:
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* invalid input flags.
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* start address is not page aligned.
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* Address arange (start + len) overflow.
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* -ENOMEM:
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* addr is not a valid address (not allocated).
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* end (start + len) is not a valid address.
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* a gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
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* -EPERM:
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* - In 32 bit architecture, sealing is not supported.
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* Note:
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* user can call mseal(2) multiple times, adding a seal on an
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* already sealed memory is a no-action (no error).
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*
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* unseal() is not supported.
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*/
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int do_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, unsigned long flags)
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{
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size_t len;
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int ret = 0;
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unsigned long end;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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ret = can_do_mseal(flags);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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start = untagged_addr(start);
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if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start))
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return -EINVAL;
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len = PAGE_ALIGN(len_in);
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/* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero. */
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if (len_in && !len)
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return -EINVAL;
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end = start + len;
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if (end < start)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (end == start)
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return 0;
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if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
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return -EINTR;
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/*
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* First pass, this helps to avoid
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* partial sealing in case of error in input address range,
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* e.g. ENOMEM error.
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*/
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ret = check_mm_seal(start, end);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Second pass, this should success, unless there are errors
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* from vma_modify_flags, e.g. merge/split error, or process
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* reaching the max supported VMAs, however, those cases shall
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* be rare.
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*/
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ret = apply_mm_seal(start, end);
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out:
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mmap_write_unlock(current->mm);
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return ret;
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}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
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flags)
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{
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return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
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}
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