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b1010711c0
The .remove() callback for a platform driver returns an int which makes many driver authors wrongly assume it's possible to do error handling by returning an error code. However the value returned is ignored (apart from emitting a warning) and this typically results in resource leaks. To improve here there is a quest to make the remove callback return void. In the first step of this quest all drivers are converted to .remove_new(), which already returns void. Eventually after all drivers are converted, .remove_new() will be renamed to .remove(). Trivially convert this driver from always returning zero in the remove callback to the void returning variant. Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2501 lines
67 KiB
C
2501 lines
67 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com
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*
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* Authors: Keerthy
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* Vitaly Andrianov
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* Tero Kristo
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*/
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#include <linux/bitfield.h>
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#include <linux/clk.h>
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#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
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#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
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#include <linux/dmapool.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/of.h>
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#include <linux/of_platform.h>
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#include <linux/platform_device.h>
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#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/authenc.h>
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#include <crypto/des.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
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#include <crypto/sha1.h>
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#include <crypto/sha2.h>
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#include "sa2ul.h"
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/* Byte offset for key in encryption security context */
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#define SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4)
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/* Byte offset for Aux-1 in encryption security context */
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#define SC_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4 + 32)
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC 0x0001
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH 0x0002
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV 0x0004
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV 0x0008
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#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY 0x0010
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#define SA_AUTH_SUBKEY_LEN 16
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#define SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK 0xFFFF
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#define SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK 0xFF000000
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#define MODE_CONTROL_BYTES 27
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#define SA_HASH_PROCESSING 0
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#define SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING 0
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#define SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR BIT(6)
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#define SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK 0xF0000
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#define SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK 0x1F00000
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#define SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT BIT(4)
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#define SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK 0x3E000000
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#define SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT BIT(30)
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#define SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH 0xFF000000
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#define SA_BASIC_HASH 0x10
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#define SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS 8
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/* Make 32-bit word from 4 bytes */
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#define SA_MK_U32(b0, b1, b2, b3) (((b0) << 24) | ((b1) << 16) | \
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((b2) << 8) | (b3))
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/* size of SCCTL structure in bytes */
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#define SA_SCCTL_SZ 16
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/* Max Authentication tag size */
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#define SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ 64
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enum sa_algo_id {
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SA_ALG_CBC_AES = 0,
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SA_ALG_EBC_AES,
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SA_ALG_CBC_DES3,
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SA_ALG_ECB_DES3,
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SA_ALG_SHA1,
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SA_ALG_SHA256,
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SA_ALG_SHA512,
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SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES,
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SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES,
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};
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struct sa_match_data {
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u8 priv;
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u8 priv_id;
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u32 supported_algos;
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};
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static struct device *sa_k3_dev;
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/**
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* struct sa_cmdl_cfg - Command label configuration descriptor
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* @aalg: authentication algorithm ID
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* @enc_eng_id: Encryption Engine ID supported by the SA hardware
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* @auth_eng_id: Authentication Engine ID
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* @iv_size: Initialization Vector size
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* @akey: Authentication key
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* @akey_len: Authentication key length
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* @enc: True, if this is an encode request
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*/
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struct sa_cmdl_cfg {
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int aalg;
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u8 enc_eng_id;
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u8 auth_eng_id;
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u8 iv_size;
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const u8 *akey;
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u16 akey_len;
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bool enc;
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};
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/**
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* struct algo_data - Crypto algorithm specific data
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* @enc_eng: Encryption engine info structure
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* @auth_eng: Authentication engine info structure
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* @auth_ctrl: Authentication control word
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* @hash_size: Size of digest
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* @iv_idx: iv index in psdata
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* @iv_out_size: iv out size
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* @ealg_id: Encryption Algorithm ID
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* @aalg_id: Authentication algorithm ID
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* @mci_enc: Mode Control Instruction for Encryption algorithm
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* @mci_dec: Mode Control Instruction for Decryption
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* @inv_key: Whether the encryption algorithm demands key inversion
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* @ctx: Pointer to the algorithm context
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* @keyed_mac: Whether the authentication algorithm has key
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* @prep_iopad: Function pointer to generate intermediate ipad/opad
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*/
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struct algo_data {
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struct sa_eng_info enc_eng;
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struct sa_eng_info auth_eng;
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u8 auth_ctrl;
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u8 hash_size;
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u8 iv_idx;
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u8 iv_out_size;
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u8 ealg_id;
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u8 aalg_id;
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u8 *mci_enc;
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u8 *mci_dec;
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bool inv_key;
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struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx;
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bool keyed_mac;
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void (*prep_iopad)(struct algo_data *algo, const u8 *key,
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u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad);
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_alg_tmpl: A generic template encompassing crypto/aead algorithms
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* @type: Type of the crypto algorithm.
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* @alg: Union of crypto algorithm definitions.
