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46d8c4b286
This was detected by the self-test thanks to Ard's chunking patch.
I finally got around to testing this out on my ancient Via box. It
turns out that the workaround got the assembly wrong and we end up
doing count + initial cycles of the loop instead of just count.
This obviously causes corruption, either by overwriting the source
that is yet to be processed, or writing over the end of the buffer.
On CPUs that don't require the workaround only ECB is affected.
On Nano CPUs both ECB and CBC are affected.
This patch fixes it by doing the subtraction prior to the assembly.
Fixes: a76c1c23d0
("crypto: padlock-aes - work around Nano CPU...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
552 lines
15 KiB
C
552 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* Cryptographic API.
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*
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* Support for VIA PadLock hardware crypto engine.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2004 Michal Ludvig <michal@logix.cz>
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*
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*/
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/padlock.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/percpu.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
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#include <asm/byteorder.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
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/*
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* Number of data blocks actually fetched for each xcrypt insn.
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* Processors with prefetch errata will fetch extra blocks.
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*/
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static unsigned int ecb_fetch_blocks = 2;
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#define MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS (8)
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#define ecb_fetch_bytes (ecb_fetch_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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static unsigned int cbc_fetch_blocks = 1;
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#define MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS (4)
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#define cbc_fetch_bytes (cbc_fetch_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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/* Control word. */
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struct cword {
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unsigned int __attribute__ ((__packed__))
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rounds:4,
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algo:3,
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keygen:1,
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interm:1,
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encdec:1,
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ksize:2;
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} __attribute__ ((__aligned__(PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT)));
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/* Whenever making any changes to the following
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* structure *make sure* you keep E, d_data
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* and cword aligned on 16 Bytes boundaries and
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* the Hardware can access 16 * 16 bytes of E and d_data
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* (only the first 15 * 16 bytes matter but the HW reads
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* more).
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*/
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struct aes_ctx {
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u32 E[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]
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__attribute__ ((__aligned__(PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT)));
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u32 d_data[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]
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__attribute__ ((__aligned__(PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT)));
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struct {
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struct cword encrypt;
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struct cword decrypt;
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} cword;
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u32 *D;
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};
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static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cword *, paes_last_cword);
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/* Tells whether the ACE is capable to generate
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the extended key for a given key_len. */
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static inline int
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aes_hw_extkey_available(uint8_t key_len)
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{
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/* TODO: We should check the actual CPU model/stepping
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as it's possible that the capability will be
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added in the next CPU revisions. */
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if (key_len == 16)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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static inline struct aes_ctx *aes_ctx_common(void *ctx)
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{
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unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ctx;
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unsigned long align = PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT;
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if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
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align = 1;
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return (struct aes_ctx *)ALIGN(addr, align);
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}
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static inline struct aes_ctx *aes_ctx(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
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{
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return aes_ctx_common(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
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}
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static inline struct aes_ctx *blk_aes_ctx(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm)
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{
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return aes_ctx_common(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm));
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}
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static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
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unsigned int key_len)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
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const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
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u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
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struct crypto_aes_ctx gen_aes;
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int cpu;
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if (key_len % 8) {
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*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* If the hardware is capable of generating the extended key
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* itself we must supply the plain key for both encryption
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* and decryption.
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*/
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ctx->D = ctx->E;
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ctx->E[0] = le32_to_cpu(key[0]);
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ctx->E[1] = le32_to_cpu(key[1]);
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ctx->E[2] = le32_to_cpu(key[2]);
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ctx->E[3] = le32_to_cpu(key[3]);
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/* Prepare control words. */
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memset(&ctx->cword, 0, sizeof(ctx->cword));
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ctx->cword.decrypt.encdec = 1;
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ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 16) / 4;
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ctx->cword.decrypt.rounds = ctx->cword.encrypt.rounds;
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ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize = (key_len - 16) / 8;
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ctx->cword.decrypt.ksize = ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize;
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/* Don't generate extended keys if the hardware can do it. */
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if (aes_hw_extkey_available(key_len))
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goto ok;
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ctx->D = ctx->d_data;
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ctx->cword.encrypt.keygen = 1;
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ctx->cword.decrypt.keygen = 1;
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if (crypto_aes_expand_key(&gen_aes, in_key, key_len)) {
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*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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memcpy(ctx->E, gen_aes.key_enc, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
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memcpy(ctx->D, gen_aes.key_dec, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
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ok:
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for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
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if (&ctx->cword.encrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) ||
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&ctx->cword.decrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu))
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per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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/* ====== Encryption/decryption routines ====== */
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/* These are the real call to PadLock. */
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static inline void padlock_reset_key(struct cword *cword)
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{
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int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
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if (cword != per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu))
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#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
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asm volatile ("pushfl; popfl");
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#else
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asm volatile ("pushfq; popfq");
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#endif
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}
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static inline void padlock_store_cword(struct cword *cword)
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{
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per_cpu(paes_last_cword, raw_smp_processor_id()) = cword;
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}
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/*
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* While the padlock instructions don't use FP/SSE registers, they
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* generate a spurious DNA fault when CR0.TS is '1'. Fortunately,
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* the kernel doesn't use CR0.TS.
