linux/kernel/kexec_file.c
Linus Torvalds aefcf2f4b5 Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00

1338 lines
33 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* kexec: kexec_file_load system call
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
* Authors:
* Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kexec_internal.h"
static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image);
/*
* Currently this is the only default function that is exported as some
* architectures need it to do additional handlings.
* In the future, other default functions may be exported too if required.
*/
int kexec_image_probe_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
const struct kexec_file_ops * const *fops;
int ret = -ENOEXEC;
for (fops = &kexec_file_loaders[0]; *fops && (*fops)->probe; ++fops) {
ret = (*fops)->probe(buf, buf_len);
if (!ret) {
image->fops = *fops;
return ret;
}
}
return ret;
}
/* Architectures can provide this probe function */
int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
return kexec_image_probe_default(image, buf, buf_len);
}
static void *kexec_image_load_default(struct kimage *image)
{
if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
return image->fops->load(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len, image->initrd_buf,
image->initrd_buf_len, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len);
}
void * __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
{
return kexec_image_load_default(image);
}
int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(struct kimage *image)
{
if (!image->fops || !image->fops->cleanup)
return 0;
return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
}
int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
{
return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
}
int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
}
#endif
/*
* arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add - apply relocations of type RELA
* @pi: Purgatory to be relocated.
* @section: Section relocations applying to.
* @relsec: Section containing RELAs.
* @symtab: Corresponding symtab.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
int __weak
arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section,
const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab)
{
pr_err("RELA relocation unsupported.\n");
return -ENOEXEC;
}
/*
* arch_kexec_apply_relocations - apply relocations of type REL
* @pi: Purgatory to be relocated.
* @section: Section relocations applying to.
* @relsec: Section containing RELs.
* @symtab: Corresponding symtab.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
int __weak
arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi, Elf_Shdr *section,
const Elf_Shdr *relsec, const Elf_Shdr *symtab)
{
pr_err("REL relocation unsupported.\n");
return -ENOEXEC;
}
/*
* Free up memory used by kernel, initrd, and command line. This is temporary
* memory allocation which is not needed any more after these buffers have
* been loaded into separate segments and have been copied elsewhere.
*/
void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
{
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
vfree(image->kernel_buf);
image->kernel_buf = NULL;
vfree(image->initrd_buf);
image->initrd_buf = NULL;
kfree(image->cmdline_buf);
image->cmdline_buf = NULL;
vfree(pi->purgatory_buf);
pi->purgatory_buf = NULL;
vfree(pi->sechdrs);
pi->sechdrs = NULL;
/* See if architecture has anything to cleanup post load */
arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
/*
* Above call should have called into bootloader to free up
* any data stored in kimage->image_loader_data. It should
* be ok now to free it up.
*/
kfree(image->image_loader_data);
image->image_loader_data = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
static int
kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
{
const char *reason;
int ret;
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
break;
/* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not
* checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there
* must be a valid signature.
*/
case -ENODATA:
reason = "kexec of unsigned image";
goto decide;
case -ENOPKG:
reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto";
goto decide;
case -ENOKEY:
reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key";
decide:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason);
return ret;
}
/* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
* down.
*/
if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
* signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
* aren't required.