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* @registered: Flag indicating if the crypto algorithm is already registered
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*/
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struct sa_alg_tmpl {
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u32 type; /* CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE from <linux/crypto.h> */
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union {
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struct skcipher_alg skcipher;
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struct ahash_alg ahash;
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struct aead_alg aead;
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} alg;
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bool registered;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_mapped_sg: scatterlist information for tx and rx
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* @mapped: Set to true if the @sgt is mapped
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* @dir: mapping direction used for @sgt
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* @split_sg: Set if the sg is split and needs to be freed up
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* @static_sg: Static scatterlist entry for overriding data
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* @sgt: scatterlist table for DMA API use
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*/
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struct sa_mapped_sg {
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bool mapped;
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enum dma_data_direction dir;
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struct scatterlist static_sg;
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struct scatterlist *split_sg;
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struct sg_table sgt;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_rx_data: RX Packet miscellaneous data place holder
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* @req: crypto request data pointer
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* @ddev: pointer to the DMA device
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* @tx_in: dma_async_tx_descriptor pointer for rx channel
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* @mapped_sg: Information on tx (0) and rx (1) scatterlist DMA mapping
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* @enc: Flag indicating either encryption or decryption
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* @enc_iv_size: Initialisation vector size
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* @iv_idx: Initialisation vector index
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*/
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struct sa_rx_data {
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void *req;
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struct device *ddev;
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struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in;
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struct sa_mapped_sg mapped_sg[2];
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u8 enc;
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u8 enc_iv_size;
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u8 iv_idx;
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};
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/**
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* struct sa_req: SA request definition
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* @dev: device for the request
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* @size: total data to the xmitted via DMA
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* @enc_offset: offset of cipher data
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* @enc_size: data to be passed to cipher engine
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* @enc_iv: cipher IV
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* @auth_offset: offset of the authentication data
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* @auth_size: size of the authentication data
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* @auth_iv: authentication IV
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* @type: algorithm type for the request
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* @cmdl: command label pointer
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* @base: pointer to the base request
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* @ctx: pointer to the algorithm context data
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* @enc: true if this is an encode request
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* @src: source data
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* @dst: destination data
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* @callback: DMA callback for the request
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* @mdata_size: metadata size passed to DMA
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*/
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struct sa_req {
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struct device *dev;
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u16 size;
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u8 enc_offset;
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u16 enc_size;
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u8 *enc_iv;
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u8 auth_offset;
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u16 auth_size;
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u8 *auth_iv;
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u32 type;
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u32 *cmdl;
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struct crypto_async_request *base;
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struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx;
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bool enc;
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struct scatterlist *src;
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struct scatterlist *dst;
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dma_async_tx_callback callback;
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u16 mdata_size;
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_enc_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_dec_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for encryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_ecb_enc_array[3][27] = {
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256
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* For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for decryption
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*/
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static u8 mci_ecb_dec_array[3][27] = {
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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{ 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
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};
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/*
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* Mode Control Instructions for DES algorithm
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* For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode and ECB mode
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* encryption and for decryption respectively
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*/
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static u8 mci_cbc_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_cbc_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x70, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_ecb_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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static u8 mci_ecb_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = {
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0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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};
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/*
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* Perform 16 byte or 128 bit swizzling
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* The SA2UL Expects the security context to
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* be in little Endian and the bus width is 128 bits or 16 bytes
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* Hence swap 16 bytes at a time from higher to lower address
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*/
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static void sa_swiz_128(u8 *in, u16 len)
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{
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u8 data[16];
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
|
|
memcpy(data, &in[i], 16);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
|
|
in[i + j] = data[15 - j];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare the ipad and opad from key as per SHA algorithm step 1*/
|
|
static void prepare_kipad(u8 *k_ipad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++)
|
|
k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
|
|
|
|
/* Instead of XOR with 0 */
|
|
for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
k_ipad[i] = 0x36;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void prepare_kopad(u8 *k_opad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++)
|
|
k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
|
|
|
|
