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7172dc93d6
Commit1af2dface5
("af_unix: Don't access successor in unix_del_edges() during GC.") fixed use-after-free by avoid accessing edge->successor while GC is in progress. However, there could be a small race window where another process could call unix_del_edges() while gc_in_progress is true and __skb_queue_purge() is on the way. So, we need another marker for struct scm_fp_list which indicates if the skb is garbage-collected. This patch adds dead flag in struct scm_fp_list and set it true before calling __skb_queue_purge(). Fixes:1af2dface5
("af_unix: Don't access successor in unix_del_edges() during GC.") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508171150.50601-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
233 lines
5.4 KiB
C
233 lines
5.4 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
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#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/net.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <net/compat.h>
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/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
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* to accept passed FDs 8)
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*/
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#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
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struct scm_creds {
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u32 pid;
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX
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struct unix_edge;
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#endif
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struct scm_fp_list {
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short count;
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short count_unix;
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short max;
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#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX
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bool inflight;
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bool dead;
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struct list_head vertices;
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struct unix_edge *edges;
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#endif
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struct user_struct *user;
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struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
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};
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struct scm_cookie {
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struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
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struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
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struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
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#endif
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};
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void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
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struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
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}
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#else
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static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{ }
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
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static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
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struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
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{
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scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
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scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
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scm->creds.uid = uid;
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scm->creds.gid = gid;
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}
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static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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put_pid(scm->pid);
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scm->pid = NULL;
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}
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static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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if (scm->fp)
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__scm_destroy(scm);
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}
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static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
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{
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memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
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scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
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scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
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if (forcecreds)
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scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
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unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
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if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
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return 0;
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return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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char *secdata;
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u32 seclen;
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int err;
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
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err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
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if (!err) {
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
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security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
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}
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}
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}
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static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
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{
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return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
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}
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#else
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static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{ }
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static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
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{
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return false;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
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static __inline__ void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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struct file *pidfd_file = NULL;
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int len, pidfd;
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/* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated,
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* that's why we need to opencode these checks here.
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*/
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if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
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len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
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else
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len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
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if (msg->msg_controllen < len) {
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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return;
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}
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if (!scm->pid)
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return;
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pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, 0, &pidfd_file);
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if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) {
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if (pidfd_file) {
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put_unused_fd(pidfd);
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fput(pidfd_file);
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}
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return;
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}
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if (pidfd_file)
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fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file);
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}
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static inline bool __scm_recv_common(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
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{
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if (!msg->msg_control) {
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
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test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags) ||
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scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sock))
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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scm_destroy(scm);
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return false;
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}
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
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struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
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struct ucred ucreds = {
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.pid = scm->creds.pid,
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.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
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.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
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};
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
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}
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scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
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if (scm->fp)
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scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
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return true;
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}
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static inline void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
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{
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if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
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return;
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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}
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static inline void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
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{
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if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
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return;
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags))
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scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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}
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static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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if (!ufd)
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return -EFAULT;
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return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
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}
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#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
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