*/
default:
pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
}
return ret;
}
#endif
/*
* In file mode list of segments is prepared by kernel. Copy relevant
* data from user space, do error checking, prepare segment list
*/
static int
kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
const char __user *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags)
{
int ret;
void *ldata;
loff_t size;
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
&size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
if (ret)
return ret;
image->kernel_buf_len = size;
/* Call arch image probe handlers */
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len);
if (ret)
goto out;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
ret = kimage_validate_signature(image);
if (ret)
goto out;
#endif
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
&size, INT_MAX,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
if (ret)
goto out;
image->initrd_buf_len = size;
}
if (cmdline_len) {
image->cmdline_buf = memdup_user(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len);
if (IS_ERR(image->cmdline_buf)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(image->cmdline_buf);
image->cmdline_buf = NULL;
goto out;
}
image->cmdline_buf_len = cmdline_len;
/* command line should be a string with last byte null */
if (image->cmdline_buf[cmdline_len - 1] != '\0') {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
}
/* IMA needs to pass the measurement list to the next kernel. */
ima_add_kexec_buffer(image);
/* Call arch image load handlers */
ldata = arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(image);
if (IS_ERR(ldata)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ldata);
goto out;
}
image->image_loader_data = ldata;
out:
/* In case of error, free up all allocated memory in this function */
if (ret)
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
return ret;
}
static int
kimage_file_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, int kernel_fd,
int initrd_fd, const char __user *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned long flags)
{
int ret;
struct kimage *image;
bool kexec_on_panic = flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH;
image = do_kimage_alloc_init();
if (!image)
return -ENOMEM;
image->file_mode = 1;
if (kexec_on_panic) {
/* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */
image->control_page = crashk_res.start;
image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH;
}
ret = kimage_file_prepare_segments(image, kernel_fd, initrd_fd,
cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len, flags);
if (ret)
goto out_free_image;
ret = sanity_check_segment_list(image);
if (ret)
goto out_free_post_load_bufs;
ret = -ENOMEM;
image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image,
get_order(KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE));
if (!image->control_code_page) {
pr_err("Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
goto out_free_post_load_bufs;
}
if (!kexec_on_panic) {
image->swap_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0);
if (!image->swap_page) {
pr_err("Could not allocate swap buffer\n");
goto out_free_control_pages;
}
}
*rimage = image;
return 0;
out_free_control_pages:
kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
out_free_post_load_bufs:
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
out_free_image:
kfree(image);
return ret;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long, flags)
{
int ret = 0, i;
struct kimage **dest_image, *image;
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */
if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
return -EINVAL;
image = NULL;
if (!mutex_trylock(&kexec_mutex))
return -EBUSY;
dest_image = &kexec_image;
if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) {
dest_image = &kexec_crash_image;
if (kexec_crash_image)
arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres();
}
if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD)
goto exchange;
/*
* In case of crash, new kernel gets loaded in reserved region. It is
* same memory where old crash kernel might be loaded. Free any
* current crash dump kernel before we corrupt it.
*/
if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH)
kimage_free(xchg(&kexec_crash_image, NULL));
ret = kimage_file_alloc_init(&image, kernel_fd, initrd_fd, cmdline_ptr,
cmdline_len, flags);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = machine_kexec_prepare(image);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Some architecture(like S390) may touch the crash memory before
* machine_kexec_prepare(), we must copy vmcoreinfo data after it.
*/
ret = kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(image);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = kexec_calculate_store_digests(image);
if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
struct kexec_segment *ksegment;
ksegment = &image->segment[i];
pr_debug("Loading segment %d: buf=0x%p bufsz=0x%zx mem=0x%lx memsz=0x%zx\n",
i, ksegment->buf, ksegment->bufsz, ksegment->mem,
ksegment->memsz);
ret = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segment[i]);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
kimage_terminate(image);
/*
* Free up any temporary buffers allocated which are not needed
* after image has been loaded
*/
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
exchange:
image = xchg(dest_image, image);
out:
if ((flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) && kexec_crash_image)
arch_kexec_protect_crashkres();
mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex);
kimage_free(image);
return ret;
}
static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
temp_end = min(end, kbuf->buf_max);
temp_start = temp_end - kbuf->memsz;
do {
/* align down start */
temp_start = temp_start & (~(kbuf->buf_align - 1));
if (temp_start < start || temp_start < kbuf->buf_min)
return 0;
temp_end = temp_start + kbuf->memsz - 1;
/*
* Make sure this does not conflict with any of existing
* segments
*/
if (kimage_is_destination_range(image, temp_start, temp_end)) {
temp_start = temp_start - PAGE_SIZE;
continue;
}
/* We found a suitable memory range */
break;
} while (1);
/* If we are here, we found a suitable memory range */
kbuf->mem = temp_start;
/* Success, stop navigating through remaining System RAM ranges */
return 1;
}
static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
temp_start = max(start, kbuf->buf_min);
do {
temp_start = ALIGN(temp_start, kbuf->buf_align);
temp_end = temp_start + kbuf->memsz - 1;
if (temp_end > end || temp_end > kbuf->buf_max)
return 0;
/*
* Make sure this does not conflict with any of existing
* segments
*/
if (kimage_is_destination_range(image, temp_start, temp_end)) {
temp_start = temp_start + PAGE_SIZE;
continue;
}
/* We found a suitable memory range */
break;
} while (1);
/* If we are here, we found a suitable memory range */
kbuf->mem = temp_start;
/* Success, stop navigating through remaining System RAM ranges */
return 1;
}
static int locate_mem_hole_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct kexec_buf *kbuf = (struct kexec_buf *)arg;
u64 start = res->start, end = res->end;
unsigned long sz = end - start + 1;
/* Returning 0 will take to next memory range */
if (sz < kbuf->memsz)
return 0;
if (end < kbuf->buf_min || start > kbuf->buf_max)
return 0;
/*
* Allocate memory top down with-in ram range. Otherwise bottom up
* allocation.