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*/
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static inline void rep_xcrypt_ecb(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
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struct cword *control_word, int count)
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{
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8" /* rep xcryptecb */
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: "+S"(input), "+D"(output)
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: "d"(control_word), "b"(key), "c"(count));
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}
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static inline u8 *rep_xcrypt_cbc(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
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u8 *iv, struct cword *control_word, int count)
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{
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0" /* rep xcryptcbc */
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: "+S" (input), "+D" (output), "+a" (iv)
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: "d" (control_word), "b" (key), "c" (count));
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return iv;
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}
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static void ecb_crypt_copy(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
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struct cword *cword, int count)
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{
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/*
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* Padlock prefetches extra data so we must provide mapped input buffers.
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* Assume there are at least 16 bytes of stack already in use.
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*/
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u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * (MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS - 1) + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1];
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u8 *tmp = PTR_ALIGN(&buf[0], PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT);
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memcpy(tmp, in, count * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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rep_xcrypt_ecb(tmp, out, key, cword, count);
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}
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static u8 *cbc_crypt_copy(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
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u8 *iv, struct cword *cword, int count)
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{
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/*
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* Padlock prefetches extra data so we must provide mapped input buffers.
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* Assume there are at least 16 bytes of stack already in use.
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*/
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u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * (MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS - 1) + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1];
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u8 *tmp = PTR_ALIGN(&buf[0], PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT);
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memcpy(tmp, in, count * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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return rep_xcrypt_cbc(tmp, out, key, iv, cword, count);
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}
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static inline void ecb_crypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
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struct cword *cword, int count)
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{
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/* Padlock in ECB mode fetches at least ecb_fetch_bytes of data.
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* We could avoid some copying here but it's probably not worth it.
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*/
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if (unlikely(offset_in_page(in) + ecb_fetch_bytes > PAGE_SIZE)) {
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ecb_crypt_copy(in, out, key, cword, count);
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return;
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}
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rep_xcrypt_ecb(in, out, key, cword, count);
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}
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static inline u8 *cbc_crypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 *key,
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u8 *iv, struct cword *cword, int count)
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{
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/* Padlock in CBC mode fetches at least cbc_fetch_bytes of data. */
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if (unlikely(offset_in_page(in) + cbc_fetch_bytes > PAGE_SIZE))
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return cbc_crypt_copy(in, out, key, iv, cword, count);
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return rep_xcrypt_cbc(in, out, key, iv, cword, count);
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}
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static inline void padlock_xcrypt_ecb(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
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void *control_word, u32 count)
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{
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u32 initial = count & (ecb_fetch_blocks - 1);
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if (count < ecb_fetch_blocks) {
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ecb_crypt(input, output, key, control_word, count);
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return;
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}
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count -= initial;
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if (initial)
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8" /* rep xcryptecb */
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: "+S"(input), "+D"(output)
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: "d"(control_word), "b"(key), "c"(initial));
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8" /* rep xcryptecb */
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: "+S"(input), "+D"(output)
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: "d"(control_word), "b"(key), "c"(count));
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}
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static inline u8 *padlock_xcrypt_cbc(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
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u8 *iv, void *control_word, u32 count)
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{
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u32 initial = count & (cbc_fetch_blocks - 1);
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if (count < cbc_fetch_blocks)
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return cbc_crypt(input, output, key, iv, control_word, count);
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count -= initial;
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if (initial)
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0" /* rep xcryptcbc */
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: "+S" (input), "+D" (output), "+a" (iv)
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: "d" (control_word), "b" (key), "c" (initial));
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asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0" /* rep xcryptcbc */
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: "+S" (input), "+D" (output), "+a" (iv)
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: "d" (control_word), "b" (key), "c" (count));
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return iv;
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}
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static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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ecb_crypt(in, out, ctx->E, &ctx->cword.encrypt, 1);
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padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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}
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static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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ecb_crypt(in, out, ctx->D, &ctx->cword.decrypt, 1);
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padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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}
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static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
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.cra_name = "aes",
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.cra_driver_name = "aes-padlock",
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.cra_priority = PADLOCK_CRA_PRIORITY,
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.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
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.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
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.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ctx),
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.cra_alignmask = PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1,
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.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
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.cra_u = {
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.cipher = {
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.cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
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.cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
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.cia_setkey = aes_set_key,
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.cia_encrypt = aes_encrypt,
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.cia_decrypt = aes_decrypt,
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}
