linux/Documentation/security
David Howells 5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
..
00-INDEX ima: new templates management mechanism 2013-10-25 17:17:04 -04:00
apparmor.txt
credentials.txt Documentation: clarify the purpose of LSMs 2011-11-16 12:37:27 +11:00
IMA-templates.txt ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt 2014-10-13 08:39:02 -04:00
keys-ecryptfs.txt encrypted-keys: move ecryptfs documentation to proper location 2011-06-30 19:08:14 +10:00
keys-request-key.txt
keys-trusted-encrypted.txt keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy 2015-12-20 15:27:13 +02:00
keys.txt KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring 2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
LSM.txt doc: LSM: update reference, kerneltrap.org no longer works 2014-06-19 15:15:28 +02:00
SELinux.txt
Smack.txt Smack: limited capability for changing process label 2015-10-19 12:06:47 -07:00
tomoyo.txt
Yama.txt Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED 2015-07-28 13:18:19 +10:00