*/
if (kbuf->top_down)
return locate_mem_hole_top_down(start, end, kbuf);
return locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(start, end, kbuf);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK
static int kexec_walk_memblock(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
int ret = 0;
u64 i;
phys_addr_t mstart, mend;
struct resource res = { };
if (kbuf->image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
return func(&crashk_res, kbuf);
if (kbuf->top_down) {
for_each_free_mem_range_reverse(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, MEMBLOCK_NONE,
&mstart, &mend, NULL) {
/*
* In memblock, end points to the first byte after the
* range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
* in the range.
*/
res.start = mstart;
res.end = mend - 1;
ret = func(&res, kbuf);
if (ret)
break;
}
} else {
for_each_free_mem_range(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, MEMBLOCK_NONE,
&mstart, &mend, NULL) {
/*
* In memblock, end points to the first byte after the
* range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
* in the range.
*/
res.start = mstart;
res.end = mend - 1;
ret = func(&res, kbuf);
if (ret)
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
#else
static int kexec_walk_memblock(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
return 0;
}
#endif
/**
* kexec_walk_resources - call func(data) on free memory regions
* @kbuf: Context info for the search. Also passed to @func.
* @func: Function to call for each memory region.
*
* Return: The memory walk will stop when func returns a non-zero value
* and that value will be returned. If all free regions are visited without
* func returning non-zero, then zero will be returned.
*/
static int kexec_walk_resources(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
if (kbuf->image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
return walk_iomem_res_desc(crashk_res.desc,
IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY,
crashk_res.start, crashk_res.end,
kbuf, func);
else
return walk_system_ram_res(0, ULONG_MAX, kbuf, func);
}
/**
* kexec_locate_mem_hole - find free memory for the purgatory or the next kernel
* @kbuf: Parameters for the memory search.
*
* On success, kbuf->mem will have the start address of the memory region found.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
int ret;
/* Arch knows where to place */
if (kbuf->mem != KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN)
return 0;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK))
ret = kexec_walk_resources(kbuf, locate_mem_hole_callback);
else
ret = kexec_walk_memblock(kbuf, locate_mem_hole_callback);
return ret == 1 ? 0 : -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
/**
* kexec_add_buffer - place a buffer in a kexec segment
* @kbuf: Buffer contents and memory parameters.
*
* This function assumes that kexec_mutex is held.
* On successful return, @kbuf->mem will have the physical address of
* the buffer in memory.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
struct kexec_segment *ksegment;
int ret;
/* Currently adding segment this way is allowed only in file mode */
if (!kbuf->image->file_mode)
return -EINVAL;
if (kbuf->image->nr_segments >= KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Make sure we are not trying to add buffer after allocating
* control pages. All segments need to be placed first before
* any control pages are allocated. As control page allocation
* logic goes through list of segments to make sure there are
* no destination overlaps.
