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9e7860cee1
Haogang Chen found out that:
There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result
in cross-domain attack.
body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg->hdr.len, the subsequent
call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer.
The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon
so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The
xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system.
However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should
have it.
And Ian when read the API docs found that:
The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096
(XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions. If a client exceeds the
limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by
xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of
view. Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect)
should avoid this.
so this patch checks against that instead.
This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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| .. | ||
| Makefile | ||
| xenbus_client.c | ||
| xenbus_comms.c | ||
| xenbus_comms.h | ||
| xenbus_dev_backend.c | ||
| xenbus_dev_frontend.c | ||
| xenbus_probe_backend.c | ||
| xenbus_probe_frontend.c | ||
| xenbus_probe.c | ||
| xenbus_probe.h | ||
| xenbus_xs.c | ||