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ieee80211_iter_keys() currently returns keys in the backward order they were installed in, which is a bit confusing. Add them to the tail of the key list to make sure iterations go in the same order that keys were originally installed in. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
703 lines
18 KiB
C
703 lines
18 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
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* Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
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* Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
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* Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*/
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#include <linux/if_ether.h>
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#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <net/mac80211.h>
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#include "ieee80211_i.h"
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#include "driver-ops.h"
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#include "debugfs_key.h"
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#include "aes_ccm.h"
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#include "aes_cmac.h"
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/**
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* DOC: Key handling basics
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*
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* Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
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* keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
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* each station key also belongs to that interface.
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*
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* Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
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* that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked
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* to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
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* simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
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* that isn't implemented in software).
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* There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
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* or HW except by looking into debugfs.
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*
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* All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
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* other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
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* references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
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* unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
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* acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
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* remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
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*/
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static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
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static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local)
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{
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lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx);
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}
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static struct ieee80211_sta *get_sta_for_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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{
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if (key->sta)
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return &key->sta->sta;
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return NULL;
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}
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static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
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{
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/*
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* When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
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* for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
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* cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
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*
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* 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
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* the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
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*
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* 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
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* just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
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* off.
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*
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* In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
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* tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
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*
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* Solution has been explained at
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* http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net
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*/
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if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) {
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/*
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* Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
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* encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
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*/
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synchronize_net();
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}
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}
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static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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{
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
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struct ieee80211_sta *sta;
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int ret;
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might_sleep();
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if (!key->local->ops->set_key)
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goto out_unsupported;
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assert_key_lock(key->local);
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sta = get_sta_for_key(key);
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/*
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* If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
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* is supported; if not, return.
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*/
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if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) &&
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!(key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK))
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goto out_unsupported;
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sdata = key->sdata;
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if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
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/*
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* The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
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* Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
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*/
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if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE))
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goto out_unsupported;
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sdata = container_of(sdata->bss,
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
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u.ap);
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}
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ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, sta, &key->conf);
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if (!ret) {
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key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
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if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
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(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
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sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
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return 0;
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}
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if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
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wiphy_err(key->local->hw.wiphy,
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"failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
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key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->addr : bcast_addr, ret);
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out_unsupported:
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switch (key->conf.cipher) {
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
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/* all of these we can do in software */
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return 0;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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{
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
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struct ieee80211_sta *sta;
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int ret;
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might_sleep();
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if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key)
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return;
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assert_key_lock(key->local);
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if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
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return;
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sta = get_sta_for_key(key);
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sdata = key->sdata;
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if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
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(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
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increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
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if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN)
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sdata = container_of(sdata->bss,
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
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u.ap);
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ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
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sta, &key->conf);
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if (ret)
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wiphy_err(key->local->hw.wiphy,
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"failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
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key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->addr : bcast_addr, ret);
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key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
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}
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void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *key;
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key = container_of(key_conf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
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might_sleep();
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assert_key_lock(key->local);
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key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
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/*
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* Flush TX path to avoid attempts to use this key
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* after this function returns. Until then, drivers
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* must be prepared to handle the key.
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*/
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synchronize_rcu();
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_removed);
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static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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int idx, bool uni, bool multi)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
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assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
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if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
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key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
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if (uni)
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rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key);
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if (multi)
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rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key);
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ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
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}
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void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
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bool uni, bool multi)
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{
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mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi);
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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}
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static void
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__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
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assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
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if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS &&
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idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
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key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
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rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key);
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ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
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}
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void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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int idx)
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{
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mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx);
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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}
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static void __ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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struct sta_info *sta,
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bool pairwise,
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struct ieee80211_key *old,
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struct ieee80211_key *new)
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{
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int idx;
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bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey;
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if (new)
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list_add_tail(&new->list, &sdata->key_list);
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if (sta && pairwise) {
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rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk, new);
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} else if (sta) {
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if (old)
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idx = old->conf.keyidx;
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else
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idx = new->conf.keyidx;
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rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new);
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} else {
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WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx);
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if (old)
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idx = old->conf.keyidx;
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else
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idx = new->conf.keyidx;
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defunikey = old &&
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old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
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sdata->default_unicast_key);
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defmultikey = old &&
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old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
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sdata->default_multicast_key);
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defmgmtkey = old &&
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old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
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sdata->default_mgmt_key);
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if (defunikey && !new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false);
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if (defmultikey && !new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true);
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if (defmgmtkey && !new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1);
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rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new);
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if (defunikey && new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
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true, false);
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if (defmultikey && new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
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false, true);
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if (defmgmtkey && new)
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__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata,
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new->conf.keyidx);
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}
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if (old)
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list_del(&old->list);
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}
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struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
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const u8 *key_data,
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size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *key;
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int i, j, err;
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BUG_ON(idx < 0 || idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS);
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key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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/*
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* Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
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* key to the hardware if possible.