*/
if (!list_empty(&kbuf->image->control_pages)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Ensure minimum alignment needed for segments. */
kbuf->memsz = ALIGN(kbuf->memsz, PAGE_SIZE);
kbuf->buf_align = max(kbuf->buf_align, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Walk the RAM ranges and allocate a suitable range for the buffer */
ret = kexec_locate_mem_hole(kbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Found a suitable memory range */
ksegment = &kbuf->image->segment[kbuf->image->nr_segments];
ksegment->kbuf = kbuf->buffer;
ksegment->bufsz = kbuf->bufsz;
ksegment->mem = kbuf->mem;
ksegment->memsz = kbuf->memsz;
kbuf->image->nr_segments++;
return 0;
}
/* Calculate and store the digest of segments */
static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
int ret = 0, i, j, zero_buf_sz, sha_region_sz;
size_t desc_size, nullsz;
char *digest;
void *zero_buf;
struct kexec_sha_region *sha_regions;
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY))
return 0;
zero_buf = __va(page_to_pfn(ZERO_PAGE(0)) << PAGE_SHIFT);
zero_buf_sz = PAGE_SIZE;
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
goto out;
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_tfm;
}
sha_region_sz = KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX * sizeof(struct kexec_sha_region);
sha_regions = vzalloc(sha_region_sz);
if (!sha_regions)
goto out_free_desc;
desc->tfm = tfm;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free_sha_regions;
digest = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!digest) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_sha_regions;
}
for (j = i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
struct kexec_segment *ksegment;
ksegment = &image->segment[i];
/*
* Skip purgatory as it will be modified once we put digest
* info in purgatory.
*/
if (ksegment->kbuf == pi->purgatory_buf)
continue;
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, ksegment->kbuf,
ksegment->bufsz);
if (ret)
break;
/*
* Assume rest of the buffer is filled with zero and
* update digest accordingly.
*/
nullsz = ksegment->memsz - ksegment->bufsz;
while (nullsz) {
unsigned long bytes = nullsz;
if (bytes > zero_buf_sz)
bytes = zero_buf_sz;
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, zero_buf, bytes);
if (ret)
break;
nullsz -= bytes;
}
if (ret)
break;
sha_regions[j].start = ksegment->mem;
sha_regions[j].len = ksegment->memsz;
j++;
}
if (!ret) {
ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
if (ret)
goto out_free_digest;
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "purgatory_sha_regions",
sha_regions, sha_region_sz, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free_digest;
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "purgatory_sha256_digest",
digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free_digest;
}
out_free_digest:
kfree(digest);
out_free_sha_regions:
vfree(sha_regions);
out_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
out_free_tfm:
kfree(tfm);
out:
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
/*
* kexec_purgatory_setup_kbuf - prepare buffer to load purgatory.
* @pi: Purgatory to be loaded.
* @kbuf: Buffer to setup.
*
* Allocates the memory needed for the buffer. Caller is responsible to free
* the memory after use.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
static int kexec_purgatory_setup_kbuf(struct purgatory_info *pi,
struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
unsigned long bss_align;
unsigned long bss_sz;
unsigned long align;
int i, ret;
sechdrs = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff;
kbuf->buf_align = bss_align = 1;
kbuf->bufsz = bss_sz = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
continue;
align = sechdrs[i].sh_addralign;
if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) {
if (kbuf->buf_align < align)
kbuf->buf_align = align;
kbuf->bufsz = ALIGN(kbuf->bufsz, align);
kbuf->bufsz += sechdrs[i].sh_size;
} else {
if (bss_align < align)
bss_align = align;
bss_sz = ALIGN(bss_sz, align);
bss_sz += sechdrs[i].sh_size;
}
}
kbuf->bufsz = ALIGN(kbuf->bufsz, bss_align);
kbuf->memsz = kbuf->bufsz + bss_sz;
if (kbuf->buf_align < bss_align)
kbuf->buf_align = bss_align;
kbuf->buffer = vzalloc(kbuf->bufsz);
if (!kbuf->buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
pi->purgatory_buf = kbuf->buffer;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
vfree(pi->purgatory_buf);
pi->purgatory_buf = NULL;
return ret;
}
/*
* kexec_purgatory_setup_sechdrs - prepares the pi->sechdrs buffer.
* @pi: Purgatory to be loaded.
* @kbuf: Buffer prepared to store purgatory.
