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91b6163be4
Summary * Removed sentinel elements from ctl_table structs in kernel/* Removing sentinels in ctl_table arrays reduces the build time size and runtime memory consumed by ~64 bytes per array. Removals for net/, io_uring/, mm/, ipc/ and security/ are set to go into mainline through their respective subsystems making the next release the most likely place where the final series that removes the check for proc_name == NULL will land. This PR adds to removals already in arch/, drivers/ and fs/. * Adjusted ctl_table definitions and references to allow constification Adjustments: - Removing unused ctl_table function arguments - Moving non-const elements from ctl_table to ctl_table_header - Making ctl_table pointers const in ctl_table_root structure Making the static ctl_table structs const will increase safety by keeping the pointers to proc_handler functions in .rodata. Though no ctl_tables where made const in this PR, the ground work for making that possible has started with these changes sent by Thomas Weißschuh. Testing * These changes went into linux-next after v6.9-rc4; giving it a good month of testing. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGzBAABCgAdFiEErkcJVyXmMSXOyyeQupfNUreWQU8FAmZFvBMACgkQupfNUreW QU/eGAv9EWeiXKxr3EVSMAsb9MWbJq7C99I/pd5hMf+qH4PgJpKDH7w/sb2e8h8+ unGiW83ikgrtph7OS4/xM3Y9r3Nvzd6C/OztqgMnNKeRFdMgP7wu9HaSNs05ordb CqJdhvL93quc5HxrGTS9sdLK/wLJWOHwuWMXhX4qS44JNxTdPV2q10Rb7DZyHZ6O C9qp61L2Q2CrnOBKIx8MoeCh20ynJQAo3b0pTN63ZYF4D0vqCcnYNNTPkge4ID8/ ULJoP5hAQY0vJ4g4fC4Gmooa5GECpm8MfZUf3SdgPyauqM/sm3dVdsLXAWD4Phcp TsG2a/5KMYwnLHrUGwDW7bFfEemRU88h0Iam56+SKMl1kMlEpWaLL9ApQXoHFayG e10izS+i/nlQiqYIHtuczCoTimT4/LGnonCLcdA//C3XzBT5MnOd7xsjuaQSpFWl /CV9SZa4ABwzX7u2jty8ik90iihLCFQyKj1d9m1mDVbgb6r3iUOxVuHBgMtY7MF7 eyaEmV7l =/rQW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'sysctl-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl Pull sysctl updates from Joel Granados: - Remove sentinel elements from ctl_table structs in kernel/* Removing sentinels in ctl_table arrays reduces the build time size and runtime memory consumed by ~64 bytes per array. Removals for net/, io_uring/, mm/, ipc/ and security/ are set to go into mainline through their respective subsystems making the next release the most likely place where the final series that removes the check for proc_name == NULL will land. This adds to removals already in arch/, drivers/ and fs/. - Adjust ctl_table definitions and references to allow constification - Remove unused ctl_table function arguments - Move non-const elements from ctl_table to ctl_table_header - Make ctl_table pointers const in ctl_table_root structure Making the static ctl_table structs const will increase safety by keeping the pointers to proc_handler functions in .rodata. Though no ctl_tables where made const in this PR, the ground work for making that possible has started with these changes sent by Thomas Weißschuh. * tag 'sysctl-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl: sysctl: drop now unnecessary out-of-bounds check sysctl: move sysctl type to ctl_table_header sysctl: drop sysctl_is_perm_empty_ctl_table sysctl: treewide: constify argument ctl_table_root::permissions(table) sysctl: treewide: drop unused argument ctl_table_root::set_ownership(table) bpf: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array delayacct: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array kprobes: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array printk: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array scheduler: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array seccomp: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array timekeeping: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array ftrace: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array umh: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array kernel misc: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
177 lines
4.7 KiB
C
177 lines
4.7 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
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* before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
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* ported from grsecurity/PaX.
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*
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* Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
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*
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* STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
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* reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
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*/
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#include <linux/stackleak.h>
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#include <linux/kprobes.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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#include <linux/jump_label.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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static int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
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void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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int prev_state = state;
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struct ctl_table table_copy = *table;
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table_copy.data = &state;
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ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
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state = !!state;
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if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
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return ret;
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if (state)
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static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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else
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static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
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pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
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state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
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return ret;
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}
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static struct ctl_table stackleak_sysctls[] = {
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{
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.procname = "stack_erasing",
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.data = NULL,
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.maxlen = sizeof(int),
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.mode = 0600,
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.proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl,
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.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
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.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
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},
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};
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static int __init stackleak_sysctls_init(void)
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{
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register_sysctl_init("kernel", stackleak_sysctls);
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
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#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
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#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
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#else
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#define skip_erasing() false
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#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
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#ifndef __stackleak_poison
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static __always_inline void __stackleak_poison(unsigned long erase_low,
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unsigned long erase_high,
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unsigned long poison)
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{
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while (erase_low < erase_high) {
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*(unsigned long *)erase_low = poison;
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erase_low += sizeof(unsigned long);
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}
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}
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#endif
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static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack)
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{
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const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
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const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current);
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unsigned long erase_low, erase_high;
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erase_low = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low,
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current->lowest_stack);
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
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current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low;
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#endif
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/*
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* Write poison to the task's stack between 'erase_low' and
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* 'erase_high'.
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*
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* If we're running on a different stack (e.g. an entry trampoline
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* stack) we can erase everything below the pt_regs at the top of the
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* task stack.
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*
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* If we're running on the task stack itself, we must not clobber any
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* stack used by this function and its caller. We assume that this
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* function has a fixed-size stack frame, and the current stack pointer
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* doesn't change while we write poison.
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*/
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if (on_task_stack)
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erase_high = current_stack_pointer;
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else
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erase_high = task_stack_high;
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__stackleak_poison(erase_low, erase_high, STACKLEAK_POISON);
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/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
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current->lowest_stack = task_stack_high;
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}
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/*
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* Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
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* Can be called from the task stack or an entry stack when the task stack is
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* no longer in use.
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*/
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asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void)
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{
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if (skip_erasing())
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return;
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__stackleak_erase(on_thread_stack());
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}
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/*
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* Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
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* Can only be called from the task stack.
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*/
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asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void)
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{
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if (skip_erasing())
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return;
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__stackleak_erase(true);
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}
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/*
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* Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
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* Can only be called from a stack other than the task stack.
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*/
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asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void)
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{
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if (skip_erasing())
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return;
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__stackleak_erase(false);
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}
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void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
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{
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unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
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/*
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* Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
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* STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
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* stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
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*/
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BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
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/* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
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sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
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if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
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sp >= stackleak_task_low_bound(current)) {
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current->lowest_stack = sp;
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
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