/* Instead of XOR with 0 */
|
|
for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
k_opad[i] = 0x5c;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_export_shash(void *state, struct shash_desc *hash,
|
|
int digest_size, __be32 *out)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sha1_state *sha1;
|
|
struct sha256_state *sha256;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
|
|
switch (digest_size) {
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
sha1 = state;
|
|
result = sha1->state;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
sha256 = state;
|
|
result = sha256->state;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad digest_size=%d\n", __func__,
|
|
digest_size);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_export(hash, state);
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_be32_array(out, result, digest_size / 4);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_prepare_iopads(struct algo_data *data, const u8 *key,
|
|
u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad)
|
|
{
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, data->ctx->shash);
|
|
int block_size = crypto_shash_blocksize(data->ctx->shash);
|
|
int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(data->ctx->shash);
|
|
union {
|
|
struct sha1_state sha1;
|
|
struct sha256_state sha256;
|
|
u8 k_pad[SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
} sha;
|
|
|
|
shash->tfm = data->ctx->shash;
|
|
|
|
prepare_kipad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_init(shash);
|
|
crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size);
|
|
sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, ipad);
|
|
|
|
prepare_kopad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_init(shash);
|
|
crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size);
|
|
|
|
sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, opad);
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&sha, sizeof(sha));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Derive the inverse key used in AES-CBC decryption operation */
|
|
static inline int sa_aes_inv_key(u8 *inv_key, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
|
|
int key_pos;
|
|
|
|
if (aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_sz)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* work around to get the right inverse for AES_KEYSIZE_192 size keys */
|
|
if (key_sz == AES_KEYSIZE_192) {
|
|
ctx.key_enc[52] = ctx.key_enc[51] ^ ctx.key_enc[46];
|
|
ctx.key_enc[53] = ctx.key_enc[52] ^ ctx.key_enc[47];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Based crypto_aes_expand_key logic */
|
|
switch (key_sz) {
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
|
|
key_pos = key_sz + 24;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
|
|
key_pos = key_sz + 24 - 4;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(inv_key, &ctx.key_enc[key_pos], key_sz);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set Security context for the encryption engine */
|
|
static int sa_set_sc_enc(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz,
|
|
u8 enc, u8 *sc_buf)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *mci = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Set Encryption mode selector to crypto processing */
|
|
sc_buf[0] = SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING;
|
|
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
mci = ad->mci_enc;
|
|
else
|
|
mci = ad->mci_dec;
|
|
/* Set the mode control instructions in security context */
|
|
if (mci)
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[1], mci, MODE_CONTROL_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
/* For AES-CBC decryption get the inverse key */
|
|
if (ad->inv_key && !enc) {
|
|
if (sa_aes_inv_key(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
/* For all other cases: key is used */
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set Security context for the authentication engine */
|
|
static void sa_set_sc_auth(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz,
|
|
u8 *sc_buf)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *ipad = (void *)(sc_buf + 32);
|
|
__be32 *opad = (void *)(sc_buf + 64);
|
|
|
|
/* Set Authentication mode selector to hash processing */
|
|
sc_buf[0] = SA_HASH_PROCESSING;
|
|
/* Auth SW ctrl word: bit[6]=1 (upload computed hash to TLR section) */
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR;
|
|
sc_buf[1] |= ad->auth_ctrl;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the keys or ipad/opad */
|
|
if (ad->keyed_mac)
|
|
ad->prep_iopad(ad, key, key_sz, ipad, opad);
|
|
else {
|
|
/* basic hash */
|
|
sc_buf[1] |= SA_BASIC_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void sa_copy_iv(__be32 *out, const u8 *iv, bool size16)
|
|
{
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ((size16) ? 4 : 2); j++) {
|
|
*out = cpu_to_be32(*((u32 *)iv));
|
|
iv += 4;
|
|
out++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Format general command label */
|
|
static int sa_format_cmdl_gen(struct sa_cmdl_cfg *cfg, u8 *cmdl,
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 enc_offset = 0, auth_offset = 0, total = 0;
|
|
u8 enc_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2;
|
|
u8 auth_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2;
|
|
u32 *word_ptr = (u32 *)cmdl;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the command label */
|
|
memzero_explicit(cmdl, (SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)));
|
|
|
|
/* Iniialize the command update structure */
|
|
memzero_explicit(upd_info, sizeof(*upd_info));
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->enc_eng_id && cfg->auth_eng_id) {
|
|
if (cfg->enc) {
|
|
auth_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
enc_next_eng = cfg->auth_eng_id;
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->iv_size)
|
|
auth_offset += cfg->iv_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
enc_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
auth_next_eng = cfg->enc_eng_id;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->enc_eng_id) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC;
|
|
upd_info->enc_size.index = enc_offset >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->enc_offset.index = upd_info->enc_size.index + 1;
|
|
/* Encryption command label */
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = enc_next_eng;
|
|
|
|
/* Encryption modes requiring IV */
|
|
if (cfg->iv_size) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV;
|
|
upd_info->enc_iv.index =
|
|
(enc_offset + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES) >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->enc_iv.size = cfg->iv_size;
|
|
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size;
|
|
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL1] =
|
|
(SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET | (cfg->iv_size >> 3));
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg->auth_eng_id) {
|
|
upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH;
|
|
upd_info->auth_size.index = auth_offset >> 2;
|
|
upd_info->auth_offset.index = upd_info->auth_size.index + 1;
|
|
cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = auth_next_eng;
|
|
cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] =
|
|
SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total = roundup(total, 8);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < total / 4; i++)
|
|
word_ptr[i] = swab32(word_ptr[i]);
|
|
|
|
return total;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update Command label */
|
|
static inline void sa_update_cmdl(struct sa_req *req, u32 *cmdl,
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0, j;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC)) {
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] |= req->enc_size;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] &=
|
|
~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] |=
|
|
FIELD_PREP(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK,
|
|
req->enc_offset);
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV)) {
|
|
__be32 *data = (__be32 *)&cmdl[upd_info->enc_iv.index];
|
|
u32 *enc_iv = (u32 *)req->enc_iv;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; i < upd_info->enc_iv.size; i += 4, j++) {
|
|
data[j] = cpu_to_be32(*enc_iv);
|
|
enc_iv++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH)) {
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] |= req->auth_size;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] &=
|
|
~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK;
|
|
cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] |=
|
|
FIELD_PREP(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK,
|
|
req->auth_offset);
|
|
if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV) {
|
|
sa_copy_iv((void *)&cmdl[upd_info->auth_iv.index],
|
|
req->auth_iv,
|
|
(upd_info->auth_iv.size > 8));
|
|
}
|
|
if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY) {
|
|
int offset = (req->auth_size & 0xF) ? 4 : 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&cmdl[upd_info->aux_key_info.index],
|
|
&upd_info->aux_key[offset], 16);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Format SWINFO words to be sent to SA */
|
|
static
|
|
void sa_set_swinfo(u8 eng_id, u16 sc_id, dma_addr_t sc_phys,
|
|
u8 cmdl_present, u8 cmdl_offset, u8 flags,
|
|
u8 hash_size, u32 *swinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
swinfo[0] = sc_id;
|
|
swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK, flags);
|
|
if (likely(cmdl_present))
|
|
swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK,
|
|
cmdl_offset | SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT);
|
|
swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK, eng_id);
|
|
|
|
