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e2ebff9c57
If something manages to set the maximum file size to MAX_OFFSET+1, this can cause the xfs and ext4 filesystems at least to become corrupt. Ordinarily, the kernel protects against userspace trying this by checking the value early in the truncate() and ftruncate() system calls calls - but there are at least two places that this check is bypassed: (1) Cachefiles will round up the EOF of the backing file to DIO block size so as to allow DIO on the final block - but this might push the offset negative. It then calls notify_change(), but this inadvertently bypasses the checking. This can be triggered if someone puts an 8EiB-1 file on a server for someone else to try and access by, say, nfs. (2) ksmbd doesn't check the value it is given in set_end_of_file_info() and then calls vfs_truncate() directly - which also bypasses the check. In both cases, it is potentially possible for a network filesystem to cause a disk filesystem to be corrupted: cachefiles in the client's cache filesystem; ksmbd in the server's filesystem. nfsd is okay as it checks the value, but we can then remove this check too. Fix this by adding a check to inode_newsize_ok(), as called from setattr_prepare(), thereby catching the issue as filesystems set up to perform the truncate with minimal opportunity for bypassing the new check. Fixes:1f08c925e7
("cachefiles: Implement backing file wrangling") Fixes:f441584858
("cifsd: add file operations") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> cc: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com> cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> cc: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
433 lines
13 KiB
C
433 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* linux/fs/attr.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* changes by Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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/**
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* chown_ok - verify permissions to chown inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check permissions on
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* @ia_vfsuid: uid to chown @inode to
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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static bool chown_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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const struct inode *inode, vfsuid_t ia_vfsuid)
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{
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vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()) &&
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vfsuid_eq(ia_vfsuid, vfsuid))
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return true;
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if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid) &&
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ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* chgrp_ok - verify permissions to chgrp inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
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* @inode: inode to check permissions on
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* @ia_vfsgid: gid to chown @inode to
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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static bool chgrp_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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const struct inode *inode, vfsgid_t ia_vfsgid)
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{
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vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) {
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if (vfsgid_eq(ia_vfsgid, vfsgid))
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return true;
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if (vfsgid_in_group_p(ia_vfsgid))
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return true;
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}
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if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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if (!vfsgid_valid(vfsgid) &&
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ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @dentry: dentry to check
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* @attr: attributes to change
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*
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* Check if we are allowed to change the attributes contained in @attr
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* in the given dentry. This includes the normal unix access permission
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* checks, as well as checks for rlimits and others. The function also clears
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* SGID bit from mode if user is not allowed to set it. Also file capabilities
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* and IMA extended attributes are cleared if ATTR_KILL_PRIV is set.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*
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* Should be called as the first thing in ->setattr implementations,
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* possibly after taking additional locks.
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*/
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int setattr_prepare(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct iattr *attr)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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/*
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* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
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* ATTR_FORCE.
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
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int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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/* If force is set do it anyway. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
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goto kill_priv;
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/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
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!chown_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_vfsuid))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
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!chgrp_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_vfsgid))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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vfsgid_t vfsgid;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
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vfsgid = attr->ia_vfsgid;
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else
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vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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/* Also check the setgid bit! */
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if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
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attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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/* Check for setting the inode time. */
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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kill_priv:
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/* User has permission for the change */
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
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int error;
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error = security_inode_killpriv(mnt_userns, dentry);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_prepare);
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/**
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* inode_newsize_ok - may this inode be truncated to a given size
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* @inode: the inode to be truncated
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* @offset: the new size to assign to the inode
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* inode_newsize_ok will check filesystem limits and ulimits to check that the
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* new inode size is within limits. inode_newsize_ok will also send SIGXFSZ
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* when necessary. Caller must not proceed with inode size change if failure is
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* returned. @inode must be a file (not directory), with appropriate
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* permissions to allow truncate (inode_newsize_ok does NOT check these
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* conditions).