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}
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};
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static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
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struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
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unsigned int nbytes)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
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struct blkcipher_walk walk;
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int err;
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
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err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
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while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
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padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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ctx->E, &ctx->cword.encrypt,
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nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
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err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
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}
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padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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return err;
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}
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static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
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struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
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unsigned int nbytes)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
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struct blkcipher_walk walk;
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int err;
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.decrypt);
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blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
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err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
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while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
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padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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ctx->D, &ctx->cword.decrypt,
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nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
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err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
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}
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padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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return err;
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}
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static struct crypto_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
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.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
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.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-padlock",
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.cra_priority = PADLOCK_COMPOSITE_PRIORITY,
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.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
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.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
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.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ctx),
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.cra_alignmask = PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1,
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.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
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.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
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.cra_u = {
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.blkcipher = {
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.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
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.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
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.setkey = aes_set_key,
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.encrypt = ecb_aes_encrypt,
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.decrypt = ecb_aes_decrypt,
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}
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}
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};
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static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
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struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
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unsigned int nbytes)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
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struct blkcipher_walk walk;
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int err;
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
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err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
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while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
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u8 *iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(walk.src.virt.addr,
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walk.dst.virt.addr, ctx->E,
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walk.iv, &ctx->cword.encrypt,
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nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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memcpy(walk.iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
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err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
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}
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padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.decrypt);
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return err;
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}
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static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
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struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
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unsigned int nbytes)
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{
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struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
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struct blkcipher_walk walk;
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int err;
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padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
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blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
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err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
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while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
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padlock_xcrypt_cbc(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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ctx->D, walk.iv, &ctx->cword.decrypt,
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nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
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err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct crypto_alg cbc_aes_alg = {
|
|
.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-padlock",
|
|
.cra_priority = PADLOCK_COMPOSITE_PRIORITY,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ctx),
|
|
.cra_alignmask = PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - 1,
|
|
.cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_u = {
|
|
.blkcipher = {
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = aes_set_key,
|
|
.encrypt = cbc_aes_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = cbc_aes_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct x86_cpu_id padlock_cpu_id[] = {
|
|
X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_XCRYPT),
|
|
{}
|
|
};
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, padlock_cpu_id);
|
|
|
|
static int __init padlock_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(0);
|
|
|
|
if (!x86_match_cpu(padlock_cpu_id))
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XCRYPT_EN)) {
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "VIA PadLock detected, but not enabled. Hmm, strange...\n");
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg)))
|
|
goto aes_err;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = crypto_register_alg(&ecb_aes_alg)))
|
|
goto ecb_aes_err;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = crypto_register_alg(&cbc_aes_alg)))
|
|
goto cbc_aes_err;
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "Using VIA PadLock ACE for AES algorithm.\n");
|
|
|
|
if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_stepping == 2) {
|
|
ecb_fetch_blocks = MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS;
|
|
cbc_fetch_blocks = MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS;
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "VIA Nano stepping 2 detected: enabling workaround.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
cbc_aes_err:
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
|
|
ecb_aes_err:
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&aes_alg);
|
|
aes_err:
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR PFX "VIA PadLock AES initialization failed.\n");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __exit padlock_fini(void)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_aes_alg);
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
|
|
crypto_unregister_alg(&aes_alg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module_init(padlock_init);
|
|
module_exit(padlock_fini);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("VIA PadLock AES algorithm support");
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Michal Ludvig");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes");
|