swinfo[0] |= SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT;
|
|
swinfo[1] = (u32)(sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
swinfo[2] = (u32)((sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL) >> 32);
|
|
swinfo[2] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH, hash_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dump the security context */
|
|
static void sa_dump_sc(u8 *buf, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
dev_info(sa_k3_dev, "Security context dump:: 0x%pad\n", &dma_addr);
|
|
print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
|
|
16, 1, buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, false);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static
|
|
int sa_init_sc(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, const struct sa_match_data *match_data,
|
|
const u8 *enc_key, u16 enc_key_sz,
|
|
const u8 *auth_key, u16 auth_key_sz,
|
|
struct algo_data *ad, u8 enc, u32 *swinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
int enc_sc_offset = 0;
|
|
int auth_sc_offset = 0;
|
|
u8 *sc_buf = ctx->sc;
|
|
u16 sc_id = ctx->sc_id;
|
|
u8 first_engine = 0;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ);
|
|
|
|
if (ad->auth_eng.eng_id) {
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
else
|
|
first_engine = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
|
|
enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ;
|
|
auth_sc_offset = enc_sc_offset + ad->enc_eng.sc_size;
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_AUTH_ENC;
|
|
if (!ad->hash_size)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
ad->hash_size = roundup(ad->hash_size, 8);
|
|
|
|
} else if (ad->enc_eng.eng_id && !ad->auth_eng.eng_id) {
|
|
enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ;
|
|
first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_ENC;
|
|
ad->hash_size = ad->iv_out_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SCCTL Owner info: 0=host, 1=CP_ACE */
|
|
sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0;
|
|
memcpy(&sc_buf[2], &sc_id, 2);
|
|
sc_buf[4] = 0x0;
|
|
sc_buf[5] = match_data->priv_id;
|
|
sc_buf[6] = match_data->priv;
|
|
sc_buf[7] = 0x0;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare context for encryption engine */
|
|
if (ad->enc_eng.sc_size) {
|
|
if (sa_set_sc_enc(ad, enc_key, enc_key_sz, enc,
|
|
&sc_buf[enc_sc_offset]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare context for authentication engine */
|
|
if (ad->auth_eng.sc_size)
|
|
sa_set_sc_auth(ad, auth_key, auth_key_sz,
|
|
&sc_buf[auth_sc_offset]);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the ownership of context to CP_ACE */
|
|
sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0x80;
|
|
|
|
/* swizzle the security context */
|
|
sa_swiz_128(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ);
|
|
|
|
sa_set_swinfo(first_engine, ctx->sc_id, ctx->sc_phys, 1, 0,
|
|
SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_EVICT, ad->hash_size, swinfo);
|
|
|
|
sa_dump_sc(sc_buf, ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Free the per direction context memory */
|
|
static void sa_free_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx,
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long bn;
|
|
|
|
bn = ctx->sc_id - data->sc_id_start;
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
__clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id--;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->sc) {
|
|
dma_pool_free(data->sc_pool, ctx->sc, ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
ctx->sc = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_init_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx,
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long bn;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
bn = find_first_zero_bit(data->ctx_bm, SA_MAX_NUM_CTX);
|
|
__set_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id++;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sc_id = (u16)(data->sc_id_start + bn);
|
|
|
|
ctx->sc = dma_pool_alloc(data->sc_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &ctx->sc_phys);
|
|
if (!ctx->sc) {
|
|
dev_err(&data->pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate SC memory\n");
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto scid_rollback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
scid_rollback:
|
|
spin_lock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
__clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm);
|
|
data->sc_id--;
|
|
spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_cipher_cra_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback.skcipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_cra_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base);
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *child;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->dev_data = data;
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
child = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(child);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->fallback.skcipher = child;
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(child) +
|
|
sizeof(struct skcipher_request));
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen, struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *child = ctx->fallback.skcipher;
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
|
|
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(child, tfm->base.crt_flags &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, key, keylen, NULL, 0,
|
|
ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, ctx->dev_data->match_data, key, keylen, NULL, 0,
|
|
ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
ctx->iv_idx = ad->iv_idx;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
badkey:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aes_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.inv_key = true;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.iv_idx = 4;
|
|
ad.iv_out_size = 16;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aes_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_enc_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_dec_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad.inv_key = true;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_ECB;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_3des_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_3des_enc_array;
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_3des_dec_array;
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_3DES_CBC;
|
|
ad.iv_idx = 6;
|
|
ad.iv_out_size = 8;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_3des_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
|
|
unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_3des_enc_array;
|
|
ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_3des_dec_array;
|
|
|
|
return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sync_from_device(struct sa_rx_data *rxd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sg_table *sgt;
|
|
|
|
if (rxd->mapped_sg[0].dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL)
|
|
sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[0].sgt;
|
|
else
|
|
sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[1].sgt;
|
|
|
|
dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu(rxd->ddev, sgt, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_free_sa_rx_data(struct sa_rx_data *rxd)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rxd->mapped_sg); i++) {
|
|
struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[i];
|
|
|
|
if (mapped_sg->mapped) {
|
|
dma_unmap_sgtable(rxd->ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
mapped_sg->dir, 0);
|
|
kfree(mapped_sg->split_sg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(rxd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_aes_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = data;
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
__be32 *mdptr;
|
|
size_t ml, pl;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct skcipher_request, base);
|
|
|
|
if (req->iv) {
|
|
mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl,
|
|
&ml);
|
|
result = (u32 *)req->iv;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (rxd->enc_iv_size / 4); i++)
|
|
result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + rxd->iv_idx]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_complete(req, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sa_prepare_tx_desc(u32 *mdptr, u32 pslen, u32 *psdata, u32 epiblen, u32 *epib)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 *out, *in;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (out = mdptr, in = epib, i = 0; i < epiblen / sizeof(u32); i++)
|
|
*out++ = *in++;
|
|
|
|
mdptr[4] = (0xFFFF << 16);
|
|
for (out = &mdptr[5], in = psdata, i = 0;
|
|
i < pslen / sizeof(u32); i++)
|
|
*out++ = *in++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_run(struct sa_req *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd;
|
|
gfp_t gfp_flags;
|
|
u32 cmdl[SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS];
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *pdata = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
struct device *ddev;
|
|
struct dma_chan *dma_rx;
|
|
int sg_nents, src_nents, dst_nents;
|
|
struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
|
|
size_t pl, ml, split_size;
|
|
struct sa_ctx_info *sa_ctx = req->enc ? &req->ctx->enc : &req->ctx->dec;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_out;
|
|
u32 *mdptr;
|
|
bool diff_dst;
|
|
enum dma_data_direction dir_src;
|
|
struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg;
|
|
|
|
gfp_flags = req->base->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ?
