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8e323a02e8
Add a restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain link restriction that searches for signing keys in the destination keyring in addition to the signing key or keyring designated when the destination keyring was created. Userspace enables this behavior by including the "chain" option in the keyring restriction: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, keyring, "asymmetric", "key_or_keyring:<signing key>:chain"); Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
264 lines
7.8 KiB
C
264 lines
7.8 KiB
C
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
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static bool use_builtin_keys;
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static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
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#ifndef MODULE
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static struct {
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struct asymmetric_key_id id;
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unsigned char data[10];
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} cakey;
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static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
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{
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if (!str) /* default system keyring */
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return 1;
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if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
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struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
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size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
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int ret;
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if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
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pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
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return 1;
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}
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ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
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if (ret < 0)
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pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
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else
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ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
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} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
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use_builtin_keys = true;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
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#endif
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/**
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* restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
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* @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
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* @type: The type of key being added.
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* @payload: The payload of the new key.
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* @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
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*
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* Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
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* those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
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* new certificate as being trusted.
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*
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* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
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* matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
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* signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
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* there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
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*/
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int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
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const struct key_type *type,
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const union key_payload *payload,
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struct key *trust_keyring)
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{
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const struct public_key_signature *sig;
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struct key *key;
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int ret;
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pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
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if (!trust_keyring)
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
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if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
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return -EPERM;
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/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
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key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
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sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
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false);
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
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ret = -ENOKEY;
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else
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ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
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key_put(key);
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return ret;
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}
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static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair,
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
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{
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return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) ||
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asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single));
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}
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static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
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const struct key_type *type,
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const union key_payload *payload,
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struct key *trusted, bool check_dest)
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{
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const struct public_key_signature *sig;
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struct key *key = NULL;
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int ret;
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pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
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if (!dest_keyring)
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return -ENOKEY;
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else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (!trusted && !check_dest)
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
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if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (trusted) {
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if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) {
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/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
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key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0],
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sig->auth_ids[1], false);
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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key = NULL;
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} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
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const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids;
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signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
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/*
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* The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
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* one that is being considered for addition to
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* dest_keyring) and identify the key that was
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* used to sign.
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*
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* The signer_ids are identifiers for the
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* signing key specified for dest_keyring.
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*
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* The first auth_id is the preferred id, and
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* the second is the fallback. If only one
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* auth_id is present, it may match against
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* either signer_id. If two auth_ids are
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* present, the first auth_id must match one
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* signer_id and the second auth_id must match
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* the second signer_id.
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*/
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if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
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auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
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if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
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key = __key_get(trusted);
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} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1],
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sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
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match_either_id(signer_ids,
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sig->auth_ids[0])) {
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key = __key_get(trusted);
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}
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} else {
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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}
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if (check_dest && !key) {
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/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */
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key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0],
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sig->auth_ids[1], false);
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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key = NULL;
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}
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if (!key)
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return -ENOKEY;
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ret = key_validate(key);
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
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key_put(key);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public
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* keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
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* @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
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* @type: The type of key being added.
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* @payload: The payload of the new key.
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* @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
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*
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* Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
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* parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
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* certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
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*
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* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
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* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
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* -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
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* there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
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* performed.
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*/
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int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
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const struct key_type *type,
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const union key_payload *payload,
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struct key *trusted)
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{
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return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
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false);
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}
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/**
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* restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of
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* public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
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* @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
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* @type: The type of key being added.
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* @payload: The payload of the new key.
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* @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
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*
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* Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
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* parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
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* certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
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*
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* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
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* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
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* -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
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* there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
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* performed.
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*/
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int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
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const struct key_type *type,
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const union key_payload *payload,
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struct key *trusted)
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{
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return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
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true);
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}
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