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5f46ce14bd
Got burned by setting the proposed default of 65536 across all Debian archs. Thus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may set this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that doesn't break sshd. Reword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too. Signed-off-by: maximilian attems <max@stro.at> Cc: Martin Michlmayr <tbm@cyrius.com> Cc: Gordon Farquharson <gordonfarquharson@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
132 lines
4.4 KiB
Plaintext
132 lines
4.4 KiB
Plaintext
#
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# Security configuration
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#
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menu "Security options"
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config KEYS
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bool "Enable access key retention support"
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help
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This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
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access keys in the kernel.
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It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
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associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
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support and the like can find them.
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Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
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a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
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to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
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process and thread.
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If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
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config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
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bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
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depends on KEYS
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help
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This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
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can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
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reading process.
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The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
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permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
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Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
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filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
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Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
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the resulting table.
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If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
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config SECURITY
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bool "Enable different security models"
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depends on SYSFS
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help
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This allows you to choose different security modules to be
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configured into your kernel.
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If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
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model will be used.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_NETWORK
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bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
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depends on SECURITY
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help
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This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
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If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
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implement socket and networking access controls.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
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bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
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depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
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help
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This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
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If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
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implement per-packet access controls based on labels
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derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
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designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
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to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
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IPSec.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
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bool "Default Linux Capabilities"
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depends on SECURITY
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default y
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help
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This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
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config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
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bool "File POSIX Capabilities (EXPERIMENTAL)"
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depends on (SECURITY=n || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES!=n) && EXPERIMENTAL
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default n
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help
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This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
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binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
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If in doubt, answer N.
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config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
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bool "Root Plug Support"
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depends on USB=y && SECURITY
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help
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This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such.
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It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific
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USB device is not present in the system.
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See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
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more information about this module.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
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int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
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depends on SECURITY
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default 0
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help
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This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
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from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
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can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
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For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
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a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
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On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
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Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
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permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
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this protection disabled.
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This value can be changed after boot using the
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/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
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source security/selinux/Kconfig
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source security/smack/Kconfig
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endmenu
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