|
|
GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
|
|
|
|
rxd = kzalloc(sizeof(*rxd), gfp_flags);
|
|
if (!rxd)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (req->src != req->dst) {
|
|
diff_dst = true;
|
|
dir_src = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
diff_dst = false;
|
|
dir_src = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SA2UL has an interesting feature where the receive DMA channel
|
|
* is selected based on the data passed to the engine. Within the
|
|
* transition range, there is also a space where it is impossible
|
|
* to determine where the data will end up, and this should be
|
|
* avoided. This will be handled by the SW fallback mechanism by
|
|
* the individual algorithm implementations.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (req->size >= 256)
|
|
dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx2;
|
|
else
|
|
dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx1;
|
|
|
|
ddev = dmaengine_get_dma_device(pdata->dma_tx);
|
|
rxd->ddev = ddev;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl_size);
|
|
|
|
sa_update_cmdl(req, cmdl, &sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (req->type != CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) {
|
|
if (req->enc)
|
|
req->type |=
|
|
(SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_ENC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT);
|
|
else
|
|
req->type |=
|
|
(SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_DEC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmdl[sa_ctx->cmdl_size / sizeof(u32)] = req->type;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Map the packets, first we check if the data fits into a single
|
|
* sg entry and use that if possible. If it does not fit, we check
|
|
* if we need to do sg_split to align the scatterlist data on the
|
|
* actual data size being processed by the crypto engine.
|
|
*/
|
|
src = req->src;
|
|
sg_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, req->size);
|
|
|
|
split_size = req->size;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[0];
|
|
if (sg_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->src->length) {
|
|
src = &mapped_sg->static_sg;
|
|
src_nents = 1;
|
|
sg_init_table(src, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(src, sg_page(req->src), split_size,
|
|
req->src->offset);
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = src;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = src_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kfree(rxd);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = dir_src;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->src;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = sg_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kfree(rxd);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = dir_src;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents, 0, 1,
|
|
&split_size, &src, &src_nents, gfp_flags);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
src_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents;
|
|
src = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->split_sg = src;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dma_sync_sgtable_for_device(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
if (!diff_dst) {
|
|
dst_nents = src_nents;
|
|
dst = src;
|
|
} else {
|
|
dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->size);
|
|
mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[1];
|
|
|
|
if (dst_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->dst->length) {
|
|
dst = &mapped_sg->static_sg;
|
|
dst_nents = 1;
|
|
sg_init_table(dst, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(dst, sg_page(req->dst), split_size,
|
|
req->dst->offset);
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = dst;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->dst;
|
|
mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents;
|
|
ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt,
|
|
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
|
|
mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
|
|
mapped_sg->mapped = true;
|
|
|
|
ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents,
|
|
0, 1, &split_size, &dst, &dst_nents,
|
|
gfp_flags);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dst_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents;
|
|
dst = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mapped_sg->split_sg = dst;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rxd->tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(dma_rx, dst, dst_nents,
|
|
DMA_DEV_TO_MEM,
|
|
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
|
|
if (!rxd->tx_in) {
|
|
dev_err(pdata->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rxd->req = (void *)req->base;
|
|
rxd->enc = req->enc;
|
|
rxd->iv_idx = req->ctx->iv_idx;
|
|
rxd->enc_iv_size = sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info.enc_iv.size;
|
|
rxd->tx_in->callback = req->callback;
|
|
rxd->tx_in->callback_param = rxd;
|
|
|
|
tx_out = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(pdata->dma_tx, src,
|
|
src_nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV,
|
|
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
|
|
|
|
if (!tx_out) {
|
|
dev_err(pdata->dev, "OUT prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto err_cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prepare metadata for DMA engine. This essentially describes the
|
|
* crypto algorithm to be used, data sizes, different keys etc.