*
* Allocates the memory needed for the buffer. Caller is responsible to free
* the memory after use.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
static int kexec_purgatory_setup_sechdrs(struct purgatory_info *pi,
struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
unsigned long bss_addr;
unsigned long offset;
Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
int i;
/*
* The section headers in kexec_purgatory are read-only. In order to
* have them modifiable make a temporary copy.
*/
sechdrs = vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(Elf_Shdr), pi->ehdr->e_shnum));
if (!sechdrs)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(sechdrs, (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff,
pi->ehdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr));
pi->sechdrs = sechdrs;
offset = 0;
bss_addr = kbuf->mem + kbuf->bufsz;
kbuf->image->start = pi->ehdr->e_entry;
for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
unsigned long align;
void *src, *dst;
if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
continue;
align = sechdrs[i].sh_addralign;
if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_NOBITS) {
bss_addr = ALIGN(bss_addr, align);
sechdrs[i].sh_addr = bss_addr;
bss_addr += sechdrs[i].sh_size;
continue;
}
offset = ALIGN(offset, align);
if (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR &&
pi->ehdr->e_entry >= sechdrs[i].sh_addr &&
pi->ehdr->e_entry < (sechdrs[i].sh_addr
+ sechdrs[i].sh_size)) {
kbuf->image->start -= sechdrs[i].sh_addr;
kbuf->image->start += kbuf->mem + offset;
}
src = (void *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[i].sh_offset;
dst = pi->purgatory_buf + offset;
memcpy(dst, src, sechdrs[i].sh_size);
sechdrs[i].sh_addr = kbuf->mem + offset;
sechdrs[i].sh_offset = offset;
offset += sechdrs[i].sh_size;
}
return 0;
}
static int kexec_apply_relocations(struct kimage *image)
{
int i, ret;
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
sechdrs = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff;
for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
const Elf_Shdr *relsec;
const Elf_Shdr *symtab;
Elf_Shdr *section;
relsec = sechdrs + i;
if (relsec->sh_type != SHT_RELA &&
relsec->sh_type != SHT_REL)
continue;
/*
* For section of type SHT_RELA/SHT_REL,
* ->sh_link contains section header index of associated
* symbol table. And ->sh_info contains section header
* index of section to which relocations apply.
*/
if (relsec->sh_info >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum ||
relsec->sh_link >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum)
return -ENOEXEC;
section = pi->sechdrs + relsec->sh_info;
symtab = sechdrs + relsec->sh_link;
if (!(section->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
continue;
/*
* symtab->sh_link contain section header index of associated
* string table.
*/
if (symtab->sh_link >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum)
/* Invalid section number? */
continue;
/*
* Respective architecture needs to provide support for applying
* relocations of type SHT_RELA/SHT_REL.
*/
if (relsec->sh_type == SHT_RELA)
ret = arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(pi, section,
relsec, symtab);
else if (relsec->sh_type == SHT_REL)
ret = arch_kexec_apply_relocations(pi, section,
relsec, symtab);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* kexec_load_purgatory - Load and relocate the purgatory object.
* @image: Image to add the purgatory to.
* @kbuf: Memory parameters to use.
*
* Allocates the memory needed for image->purgatory_info.sechdrs and
* image->purgatory_info.purgatory_buf/kbuf->buffer. Caller is responsible
* to free the memory after use.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
*/
int kexec_load_purgatory(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
{
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
int ret;
if (kexec_purgatory_size <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
pi->ehdr = (const Elf_Ehdr *)kexec_purgatory;
ret = kexec_purgatory_setup_kbuf(pi, kbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = kexec_purgatory_setup_sechdrs(pi, kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_kbuf;
ret = kexec_apply_relocations(image);
if (ret)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
vfree(pi->sechdrs);
pi->sechdrs = NULL;
out_free_kbuf:
vfree(pi->purgatory_buf);
pi->purgatory_buf = NULL;
return ret;
}
/*
* kexec_purgatory_find_symbol - find a symbol in the purgatory
* @pi: Purgatory to search in.
* @name: Name of the symbol.
*
* Return: pointer to symbol in read-only symtab on success, NULL on error.
