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9c07f57869
Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it. So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do exactly this. While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters. The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult. Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this is no longer. Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of the code. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
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