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -ve errno on failure
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*/
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int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
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{
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if (offset < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (inode->i_size < offset) {
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unsigned long limit;
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limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
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if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
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goto out_sig;
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if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
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goto out_big;
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} else {
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/*
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* truncation of in-use swapfiles is disallowed - it would
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* cause subsequent swapout to scribble on the now-freed
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* blocks.
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*/
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if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
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return -ETXTBSY;
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}
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return 0;
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out_sig:
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send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
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out_big:
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return -EFBIG;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_newsize_ok);
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/**
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* setattr_copy - copy simple metadata updates into the generic inode
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @inode: the inode to be updated
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* @attr: the new attributes
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*
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* setattr_copy must be called with i_mutex held.
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*
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* setattr_copy updates the inode's metadata with that specified
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* in attr on idmapped mounts. Necessary permission checks to determine
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* whether or not the S_ISGID property needs to be removed are performed with
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* the correct idmapped mount permission helpers.
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* Noticeably missing is inode size update, which is more complex
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* as it requires pagecache updates.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*
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* The inode is not marked as dirty after this operation. The rationale is
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* that for "simple" filesystems, the struct inode is the inode storage.
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* The caller is free to mark the inode dirty afterwards if needed.
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*/
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void setattr_copy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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const struct iattr *attr)
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{
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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i_uid_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode);
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i_gid_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
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inode->i_atime = attr->ia_atime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
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inode->i_mtime = attr->ia_mtime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
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inode->i_ctime = attr->ia_ctime;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
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umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
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vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
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if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
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!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
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mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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inode->i_mode = mode;
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
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int may_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
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unsigned int ia_valid)
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{
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int error;
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if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
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* times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode)) {
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error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(may_setattr);
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/**
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* notify_change - modify attributes of a filesytem object
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* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
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* @dentry: object affected
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* @attr: new attributes
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* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
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*
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* The caller must hold the i_mutex on the affected object.
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*
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* If notify_change discovers a delegation in need of breaking,
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* it will return -EWOULDBLOCK and return a reference to the inode in
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* delegated_inode. The caller should then break the delegation and
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* retry. Because breaking a delegation may take a long time, the
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* caller should drop the i_mutex before doing so.
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*
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* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
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* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
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* to be NFS exported. Also, passing NULL is fine for callers holding
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* the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
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* that case.
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*
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* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
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* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
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* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
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* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
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* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
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*/
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int notify_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct iattr *attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
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int error;
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struct timespec64 now;
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unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
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error = may_setattr(mnt_userns, inode, ia_valid);
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if (error)
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return error;
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if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
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umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
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/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
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if (is_sxid(amode))
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inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
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}
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now = current_time(inode);
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attr->ia_ctime = now;
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
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attr->ia_atime = now;
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else
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attr->ia_atime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_atime, inode);
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
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attr->ia_mtime = now;
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else
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attr->ia_mtime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_mtime, inode);
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
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error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
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if (error < 0)
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return error;
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if (error == 0)
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
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}
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/*
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* We now pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to the lower level setattr function so
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* that the function has the ability to reinterpret a mode change
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* that's due to these bits. This adds an implicit restriction that
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* no function will ever call notify_change with both ATTR_MODE and
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* ATTR_KILL_S*ID set.
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*/
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if ((ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) &&
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(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
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BUG();
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
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if (mode & S_ISUID) {
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
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attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
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}
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}
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SGID) {
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if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
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ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
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attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode;
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}
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attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
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}
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}
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if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
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* namespace of the superblock.
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*/
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
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!vfsuid_has_fsmapping(mnt_userns, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
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attr->ia_vfsuid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
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!vfsgid_has_fsmapping(mnt_userns, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
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attr->ia_vfsgid))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
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* gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
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*/
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
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!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
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!vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode)))
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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error = security_inode_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
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if (error)
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return error;
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error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
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if (error)
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return error;
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if (inode->i_op->setattr)
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error = inode->i_op->setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
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else
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error = simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
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if (!error) {
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fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
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ima_inode_post_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry);
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evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
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}
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return error;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
|