*/
static const Elf_Sym *kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(struct purgatory_info *pi,
const char *name)
{
const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr;
const Elf_Sym *syms;
const char *strtab;
int i, k;
if (!pi->ehdr)
return NULL;
ehdr = pi->ehdr;
sechdrs = (void *)ehdr + ehdr->e_shoff;
for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_SYMTAB)
continue;
if (sechdrs[i].sh_link >= ehdr->e_shnum)
/* Invalid strtab section number */
continue;
strtab = (void *)ehdr + sechdrs[sechdrs[i].sh_link].sh_offset;
syms = (void *)ehdr + sechdrs[i].sh_offset;
/* Go through symbols for a match */
for (k = 0; k < sechdrs[i].sh_size/sizeof(Elf_Sym); k++) {
if (ELF_ST_BIND(syms[k].st_info) != STB_GLOBAL)
continue;
if (strcmp(strtab + syms[k].st_name, name) != 0)
continue;
if (syms[k].st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF ||
syms[k].st_shndx >= ehdr->e_shnum) {
pr_debug("Symbol: %s has bad section index %d.\n",
name, syms[k].st_shndx);
return NULL;
}
/* Found the symbol we are looking for */
return &syms[k];
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(struct kimage *image, const char *name)
{
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
const Elf_Sym *sym;
Elf_Shdr *sechdr;
sym = kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(pi, name);
if (!sym)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
sechdr = &pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx];
/*
* Returns the address where symbol will finally be loaded after
* kexec_load_segment()
*/
return (void *)(sechdr->sh_addr + sym->st_value);
}
/*
* Get or set value of a symbol. If "get_value" is true, symbol value is
* returned in buf otherwise symbol value is set based on value in buf.
*/
int kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(struct kimage *image, const char *name,
void *buf, unsigned int size, bool get_value)
{
struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info;
const Elf_Sym *sym;
Elf_Shdr *sec;
char *sym_buf;
sym = kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(pi, name);
if (!sym)
return -EINVAL;
if (sym->st_size != size) {
pr_err("symbol %s size mismatch: expected %lu actual %u\n",
name, (unsigned long)sym->st_size, size);
return -EINVAL;
}
sec = pi->sechdrs + sym->st_shndx;
if (sec->sh_type == SHT_NOBITS) {
pr_err("symbol %s is in a bss section. Cannot %s\n", name,
get_value ? "get" : "set");
return -EINVAL;
}
sym_buf = (char *)pi->purgatory_buf + sec->sh_offset + sym->st_value;
if (get_value)
memcpy((void *)buf, sym_buf, size);
else
memcpy((void *)sym_buf, buf, size);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY */
int crash_exclude_mem_range(struct crash_mem *mem,
unsigned long long mstart, unsigned long long mend)
{
int i, j;
unsigned long long start, end;
struct crash_mem_range temp_range = {0, 0};
for (i = 0; i < mem->nr_ranges; i++) {
start = mem->ranges[i].start;
end = mem->ranges[i].end;
if (mstart > end || mend < start)
continue;
/* Truncate any area outside of range */
if (mstart < start)
mstart = start;
if (mend > end)
mend = end;
/* Found completely overlapping range */
if (mstart == start && mend == end) {
mem->ranges[i].start = 0;
mem->ranges[i].end = 0;
if (i < mem->nr_ranges - 1) {
/* Shift rest of the ranges to left */
for (j = i; j < mem->nr_ranges - 1; j++) {
mem->ranges[j].start =
mem->ranges[j+1].start;
mem->ranges[j].end =
mem->ranges[j+1].end;
}
}
mem->nr_ranges--;
return 0;
}
if (mstart > start && mend < end) {
/* Split original range */
mem->ranges[i].end = mstart - 1;
temp_range.start = mend + 1;
temp_range.end = end;
} else if (mstart != start)
mem->ranges[i].end = mstart - 1;
else
mem->ranges[i].start = mend + 1;
break;
}
/* If a split happened, add the split to array */
if (!temp_range.end)
return 0;
/* Split happened */
if (i == mem->max_nr_ranges - 1)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Location where new range should go */
j = i + 1;
if (j < mem->nr_ranges) {
/* Move over all ranges one slot towards the end */
for (i = mem->nr_ranges - 1; i >= j; i--)
mem->ranges[i + 1] = mem->ranges[i];
}
mem->ranges[j].start = temp_range.start;
mem->ranges[j].end = temp_range.end;
mem->nr_ranges++;
return 0;
}
int crash_prepare_elf64_headers(struct crash_mem *mem, int kernel_map,
void **addr, unsigned long *sz)
{
Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
Elf64_Phdr *phdr;
unsigned long nr_cpus = num_possible_cpus(), nr_phdr, elf_sz;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned int cpu, i;
unsigned long long notes_addr;
unsigned long mstart, mend;
/* extra phdr for vmcoreinfo elf note */
nr_phdr = nr_cpus + 1;
nr_phdr += mem->nr_ranges;
/*
* kexec-tools creates an extra PT_LOAD phdr for kernel text mapping
* area (for example, ffffffff80000000 - ffffffffa0000000 on x86_64).
