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Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"There have been a few important changes to the RNG's crypto, but the
intent for 5.18 has been to shore up the existing design as much as
possible with modern cryptographic functions and proven constructions,
rather than actually changing up anything fundamental to the RNG's
design.
So it's still the same old RNG at its core as before: it still counts
entropy bits, and collects from the various sources with the same
heuristics as before, and so forth. However, the cryptographic
algorithms that transform that entropic data into safe random numbers
have been modernized.
Just as important, if not more, is that the code has been cleaned up
and re-documented. As one of the first drivers in Linux, going back to
1.3.30, its general style and organization was showing its age and
becoming both a maintenance burden and an auditability impediment.
Hopefully this provides a more solid foundation to build on for the
future. I encourage you to open up the file in full, and maybe you'll
remark, "oh, that's what it's doing," and enjoy reading it. That, at
least, is the eventual goal, which this pull begins working toward.
Here's a summary of the various patches in this pull:
- /dev/urandom and /dev/random now do the same thing, per the patch
we discussed on the list. I think this is worth trying out. If it
does appear problematic, I've made sure to keep it standalone and
revertible without any conflicts.
- Fixes and cleanups for numerous integer type problems, locking
issues, and general code quality concerns.
- The input pool's LFSR has been replaced with a cryptographically
secure hash function, which has security and performance benefits
alike, and consequently allows us to count entropy bits linearly.
- The pre-init injection now uses a real hash function too, instead
of an LFSR or vanilla xor.
- The interrupt handler's fast_mix() function now uses one round of
SipHash, rather than the fake crypto that was there before.
- All additions of RDRAND and RDSEED now go through the input pool's
hash function, in part to mitigate ridiculous hypothetical CPU
backdoors, but more so to have a consistent interface for ingesting
entropy that's easy to analyze, making everything happen one way,
instead of a potpourri of different ways.
- The crng now works on per-cpu data, while also being in accordance
with the actual "fast key erasure RNG" design. This allows us to
fix several boot-time race complications associated with the prior
dynamically allocated model, eliminates much locking, and makes our
backtrack protection more robust.
- Batched entropy now erases doled out values so that it's backtrack
resistant.
- Working closely with Sebastian, the interrupt handler no longer
needs to take any locks at all, as we punt the
synchronized/expensive operations to a workqueue. This is
especially nice for PREEMPT_RT, where taking spinlocks in irq
context is problematic. It also makes the handler faster for the
rest of us.
- Also working with Sebastian, we now do the right thing on CPU
hotplug, so that we don't use stale entropy or fail to accumulate
new entropy when CPUs come back online.
- We handle virtual machines that fork / clone / snapshot, using the
"vmgenid" ACPI specification for retrieving a unique new RNG seed,
which we can use to also make WireGuard (and in the future, other
things) safe across VM forks.
- Around boot time, we now try to reseed more often if enough entropy
is available, before settling on the usual 5 minute schedule.
- Last, but certainly not least, the documentation in the file has
been updated considerably"
* tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (60 commits)
random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy
random: reseed more often immediately after booting
random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator
wireguard: device: clear keys on VM fork
random: provide notifier for VM fork
random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one
random: do not export add_vmfork_randomness() unless needed
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID
ACPI: allow longer device IDs
random: add mechanism for VM forks to reinitialize crng
random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to
random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value
random: block in /dev/urandom
random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types
random: cleanup UUID handling
random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed
random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32
random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
...
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| events | ||
| bpf_probe.h | ||
| define_trace.h | ||
| perf.h | ||
| syscall.h | ||
| trace_events.h | ||