|
|
*/
|
|
mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(tx_out, &pl, &ml);
|
|
|
|
sa_prepare_tx_desc(mdptr, (sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS *
|
|
sizeof(u32))), cmdl, sizeof(sa_ctx->epib),
|
|
sa_ctx->epib);
|
|
|
|
ml = sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * sizeof(u32));
|
|
dmaengine_desc_set_metadata_len(tx_out, req->mdata_size);
|
|
|
|
dmaengine_submit(tx_out);
|
|
dmaengine_submit(rxd->tx_in);
|
|
|
|
dma_async_issue_pending(dma_rx);
|
|
dma_async_issue_pending(pdata->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
return -EINPROGRESS;
|
|
|
|
err_cleanup:
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cipher_run(struct skcipher_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx =
|
|
crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
|
|
struct crypto_alg *alg = req->base.tfm->__crt_alg;
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
if (!req->cryptlen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (req->cryptlen % alg->cra_blocksize)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Use SW fallback if the data size is not supported */
|
|
if (req->cryptlen > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(req->cryptlen >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
req->cryptlen <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.skcipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
|
|
req->base.complete,
|
|
req->base.data);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
|
|
req->cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
if (enc)
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq);
|
|
else
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
sa_req.enc_size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->dst;
|
|
sa_req.enc_iv = iv;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER;
|
|
sa_req.enc = enc;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_aes_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 44;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sha_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = data;
|
|
struct ahash_request *req;
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
|
|
unsigned int authsize;
|
|
int i;
|
|
size_t ml, pl;
|
|
u32 *result;
|
|
__be32 *mdptr;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct ahash_request, base);
|
|
tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
authsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml);
|
|
result = (u32 *)req->result;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++)
|
|
result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + 4]);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_complete(req, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int zero_message_process(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
int sa_digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
switch (sa_digest_size) {
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha1_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha256_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
|
memcpy(req->result, sha512_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_run(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
size_t auth_len;
|
|
|
|
auth_len = req->nbytes;
|
|
|
|
if (!auth_len)
|
|
return zero_message_process(req);
|
|
|
|
if (auth_len > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(auth_len >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
auth_len <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_init(subreq);
|
|
|
|
subreq->nbytes = auth_len;
|
|
subreq->src = req->src;
|
|
subreq->result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
ret |= crypto_ahash_update(subreq);
|
|
|
|
subreq->nbytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret |= crypto_ahash_final(subreq);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.size = auth_len;
|
|
sa_req.auth_size = auth_len;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.enc = true;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_sha_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 28;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_setup(struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx, struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(ctx->shash);
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->authkey, 0, bs);
|
|
memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id;
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = 0;
|
|
cfg.akey = NULL;
|
|
cfg.akey_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dev_data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
ad, 0, &ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
goto badkey;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
badkey:
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_cra_init_alg(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_base)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->dev_data = data;
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
if (alg_base) {
|
|
ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_base, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n",
|
|
alg_base);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash);
|
|
}
|
|
/* for fallback */
|
|
ctx->fallback.ahash =
|
|
crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_base, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash)) {
|
|
dev_err(ctx->dev_data->dev,
|
|
"Could not load fallback driver\n");
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
|
|
sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
crypto_ahash_reqsize(ctx->fallback.ahash));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_sha_run(req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_init(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "init: digest size: %u, rctx=%p\n",
|
|
crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), rctx);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_init(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_update(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_update(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_final(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_final(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags =
|
|
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src;
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_finup(&rctx->fallback_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->fallback_req, in);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req;
|
|
|
|
ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ahash_export(subreq, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha1_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha1");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA1;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha256_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha256");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_256;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_sha512_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha512");
|
|
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_512;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA512;
|
|
|
|
sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_sha_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_tfm_alg_type(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash);
|
|
crypto_free_ahash(ctx->fallback.ahash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_aead_dma_in_callback(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_rx_data *rxd = data;
|
|
struct aead_request *req;
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
|
|
unsigned int start;
|
|
unsigned int authsize;
|
|
u8 auth_tag[SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ];
|
|
size_t pl, ml;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
u32 *mdptr;
|
|
|
|
sa_sync_from_device(rxd);
|
|
req = container_of(rxd->req, struct aead_request, base);
|
|
tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
start = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
|
|
authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
|
|
mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++)
|
|
mdptr[i + 4] = swab32(mdptr[i + 4]);
|
|
|
|
if (rxd->enc) {
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&mdptr[4], req->dst, start, authsize,
|
|
1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
start -= authsize;
|
|
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(auth_tag, req->src, start, authsize,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
err = memcmp(&mdptr[4], auth_tag, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd);
|
|
|
|
aead_request_complete(req, err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash,
|
|
const char *fallback)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
ctx->dev_data = data;
|
|
|
|
ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n", hash);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->fallback.aead = crypto_alloc_aead(fallback, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead)) {
|
|
dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "fallback driver %s couldn't be loaded\n",
|
|
