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f1d9b23cab
audit_log_string() was inteded to be an internal audit function and since there are only two internal uses, remove them. Purge all external uses of it by restructuring code to use an existing audit_log_format() or using audit_log_format(). Please see the upstream issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/84 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
219 lines
5.9 KiB
C
219 lines
5.9 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
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*/
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#include <linux/gfp.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/capability.h"
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#include "include/cred.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/ipc.h"
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#include "include/sig_names.h"
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/**
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* audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
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* @mask: permission mask to convert
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*
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* Returns: pointer to static string
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*/
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static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
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{
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switch (mask) {
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case MAY_READ:
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return "read";
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case MAY_WRITE:
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return "trace";
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case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
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return "readby";
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case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
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return "tracedby";
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}
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return "";
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}
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/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
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static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
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if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
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audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
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if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
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audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
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}
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}
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audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
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/* TODO: conditionals */
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static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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struct aa_perms perms = { };
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aad(sa)->peer = peer;
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aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
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&perms);
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
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}
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static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
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struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return 0;
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
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}
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static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
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struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
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return 0;
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if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
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/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
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if (&tracer->label == tracee)
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
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aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
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aad(sa)->request = 0;
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aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
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CAP_OPT_NONE);
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return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
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}
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/**
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* aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
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* @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
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* @tracee: task label to be traced
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* @request: permission request
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
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*/
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int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
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u32 request)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
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return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
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profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
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profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
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}
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static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
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{
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if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
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return SIGUNKNOWN;
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else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
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return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
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else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
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return sig_map[sig];
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return SIGUNKNOWN;
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}
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/**
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* audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
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* @mask: permission mask to convert
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*
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* Returns: pointer to static string
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*/
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static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
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{
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if (mask & MAY_READ)
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return "receive";
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if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
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return "send";
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return "";
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}
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/**
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* audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
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* @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
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* @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
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*/
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static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
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if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
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audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
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if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
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audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
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}
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}
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if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
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audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
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aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
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else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
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audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
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else
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audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
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aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
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audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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struct aa_perms perms;
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unsigned int state;
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if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->peer = peer;
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/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
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state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
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profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
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aad(sa)->signal);
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aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
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}
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int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
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aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
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aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
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return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
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profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
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profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
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}
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