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*/
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key->conf.flags = 0;
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key->flags = 0;
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key->conf.cipher = cipher;
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key->conf.keyidx = idx;
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key->conf.keylen = key_len;
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switch (cipher) {
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
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key->conf.iv_len = WEP_IV_LEN;
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key->conf.icv_len = WEP_ICV_LEN;
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break;
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
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key->conf.iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN;
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key->conf.icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
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if (seq) {
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for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES; i++) {
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key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 =
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get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]);
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key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 =
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get_unaligned_le16(seq);
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}
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}
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spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
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break;
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
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key->conf.iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN;
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key->conf.icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
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if (seq) {
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for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1; i++)
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for (j = 0; j < CCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
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key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
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seq[CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
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}
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/*
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* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
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* it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
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*/
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key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(key_data);
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if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
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kfree(key);
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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break;
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case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
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key->conf.iv_len = 0;
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key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie);
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if (seq)
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for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
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key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] = seq[6 - j - 1];
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/*
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* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
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* it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
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*/
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key->u.aes_cmac.tfm =
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ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data);
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if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
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kfree(key);
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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break;
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}
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memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len);
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list);
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return key;
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}
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static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key)
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{
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if (!key)
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return;
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/*
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* Synchronize so the TX path can no longer be using
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* this key before we free/remove it.
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*/
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synchronize_rcu();
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if (key->local)
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ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key);
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if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
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ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
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if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
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ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
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if (key->local) {
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ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
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key->sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
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}
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kfree(key);
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}
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int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
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struct sta_info *sta)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
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int idx, ret;
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bool pairwise;
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BUG_ON(!sdata);
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BUG_ON(!key);
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pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
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idx = key->conf.keyidx;
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key->local = sdata->local;
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key->sdata = sdata;
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key->sta = sta;
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if (sta) {
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/*
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* some hardware cannot handle TKIP with QoS, so
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* we indicate whether QoS could be in use.
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*/
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if (test_sta_flags(sta, WLAN_STA_WME))
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key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA;
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} else {
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if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) {
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struct sta_info *ap;
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/*
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* We're getting a sta pointer in, so must be under
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* appropriate locking for sta_info_get().
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*/
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/* same here, the AP could be using QoS */
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ap = sta_info_get(key->sdata, key->sdata->u.mgd.bssid);
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if (ap) {
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if (test_sta_flags(ap, WLAN_STA_WME))
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key->conf.flags |=
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IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA;
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}
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}
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}
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|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
|
|
if (sta && pairwise)
|
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk);
|
|
else if (sta)
|
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]);
|
|
else
|
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
|
|
|
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
|
|
|
|
__ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
|
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key);
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
|
|
|
|
ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void __ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (key->sdata)
|
|
__ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
|
|
key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
|
|
key, NULL);
|
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_local *local,
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
|
|
__ieee80211_key_free(key);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_RTNL();
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
|
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
|
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
|
|
ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
|
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
|
|
void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
|
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
|
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
|
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
|
|
void *data),
|
|
void *iter_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key;
|
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_RTNL();
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
|
|
if (vif) {
|
|
sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
|
|
list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
|
|
iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
|
|
key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
|
|
&key->conf, iter_data);
|
|
} else {
|
|
list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
|
|
list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
|
|
iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
|
|
key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
|
|
&key->conf, iter_data);
|
|
}
|
|
mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys);
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_disable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_RTNL();
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
|
|
ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list)
|
|
__ieee80211_key_free(key);
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
|
|
const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
|
|
|
|
trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr);
|
|
|
|
cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
|
|
struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key;
|
|
u64 pn64;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
|
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) {
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
|
|
seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv32;
|
|
seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv16;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
|
|
pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
|
|
pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
|
|
seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN_ON(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq);
|
|
|
|
void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
|
|
int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_key *key;
|
|
const u8 *pn;
|
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
|
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) {
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
|
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
|
|
return;
|
|
seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
|
|
seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
|
|
break;
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
|
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
|
|
return;
|
|
if (tid < 0)
|
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
|
|
else
|
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
|
|
memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
|
|
break;
|
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
|
|
if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
|
|
return;
|
|
pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
|
|
memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, CMAC_PN_LEN);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);
|