fallback);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_request) +
|
|
crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->fallback.aead));
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n",
|
|
__func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys,
|
|
ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha1(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha1",
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha1-ce),cbc(aes-ce))");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha256(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha256",
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha256-ce),cbc(aes-ce))");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_exit_tfm_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash);
|
|
crypto_free_aead(ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data);
|
|
sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm configuration interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
|
|
struct algo_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
|
|
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
|
|
int cmdl_len;
|
|
struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg;
|
|
int key_idx;
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */
|
|
key_idx = (keys.enckeylen >> 3) - 2;
|
|
if (key_idx >= 3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ad->ctx = ctx;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1;
|
|
ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1;
|
|
ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ;
|
|
ad->mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad->mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[key_idx];
|
|
ad->inv_key = true;
|
|
ad->keyed_mac = true;
|
|
ad->ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad->prep_iopad = sa_prepare_iopads;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
cfg.enc = true;
|
|
cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id;
|
|
cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id;
|
|
cfg.iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc);
|
|
cfg.akey = keys.authkey;
|
|
cfg.akey_len = keys.authkeylen;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, keys.enckey,
|
|
keys.enckeylen, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
|
|
ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg,
|
|
(u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */
|
|
if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, ctx->dev_data->match_data, keys.enckey,
|
|
keys.enckeylen, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
|
|
ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1]))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cfg.enc = false;
|
|
cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl,
|
|
&ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info);
|
|
|
|
if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len;
|
|
|
|
crypto_aead_clear_flags(ctx->fallback.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_aead_set_flags(ctx->fallback.aead,
|
|
crypto_aead_get_flags(authenc) &
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback.aead, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm));
|
|
|
|
return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->fallback.aead, authsize);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA1;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1;
|
|
|
|
return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
|
|
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct algo_data ad = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC;
|
|
ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA2_256;
|
|
ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
|
|
ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_aead_run(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 };
|
|
size_t auth_size, enc_size;
|
|
|
|
enc_size = req->cryptlen;
|
|
auth_size = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!enc) {
|
|
enc_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
auth_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (auth_size > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ ||
|
|
(auth_size >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN &&
|
|
auth_size <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) {
|
|
struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.aead);
|
|
aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
|
|
req->base.complete, req->base.data);
|
|
aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
|
|
req->cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
|
|
|
|
ret = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
|
|
crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_req.enc_offset = req->assoclen;
|
|
sa_req.enc_size = enc_size;
|
|
sa_req.auth_size = auth_size;
|
|
sa_req.size = auth_size;
|
|
sa_req.enc_iv = iv;
|
|
sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
|
|
sa_req.enc = enc;
|
|
sa_req.callback = sa_aead_dma_in_callback;
|
|
sa_req.mdata_size = 52;
|
|
sa_req.base = &req->base;
|
|
sa_req.ctx = ctx;
|
|
sa_req.src = req->src;
|
|
sa_req.dst = req->dst;
|
|
|
|
return sa_run(&sa_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm encrypt interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD algorithm decrypt interface function */
|
|
static int sa_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct sa_alg_tmpl sa_algs[] = {
|
|
[SA_ALG_CBC_AES] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aes_cbc_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_EBC_AES] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aes_ecb_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_CBC_DES3] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_3des_cbc_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_ECB_DES3] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER,
|
|
.alg.skcipher = {
|
|
.base.cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)",
|
|
.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3-sa2ul",
|
|
.base.cra_priority = 30000,
|
|
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.init = sa_cipher_cra_init,
|
|
.exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit,
|
|
.min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
.setkey = sa_3des_ecb_setkey,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_decrypt,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_SHA1] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha1",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha1-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha1_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha1_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_SHA256] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha256",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha256-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha256_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha256_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_SHA512] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
|
|
.alg.ahash = {
|
|
.halg.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "sha512",
|
|
.cra_driver_name = "sha512-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_priority = 400,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_init = sa_sha512_cra_init,
|
|
.cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit,
|
|
},
|
|
.halg.digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
.halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) +
|
|
sizeof(struct sha512_state),
|
|
.init = sa_sha_init,
|
|
.update = sa_sha_update,
|
|
.final = sa_sha_final,
|
|
.finup = sa_sha_finup,
|
|
.digest = sa_sha_digest,
|
|
.export = sa_sha_export,
|
|
.import = sa_sha_import,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
|
|
.alg.aead = {
|
|
.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
|
|
.cra_driver_name =
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_priority = 3000,
|
|
},
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha1,
|
|
.exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey,
|
|
.setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
[SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES] = {
|
|
.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
|
|
.alg.aead = {
|
|
.base = {
|
|
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
|
|
.cra_driver_name =
|
|
"authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))-sa2ul",
|
|
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
|
|
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx),
|
|
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.cra_alignmask = 0,
|
|
.cra_priority = 3000,
|
|
},
|
|
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
.init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha256,
|
|
.exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead,
|
|
.setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey,
|
|
.setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize,
|
|
.encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt,
|
|
.decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Register the algorithms in crypto framework */
|
|