* I think this is required by tools like gdb. So same physical
* memory will be mapped in two elf headers. One will contain kernel
* text virtual addresses and other will have __va(physical) addresses.
*/
nr_phdr++;
elf_sz = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr) + nr_phdr * sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
elf_sz = ALIGN(elf_sz, ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN);
buf = vzalloc(elf_sz);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ehdr = (Elf64_Ehdr *)buf;
phdr = (Elf64_Phdr *)(ehdr + 1);
memcpy(ehdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
ehdr->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELFCLASS64;
ehdr->e_ident[EI_DATA] = ELFDATA2LSB;
ehdr->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
ehdr->e_ident[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI;
memset(ehdr->e_ident + EI_PAD, 0, EI_NIDENT - EI_PAD);
ehdr->e_type = ET_CORE;
ehdr->e_machine = ELF_ARCH;
ehdr->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
ehdr->e_phoff = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr);
ehdr->e_ehsize = sizeof(Elf64_Ehdr);
ehdr->e_phentsize = sizeof(Elf64_Phdr);
/* Prepare one phdr of type PT_NOTE for each present cpu */
for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
phdr->p_type = PT_NOTE;
notes_addr = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(per_cpu_ptr(crash_notes, cpu));
phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = notes_addr;
phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = sizeof(note_buf_t);
(ehdr->e_phnum)++;
phdr++;
}
/* Prepare one PT_NOTE header for vmcoreinfo */
phdr->p_type = PT_NOTE;
phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = paddr_vmcoreinfo_note();
phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = VMCOREINFO_NOTE_SIZE;
(ehdr->e_phnum)++;
phdr++;
/* Prepare PT_LOAD type program header for kernel text region */
if (kernel_map) {
phdr->p_type = PT_LOAD;
phdr->p_flags = PF_R|PF_W|PF_X;
phdr->p_vaddr = (Elf64_Addr)_text;
phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = _end - _text;
phdr->p_offset = phdr->p_paddr = __pa_symbol(_text);
ehdr->e_phnum++;
phdr++;
}
/* Go through all the ranges in mem->ranges[] and prepare phdr */
for (i = 0; i < mem->nr_ranges; i++) {
mstart = mem->ranges[i].start;
mend = mem->ranges[i].end;
phdr->p_type = PT_LOAD;
phdr->p_flags = PF_R|PF_W|PF_X;
phdr->p_offset = mstart;
phdr->p_paddr = mstart;
phdr->p_vaddr = (unsigned long long) __va(mstart);
phdr->p_filesz = phdr->p_memsz = mend - mstart + 1;
phdr->p_align = 0;
ehdr->e_phnum++;
phdr++;
pr_debug("Crash PT_LOAD elf header. phdr=%p vaddr=0x%llx, paddr=0x%llx, sz=0x%llx e_phnum=%d p_offset=0x%llx\n",
phdr, phdr->p_vaddr, phdr->p_paddr, phdr->p_filesz,
ehdr->e_phnum, phdr->p_offset);
}
*addr = buf;
*sz = elf_sz;
return 0;
}