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674f368a95
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless. Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key. Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309, rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/. Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths. So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove this flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
26 lines
743 B
C
26 lines
743 B
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef _CRYPTO_TWOFISH_H
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#define _CRYPTO_TWOFISH_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#define TF_MIN_KEY_SIZE 16
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#define TF_MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
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#define TF_BLOCK_SIZE 16
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struct crypto_tfm;
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/* Structure for an expanded Twofish key. s contains the key-dependent
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* S-boxes composed with the MDS matrix; w contains the eight "whitening"
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* subkeys, K[0] through K[7]. k holds the remaining, "round" subkeys. Note
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* that k[i] corresponds to what the Twofish paper calls K[i+8]. */
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struct twofish_ctx {
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u32 s[4][256], w[8], k[32];
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};
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int __twofish_setkey(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
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unsigned int key_len);
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int twofish_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len);
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#endif
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