static void sa_register_algos(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct sa_match_data *match_data = dev_data->match_data;
|
|
struct device *dev = dev_data->dev;
|
|
char *alg_name;
|
|
u32 type;
|
|
int i, err;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) {
|
|
/* Skip unsupported algos */
|
|
if (!(match_data->supported_algos & BIT(i)))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
type = sa_algs[i].type;
|
|
if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher);
|
|
} else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.ahash.halg.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash);
|
|
} else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) {
|
|
alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.aead.base.cra_name;
|
|
err = crypto_register_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dev_err(dev,
|
|
"un-supported crypto algorithm (%d)",
|
|
sa_algs[i].type);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Failed to register '%s'\n", alg_name);
|
|
else
|
|
sa_algs[i].registered = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unregister the algorithms in crypto framework */
|
|
static void sa_unregister_algos(const struct device *dev)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 type;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) {
|
|
type = sa_algs[i].type;
|
|
if (!sa_algs[i].registered)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER)
|
|
crypto_unregister_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher);
|
|
else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
|
|
crypto_unregister_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash);
|
|
else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD)
|
|
crypto_unregister_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead);
|
|
|
|
sa_algs[i].registered = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_init_mem(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *dev = &dev_data->pdev->dev;
|
|
/* Setup dma pool for security context buffers */
|
|
dev_data->sc_pool = dma_pool_create("keystone-sc", dev,
|
|
SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, 64, 0);
|
|
if (!dev_data->sc_pool) {
|
|
dev_err(dev, "Failed to create dma pool");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_dma_init(struct sa_crypto_data *dd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct dma_slave_config cfg;
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx1 = NULL;
|
|
dd->dma_tx = NULL;
|
|
dd->dma_rx2 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dd->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48));
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx1 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx1");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx1))
|
|
return dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1),
|
|
"Unable to request rx1 DMA channel\n");
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_rx2 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx2");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx2)) {
|
|
ret = dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx2),
|
|
"Unable to request rx2 DMA channel\n");
|
|
goto err_dma_rx2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dd->dma_tx = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "tx");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_tx)) {
|
|
ret = dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_tx),
|
|
"Unable to request tx DMA channel\n");
|
|
goto err_dma_tx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg));
|
|
|
|
cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
|
|
cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
|
|
cfg.src_maxburst = 4;
|
|
cfg.dst_maxburst = 4;
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx1, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
goto err_dma_config;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx2, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
goto err_dma_config;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_tx, &cfg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure OUT dmaengine slave: %d\n",
|
|
ret);
|
|
goto err_dma_config;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_dma_config:
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_tx);
|
|
err_dma_tx:
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx2);
|
|
err_dma_rx2:
|
|
dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sa_link_child(struct device *dev, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *parent = data;
|
|
|
|
device_link_add(dev, parent, DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct sa_match_data am654_match_data = {
|
|
.priv = 1,
|
|
.priv_id = 1,
|
|
.supported_algos = BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_AES) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_EBC_AES) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_DES3) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_ECB_DES3) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_SHA1) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_SHA256) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_SHA512) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct sa_match_data am64_match_data = {
|
|
.priv = 0,
|
|
.priv_id = 0,
|
|
.supported_algos = BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_AES) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_EBC_AES) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_SHA256) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_SHA512) |
|
|
BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct of_device_id of_match[] = {
|
|
{ .compatible = "ti,j721e-sa2ul", .data = &am654_match_data, },
|
|
{ .compatible = "ti,am654-sa2ul", .data = &am654_match_data, },
|
|
{ .compatible = "ti,am64-sa2ul", .data = &am64_match_data, },
|
|
{ .compatible = "ti,am62-sa3ul", .data = &am64_match_data, },
|
|
{},
|
|
};
|
|
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_match);
|
|
|
|
static int sa_ul_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
|
|
struct device_node *node = dev->of_node;
|
|
static void __iomem *saul_base;
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data;
|
|
u32 status, val;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
dev_data = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev_data), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!dev_data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
dev_data->match_data = of_device_get_match_data(dev);
|
|
if (!dev_data->match_data)
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
saul_base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(saul_base))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(saul_base);
|
|
|
|
sa_k3_dev = dev;
|
|
dev_data->dev = dev;
|
|
dev_data->pdev = pdev;
|
|
dev_data->base = saul_base;
|
|
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev_data);
|
|
dev_set_drvdata(sa_k3_dev, dev_data);
|
|
|
|
pm_runtime_enable(dev);
|
|
ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
dev_err(dev, "%s: failed to get sync: %d\n", __func__, ret);
|
|
pm_runtime_disable(dev);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa_init_mem(dev_data);
|
|
ret = sa_dma_init(dev_data);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto destroy_dma_pool;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&dev_data->scid_lock);
|
|
|
|
val = SA_EEC_ENCSS_EN | SA_EEC_AUTHSS_EN | SA_EEC_CTXCACH_EN |
|
|
SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_IN_EN | SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_OUT_EN |
|
|
SA_EEC_TRNG_EN;
|
|
status = readl_relaxed(saul_base + SA_ENGINE_STATUS);
|
|
/* Only enable engines if all are not already enabled */
|
|
if (val & ~status)
|
|
writel_relaxed(val, saul_base + SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL);
|
|
|
|
sa_register_algos(dev_data);
|
|
|
|
ret = of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, dev);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto release_dma;
|
|
|
|
device_for_each_child(dev, dev, sa_link_child);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
release_dma:
|
|
sa_unregister_algos(dev);
|
|
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
destroy_dma_pool:
|
|
dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool);
|
|
|
|
pm_runtime_put_sync(dev);
|
|
pm_runtime_disable(dev);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sa_ul_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
|
|
|
|
of_platform_depopulate(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev);
|
|
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1);
|
|
dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx);
|
|
|
|
dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool);
|
|
|
|
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
|
|
|
|
pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
|
|
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct platform_driver sa_ul_driver = {
|
|
.probe = sa_ul_probe,
|
|
.remove_new = sa_ul_remove,
|
|
.driver = {
|
|
.name = "saul-crypto",
|
|
.of_match_table = of_match,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
module_platform_driver(sa_ul_driver);
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|